Sceptycyzm w filozofii Dawida Hume’a
dc.contributor.author | Grzeliński, Adam | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2013-11-22T11:53:56Z | |
dc.date.available | 2013-11-22T11:53:56Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2007 | |
dc.description.abstract | In his principal work, Treatise of Human Nature, Hume writes he 'must plead the privilege of a sceptic', and the phrase seems to be motto of all his philosophy as it is often ascribed as a sceptical one. The very notion of scepticism can be understood twofold: in the relation to philosophical tradition of Pyrrho and Sextus Empiricus — what is more important — as an immanent feature of Hume's own philosophical system. In this later sense Hume contrasts two kinds of scepticism — an excessive and a mitigated one. The inner contradictions of the former species of scepticism make clear the mpossibility of reducing human nature only to the operations of reason. On the other hand a itigated scepticism allows to delimit the claims of reason in order to point out the importance of human affectivity in various spheres of human practical activity. | pl |
dc.identifier.citation | Toruński Przegląd Filozoficzny, t. 7/8, 2007, s. 137-154 | pl |
dc.identifier.issn | 1427-7026 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://repozytorium.umk.pl/handle/item/1040 | |
dc.language.iso | pol | pl |
dc.publisher | Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika | pl |
dc.rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | |
dc.subject | Hume David | pl |
dc.subject | sceptycyzm | pl |
dc.subject | filozofia brytyjska | pl |
dc.title | Sceptycyzm w filozofii Dawida Hume’a | pl |
dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/article | pl |