Sceptycyzm w filozofii Dawida Hume’a

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dc.contributor.author Grzeliński, Adam
dc.date.accessioned 2013-11-22T11:53:56Z
dc.date.available 2013-11-22T11:53:56Z
dc.date.issued 2007
dc.identifier.citation Toruński Przegląd Filozoficzny, t. 7/8, 2007, s. 137-154
dc.identifier.issn 1427-7026
dc.identifier.uri http://repozytorium.umk.pl/handle/item/1040
dc.description.abstract In his principal work, Treatise of Human Nature, Hume writes he 'must plead the privilege of a sceptic', and the phrase seems to be motto of all his philosophy as it is often ascribed as a sceptical one. The very notion of scepticism can be understood twofold: in the relation to philosophical tradition of Pyrrho and Sextus Empiricus — what is more important — as an immanent feature of Hume's own philosophical system. In this later sense Hume contrasts two kinds of scepticism — an excessive and a mitigated one. The inner contradictions of the former species of scepticism make clear the mpossibility of reducing human nature only to the operations of reason. On the other hand a itigated scepticism allows to delimit the claims of reason in order to point out the importance of human affectivity in various spheres of human practical activity.
dc.language.iso pol
dc.publisher Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika
dc.rights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subject Hume David
dc.subject sceptycyzm
dc.subject filozofia brytyjska
dc.title Sceptycyzm w filozofii Dawida Hume’a
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/article

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