The impact of Brexit on the member states' ability to bulid blocking coalitions in the Council

Abstract

The paper presents the results of the research on the impact of the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union on Member States’ ability to build small, minimal blocking coalitions in the Council. To this end, the theory of voting games was used, but departing from the assumption that the creation of each possible coalition of players is equally likely. It was also assumed that they do not necessarily make decisions independently of each other, and the analysis focuses on the ability to build minimal blocking coalitions. The conducted analysis indicates that after Brexit the ability of the Council members to form small minimally blocking coalitions will have changed significantly. The UK's withdrawal from the EU will strengthen the position of the other five member states with the largest population in the Council, in particular Germany and France. The position of the five most-populated member states will determine the scope of a possible compromise in the Council to an even greater extent.