dc.contributor.author |
Grabowska, Barbara |
dc.date.accessioned |
2013-11-15T09:35:14Z |
dc.date.available |
2013-11-15T09:35:14Z |
dc.date.issued |
2012 |
dc.identifier.citation |
"Filo–Sofija" Nr 17 (2012/2), s. 39-49 |
dc.identifier.issn |
1642-3267 |
dc.identifier.uri |
http://repozytorium.umk.pl/handle/item/989 |
dc.description |
Artykuł pobrany ze strony www.filo-sofija.pl, na której zamieszczone są również teksty innych pracowników Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika |
dc.description.abstract |
Descartes claims that an animal is an automaton that operates by laws of mechanics.
It doesn't think, it doesn’t feel, and, therefore, it doesn’t suffer. So animals can be
exploited without a guilty conscience and scientifi c experiments can be carried out on
them. This view, very convenient for people, has followers nowadays, too. |
dc.language.iso |
pol |
dc.rights |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
dc.subject |
Kartezjusz |
dc.subject |
zwierzę-maszyna |
dc.subject |
ludzie |
dc.title |
Kartezjańska koncepcja zwierzęcia-maszyny i jej konsekwencje |
dc.title.alternative |
Descartes’s Conception of Animal-Machine and Its Consequences |
dc.type |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |