

SOCIAL SECURITY

Selected Aspects

Joanna Marszałek-Kawa
Danuta Plecka
Adam Hołub

REVIEWERS

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prof. dr hab. Bogdan Szulc

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Daniel Kawa

TECHNICAL EDITING

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Toruń 2018

ISBN 978-83-8019-968-2

Sales Department: tel./fax 56 648 50 70; e-mail:
marketing@marszalek.com.pl, www.marszalek.com.pl

Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, ul. Lubicka 44, 87-100 Toruń
tel./fax 56 648 50 70; tel. 56 660 81 60, 56 664 22 35
e-mail: info@marszalek.com.pl, www.marszalek.com.pl
Drukarnia, ul. Warszawska 54, 87-148 Łysomice, tel. 56 678 34 78

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Introduction

In the modern world, security is some one of the basic human needs. In addition to the multiple threats that can be considered traditional, i.e. military or political ones, new, unconventional risks to the public appear. Unconventional threats are so dangerous for the society that they are not fully identified and there are no developed ways of dealing with them. These threats can be called social hazards that defy the existential basis of human existence. The answer to the more and more frequent occurrences of such phenomena are social security instruments and tasks assigned to it, for which both the state, institutions shaped by civil society and the citizen are responsible.

In discussing social security, what is a very important issue are new social phenomena, poorly grounded in societies and therefore also understood by only a small part of them. They lead to the emergence of tensions causing specific consequences: an increase in political extremism, aversion to “others,” the a significant escalation of populism and claiming attitudes towards state institutions. The key to inhibiting the development of the above situations is the diagnosis of the phenomenon and its explanation, which in turn will allow us to understand the changes that occur in the modern world.

We give you a book that is just such an attempt to explain the phenomena occurring in the modern world regarding specific areas of social security: related to labor migration, the functioning of national minorities or refugees. The individual analyses were preceded by a theoretical part, in which there is an explanation of the phenomenon of

social security and its importance for public order. The book is the result of the first stage of research on social security in the modern world at Professor Czesław Mojsiewicz Foundation for International Cooperation. We hope that the book will meet the readers' expectations, and for scientists it will become, if not a valuable source of information, at least a contribution to discussion and further analysis.

Authors

Social Security and Its Pillars

Social security is a phenomenon, a category, and an area of security, which encompasses a number of scientific disciplines. They include economics, political science, sociology, and other fields that social security draws inspiration and research methods from (e.g. statistics). It should be emphasized that military security is seen as a so-called “hard” type of security, while the social dimension of security is considered to belong to “soft” areas. This does not mean that it is less important than other kinds of security. We can even risk a statement that the proper development of social security reduces the need for high investment in its other areas.

In order to understand the concept of security, we must consider its two basic assumptions: survival and development. The first of them clearly refers to the ability to survive physically. This relates not only to the state’s military potential, but also, more importantly, to its capabilities in the field of welfare activity (e.g. the quality of and access to healthcare, “contribution” to the demographic development of the society, ageing processes or migrations). Thus, looking from this perspective, security is defined as the product of certain values and goals which determine it, such as: the security of existence, satisfying basic needs, protection against the loss of livelihood, balance, and a sense of well-being and satisfaction. As may be noted, the presence and tasks of the state in this respect are essential, because, in today’s world, they guarantee that the other assumption of security, i.e. development, will be met. It may obviously be interpreted from the angle of

individual development, but it would be quite limited then. There is a type of feedback here: if an individual does not develop, the society does not develop either; if the society does not develop, its members are not likely to develop as well. Therefore, when talking about security, it should be pointed out that it provides an objective guarantee of inviolable survival and development.¹

Security defined in this way does not exist in a vacuum – it must relate to the concepts of different social sciences and humanities. Without drawing on past experience, one cannot shape its relations with neighbours, i.e. security in the international context. Without knowing social behaviours and political mechanisms, it is difficult to shape the feeling of safety and form the best possible political regime, i.e. the one that will ensure survival and the highest degree of development both for individuals and communities. And development is naturally related to economy. Finally, military potential is inseparably linked with the knowledge of the rules of physics and chemistry.

These few examples are sufficient to show how high potential of interdisciplinarity security as a scientific field has. Social security is one of its platforms and has become a significant part of the discourse on the quality of life of individuals and social groups. It encompasses all legal and organizational efforts undertaken by the authorities both in the national and international dimension, which “are aimed at ensuring a proper living standard for people, families and social groups and preventing them from being marginalized and socially excluded.”² It would be oversimplification though if we considered governments to be the only bodies responsible for action in this respect. It is also citizens who play a very important role in shaping social security.

¹ See: P. Majer, A. Urbanek, *Bezpieczeństwo społeczne. Ewolucja, instytucje, zagrożenia*, Warsaw 2016.

² M. Leszczyński, *Bezpieczeństwo społeczne Polaków wobec wyzwań XXI wieku*, Warsaw 2011, p. 58.

Therefore, if the established social goals are to be achieved, responsibility must be shared between the authorities and the society. Otherwise, people acquire a sense of helplessness and fall into the habit of expecting others to solve their problems; thus, they gradually lose the ability to cope with hardships, such as the loss of job, natural disasters, etc. At the same time, “learned helplessness” may lead to abusing the state’s help and, consequently, to its withdrawal from the sphere of pro-social activities.

In the literature on internal and national security, the social dimension of security is often narrowed down to welfare issues and the state’s tasks related to them. Thus, a number of important aspects of social security are ignored. Among them, one of the most vital areas is the problem of development, i.e. human capital, which involves people’s qualifications, knowledge, skills, etc. Another important aspect refers to the dimension of societal security, seen mostly in the context of social capital and the related culture of social trust, citizens’ participation and other elements, such as the ability to cooperate in crisis situations or the development of civil society. This does not mean that problems located in the traditional sphere of welfare security do not concern its social dimension. However, it must be emphasized that they are only one of the components of social security and, as important as they are, they are only a supplement to its developmental and community dimensions.³

It seems justified to say that it is not possible to effectively introduce welfare security without developmental elements, such as human capital. This capital has low shaping potential if the society is devoid of the dimension of societal security, the integral component of which is social capital. Such a phenomenon is relatively new in the debate on citizens’ security in the political system. It is connected

³ Ibidem, p. 59.

with various aspects, the most important of which seems to be the increasing number of social threats that negatively affects both the consolidation of democracy and citizens' development prospects. At the same time, it may be noted that the category of social security has supplanted the term social policy in the awareness of both politicians and individuals. Moreover, both concepts are often seen as synonyms in public space. The categories of *social security* and *welfare security* are perceived as equivalent concepts even more frequently. It is obviously not consistent with the characteristics and definitions of phenomena and they should not be considered to be synonyms, but as separate concepts. Social security involves a wide array of activities performed by different entities and welfare security refers to the state's activity in the sphere of welfare policy only.

While Marek Leszczyński's definition of the category of social security, which we adopted in this paper, comprehensively focuses on the issue of the diagnosis of threats and possible solutions to problems – through the state's intervention and social or developmental capital – the concept of welfare security or welfare policy refers only to the state's role in ensuring social security. Thus, these phenomena address the problem in a small segment of activities which are necessary for a citizen to function properly in the society. Therefore, it may even be stated that it is one of the pillars of social security, which is obviously essential, but not the only one. It has formal instruments and is managed by state institutions. However, without the participation of the community and individuals, in the long-term, they may become inefficient when it comes to efforts undertaken for the sake of social security. Not only do the consequences affect the state budget, but they also (or perhaps first of all) influence individuals, who become clients rather than citizens: people dependent on aid institutions instead of being the creators of their own life. This is why it is so important to implement and use the pillars of social security in the

welfare, community and developmental dimension. Otherwise, social security will be narrowed down to the issue of social engineering, which focuses on the technical solution to a specific social problem instead of shaping the feeling of safety in the community. Thus, it may largely contribute to the reinforcement of the habit of expecting others to solve their problems and the attitude of “learned helplessness.” This leads to the increased activity of the state as the only participant of social security.

