Knowledge Argument versus Bundle Theory according to Derek Parfit

dc.contributor.authorHuzarek, Tomaszpl
dc.date.accessioned2018-02-16T09:35:01Z
dc.date.available2018-02-16T09:35:01Z
dc.date.issued2017-10-09pl
dc.description.abstractAccording to constitutive reductionism of Derek Parfit, a subject/person is not a separate existing being but his existence consists in the existence of a brain and body, performance of actions, thinking and occurrence of other physical and mental events. The identity of the subject in time comes down only to “Relation R” - mental consistency and/or connectedness – elicited by appropriate reasons. In the following article, I will try, relying on Frank Johnson's Knowledge Argument, to argue in favour of the following conclusions: (1) a person/subject is a “fact”irreducible to body and physical relations with the environment and (2) a subject is something/”fact” non-reducible to mental occurrences.pl
dc.identifier.citationScientia et Fides, No. 2, Vol. 5, pp. 237-250pl
dc.identifier.issn2353-5636pl
dc.identifier.otherdoi:10.12775/SetF.2017.027pl
dc.identifier.urihttp://repozytorium.umk.pl/handle/item/5072
dc.language.isoengpl
dc.rightsAttribution-NoDerivs 3.0 Polandpl
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesspl
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/3.0/pl/pl
dc.subjectsubjectpl
dc.subjectpersonpl
dc.subjectidentitypl
dc.subjectqualiapl
dc.subjectconsciousnesspl
dc.subjectself-consciousnesspl
dc.titleKnowledge Argument versus Bundle Theory according to Derek Parfitpl
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/articlepl

Files

Original bundle

Loading...
Thumbnail Image
Name:
SetF.2017.027,Huzarek.pdf
Size:
710.48 KB
Format:
Adobe Portable Document Format

Collections