dc.contributor.author |
Karczewska, Natalia |
dc.date.accessioned |
2014-01-09T18:47:14Z |
dc.date.available |
2014-01-09T18:47:14Z |
dc.date.issued |
2013-12-17 |
dc.identifier.citation |
Studia Iuridica Toruniensia, Vol. 12, pp. 85-95 |
dc.identifier.issn |
1689-5258 |
dc.identifier.other |
doi:10.12775/SIT.2013.005 |
dc.identifier.uri |
http://repozytorium.umk.pl/handle/item/1306 |
dc.description.abstract |
This article concerns the issue of legal indeterminacy in American doctrine. Legal indeterminacy in simple words means that law does not always determine the answear to a legal question.It has its origins in the 1920s and 30s, when the argument that Anglo-American law is indeterminate was developed by the legal realists. In the 1980s a new group of legal academics, known as „Crits” (from Critical Legal Studies) revived and unfold this thesis. Although today it is regarded as passé, it seems that not all Crits’ arguments are insubstantial. The author of this article provides basic information about the thesis of legal indeterminacy, its development and kinds (radical indeterminacy, underdeterminacy), explain the relation between uncertainty and indeterminacy, and give some examples. |
dc.language.iso |
pol |
dc.rights |
Attribution-NoDerivs 3.0 Poland |
dc.rights |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
dc.rights.uri |
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/3.0/pl/ |
dc.subject |
legal indeterminacy |
dc.subject |
Critical Legal Studies |
dc.subject |
theory of law |
dc.title |
Legal indeterminacy – nieokreśloność prawa w doktrynie amerykańskiej |
dc.type |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |