Anselm and Russell

dc.contributor.authorNowicki, Maciejpl
dc.date.accessioned2013-10-17T17:05:59Z
dc.date.available2013-10-17T17:05:59Z
dc.date.issued2007-03-15pl
dc.description.abstractIn his paper “St. Anselm’s ontological argument succumbs to Russell’s paradox” Christopher Viger presents a critique of Anselm’s Argument from the second chapter of Proslogion. Viger claims there that he manages to show that the greater than relation that Anselm used in his proof leads to inconsistency. I argue firstly, that Viger does not show what he maintains to show, secondly, that the flaw is not in the nature of Anselm’s reasoning but in Viger’s (mis)understanding of Anselm as well as in Viger’s (mis)application of some set-theoretical notions. I also describe some features of Anselmian greater than relation, which indeed plays a crucial role in his Ontological Argument. Last but not least, I present the Argument itself.en
dc.identifier.citationLogic and Logical Philosophy, No. 4, Vol. 15, 2007, pp. 355-368pl
dc.identifier.issn1425-3305pl
dc.identifier.otherdoi:10.12775/LLP.2006.020pl
dc.identifier.urihttp://repozytorium.umk.pl/handle/item/728
dc.language.isoengpl
dc.rightsAttribution-NoDerivs 3.0 Polandpl
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesspl
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/3.0/pl/pl
dc.subjectontological argumenten
dc.subjectSt. Anselm, Russell’s paradoxen
dc.subjectontologyen
dc.titleAnselm and Russellpl
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/articlepl

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