Chapter Ten
Philosophy of Garden as a Philosophy 
of Loneliness
Piotr Domeracki

Garden can be perceived in many ways: as a place, state of things, a symbol, a metaphor, a medium of artistic expression, a figure of literary expression or a subject of scientific exploration. Fundamentally garden is a place shaped in certain way which can be subject to many translations. Garden is not only a place of work, but also relaxation. Garden is not only the literal, but also an embodiment of the inexplicable which bothers, delights and inspires. It is this metaphysical quality of the garden which transcends its literality. Otherwise we would probably never consider it an issue, nay, it would not have been an issue at all in the first place. Therefore, under the surface of literality, there is a profundity, a level at which the garden becomes a phenomenon. We perceive the garden in many ways. Thus, we refer to it in different ways and seek different terms to account for its multidimensionality. This quality of the garden has its consequences in how we comprehend the garden. The primary explicitness of the place called the garden, upon discovering its perfection, shatters. It is our task then, keeping Plato in mind, to observe how the ideal quality of the garden manifests itself on its palpable surface. Rather than looking at how the idea of the garden manifests itself, we should devote our time to critically discussing and systematizing the descriptions which are already present in the culture of words, images, and sounds. This is my intention.
At the beginning I stated that the garden is a multidimensional phenomenon, which at the conceptual level influences its ambiguity. Therefore, there is no way to discuss it but in transdisciplinary terms. I will try to cast light on the problem from the philosophical point of view which I treat as one of the possible approaches, but by no means the only legitimate one.    
The research method with which I have chosen to accomplish this task is the following: I would like to show a sample of the ideal garden heuristics and show the functions it may have in culture. To implement this project I have chosen a theory which is eligible and can fulfil the needed criteria. Thus, I have chosen a classic theory which is well established and is inspired by the garden and constitutes an extension of the idea of the garden.  It is a concept which has no analogue in philosophy. There is only one such theory which can be called the philosophy of The Garden and it is a theory by Epicurus from Athens, the founder of the first Hellenistic school of philosophy. 
Notably, Epicurus’ philosophy which is called The Philosophy of the Garden does not provide systematic thought of the notion of the garden. It is rather founded on it, growing out of it, being a thematic variation basing on the garden’s multifunctional quality. Any search of systematic study of “gardeness” is futile and there is no use searching for it. It is still too early at that point for the phenomenology of the Garden. In any case, that was not the most important thing for Epicurus. Reproaching him for that pointless and is no accusation at all. In Epicureanism the notion of The Garden seems to be a ready philosophy of its own. This theory is not so much about philosophising about the Garden itself, rather than about extracting philosophy out of The Garden which The Garden implicitly contains. This is how one should understand the notion of the Philosophy of the Garden with reference to Epicurus. It is also a Philosophy of the Garden because it comes form the garden itself, it is its supraliteral emanation. What, then, is this philosophy?
Epicurus’ Philosophy of the Garden is the first doctrine in history which was able to say “no”, which was able to oppose; a doctrine which has grown out of resistance. Projecting this thought onto the notion of the Garden, one can already say that this notion is a sign of resistance, disagreement, rejection and sympathizing with the other side. Epicurus’ philosophy is founded on such a ground. It is an opposition against, apparently, discredited polis ethos. Plato-Aristotelian promotion of the state which did not withstand the test of time. It failed faced with real life. Plato-Aristotelian formula of a man who is a political animal, made him a citizen of a polis, someone absolutely subjected to it in every aspect of life, creating with it an entity and founding one’s identity on it. The citizen had to constantly develop his virtue of citizenship, which made him a better citizen. For Epicurus this formula of a citizen completely discredited itself before his eyes. Philosophy of the polis was coming to its end and Epicurus was loudly proclaiming that. Some may think that Epicurus had nothing else to offer but a criticism of something which was impossible to defend. The philosopher most probably claimed that it is no criticism at all but a mere statement of facts. Whichever is that case, one may be see that Epicurus provided something more than just criticism. His mastery is not about supplying a new utopia for an old one. Neither is it about calling into question the order which wore out itself or was unfavourable to him. Of course, Epicurean rhetoric is of a rebellious nature. Nevertheless, it is not about subversion. Although his rhetoric is disjunctive, the alternative which he suggest is not disjunctive itself. The Philosophy of the Garden is an attempt at creative transcendence of the polis philosophy; it is an attempt at finding a reasonable alternative which would not simply be a negation. This philosophy is also the first philosophy in history which tried to re-examine the traditional values expressed in the philosophy of the polis. The Philosophy of the Garden is also alternative in a sense that it preserves its autonomy without violating the autonomy of competing theories, including the philosophy of the polis. For example, just as a garden may exist on the suburbs of the city, Epicurus’ Philosophy of the Garden is an independent enclave on the premises of the polis. It is not any new polis philosophy or a modification of it. In a sense, it is a post-polis philosophy because it was created at the time when the values of the polis philosophy shattered. It is a trans-polis philosophy because it transcends the models and values of the philosophy of the polis. It also is an anti-polis philosophy because it is also determined on the basis of its opposition towards polis’ models and virtues. It can be seen in such a simple case as choosing a location for the School. With his choice, Epicurus makes it clear which models and virtues he considers to be important and close to his heart; he also shows which ethos he supports. His choice is a building with a garden in the suburbs of Athens. It can be said that Epicurus took philosophy out of polis and moved it to the garden; as B.Farrington notices “Establishing the Garden was [Epicurus’] answer to the evil present in the world”.