Welfare security as the pillar of social security

The contemporary state may play different roles in the shaping of social security. The most frequent of them include: “a night watchman” state, a social state and a welfare state. Social security models are established on the basis of the kind of tasks resulting from the adopted ideological position of state institutions. This problem will be addressed in the further part of the paper, because before we carry out an analysis, we first of all have to define the way in which the state should function in order to build and maintain social security.

If we take into account the chronological development of the models of the state, the first of them was a “night watchman state.” The concept emerged with the development of free market economy, which reflected liberalism in the 17th century.⁴ Its premises, however, are best expressed by liberal thinkers of the 20th century, such as Friedrich von

⁴ Deliberations on social security do not make room for the detailed discussion of the history of the development of a neoliberal state. For more details: D. Karnowska, *W kierunku liberalizmu? Recepcja idei liberalnych w Polsce w warunkach transformacji ustrojowej*, Toruń 2005; J. Marszałek-Kawa, *The institutional position and functions of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland after the accession to the European Union*, Toruń 2016.

Hayek or Milton Friedman. Neoliberals are definitely against the collectivist perception of the society and oppose all forms of state interventionism. Both Hayek and Friedman viewed the society as a set of individual atoms that shared the idea of freedom in the negative sense, i.e. as Isaac Berlin put it, “freedom from.”⁵ This trend in liberalism assumes that no individual can be subject to any type of coercion – whether in the political, economic or axiological sphere. It was agreed that freedom in economy is naturally related to the development of the human being, but also to the risk it entails, including, first of all, one’s responsibility for his or her actions. Thus, the state should not make efforts to protect individuals against the positive and negative consequences of their activity. Instead, it should create the best objective conditions for taking action.

What follows from this way of thinking is the interpretation of the idea of equality. Friedman and Hayek believed that people are not equal by nature; thus, it is only equality before the law that is legitimized. All its other dimensions, e.g. equality in the economic sphere, are not justified. Therefore, according to neoliberals, the state’s role is not the distribution of goods unavailable for some individuals. The point is this deficit contributes to personal development: people always aim for more and economic inequality is conducive to such aspirations. In such circumstances, it is not only individuals, but also the whole society that develops. Thus, neoliberals are the opponents of the phenomenon of social or distributive justice. In their opinion, any kind of the state’s interference with the existing economic inequality, under the slogan of social justice, harms inventiveness and individualism, favouring different forms of the state’s coercion. Hence, they give priority to the liberal-individualist order before the collectivist one. The latter, they believe, respects neither freedom nor individualism.

⁵ See: I. Berlin, *Two Concepts of Liberty*, Oxford 1958.

Thus, there is no room for interventionism in the concept of a “night watchman state.” The state does not participate in the creation of social security in any sphere. Neoliberals were obviously aware that some members of the society were temporarily threatened by economic uncertainty (for example, due to the loss of job), but in such cases they only proposed that the principles of the so-called commutative justice be introduced – resulting from market activity based on universally accepted moral rules in the society. To be more precise, they emphasized that the society should take care of individual citizens only if they suffered privation.

Neoliberals thus proposed that the state should be marginalized or even excluded from activity in the field of education, social security or healthcare. All these spheres should be competitive, which would determine the development and quality of services provided. They would obviously be widely accessible to citizens, which should be considered to be the optimistic perception of human nature and people’s potential. At the same time, the state’s interventionism was believed to be the cause of a number of social problems and was thought to slow down the development of people and society.

This style of thinking about the state, although also present in the authorities’ actions in the 20th and 21st centuries (e.g. the activity of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan) was criticized by the thinkers who had a different perception of the state’s role in the shaping of social security.

Although these categories are often used interchangeably, at the beginning of our deliberations we should discuss basic differences between them. First of all, they have ideological origins. The social state was the product of the development of socialist and communist ideas in the 19th century, as well as the result of pragmatic activities undertaken by those in rule: Otto von Bismarck in Germany and Lloyd George in Great Britain. It was particularly Bismarck’s acts passed

in the years 1883–1889 that triggered the development of a social state.⁶

Originally, the concept of the social state tried to reconcile two contradictory ideas: freedom and security, i.e. the ideas, as Zygmunt Bauman put it, which “cannot live without each other, cannot live together (in peace and undisturbed agreement).”⁷ The deadlock was broken thanks to a social contract commonly known as the social state, i.e. the model in which “the emphasis is shifted from the distribution of material resources to shared motivations and the aims of dividing them.”⁸ The social state was a project which guarded the community against “privatization, destruction of human relationships or solidarity between people.”⁹ Thus, the state became responsible for individuals who were unable to cope with problems. It is a social state that had to bear consequences resulting from people’s inability to ensure social security. According to Z. Bauman, the social state is an institution which “joins citizens’ forces in order to prevent a devastating war of everyone against everyone.”¹⁰

Therefore, a country can be referred to as a social state when it supports the idea of collective protection in case of individual failures and their consequences. Thus, the society of individual atoms changes into the society of an authentic community,¹¹ and the model based on egoism is replaced by the system of social equality and justice. It is social rather than political laws that are the fundamental premise for the shaping of the social state. This idea is consistent with the princi-

⁶ Otto von Bismarck introduced a set of laws concerning the obligation to insure employees against illness, industrial accidents and disability. The regulations turned out to be revolutionary in the employee-employer-state relations.

⁷ Z. Bauman, *Życie na przemiał*, Warsaw 2005, p. 19.

⁸ Ibidem, pp. 33–34.

⁹ Ibidem.

¹⁰ Ibidem.

¹¹ F. Tönnis, *Community and Society*, New York 1963, p. 48.

ple that “without common access to social rights, a large and probably increasing number of people will consider their political rights to be useless and not worth the trouble. If political rights are necessary to institute social rights, the latter are an indispensable condition for the real and proper functioning of political rights. The former cannot exist without the latter, and they can only survive if they function together.”¹²

As far as the pragmatic provision of basic social rights by the government is considered, it is worth discussing the causes of such behaviours. The authorities assumed that the social state was to serve the interests of workers and soldiers and ensure the efficient functioning of institutions. A principle was adopted that the social state's role is not to show compassion or pity, but to serve general social interests, such as the formation of the army in case of war. That is why both Bismarck and other political leaders believed that it was easier to send a well-fed worker to war than a physically exhausted one. Thus, the state intensified its activity in the sphere of social welfare, believing that it was a good form of depositing public funds. Jürgen Habermas called this the “secondary commodification of capital and labour force,”¹³ i.e. a “kind of equipping capital with the ability and willingness to acquire labour force, and making labour force attractive enough to persuade potential buyers to act.”¹⁴ This rational investment was no longer needed with the development of industry – it also affected the military sphere as, in many cases, people could be easily replaced by new technologies.

At the same time, on the rising tide of criticism of both the neoliberal and social solutions and following the experience of the first half of the 20th century, some new concepts of the state's role in the social

¹² Z. Bauman, *Życie na przemiał*, op.cit., p. 143.

