Ocena reformy systemu głosowania w radzie prezesów Europejskiego Banku Centralnego

Abstract

THE ENLARGEMENT OF the European Union forces changes in the decision-making process of the European Central Bank. In order to maintain the Governing Council’s capacity for effi cient and timely decision-making, the Governing Council agreed in November 2002 that the number of governors of the national central banks exercising their voting right should be reduced. In order to overcome the ”numbers problem”, the EU Council decided in March 2003 to introduce weighted rotation system that limits the number of votes in the Governing Council of the ECB to at most 21. However this rotation model still does not work and does not solve ECB’s decision problems. Th is paper explains the clue of the rotation system in the Governing Council of the ECB – its main features and functioning. Finally, it discusses its advantages