Thus far, philosophy acquiesced to polis, was created for it and to its advantage. Epicurus’ philosophy trying to set free from those constraints approached the new, even though the philosopher thought otherwise.  
To learn the message which Epicurus finds in the Garden, it is enough to look at the Garden closely. Its location speaks volumes. Away from the hustle of the polis, peace and quiet is ensured. The location is free from the “tumult of political life” and citizen duties. It makes one feel autonomous and self-reliant. The landscape of the garden moves the imagination, delights with its charm, strikes the deep chord with people’s sensitivity, makes them feel carefree and imbues them with the feeling of abundance and happiness which stems form the pleasures which the garden supplies. 
This is the basis on which Epicurus’ philosophy stands. One of its most important issues is life. In the immediate surroundings of the garden everything else ceases to be important. The most important thing is life, the sheer fact of being alive. Nothing else. Everything else acquires significance if it serves life or is absolutely dependant on it. What kind of life is meant here? Obviously, a life that is spent in the Garden but maybe even more – the life of the Garden itself. What kind of life is it? Definitely different from the life in the state and the life of the state. Where is the difference? Life of the Garden is a life which is simple, regular, quiet, peaceful, self-sufficient (not dependent on anything else except itself), self-reliant (using its own resources), the same for everyone who wants to participate in it. It is a merry, pleasant, happy, carefree life going with its own natural rhythm. Life in the Garden is subject to the same laws as the Garden itself. It also refers to a human life for which Epicurus had an almost mystical respect. Human life harmonizing with the life of the Garden creates a new ethos. This ethos does not have to be specifically looked for, it is in the Garden itself. It is enough to sensitise oneself to it act according to its rules. What ethos is it? Certainly it is not an ethos of the citizen; the citizen who serves polis, for whom life of the state means more than his own life. However, there can be no life of the state without the life of its citizens. There is no life of the citizens if they are utterly dedicated to the life of the state. It’s a vicious circle which cannot be seen from the borderline of the polis. It can be only see from the retreat of the Garden. Life in the state is ersatz of a real life; it is a fiction. Life in the state means being incapacitated. A citizen’s life in the state is dominated by ideology; it is a ready project, designed form the beginning to the end, calculated and count in the development of the state. The individuals do not matter, what matters is the whole state. On that basis the citizens are being told that everything which serves the development of the state, servers their own development. As a result, in a way they become hostages of the state. They do not realise that they are giving up what is most precious to them – their life – to something which is taking it away from them. Confused, they look for success, fulfilment and luck somewhere where it cannot be found or they find only an illusion of these. To change this situation or at least dissociate form it one needs ethos which would enable revitalisation (re-naturalisation) of life. According to Epicurus, if such an ethos exists, it must outside the polis the ethos of which brought devitalisation (denaturalisation) of life. Such an ethos must exist in a place where life goes undisturbed, where the sheer fact of existence is enough to savour life, a place where the real charm, flavour and value of life becomes visible, where life acquires its desired shape. According to the Athenian a place which fulfils these conditions is the Garden. The new ethos, rooted in the Garden radically dissociates itself from the collectivism represented by the polis ethos. Ethos of the Garden is an ethos of the individual. It is only in the Garden where one can express an unrestrained individualism which embodies the fullness and genuineness of life. Ethos of the individual bears in mind only the individual man, private man in the context of his life. Just like in moral subjectivity the individual takes over (or is rather given back) the competence of the group which constitutes the polis, political virtue, and, according to aretology (virtue ethics) gives way (or rather gives back the rightful position) to virtue of the private man. The task of this new virtue is to perfect the man as an individual, or rather to perfect the individual in a man. Learning this virtue is supposed to develop one’s individuality, autonomy, uniqueness and exceptionality regardless of one’s political inclinations. As a result, Epicurus asserts his disapproval of the traditional culture which is based on the philosophy of the polis, and especially on politics which is, in his opinion, an “unnecessary nuisance”. 
