Explaining mental phenomena with internal representations. A mechanistic perspective

Repository of Nicolaus Copernicus University

Show simple item record

dc.contributor.author Gładziejewski, Paweł
dc.date.accessioned 2018-11-06T09:08:52Z
dc.date.available 2018-11-06T09:08:52Z
dc.date.issued 2015
dc.identifier.citation Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric vol. 40 (53), 2015, pp. 63 - 90
dc.identifier.isbn 978-83-7431-440-4
dc.identifier.issn 0860-150X
dc.identifier.uri http://repozytorium.umk.pl/handle/item/5460
dc.description.abstract Despite the fact that the notion of internal representation has – at least according to some – a fundamental role to play in the sciences of the mind, not only has its explanatory utility been under attack for a while now, but it also remains unclear what criteria should an explanation of a given cognitive phenomenon meet to count as a (truly, genuinely, nontrivially, etc.) represen- tational explanation in the first place. The aim of this article is to propose a solution to this latter problem. I will assume that representational explanations should be construed as a form of mechanistic explanations and proceed by proposing a general sketch of a functional architecture of a representational cognitive mechanism. According to the view on offer here, representational mechanisms are mechanisms that meet four conditions: the structural resemblance condition, the action-guidance condition, the decouplability condition, and the error-detection condition.
dc.language.iso eng
dc.rights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subject mechanistic explanation
dc.subject representationalism
dc.subject antirepresentationalism
dc.subject emulation theory
dc.subject predictive coding
dc.subject structural representation
dc.title Explaining mental phenomena with internal representations. A mechanistic perspective
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/article

Files in this item

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record

Search repository

Advanced Search


My Account