Libertarianism, Defense of Property, and Absolute Rights

Abstract

The present paper argues that libertarians (e.g. Murray Rothbard, Stephan Kinsella) who subscribe to the proportionality principle while embracing the view that to have a right to property is to have a right to defend it run into what we call the Property Defense Dilemma. For if the only way to defend property is to defend it disproportionately, then a private property right – contrary to what these think- ers claim – is not accompanied by a right to defend it. The most plausible way out of the dilemma – the present paper argues – is to conceive of private property rights as only weakly absolute, to use Matthew H. Kramer’s illuminating distinc- tion. On the other hand, libertarians who, like Walter Block, would like to escape the dilemma by replacing the proportionality standard with the gentleness principle run into other sorts of problems (moral implausibility, incoherence), which also shows that it is the libertarian view on rights as infinitely stringent side constraints that calls for revision and attenuation.