If the tumult of the political life is a obstacle to learn the virtue of a private man, then one needs essentially different conditions. To develop this virtue one needs a secluded place which guarantees privacy, seclusion, being away from the “political tumult”. Such a place is the Garden. 
At this stage it becomes more visible that Epicurean philosophy of the Garden has features of the philosophy of solitude. Before I elaborate on that I would like to propose a thesis that Epicurean philosophy of the Garden is a special case of the philosophy of solitude, a fact which is usually not mentioned at all. Philosophy of the Garden is, indeed, the philosophy of solitude. In other words, the philosophy of the Garden is solitude – understood in a simplest and unambiguously positive way. It is a solitude understood as isolation, resigning form contact with others to spend time with oneself. Epicurean solitude means apatridism (statelessness) and self-reliance. But not only this and, above all, not essentially this. Solitude which Epicurus eulogizes is essentially life in seclusion on two levels: external and internal. The two are inseparable and they complete each other. On the external level it means distancing oneself from the institution of the state and common people. On the internal level life seclusion means retreating into oneself where human nature, as Epicurus believes, remains, like the Garden, untainted. Secluded life constitutes then the unquestionable and the greatest virtue.
The thesis formulated in such a way made it necessary to question Plato-Aristotelian thesis about the natural socio-political nature of people. Epicurus disagrees stating that there is no natural socio-political connection between people because “everyone thinks only about themselves”. We are essentially egoistic. Paradoxically, what unites us as a society is a characteristic which brings us apart. In that sense, the society which we create is like a society from Striner’s “The Ego and Its Own”..
The question is, why should secluded life have such a great value whilst socio-political life has no such value? Epicurus’ answer is again swift and self-confident. The great value of secluded life stems from the fact that in it one may find “the most precious thing a human being can have”, that is happiness, real happiness. Happiness (eudaimonia) is nothing less but aponía, autarkia, and ataraxia. Here I would like to say that we are advancing towards Epicurus’ moderate hedonism, the theory of pleasure which for reasons unknown – be it lack of knowledge, misunderstanding or malevolence – was brought into disrepute for many centuries. Epicurus’ hedonism is fundamentally a naturalism. At its basis lies atomistic materialism, which supports it ontologically, and logic of eleatism which supports it by eliminating any transitional stages. Having this in mind, Epicurus states that human nature constitutes homogeneous clusters of atoms: a cluster of soul atoms and a cluster of body atoms. Both are material. If human being is material, then, good which makes people happy, also has to be material. It is nature that teaches us what is good by letting us experience pleasure and anguish (pain and suffering). Form the very birth, man is drawn towards everything that evokes pleasure and avoids all things unpleasant and painful. Therefore, “pleasure is a real natural good, a rule and aim of everything we do”. Happiness formula can be found in pleasure because experiencing pleasure “makes man” genuinely “happy”. One can notice here Epicurus’ reformatory aspirations. Contrary to cyrenaism which associated pleasure with a gentle motion, a breath of pleasure, Epicurus’ defined pleasure as an absence of pain, lack of suffering, cease of distress, being free form worry – in a word, with aponía. It is a catastematic pleasure, an edge of pleasure, sheer pleasure, utter pleasure, highest pleasure, authentic pleasure. Here echoes Epicurus’ philosophy of life which combined with the moderate hedonism makes us arrive at the conclusions that to live is enough to feel happiness. To be happy one does not need intense or ecstatic experiences on a grand scale or pleasures becoming more and more pleasant (according to Bauman’s formula referred to the postmodernist morality). Pleasure which is “characterised by lack physical suffering and lack of spiritual distress” is enough to feel happiness. There is one more thing worth mentioning. Pleasure in itself, according to its definition, cannot be evil because the only evil, according to eleatic schema, is suffering. That cannot be said about all of the things which can bring pleasure. Often it