Abstrakt:
Commentators of Hume's thought do not agree on the problem of its coherence
and not rarely they announce that it is a collection of sceptical doubts directed
towards the seventeenth-century metaphysics of substance. One of the most interesting
problems is the supposed gap between the phenomenologist approach of
Humean epistemology, as represented in the first book of his Treatise and in
Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, and commonsensical theory of practical
philosophy: ethics, politics, economy, found in Enquiry Concerning the Principles
of Morals and some essays. In the paper I try to defend systematic character of
his philosophy. According to Hume's own statements, various parts of his philosophy
represent succeeding parts of his "science on man", e. g. on human nature.
A link between the two main parts of Hume's is to be found in his theory of ethics.
There he rejects a metaphysical notion of 'substance', typical for the seventeenth-
-century thought, and endeavours to establish a new theory based on "experimental"
or empiricist method. Thus he shows that our moral distinctions have nothing
in common with metaphysical assumptions.