¹³ J. Habermas, *Uwzględniając Innego*, Warsaw 2009, pp. 118–121.

¹⁴ Z. Bauman, *Życie na przemiał*, op.cit., p. 114.

sphere emerged. They attempted to reconcile the theoretical assumptions of liberalism and socialism, and were referred to as the “third way” by some researchers.¹⁵ The welfare state is based on the concept of social free market economy the originator of which was Alfred Müller-Armack from the school of ordoliberalism.¹⁶ The principles of social free market economy were first used in the Federal Republic of Germany, becoming the foundation of the welfare state. The aim of social free market economy was to find solutions which would oppose both laissez-faire and collectivist tendencies.¹⁷ According to ordoliberals, it was possible owing to the recognition that the free market is an indispensable element in the process of human development. However, there are also people in the society who cannot meet the requirements of the free market principles, so they need the state’s protection in order to lead a decent life. Hence, the economic functioning of the society is based on the free market, which, however, is supported by clear rules enforced by the state.

The state should first of all safeguard the principle of the competitiveness of the free market. Hence, it should make efforts to improve its functioning by fighting such imperfections of the free market as its oligarchization and monopolization. In applying these legal instruments, the state – as part of its efforts to increase the competitiveness of the market – has an obligation to take care of the weakest citizens through the use of the principle of social justice. This particularly refers to the issue of the distribution of manufactured goods. Regulations in this respect are introduced following the awareness of the imper-

¹⁵ See: R. Skarżyński, *Od liberalizmu do totalitaryzmu*, Warsaw 2002.

¹⁶ Ordoliberalism emerged in the interwar period in Germany in response to the liberal crisis. It combined the liberal ideas of freedom with the state order. See: R. Skarżyński, op.cit., T.G. Pszczółkowski, *Spoleczno-polityczna i gospodarcza doktryna neoliberalizm w RFN. Ordoliberalizm*, Warsaw 1990.

¹⁷ R. Skarżyński, *Od liberalizmu...*, op.cit., p. 188.

fections of the free market, which insufficiently protects values such as equality or welfare security. That is why some social policy actions must be taken so that an individual would not be treated only as a consumer or a producer, but should have prospects for development and a decent life.

Therefore, as the advocates of the social free market economy emphasize, a competitive, free market with an unlimited number of participants (citizens) is needed. There are no formal limitations which would prevent individuals from taking part in a free market game, based on equal legal rules. This principle should first of all support the socio-economic development (reducing unemployment, increasing wages, etc.). It may be implemented only in a democratic system, which ensures freedom not only in a political, but also legal sense, because it is the only protection against the state's potential interference in the market. Apart from providing the legal guarantees for free competition in the market, the state's only task is to make sure that the revenue from citizens' tax obligations and social insurance will be distributed in a fair way. Thus, the state should shape efficient social policy (which helps to improve the quality of citizens' life) and introduce formal solutions which are conducive to free competition in the market.¹⁸

One of the examples of the shaping of the welfare state by means of the social free market economy is contemporary Germany. In accordance with the principle that the state should pursue active economic policy and efficient social policy at the same time, certain conditions were made to citizens. Firstly, all forms of social security depend on financing it, i.e. the amount of premiums in relation to wages. Secondly, this system is decentralized, thanks to which citizens themselves choose (and are responsible for their choice) insurance institutions, doctors,

¹⁸ T.G.Pszczółkowski, *Spółeczno-polityczna...*, op.cit., pp. 56–58.

etc. Finally and most importantly, the system focuses on the issue of employment and family, i.e. access to social services is given to employees and their families; thus, what is the principal condition for receiving the state's help is the employment of at least one family member. In simple terms, the German welfare state follows the principles "what you give is what you get" and "if you do not contribute to the system, you cannot take advantage of it."

Not all welfare states have the above characteristics. Sweden can be an example here. In this case, the state helps all people who meet the criterion of citizenship. Extensive state support results from responsibility for the distribution of goods or social services. This becomes possible thanks to, among other things, the model of mixed economy, which combines different forms of the ownership of the means of production: individual, collective and state. It should be stressed here that a welfare state may be built only on the foundations of consolidated democracy, which creates space for public debate, tolerance, respect for minorities and the idea of equality. These values may be rooted in the process of the formation and strengthening of civil society through a well-developed network of various organizations mediating between citizens and the state. Owing to this, democracy develops from the grassroots level and does not adopt an elite character. Different origins of the welfare state do not contradict its essence, i.e. its reference to the social free market economy – in both cases, the free market is the foundation of economy and the state must be involved in the shaping of social policy.

However, the welfare state also met with criticism. Zygmunt Bauman said "it seems that this complex project takes into consideration all forms of supervision and regulation, both in macro- and micro-scale. Unlike the system of regulation and supervision in the financial and banking system (...), the social welfare system involves the strict and excessive control of everything. No one will receive "too much" within

the framework of this thoroughly organized structure. No generous or compassionate ‘invisible hand’ will grant additional help to people entitled to social benefits. No one will finance people who receive unemployment benefit or any other social services.”¹⁹

The opponents of the welfare state believe that its activity does not contribute to the development of the society and economy and, what is more, it serves the purpose of maintaining the government’s control over some segments of the community. State interventionism in the private sphere helps to supervise the poor, who – by expressing their dissatisfaction with the socio-economic situation – may threaten the social order. Basically, there is nothing wrong in it, but efforts taken by the welfare state do not actually help the weakest citizens, but are aimed at keeping them in a kind of ghettos. The instruments applied serve the purpose of maintaining social exclusion rather than integration. As Bauman noted, the welfare state is “an institution that registers, isolates and permanently excludes [a part of, D.P.] people from the ‘normal’ society.”²⁰ At the same time, one cannot forget that the welfare state is not a social engineering instrument, but a specific method of coping with social problems. Ignoring these problems may lead to the destabilization of democratic regimes and to the emergence of political extremism. Therefore, it must be reiterated that social security built in the conditions of a welfare state should be first of all aimed at the protection of the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual both in the positive and negative sense.

¹⁹ Z. Bauman, *Życie na przemiał*, op.cit., pp. 167–168.

²⁰ Ibidem.

Community capital as the pillar of social security

As is commonly known, there are a variety of definitions of the category of social capital. The meaning of this concept is quite dynamically developing in the contemporary world, while social functions are changing and new consequences of this phenomenon occur. This does not mean, however, that there is no possibility of systematizing knowledge in this field. There are two basic types of social capital: functional, represented by James Coleman and Robert D. Putnam, and conflict-based, as analyzed by Pierre Bourdieu. For the sake of discussion on the importance of community capital for the shaping of social security, it is Putnam's concept that is the most relevant. However, it would be difficult to ignore concepts presented by Coleman or Bourdieu as they had a significant impact on the theory of R. Putnam.²¹

The notion of social capital was introduced by Pierre Bourdieu, who considered it to be an explicitly negative phenomenon for social development, being a part of conflict theories. For Bourdieu, „social capital is the sum of the resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to an individual or a group by virtue of possessing a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition.”²² This statement shows that the resources of social capital are dependent on the size of a network which an individual is able to effectively mobilize and on the scope of (cultural, economic, symbolic) capital possessed by every person that an individual is related to. Thus, social capital is private capital which consists of social relationships providing people with access to social resources and of

²¹ R. Putnam, *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*, New York 2000, pp. 27–35.

