Explaining mental phenomena with internal representations. A mechanistic perspective
dc.contributor.author | Gładziejewski, Paweł | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2018-11-06T09:08:52Z | |
dc.date.available | 2018-11-06T09:08:52Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2015 | |
dc.description.abstract | Despite the fact that the notion of internal representation has – at least according to some – a fundamental role to play in the sciences of the mind, not only has its explanatory utility been under attack for a while now, but it also remains unclear what criteria should an explanation of a given cognitive phenomenon meet to count as a (truly, genuinely, nontrivially, etc.) represen- tational explanation in the first place. The aim of this article is to propose a solution to this latter problem. I will assume that representational explanations should be construed as a form of mechanistic explanations and proceed by proposing a general sketch of a functional architecture of a representational cognitive mechanism. According to the view on offer here, representational mechanisms are mechanisms that meet four conditions: the structural resemblance condition, the action-guidance condition, the decouplability condition, and the error-detection condition. | pl |
dc.identifier.citation | Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric vol. 40 (53), 2015, pp. 63 - 90 | pl |
dc.identifier.isbn | 978-83-7431-440-4 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 0860-150X | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://repozytorium.umk.pl/handle/item/5460 | |
dc.language.iso | eng | pl |
dc.rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | |
dc.subject | mechanistic explanation | pl |
dc.subject | representationalism | pl |
dc.subject | antirepresentationalism | pl |
dc.subject | emulation theory | pl |
dc.subject | predictive coding | pl |
dc.subject | structural representation | pl |
dc.title | Explaining mental phenomena with internal representations. A mechanistic perspective | pl |
dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/article | pl |