Legal indeterminacy – nieokreśloność prawa w doktrynie amerykańskiej

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dc.contributor.author Karczewska, Natalia
dc.date.accessioned 2014-01-09T18:47:14Z
dc.date.available 2014-01-09T18:47:14Z
dc.date.issued 2013-12-17
dc.identifier.citation Studia Iuridica Toruniensia, Vol. 12, pp. 85-95
dc.identifier.issn 1689-5258
dc.identifier.other doi:10.12775/SIT.2013.005
dc.identifier.uri http://repozytorium.umk.pl/handle/item/1306
dc.description.abstract This article concerns the issue of legal indeterminacy in American doctrine. Legal indeterminacy in simple words means that law does not always determine the answear to a legal question.It has its origins in the 1920s and 30s, when the argument that Anglo-American law is indeterminate was developed by the legal realists. In the 1980s a new group of legal academics, known as „Crits” (from Critical Legal Studies) revived and unfold this thesis. Although today it is regarded as passé, it seems that not all Crits’ arguments are insubstantial. The author of this article provides basic information about the thesis of legal indeterminacy, its development and kinds (radical indeterminacy, underdeterminacy), explain the relation between uncertainty and indeterminacy, and give some examples.
dc.language.iso pol
dc.rights Attribution-NoDerivs 3.0 Poland
dc.rights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/3.0/pl/
dc.subject legal indeterminacy
dc.subject Critical Legal Studies
dc.subject theory of law
dc.title Legal indeterminacy – nieokreśloność prawa w doktrynie amerykańskiej
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/article

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