²² P. Bourdieu, *Practical Reason. On the Theory of Action*, Stanford 1998, pp. 30–76.

the quality of these resources. However, they are individual capabilities, which by no means serve social development, although they help to get access to other types of capital, owing to which they may be increased.²³

James Coleman interpreted social capital in a positive way. He believed that social capital is non-private and productive, and enables the achievement of social goals. In his approach, social capital consists of individuals' knowledge and skills and their ability to join forces in order to complete a specific task. Coleman defines social capital as "a variety of entities with two elements in common: they all consist of some aspect of social structure, and they facilitate certain actions of actors – whether persons or corporate actors – within the structure. Like other forms of capital, social capital is productive, making possible the achievement of certain ends that in its absence would not be possible."²⁴

Thus, for Coleman, social capital is reflected in some specific mechanisms: generating capital, through the application of the principle of reciprocity or through a group forcing an individual to abide by the norms; the consequences of possessing, e.g. privileged access to information; and, finally, social organization, which provides context for the implementation of social capital. Thus, social capital may manifest itself in three forms: obligation and expectation, information channels and social norms. They have to be interconnected with social trust. Owing to this, social capital becomes public rather than private good, because all people belonging to a given structure use it, as do those who are from outside this structure, but are linked with it in a specific way.²⁵

²³ Ibidem.

²⁴ J. Coleman, *Individual Interests and Collective Action*, Cambridge 1996, pp. 11–68.

²⁵ Ibidem.

The category of social capital was developed by Robert Putnam and today it is him who is mainly associated with it. He defines social capital as “features of social organization such as networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit.”²⁶ The author believes that what is the precondition for the formation of social capital is the principle of reciprocity, especially “generalized” reciprocity, i.e. when an individual acts for the sake of others without expecting anything in return, only hoping that others will behave in the same way towards him or her in the future.²⁷ It is difficult not to notice a certain analogy here. The principle of reciprocity which underlies Putnam’s concept of social capital is the essence of a community as seen by Ferdinand Tönnies. According to the German sociologist, what is the basis for building a community is, apart from the need for the mutual understanding “among all people,” the idea of reciprocity which derives from this understanding. Thus, both understanding and reciprocity must be “silent” and “intuitive.”²⁸ However, a question arises whether individuals can be required to participate in the creation of a community or social capital without any reflection. Tönnies argued that it becomes possible if certain conditions are met. First of all, linguistic, axiological and cultural boundaries must be precisely established thanks to which a community obtains the possibility of creating its identity. The size of a community also matters: it has to be small – communication among its members is thus multilateral and full of content, while messages from outside are insignificant. Finally, a community must be self-sustained, owing to which it can basically separate itself from external influences.²⁹

²⁶ R. Putnam, *Bowling Alone...*, op.cit., p. 44.

²⁷ Ibidem.

²⁸ F. Tönnies, *Community...*, op.cit., p. 87.

²⁹ Ibidem.

Such requirements cannot be obviously used in the case of defining and shaping social capital. It is difficult to demand that it should be associated with the “closing,” and, at the same time, with building ties going beyond relations with the closest surrounding. Although R. Putnam indicates that such a kind of social capital does exist, he refers to it as “binding” and has a negative opinion of it. It is similar in nature to Tönnies’s community, in which only its members maintain relations based on trust, while those outside are treated almost like enemies. This type of social capital does not create favourable conditions for the development of the society and social security. It contributes to the emergence of attitudes of hostility towards “others” and to eliminating those who express different opinions and do not submit to the dominant trends in the community.³⁰

Putnam had a totally different, positive view of the so-called bridging social capital. It is essential for the development of both civil society and social security. It consists in the creation of ties between people belonging to different communities and societies.³¹ Thus, it incorporates different styles of thinking, abilities, patterns of behaviour, etc. into standards functioning in the society. Bridging social capital involves the willingness to establish relations or cooperate with communities (groups, societies) other than one’s own community, thanks to which it opens to the world and begins to develop.³²

What is the precondition for the development of bridging social capital are social trust (to be precise, the culture of social capital)³³ and shared values, owing to which an open and participatory society

³⁰ R. Putnam, p. 133.

³¹ J. Dzwończyk, *Polityczne aspekty rozwoju społeczeństwa obywatelskiego w Polsce po 1989 roku*, Kraków 2009, p. 56.

³² R. Putnam, *Bowling Alone...*, op.cit., pp. 471–573.

³³ P. Sztompka, *Zaufanie. Fundament społeczeństwa*, Kraków 2007, pp. 265–275.

can be built, a society which can ensure that each individual will have a real influence on social security. As Piotr Sztompka points out, the culture of trust is based on the conviction that “you should trust others (...) as long as it turns out the opposite and you should seriously treat other people’s trust in you.”³⁴ These axioms constitute the foundation for building a culture of trust. It should also be emphasized that there are specific conditions which are conducive to the establishment of a culture of trust. They include: normative cohesion, the durability of social order, the transparency of social organization, the familiarity of a social setting, and the responsibility of individuals and institutions.³⁵ In the absence of these factors, a culture of distrust develops in societies and civic competences are low.

It would be a simplification if we described trust only in terms of social determinants. It should be stressed that social trust is a specific basis for the shaping of trust in the political dimension. A culture of trust cannot be narrowed down to people around you – to the trust in family and friends – and to your closest political and social circle (e.g. local authorities).

The problem of trust is frequently addressed by sociologists, economists and political scientists. Here, there is also no agreement as to the essence of the phenomenon of trust. However, it is a very important instrument for describing modern societies. The increasing number of possibilities and the complexity of social life and of institutional, organizational and technological systems make individuals confused about the real nature of today’s world. What is of the same importance for the role of social trust are citizens’ deepening anonymity and the growing “risk” of meeting a larger number of strangers.³⁶ This

³⁴ Ibidem, p. 267.

³⁵ Ibidem, pp. 265–282.

³⁶ Ibidem.

makes people disorientated and forces (to a certain extent) cooperation and solidarity among citizens. Therefore, social trust helps people find their place in the increasingly complex world, at the same time being an indispensable condition for building a network of contacts and undertaking deliberate action in order to achieve individual and common goals. For these efforts to be successful “politicians have to trust in the efficiency and approval of the strategies they propose, educators have to trust in their students’ abilities, and inventors have to trust all those who get involved in ‘representative activity’, acting ‘in their name’ in the areas of political power, technology, science, etc.”³⁷ However, as Andrzej Szahaj observes, “Poland suffers from the deficit of mutual trust. Citizens do not trust politicians and do not trust each other. Politicians do not trust other politicians and ignore voters. Businesspeople perceive the economic game as a jungle in which the only rule is the survival of the fittest. People, not taught to participate in the society and discouraged to politics, busy themselves with their own affairs, trying to survive. All of them, being less or more demoralized, settle for pseudo- knowledge reflected in the statement ‘this is life.’ The situation is becoming worse year by year.”³⁸

The above statements are confirmed by the results of public opinion polls. In 2017, as many as 55% of the respondents declared their distrust in the Sejm and the Senate, and 49% did not trust the government.³⁹ In the same survey, the following charity organizations gained more than 80% of social trust: the Great Orchestra of Christmas Charity (89%), Polish Red Cross (81%) and Caritas (89%).⁴⁰ The poll

³⁷ Ibidem, p. 397.

³⁸ A. Szahaj, *Niesprawiedliwość a demoralizacja*, [in:] *Kapitalizm drobnego druku*, ed. by A. Szahaj, Warsaw 2014, p. 67.

³⁹ *Zaufanie społeczne*, Centre for Public Opinion Research (CBOS, *Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej*) 33/2017, Warsaw 2017, p. 12.

