| dc.contributor.author |
Gładziejewski, Paweł |
| dc.date.accessioned |
2022-10-20T09:43:40Z |
| dc.date.available |
2022-10-20T09:43:40Z |
| dc.date.issued |
2022-10-20 |
| dc.identifier.other |
https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12445 |
| dc.identifier.uri |
http://repozytorium.umk.pl/handle/item/6779 |
| dc.description |
Artykuł zaakceptowany do publikacji w czasopiśmie Mind & Language. Link do publikacji: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/mila.12445
Preprint artykułu. |
| dc.description.abstract |
Perceptual experience usually comes with “phenomenal force”, a strong sense that it reflects reality as it is. Some philosophers have argued that it is in virtue of possessing phenomenal force that perceptual experiences are able to non-inferentially justify beliefs. In this article, I introduce an alternative, inferentialist take on the epistemic role of phenomenal force. Drawing on Bayesian modeling in cognitive science, I argue that the sense of reality that accompanies conscious vision can be viewed as epistemically appraisable in light of its rational etiology. |
| dc.description.sponsorship |
Narodowe Centrum Nauki, grant Opus nr 2019/33/B/HS1/00677 |
| dc.language.iso |
eng |
| dc.subject |
Bayesian brain |
| dc.subject |
derealization |
| dc.subject |
dogmatism |
| dc.subject |
perceptual justification |
| dc.subject |
predictive processing |
| dc.subject |
reality monitoring |
| dc.title |
The rational role of the perceptual sense of reality |
| dc.type |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
| dc.type |
info:eu-repo/semantics/preprint |