is the case that a thing capable of evoking pleasure causes more distress than pleasure. To avoid such a situation one should seek only that which gives pure pleasure, “without admixture of neither pain nor worry”. That pleasure can be found only in life, in being alive. However, as we know not every life can guarantee such pleasure. Civic life, for example, makes it impossible. What model of life is meant here then? The answer provided by Epicurus  (hedonist) is surprising and at the same time obvious if we look at its origin. Authentic pleasure can be found in ascetic life. This kind of life means pursuing only those pleasures which are natural, necessary and serve preserving life. Only these really help, only these soothe the pain and make misery more remote. The examples go as follows: “eating satisfies hunger, drinking quenches thirst, rest fights the fatigue”. Everything else is an unnecessary addition and a burden. If it brings pleasure then it is not the kind of pleasure which brings happiness. Therefore, everything that brings natural but unnecessary pleasure, which is a variety of the basic pleasures, should be avoided if one does not want to bring harm to oneself. Similarly, one should avoid all the urges the satisfaction of which give vain and empty pleasures which are both unnatural and unnecessary (Epicurus means here longing for riches, fame, power, privileges and the like). Why should one pursue pleasures which serve sustenance of life? The reason is that only those have a clear border, pleasure threshold, beyond which pleasure cannot be any greater. This border is aponía – the elimination of pain. Epicurus’ principle is this: “the moment the pain is eliminated, pleasure cannot increase anymore”. The natural but unnecessary wants are not worth bothering about because they do not relieve the pain, they do not even increase the pleasure, they are only a diversity of the basic pleasure. Such pleasures can have very negative effects. Even more so, one should not pursue pleasures which are unnatural and unnecessary. Not only do they not relieve the pain, but they also cause “distress of the soul”. Cicero has expressed it the following words: “Nature herself makes the wise man rich”. Pleasures from the third group (unnatural and unnecessary) belong to the political life. Many people enter political life expecting power, fame and riches. Unfortunately, to satisfy these desires means pursuing the unnatural and unnecessary pleasures. These in turn, are only illusory pleasures. If one wants to live an authentic life, to experience authentic happiness, it is best to avoid political life.
Epicurean asceticism which is visibly influenced by Cynicism, recommends static pleasures because for these a man needs only himself. The greatest wealth and happiness relies upon autarkia – being self-reliant and not needing anything. This shows that happiness depends solely on us regardless of what is happening in the outside world. Happiness comes from within and no one beside ourselves can secure it.
Apart from aponía and autarkia a man need one more thing to be happy – a peace of mind – ataraxia. As Epicurus poetically said: “it is a crown superior to a crown of any empire”. 
Somewhat earlier I have mentioned that limiting catastematic pleasures is rational in character. Indeed, to “evaluate a pleasure to decide whether to accept it or reject it” one needs phronesis, practical wisdom (prudence, reason). It is the mind that evaluates pleasures and informs us if over the pleasure’s threshold there is lack of suffering or if the pleasure is only illusory. Hence, the only reasonable choice is the one which takes into consideration pleasures form the first group. Consequently, the conclusion is that human happiness depends on the mind and reasoning, not on pure chance, someone’s whim or a stroke of luck. 
Here we start to see Epicurus’ perfect sage. Epicurus’ sage is a man who understands the need for solitude, a man who is prepared for sacrifices which are inseparably connected to this way of life. It is a man capable of distinguishing between pleasures and is satisfied with what is natural and necessary. A wise man is his own master; he maintains peace of mind even if faced with life’s vicissitudes; he is not afraid of anyone or anything; he is imperturbable. Epicurus remarks casually: “a wise man even if tormented, will feel happy”. A wise man prepared in such a way – a loner, an individual, a thinker, an ascetic – may be confident about his happiness. What is more, “he almost equals gods when it comes to happiness”. Except for eternity, “Zeus has nothing that a wise man would not have”. 
