Knowledge Argument versus Bundle Theory according to Derek Parfit

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dc.contributor.author Huzarek, Tomasz
dc.date.accessioned 2018-02-16T09:35:01Z
dc.date.available 2018-02-16T09:35:01Z
dc.date.issued 2017-10-09
dc.identifier.citation Scientia et Fides, No. 2, Vol. 5, pp. 237-250
dc.identifier.issn 2353-5636
dc.identifier.other doi:10.12775/SetF.2017.027
dc.identifier.uri http://repozytorium.umk.pl/handle/item/5072
dc.description.abstract According to constitutive reductionism of Derek Parfit, a subject/person is not a separate existing being but his existence consists in the existence of a brain and body, performance of actions, thinking and occurrence of other physical and mental events. The identity of the subject in time comes down only to “Relation R” - mental consistency and/or connectedness – elicited by appropriate reasons. In the following article, I will try, relying on Frank Johnson's Knowledge Argument, to argue in favour of the following conclusions: (1) a person/subject is a “fact”irreducible to body and physical relations with the environment and (2) a subject is something/”fact” non-reducible to mental occurrences.
dc.language.iso eng
dc.rights Attribution-NoDerivs 3.0 Poland
dc.rights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/3.0/pl/
dc.subject subject
dc.subject person
dc.subject identity
dc.subject qualia
dc.subject consciousness
dc.subject self-consciousness
dc.title Knowledge Argument versus Bundle Theory according to Derek Parfit
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/article

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