⁴⁰ Ibidem, p. 14.

still shows that Polish people have the highest degree of trust in their families (97%), friends (90%) and more distant relatives (89%).⁴¹ Trust in the closest circle of family and friends can influence the development of social trust in two ways. It can create favourable conditions for the development of a culture of trust in some societies. In some others, however, it may contribute to the reduction of contacts with and trust in strangers, thus becoming a syndrome of the lack of social trust.⁴² Consequently, it will deepen the problem of the low quality of social capital and the quality of security in the social dimension.

It should be emphasized that “social trust not only determines the shape of institutions, but it is also the result of the activity of these institutions.”⁴³ This relationship between citizens and state institutions largely affects cooperation and interaction, also having an influence on the development of security in the social context. According to Krzysztof Nowakowski, “sharing views and beliefs from which trust derives is the fundamental component of social capital and its significant economic value.”⁴⁴

What can the lack of social trust lead to? Researchers indicate one principal problem here, i.e. the lack of conviction that joint effort makes sense. Thus, not only voter turnout decreases, but also general citizen participation is very low. The level of the economic development of a society is a serious problem, too. As F. Fukuyama emphasized, “one of the most important lessons we can learn from an examination of economic life is that a nation’s well-being, as well as its ability to compete, is conditioned by a single pervasive cultural characteristic:

⁴¹ Ibidem, p. 8.

⁴² K. Nowakowski, *Wymiary zaufania i problem zaufania negatywnego w Polsce*, „Ruch Prawniczy, Ekonomiczny i Socjologiczny”, Bulletin 1/2008, p. 216.

⁴³ Ibidem.

⁴⁴ Ibidem.

the level of trust inherent in the society.”⁴⁵ When undertaking economic activity, we need to take into consideration the necessity of establishing relations with a variety of people, often from outside of one’s closest circle and in quite complex social circumstances. Hence, without social trust, a state cannot develop its economy and become competitive internationally. As a result, it is doomed to exist on the peripheries of the global economic system.

We may obviously wonder whether the above was the case of Poland when its political elites made a choice concerning the direction of economic and political changes. After all, the assumptions of Balcerowicz’s plan were largely in line with the expectations of international institutions (the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank), which made their financial aid conditional on Poland’s application of specific economic solutions. As Rafał Woś observed, “first non-Communist governments did not have a lot of leeway. One of the reasons was the wild marketization in Poland being the result of Wilczek and Rakowski’s famous act (1988). Furthermore, it was Poland’s public and private creditors who expected the neoliberal approach from the government in Warsaw. Although they forgave a large part of Poland’s debt (...), the cabinets headed by Tadeusz Mazowiecki and Jan Krzysztof Bielecki well knew that Western creditors would be favourably disposed towards Poland only if it followed the recommendations of international financial institutions.”⁴⁶ On the other hand, it is hard not to blame the-then elites (including all parties in power after 1989) for forgetting and rejecting the ideas and values of the so-called First Solidarity, which was the model of the foundation for building social trust.

⁴⁵ F. Fukuyama, *Trust. The Social Virtues and The Creation of Prosperity*, New York 1996, p. 17.

⁴⁶ R. Woś, *Dziecięta choroba liberalizmu*, Warsaw 2014, pp. 34–35.

There is no denial that the 1980s did not create favourable conditions for the development of social trust and social capital, not to mention social security. The introduction of the martial law marked the collapse of the social and political community and the beginning of social anomie. However, the political elites of the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries are also to blame. As A. Szahaj indicates, “a number of poorly prepared people became members of the political class. They were often driven by the willingness to make money owing to politics. Just like bad money drives out good, those low-quality politicians tried to marginalize those for whom politics was first of all about serving the public. (...) The society was a passive observer of the events, being treated as an element of festive mobilization (elections), after which politicians could consume their political rent, i.e. capitalize on material benefits from the position held in the political apparatus. Democracy became a façade behind which a real (pseudo) political life went on.”⁴⁷

Therefore, no strong substantive democracy – created not on the level of institutions, but through people’s identifying themselves with common good – was established. This is the only way of achieving a permanent whole: well-functioning democracy owing to the society pervaded with civic virtues. This is all the more important because, as W. Kymlicka and W. Norman point out, we are witnessing a crisis of citizenship today, manifested in: the growth of voter apathy, welfare dependency, the erosion of the welfare state, and the failure of the environmental policy based on citizens’ voluntary cooperation.⁴⁸ The

⁴⁷ A. Szahaj, *Niesprawiedliwość a demoralizacja*, [in:] *Kapitalizm...*, op.cit., p. 76; A. Zyberowicz, *Demokracja jako fasada: przypadek III RP*, [in:] *Utracona dynamika? O niedojrzałości polskiej demokracji*, ed. by E. Mokrzycki, A. Rychard, A. Zybortowicz, Warsaw 20002, pp. 173–214.

⁴⁸ W. Kymlicka, W. Norman, *Obywatelstwo w kulturowo różnorodnych społeczeństwach: problemy, konteksty, pojęcia*, [in:] ed. by B. Misztal, M. Przycho-dzeń, *Aktualność wolności. Wybór esejów*, p. 36.

deepening apathy can only be overcome by the previously mentioned “reconciliation” between individual efforts and the community’s activity in the inclusive sense.

As Andrzej Walicki noted, the ideal society should be “at the same time liberal enough to secure the freedom of an individual and loyal enough to ensure that each of its members will participate in social life.”⁴⁹ This goal will be accomplished if negative freedom is recognized as the basis of all freedoms and the society becomes responsible for providing resources needed for achieving it. As regards policy pursued by this society, the pluralism of values must be adopted. No value should be made absolute in this case since it would lead straight to anarchy. What is more, one should remember that there are values which are naturally conflicting (e.g. equality and freedom), which means that we may only strive for balancing them.⁵⁰

However, not all types of social capital bring the desired effects in social, political or economic life. It is even pointed out that “the level of the development of democracy and prosperity is determined by the existence or absence of certain kinds of social bonds.”⁵¹ There is no doubt that among social capital types distinguished in the literature – bonding, bridging and linking – it is bridging social capital that is of the biggest importance for the development of an individual in all spheres of his or her activity in social life. Its essence lies in spreading social bonds/networks to different groups and communities in order to make as many individuals as possible involved in action. This involves people’s willingness to establish relations with and extend their

⁴⁹ A. Walicki, *O liberalizmie, wspólnocie i historii*, „Przegląd Polityczny”, 2006, no. 75, p. 26.

⁵⁰ I. Berlin, *Two Concepts of Liberty*, op.cit., p. 56.

⁵¹ M. Adamczyk, *Wprowadzenie do teorii kapitału...*, p. 201; See: B. Lewenstein, *Spółczesność rodzin czy obywateli – kapitał społeczny Polaków okresu transformacji*, „Societas/Communitas”, 2006, no. 1, pp. 163–196.

network to other societies and communities. Opening up to other people/communities reflects the need for including a large number of people in acting for the common good.⁵² Social capital of the bridging (inclusive) type is potentially the most beneficial to the society as it significantly contributes to the accumulation of social capital, which makes it possible for the successive generations to use it. What is more, it helps to develop prosperity and consolidate democracy.⁵³

Bonding capital stands in contradiction to the underlying concept of bridging capital. It is associated with establishing positive relations and building a network of citizen participation only between members of a specific community. Those who remain outside this community are considered “enemies” and no ties should be maintained with them.⁵⁴ Thus, bonding social capital does not contribute the development of civil society and social security. This is a consequence of the “exclusion” from the community of all those who do not submit to its rules, whether due to their political views or because of cultural differences.

