Abstrakt:
This paper argues—contra some Austro-libertarians—that whether a
given exchange is welfare-enhancing or welfare-diminishing does not
depend on whether that exchange is just or unjust, respectively. Rather,
we suggest that in light of our two thought experiments, Austro-libertar-
ianism has at least a pro tanto reason to conceive of justice and welfare
as two logically distinct ideals. This would in turn, most interestingly,
predict the possibility of (a) just but welfare-diminishing exchanges and
(b) unjust but welfare-enhancing ones. Upon considering possible re-
joinders to our points, we suggest that Austro-libertarians abandon a
justice-based notion of welfare.
Opis:
This research was funded in whole or in part by the National Science Centre,
Poland, grant number 2020/39/B/HS5/00610. For the purpose of Open Access,
the author has applied a CC-BY public copyright licence to any Author Accepted
Manuscript (AAM) version arising from this submission.
Ta pozycja jest udostępniona na licencji Attribution 3.0 Poland