Abstrakt:
Libertarianism and the Theory of Personal Identity. Robert Nozick’s Closest
Continuer Theory as a Background Theory of the Principle of Self‑Ownership
The research problem of the present paper is the following question: May the
closest continuer theory serve as a background theory for the principle of self‑ownership?
This issue is a peculiar instance of the more general problem of the
anthropological presuppositions of the libertarian political philosophy that can
be phrased in a Kantian manner: How is self‑ownership
possible?; or in a more
detailed way: What sort of entity a human being has to be, if it is possible for
him to be a self‑owner?
The research thesis that is argued for in the paper says
that: 1) the closest continuer theory may not serve as a background theory for
a wide principle of self‑ownership
since as an example of reductionist theory of
personal identity it excludes the possibility of possessing this set of psychological
facts which the personal identity is reducible to and possession of which is
presupposed by the wide principle of self‑ownership;
2) the closest continuer
theory may though serve as a background theory for a narrow principle of self‑ownership
since this principle assumes that one can own only scarce resources
and psychological facts are not instances thereof.