The abovementioned types of social capital involve the occurrence of vertical networks of interactions. They are quite different from linking social capital, which is associated with the “vertical relationships of authority and dependence.”⁵⁵ To put it simply, it reflects interactions between “weak” and “strong” individuals (superior-subordinate relationship). As Monika Adamczyk indicates, “this type of capital – despite vertical ties it produces – may link poor and marginalized social groups with the resources, ideas and information that formal institutions possess.”⁵⁶ Linking capital may either reduce or reinforce

⁵² R.D. Putnam, *Bowling Alone...*, pp. 225–227.

⁵³ See: M. Adamczyk, *Wprowadzenie do teorii kapitału...*, pp. 165–185.

⁵⁴ R.D. Putnam, *Bowling Alone...*, pp. 225–227.

⁵⁵ M. Adamczyk, *Wprowadzenie do teorii kapitału...*, pp. 228–229.

⁵⁶ Ibidem, p. 229; Por. K. Bezanson, *Gender and the Limits of Social Capital*, „Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology” 2006, vol. 43, no. 4, p. 429.

social inequalities. It depends on the degree of the distribution of capital, its availability in a given surrounding, the difference in the amount of resources that individuals have, and, finally, on social exclusion resulting from the lack of access to capital.⁵⁷ As long as it includes citizens in the network, this type of capital is the most important one when it comes to preventing social threats. Hence, it plays the essential role in the shaping and strengthening of social security.

A culture of trust is undoubtedly connected with the axiological system of a given society. This system helps to set the directions of people's activity and, more importantly, to build identity. It also constitutes an inherent component of the political culture which prevails in a given society. As Loek Halman rightly notes, "in today's, often hot, debate, the discussion does not concern the decline of values as such, but focuses on the decline of decent (pro) social behaviours."⁵⁸ This view is in line with diagnoses made by other political scientists and sociologists, who indicate the fact that individuals turn away both from basic state and international institutions and from the authorities, which, sadly, negatively affects the level of the so-called citizen ethics.⁵⁹ It is a significant factor supporting both formal and informal social structure, and, as it vanishes, the so-called shell democracy. Thus, an argument is often raised that we should "return" to values in public life.

It is obviously difficult to recognize the absence of values in a given society. From the point of view of political science, however, a question arises whether values present in the society belong to political categories, and, consequently, whether they have an influence on the

⁵⁷ M. Theiss, *Krewni-Znajomi-Obywatele. Kapitał społeczny a lokalna polityka społeczna*, Toruń 2007, p. 39.

⁵⁸ L. Halman, *Wartości polityczne*, [in:] *Zachowania polityczne*, Warsaw 2010, p. 364.

⁵⁹ *Ibidem*.

ongoing processes in the society. As far as my study is concerned, we need to address a specific issue: are there political and other values in the life of Polish society which influence social security? In order to answer such questions, we should attempt to explain the category of values and identify the determinants of political values.

As many other concepts of social sciences, the category of values is hard to define.⁶⁰ When looking for an appropriate definition, one encounters difficulties arising from the very nature of values – they are immeasurable, so they belong to the category of proposed or inferential phenomena. That is why a “spectrum of possible definitions ranges from equating values with interest to perceiving them in a subjective way and granting them importance.”⁶¹ There is no doubt, however, that values, while being an open notion, may become subject to different classifications. Since it is not the subject of my deliberations though, I will assume that “values are deeply rooted motivations or orientations driving or explaining certain attitudes, norms and opinions, which in turn guide people’s activity or at least some parts of it. Being loyal to a given value means being inclined towards acting in a specific way.”⁶² Hence, narrowing down the scope of values to the political sphere only, we should acknowledge that they may be considered to be a specific foundation of people’s political behaviour, e.g. voter participation or its absence. If we agree with Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, who claim that political values represent people’s attitude to political objects, we must assume that each view or behaviour of an individual in the political sphere can be justified by the “picture” of values they follow.⁶³

⁶⁰ Ibidem.

⁶¹ Ibidem.

⁶² Ibidem, p. 365.

⁶³ G. Almond, S. Verba, *Civic Culture Political Attitudes and Democracy*, Princeton 1963, pp. 24–47.

Development capital and the shaping of social security

Human capital is irreplaceable when it comes to building social security. Its principal role is progress. We can risk a statement that without human capital, it would be impossible for social capital and for the state to develop. Development capital takes its origin from education. It was already Adam Smith who – in *The Wealth of Nations* – emphasized that investment in education is capital investment and raising a child is a form of deposit.⁶⁴ It should be interpreted both in the individual and social sense, because “by means of education the utilitarian qualities of social members attain the form of permanent capital.”⁶⁵ We may safely say that the education of an individual is as important as technological inventions – both factors ensure social progress. Apart from the economic profit of the society resulting from the education of its member, there is an additional benefit – not always perceptible – related to development in the cultural sphere. Thanks to the capability of critical thinking, an individual improves the whole community.

If we consider the abovementioned assumptions, we also have to indicate that the role of citizens in the shaping of social security is extremely important. This is because each citizen can – through work and development – achieve a high economic status enabling them to shape social security on their own. It is obvious that it will not protect individuals against all contemporary dangers, such as natural disasters or factors negatively affecting the consolidation of family. However, there are some aspects which are a consequence of the lack of responsibility for one’s personal decisions and the resulting actions.

⁶⁴ A. Smith, *The Wealth of Nations*, London 1778, pp. 347–348.

⁶⁵ Ibidem.

This is caused by a number of factors the most important of which seems to be the excessive state welfare.⁶⁶ It must be stressed, however, that this does not mean that the state should renounce its obligations towards people in need (the old, the ill, etc.). This aid should be provided sagaciously, though, so that people would not expect the state to solve all their problems and develop the attitude of learned helplessness. What is an example of too much interference on the part of the state were the efforts taken by the Polish government in the social sphere after the liquidation of the State Agricultural Farms (PGR, *Państwowe Gospodarstwa Rolne*). Today, they remain to be the enclaves of social exclusion.⁶⁷ Thus, the state should focus on support rather than intervention.

We should ask why? A contemporary man has a lot more developed competences (in different dimensions) than citizens living at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries. Moreover, as was mentioned earlier, the state is becoming increasingly inefficient through attempts to satisfy its citizens' social needs. In the long term, this does good to neither side. That is why individuals should take a large part of responsibility for their own life. People's independence can obviously be limited by, for example, social roles, so they should be supported in their efforts by their family and small local communities, which should be the basic circles of social activity.⁶⁸ A special role is played by one's family here; more distant relatives and friends are also important. It is them that to the largest degree build a sense of social security. This is connected both with community ties and with trust, which is naturally existent in the closest family circle.

⁶⁶ A. Skrabacz, *Bezpieczeństwo społeczne. Podstawy teoretyczne i praktyczne*, Warsaw 2012, p. 205.

⁶⁷ Ibidem.

⁶⁸ Ibidem.

As Aleksandra Skrabacz notes, “the role of the family is constant neither in time nor in space.”⁶⁹ However, this does not change its responsibility for the success of people belonging to it. Although, due to changing developmental conditions, the modern family no longer has the function of a retirement base for its senior members or a kindergarten for children, but it is still a generational obligation to both.

Local communities constitute another area which is equally responsible for the success of social security. It is in them where social bonds of a specific kind are established, thanks to which it becomes possible to solidify citizens’ sensitivity to harm done to others. These relations belong to a very delicate sphere of the activity of individuals and social groups, so they require both interpersonal and social trust. Thus, social security is shaped as near the interested parties as possible, owing to which it may provide support to all those who need it. At the same time, this support may be used in the positive sense so that an individual could develop all his or her competences to serve the whole community.