Practical wisdom can be used not only for accepting or rejecting pleasures. As Jaspers put it many centuries ago, it also serves a man who is faced with the so called “borderline situations”, that is suffering and death.
When it comes to the suffering of the soul, Epicurus is of the opinion that it is no use expatiating upon them. There is no such need to do it because “they are only an evil resulting from false judgements and mistakes of the mind”. The best antidote for them is Epicurus’ philosophy. When it comes to the physical pain, the case is almost as simple as with the suffering of the soul. If the pain is gentle then it is easy to bear and it does not diminish the happiness of the soul. If the pain is acute, then it is intense but short and quickly disappears. If the pain is severe then it quickly leads to death which is an annihilation of pain. In every case it is easy to deal with pain and suffering without diminishing the feeling of ataraxia (peace of mind) which is the source of happiness. 
Fear of death is equally absurd. It is an evil thing only for those people who – just as was the case with the sufferings of the soul – have formed false beliefs about it. If a man is composed of atoms of the body and the soul, then death is only disentanglement of the atoms. “Atoms move in every direction”, consciousness ceases to exist, the senses become dull, the remains deteriorate in time and nothing is left of a man. Death itself is not terrible “because when we exist death is not, and when death exists we are not”; nor is it terrible because of what comes after it because, as we have noted, there is nothing left of us after death – after death nothing awaits us. “All sensation” ends with death. Therefore, since a man cannot feel anything, then there is no reason to fear. Death takes nothing from our life, so it is not to be feared. Pleasure is absolute and perfect. To experience pleasure one does not need eternity. 
 Epicurus also tries to account for other fears which people face in everyday lives. He puts our minds at ease stating that we should not fear the impossibility of a pleasant life, a happy life, because pleasure in its rightful form is accessible to everyone. Equally groundless is fear of the gods. The gods live happily taking care only about their own business. Becoming involved in human matters is an obstacle to this happiness. Therefore, there is no need to fear the gods because they will neither do any harm nor will they help people. 
Despite the fact that Epicurus’ views are called egoistic individualism there exists a feature which seemingly contradicts it. I am thinking here about Epicurus’ idea of friendship. Paradoxically, Epicurus’ idea of friendship does not collide with his project of egoistic individualism but is its confirmation. Friendship is, according to Epicurus, “a free relationship uniting people who feel, think and live the same”.  Friendship rules out coercion of human nature. It is well known that freedom, selfishness, pleasure, and peace all are in human nature. In friendship one cannot impose anything from the outside. Friendship maintains intimacy of the individual. It does not serve building up the state but it serving the purpose of the individuals. Epicurus’ friendship is not devoid of seeking benefits. Friendship, like everything which a man does, starts with a benefit. When the friendship flourishes it becomes good in itself, a source of mutual pleasure. Life wisdom becomes apparent in a fact that it encourages formulation friendships and values them the most. To quote Epicurus: 
Of all the things which wisdom acquires to produce the blessedness of the complete life far the greatest is the possession of Friendship. 
Epicurean friendship only seemingly is about relations based on equality and openness with all the people. Unfortunately, this is not the case. Friendship between all the people is a utopia. True friendship may exist only between people who resemble each other as much as possible.
Everything that has been said here constitutes the dogma of Epicureanism. This dogma has been left unaffected through the centuries. Up to this day it remains unchanged. The aim is not to overthrow this dogma, or to stand against it or point to its deficiencies but to recall it, to dust the beaten tracks of thinking about the Garden and, perhaps, to follow it or reorganize its ways. 
One more thought for the end. I mentioned earlier that the philosophy of the Garden, as understood by Epicurus, is a philosophy dictated by the Garden and a life going on in it. What has Epicurus done? He filled the wild space of the Garden with the thought of itself. That thought was not simply a theory. In the first place, it was practical in character. It was dedicated to the parksis. As many sources relate, the creator of this philosophy and many of his followers lived happily following this philosophy.
Thanks to Epicurus’ attempts the space of the Garden has become the space of the culture – with its own vision of the world, its own ethos, its own model of social relations.
To conclude, a quotation form Reale: 
Epicurus’ Garden was created to form people who would be fully conscious of being individuals, people who would understand that salvation can only be found within themselves”.