Knowledge Argument versus Bundle Theory according to Derek Parfit

dc.contributor.author	Huzarek, Tomasz
dc.date.accessioned	2018-02-16T09:35:01Z
dc.date.available	2018-02-16T09:35:01Z
dc.date.issued	2017-10-09
dc.identifier.citation	Scientia et Fides, No. 2, Vol. 5, pp. 237-250
dc.identifier.issn	2353-5636
dc.identifier.other	doi:10.12775/SetF.2017.027
dc.identifier.uri	http://repozytorium.umk.pl/handle/item/5072
dc.description.abstract	According to constitutive reductionism of Derek Parfit, a subject/person is not a separate existing being but his existence consists in the existence of a brain and body, performance of actions, thinking and occurrence of other physical and mental events. The identity of the subject in time comes down only to “Relation R” - mental consistency and/or connectedness – elicited by appropriate reasons. In the following article, I will try, relying on Frank Johnson's Knowledge Argument, to argue in favour of the following conclusions: (1) a person/subject is a “fact”irreducible to body and physical relations with the environment and (2) a subject is something/”fact” non-reducible to mental occurrences.
dc.language.iso	eng
dc.rights	Attribution-NoDerivs 3.0 Poland
dc.rights	info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights.uri	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/3.0/pl/
dc.subject	subject
dc.subject	person
dc.subject	identity
dc.subject	qualia
dc.subject	consciousness
dc.subject	self-consciousness
dc.title	Knowledge Argument versus Bundle Theory according to Derek Parfit
dc.type	info:eu-repo/semantics/article