It is local communities that the success of the development of a society depends on. There is a kind of feedback here: owing to professional, intellectual and other qualifications, an individual can serve a community. The community is in turn responsible for providing the best possible growth prospects to citizens. At the same time, development capital is one of the foundations of participation and democracy. It also shapes the position and role of an individual in the society, as a citizen.

What is the foundation of the formation of an individual’s place in the society is trust. It is an important determinant of citizen attitudes and civic political competences. Without social capital, the following elements of civic political competences would be absent: interest in

⁶⁹ Ibidem, p. 207.

and knowledge of politics, citizen participation, and the axiological system based on civic values. It is the culture of social trust which shapes citizen attitudes, i.e. “the model” of a citizen who has both rights (in all spheres of his or her activity) and obligations to other citizens. In line with the concept of human rights being combined with people’s commitments to the community – individuals first of all have obligations to others and, owing to this, they obtain a right to exercise their freedoms. This conviction is based on the positive perception of privileges obtained in the community in which thinking about human rights in their negative context is negated.

There are two assumptions that are a starting point for such a concept of the citizen. They derive from a belief that everyone grows up and lives in a community. The first of them refers to the constituent characteristics of the citizen, i.e. civic virtues, and the other one is social capital. As Robert D. Putnam observed: “the health of democracy requires citizens to be publicly engaged (...); the health of public institutions depends, at least partly, on widespread participation in private, voluntary groups – in those civic engagement networks which embody social capital.”⁷⁰

Therefore, in democracy, “a network of civil society” has both an external influence on the political community and an internal impact on “its participants.”⁷¹ However, it is not possible to build such a society without trust, a sense of justice or activity in political life, and these elements may appear in the public sphere only if members of the community establish mutual relationships. “People isolated from a community, activity and company turn to extremism.”⁷² Thus, we observe the return to the citizen who constitutes the foundation of

⁷⁰ R.D. Putnam, *Bowling Alone...*, p. 550.

⁷¹ *Ibidem*, p. 552.

⁷² W. Kornhauser, *The Politics of Mass Society*, “Glencoe” 1959, vol. III, p. 73.

social capital thanks to his or her civic virtues. According to W. Galdston, we can divide them into four categories: the first of them includes general virtues, such as courage, obedience to the law and loyalty. The second group includes social virtues, i.e. independence and open-mindedness. Another set of civic virtues encompasses economic resources, such as work ethics, a person's ability to delay gratification, and the ability to adapt to economic and technological changes. The last, fourth group of civic virtues, includes political virtues, i.e. the ability to respect and recognize other people's rights (respecting minority rights), readiness to demand only things that one can pay for, the ability to assess the work of the people who hold offices in the name of citizens, or willingness to get engaged in the public discourse.⁷³

Contrary to appearances, citizen attitudes are very important for shaping social security. It is assumed that they are to a large degree based on "a national character."⁷⁴ They are influenced by historical experience and mentality. Positive features conducive to the development of social security include citizens' ability to organize themselves and a sense of community. At the same time, it must be emphasized that they emerge in crisis situations and concern the so-called lofty goals rather than everyday, rather mundane, jobs.⁷⁵ That is why the system of social security in Poland is to a larger extent determined by the so-called negative qualities of "a national character," such as the lack of the ability to set long-term goals and anticipate the consequences of one's actions, "a flash in the pan" when it comes to solving

⁷³ W. Galdston, *Liberal Purposes: Goods, Virtues, and Duties in the Liberal State*, Cambridge 1991, pp. 221–224. Polish edition: *Cele liberalizmu*, Kraków–Warsaw 1991, pp. 160–164.

⁷⁴ A. Skrabacz, K. Loranty, *Bezpieczeństwo społeczne w demokratycznym państwie. Perspektywa personalna i strukturalna*, Warsaw 2016, pp. 54–91.

⁷⁵ Ibidem.

both political and economic problems, high expectations of the state and “others,” deriving from Poles’ mentality formed over a few generations living in the conditions of real socialism, and, as Aleksandra Skrabacz and Krzysztof Loranty put it: “dissatisfaction, pessimism, apathy, the underestimation of one’s and the nation’s achievements, undertaking and complacency with temporary solutions, the lack of holistic attitude to a number of issues, including security.”⁷⁶

Thus, it is safe to say that the quality of democracy and degree of its consolidation depends on the quality of human capital and social capital. The problem of the right and obligation to participate concerns a very delicate issue of the state of democracy. It is connected with the prevalence of a specific type of political culture in the society. Regardless of research methods applied (normative or empirical), it is commonly assumed that what is the most desired type of political culture which favours the consolidation of democracy is participant culture.⁷⁷ As the authors of the theory of political culture indicate, it involves specific requirements from a citizen: “(...) a democratic citizen is expected to take part in politics, have a keen interest in it, and, in this process, be driven by reason, not by emotions.”⁷⁸ Thus, it is expected that citizens will exercise their right to participate only when they obtain a high degree of civic political competences. Their most important elements include one’s interest in and knowledge of politics, which are largely dependent on the system of political values rooted in the society. These values translate into people’s decisions and actions. These elements must be bound by social trust.⁷⁹

⁷⁶ Ibidem.

⁷⁷ G. Almond, S. Verba, *The Civil....*, op.cit., p. 487.

⁷⁸ G. Almond, S. Verba, *Problem kultury politycznej*, [in:] *Władza i społeczeństwo*, op.cit., pp. 328–329.

⁷⁹ See: T. Godlewski, *Obywatelskie kompetencje polityczne*, [in:] *Demokracja w Polsce po 2005 roku*, ed. by D. Karnowska, Toruń 2008; D. Karnowska, *Czy kompetencje społeczne mają wpływ na kształtowanie liderów społecznych?*, [in:]

The above statements, however, need elaboration following the experience of democratic societies. Almond and Verba emphasize that the “clear” types of political culture are basically only models which do not exist in social reality. Hence, they should be treated as proposals or patterns to follow. Civic political competences will thus constitute a certain normative proposal rather than citizens’ real attitudes. Moreover, as the authors indicate, “as part of civic culture, an individual does not have to be a rational, active citizen. Their activity is more complex and tempered. In this sense, it is a combination of competences, involvement and initiative with passivity and indifference.”⁸⁰ This remark is important to the extent that the right to participate in a democratic system does not have to be exercised by the whole society. The thing is that it can include individuals who intentionally choose not to get involved, which is not tantamount to questioning democracy as a political regime. As Lech Szczegółą rightly notes, this “withdrawal” may reflect people’s longing for the ‘real’ political system of democracy to be closer to declared values rather than rejecting them.”⁸¹ Thus, participation and its level pose a smaller problem than motivations, which determine passivity or activity in the political sphere. If passivity derives from the axiological system which negates solutions typical of democracy, a serious problem for its consolidation arises and there is a risk that different forms of extremism and populism – leading to the change of political regime – will appear.

Lider społeczny, ed. by K.A. Piasecki, Kraków 2013; D. Plecka, A. Turska-Kawa, W. Wojtasik, *Obywatelskie kompetencje polityczne*, „Kultura i Edukacja”, 2013, no. 3, pp. 73–98.

⁸⁰ G. Almond, S. Verba, *The Civil Culture*, op.cit., p. 487.

