Enactivism as a new version of externalism and the problems of self-knowledge

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dc.contributor.author Pacholik-Żuromska, Anita
dc.date.accessioned 2015-01-13T11:46:47Z
dc.date.available 2015-01-13T11:46:47Z
dc.date.issued 2013
dc.identifier.citation Filosofiya. Kulturohyia, nr 2 (18) 2013, pp. 54-59.
dc.identifier.uri http://repozytorium.umk.pl/handle/item/2370
dc.description.abstract The main topic of this article concerns the question, whether the self-knowledge can be still authoritative from the enactivistic point of view. The problem rests on two assumptions: 1. The definition of self-knowledge claims that a subject has a direct given knowledge about an intentional contents of his attitudes. 2. The content of subject’s attitudes is determined by external factors, which could be unknown to the subject. It means that the subject has the limited access to the content or its determinants understood as satisfaction conditions of his mental states. On this basis of the obvious conflict between the two theses the first-person-authority can be questioned
dc.language.iso eng
dc.rights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subject self-knowledge
dc.subject enactivism
dc.subject externalism
dc.title Enactivism as a new version of externalism and the problems of self-knowledge
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/article

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