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Anselm and Russell

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dc.contributor.author Nowicki, Maciej
dc.date.accessioned 2013-10-17T17:05:59Z
dc.date.available 2013-10-17T17:05:59Z
dc.date.issued 2007-03-15
dc.identifier.citation Logic and Logical Philosophy, No. 4, Vol. 15, 2007, pp. 355-368
dc.identifier.issn 1425-3305
dc.identifier.other doi:10.12775/LLP.2006.020
dc.identifier.uri http://repozytorium.umk.pl/handle/item/728
dc.description.abstract In his paper “St. Anselm’s ontological argument succumbs to Russell’s paradox” Christopher Viger presents a critique of Anselm’s Argument from the second chapter of Proslogion. Viger claims there that he manages to show that the greater than relation that Anselm used in his proof leads to inconsistency. I argue firstly, that Viger does not show what he maintains to show, secondly, that the flaw is not in the nature of Anselm’s reasoning but in Viger’s (mis)understanding of Anselm as well as in Viger’s (mis)application of some set-theoretical notions. I also describe some features of Anselmian greater than relation, which indeed plays a crucial role in his Ontological Argument. Last but not least, I present the Argument itself.
dc.language.iso eng
dc.rights Attribution-NoDerivs 3.0 Poland
dc.rights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/3.0/pl/
dc.subject ontological argument
dc.subject St. Anselm, Russell’s paradox
dc.subject ontology
dc.title Anselm and Russell
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/article


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