Knowledge Argument versus Bundle Theory according to Derek Parfit
dc.contributor.author | Huzarek, Tomasz | pl |
dc.date.accessioned | 2018-02-16T09:35:01Z | |
dc.date.available | 2018-02-16T09:35:01Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2017-10-09 | pl |
dc.description.abstract | According to constitutive reductionism of Derek Parfit, a subject/person is not a separate existing being but his existence consists in the existence of a brain and body, performance of actions, thinking and occurrence of other physical and mental events. The identity of the subject in time comes down only to “Relation R” - mental consistency and/or connectedness – elicited by appropriate reasons. In the following article, I will try, relying on Frank Johnson's Knowledge Argument, to argue in favour of the following conclusions: (1) a person/subject is a “fact”irreducible to body and physical relations with the environment and (2) a subject is something/”fact” non-reducible to mental occurrences. | pl |
dc.identifier.citation | Scientia et Fides, No. 2, Vol. 5, pp. 237-250 | pl |
dc.identifier.issn | 2353-5636 | pl |
dc.identifier.other | doi:10.12775/SetF.2017.027 | pl |
dc.identifier.uri | http://repozytorium.umk.pl/handle/item/5072 | |
dc.language.iso | eng | pl |
dc.rights | Attribution-NoDerivs 3.0 Poland | pl |
dc.rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | pl |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/3.0/pl/ | pl |
dc.subject | subject | pl |
dc.subject | person | pl |
dc.subject | identity | pl |
dc.subject | qualia | pl |
dc.subject | consciousness | pl |
dc.subject | self-consciousness | pl |
dc.title | Knowledge Argument versus Bundle Theory according to Derek Parfit | pl |
dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/article | pl |
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