dc.contributor.author |
Huzarek, Tomasz |
dc.date.accessioned |
2018-02-16T09:35:01Z |
dc.date.available |
2018-02-16T09:35:01Z |
dc.date.issued |
2017-10-09 |
dc.identifier.citation |
Scientia et Fides, No. 2, Vol. 5, pp. 237-250 |
dc.identifier.issn |
2353-5636 |
dc.identifier.other |
doi:10.12775/SetF.2017.027 |
dc.identifier.uri |
http://repozytorium.umk.pl/handle/item/5072 |
dc.description.abstract |
According to constitutive reductionism of Derek Parfit, a subject/person is not a separate existing being but his existence consists in the existence of a brain and body, performance of actions, thinking and occurrence of other physical and mental events. The identity of the subject in time comes down only to “Relation R” - mental consistency and/or connectedness – elicited by appropriate reasons. In the following article, I will try, relying on Frank Johnson's Knowledge Argument, to argue in favour of the following conclusions: (1) a person/subject is a “fact”irreducible to body and physical relations with the environment and (2) a subject is something/”fact” non-reducible to mental occurrences. |
dc.language.iso |
eng |
dc.rights |
Attribution-NoDerivs 3.0 Poland |
dc.rights |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
dc.rights.uri |
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/3.0/pl/ |
dc.subject |
subject |
dc.subject |
person |
dc.subject |
identity |
dc.subject |
qualia |
dc.subject |
consciousness |
dc.subject |
self-consciousness |
dc.title |
Knowledge Argument versus Bundle Theory according to Derek Parfit |
dc.type |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |