Perceptual justification in the Bayesian brain: A foundherentist account

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dc.contributor.author Gładziejewski, Paweł
dc.date.accessioned 2021-07-06T07:57:13Z
dc.date.available 2021-07-06T07:57:13Z
dc.date.issued 2021
dc.identifier.citation Synthese
dc.identifier.uri http://repozytorium.umk.pl/handle/item/6607
dc.description Preprint artykułu zaakceptowanego do druku w czasopiśmie Synthese
dc.description.abstract In this paper, I use the predictive processing (PP) theory of perception to tackle the question of how perceptual states can be rationally involved in cognition by justifying other mental states. I put forward two claims regarding the epistemological implications of PP. First, perceptual states can confer justification on other mental states because the perceptual states are themselves rationally acquired. Second, despite being inferentially justified rather than epistemically basic, perceptual states can still be epistemically responsive to the mind-independent world. My main goal is to elucidate the epistemology of perception already implicit in PP. But I also hope to show how it is possible to peacefully combine central tenets of foundationalist and coherentist accounts of the rational powers of perception while avoiding the well-recognized pitfalls of either.
dc.description.sponsorship NCN, grant Opus 2019/33/B/HS1/00677
dc.language.iso eng
dc.subject perceptual justification
dc.subject Bayesian brain
dc.subject foundationalism
dc.subject coherentism
dc.subject predictive processing
dc.subject epistemic justification
dc.title Perceptual justification in the Bayesian brain: A foundherentist account
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/preprint
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/article

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