⁸¹ L. Szczegółą, *Bierność obywateli*, op.cit., p. 95. See: B. Westle, *Politische Legitimität. Theorien. Konzepte, empirische Befunde*, Baden Baden 1989; P. Norris, *Introduction: The Growth of Critical Citizens?* [in:] *Critical Citizens. Global Support for Democratic Governance*, ed. by P. Norris, Oxford 1999.

In this respect, we should pay particular attention to populism, which belongs – like democracy – to a group of heterogeneous concepts and phenomena, occurring on different layers of social and political life. We can also observe that it usually emerges when social demands come into play as people express their dissatisfaction with the efforts the government makes in this field. At the same time, we can indicate the determinants of populism, as distinguished by Pierre-Andre Taguieff.⁸² They include the mobilization of the discontented ones, the presence of a charismatic leader (these factors are frequent in autocratic, presidential and semi-presidential systems), the lack of uniform ideology (thus, both conservative and progressive attitudes emerge), and, finally, the conviction that „virtue is the quality of simple folk that constitutes a vast majority, and is a part of its collective tradition.”⁸³ We should add that what is characteristic of populism is the idea of a change in the sphere of social relations, although it is not necessarily linked with progress. The intervention of the state is also important as it is seen as an institution which solves “simple folk’s” problems.

Populism is considered to be a common phenomenon and is quite often confused with demagoguery.⁸⁴ This is because the term populism tends to be used thoughtlessly, becoming an epithet to refer to politicians regardless of their party affiliation (something that media often do). The notion has even become a weapon used by the opponents of some political actors, both individual and collective, in order to discredit them. It should be remembered here that populism, as a uni-

⁸² P. Taggart, *Populizm i patologie polityki przedstawicielskiej*, [in:] *Demokracja w obliczu populizmu*, ed. by J. Szacki, Warsaw 2007, p. 40.

⁸³ P. Wiles, *Populizm, lud i rdzenna kraina*, [in:] *Populizm*, ed. by O. Wysocka, Warsaw 2010, p. 25.

⁸⁴ J. Szacki, *Populizm a demokracja*, [in:] *Populizm na przełomie XX i XXI wieku. Panaceum czy pułapka dla współczesnych społeczeństw*, ed. by M. Marczevska-Rytko, Toruń 2006, pp. 13–18; M. Karwat, *O karykaturze polityki*, Warsaw 2006, pp. 225–230.

versal phenomenon (Szacki, 2007, p. 11), “clearly seems to be shifting from the peripheries to the centres of the contemporary world. Today, populism is considered in terms of the prospects of the Western world’s political democracy, although it was not until the 1990s that the West recognized that the issue of populism was its own problem.”⁸⁵

Thus, we should address a question what modern populism is based on, if it is not a specific ideology. Jerzy Szacki rightly comments that populism is not about any concrete ideas, values or the institutionalization of masses. Populism refers to “the special understanding of democracy,”⁸⁶ which cannot be described with the use of commonly known models. It is a universal phenomenon, although its essence is hard to grasp. It does not only refer to politicians’ manipulations, but it is also the expression of the discontentment of the masses, which they manifest in the only way they can – often unprofessionally and very emotionally. This is favoured by the so-called “empty core,” which indicates populists’ total lack of attachment to any values or ideas – they are selected on the basis of the activists’ current needs. That is why it is so easy to encounter populist attitudes among people identifying themselves with great ideologies, e.g. conservatism or liberalism. At the same time, populism draws on the ideas of both the left and right wing, and is often positioned as the opposition to leading ideologies. The so-called “heartland,” in turn, is the embodiment of people’s customs and wisdoms. This principle constitutes quite an idealized construction in a community. It may even be said that it is a specific kind of the foundation myth that politicians often bandy with in their speeches. The heartland is obviously inhabited by the people and it is the people that “add meaning to populists’ all interpretations and appeals to the people.”⁸⁷

⁸⁵ J. Szacki, *Wstęp*, [in:] *Demokracja w obliczu...*, op.cit., p. 12.

⁸⁶ Ibidem, p. 14.

⁸⁷ P. Taggart, *Populizm i patologie*, op.cit., p. 84.

Both “empty core” and “heartland” are concepts used by populists in crisis situations. It should be mentioned here that populists are generally against a political system, especially its representative formula, and against becoming involved in politics. What they find disgusting is having to function in a party and parliamentary configuration, because both these institutions are an impediment to the accomplishment of the goals that have been set. The paradox lies in the fact that it is the only formula in which populists can express their views.

Despite a negative attitude to politics and to participation in its organized form, there are cases when populists get engaged in it. These are crisis situations. It is worth mentioning here that it is extremely hard to objectively decide what social and political situation assumes the proportions of a crisis. Thus, a crisis may be imagined rather than being an actual socio-political condition. According to Paul Taggart, “populism emerges when a serious process of changes evokes a sense of crisis among at least one social group.”⁸⁸ At the same time, this social group is distinguished by growing self-awareness and a sense of being separated from the centres of power.

It must be stressed that they are usually social groups with low social, economic and citizen competences. This is predominantly owing to the anti-intellectualism of populism and, as mentioned earlier, the fact that it often refers to the category of the “people” and its constituent traditions. What is also important is the conviction that anti-intellectualism has another important task to accomplish: it is a negation, escape from everything that symbolizes the elite of a specific society. It is thus the foundation for building a “new order.”

Populism is a substitute category and is often used as an epithet because it cannot be classified within the framework of common ideological models or patterns connected both ideological divisions

⁸⁸ Ibidem, p. 80.

and standards of thinking which were dominant in the West at the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries. It is also a “certain strategy of action taken for the good of a society and, as such, it should serve the accomplishment of diverse interests and goals. Populism defined in this way has mainly the instrumental dimension.”⁸⁹

From the perspective of our research problem, a question should be asked whether there are any mechanisms which may protect democracy against the influence of populists. The answer is not unambiguous, but we can make some assumptions proposing certain solutions to the problem. Firstly, there will always be some elements of populism in democracy. After all, both democracy and populism refer to the “people.”⁹⁰ Secondly, populist slogans have to find a sympathetic ear. This is connected not only with the degree of the consolidation of democracy, but also with a psychological predisposition.

It should be added that there are two clear stances here. The first of them, represented by Almond and Verba, derives from the conviction that “culture is not based on general life orientations, but on specific political orientations which legitimize the system.”⁹¹ Thus, they consolidate democracy, increase attachment to it and enhance satisfaction with its functioning to a larger degree than psychological inclinations. The other standpoint, indicating the sources of democratic ethos, is presented by Harold Lasswell and Alex Inkeles, who emphasize that “multiple mental qualities constituting one’s personality determine the support of a specific political system.”⁹² According to Lasswell, they include mainly: open-mindedness, liberal values, the pluralism of at-

⁸⁹ J. Dzwończyk, *Populistyczne tendencje w społeczeństwie postsocjalistycznym (na przykładzie Polski)*, Toruń 2000, p. 18.

⁹⁰ J. Szacki, *Populizm a demokracja*, op.cit., p. 14.

⁹¹ G. Almond, S. Verba, *The Civic Culture*, op.cit.,

⁹² M. Urban, *Demokratyczna osobowość. Model i jego urzeczywistnienie w warunkach polskiej demokracji*, Warsaw 2013, p. 27.

titudes, a high degree of social trust, resistance to fear and a sense of threat. Inkeles supplemented this catalogue with features such as loyalty to secular authority, faith in scientific progress, rationalism and readiness to participate in the life of a community.⁹³

On the opposite side of democratic inclinations, there are predictors of populist attitudes. The most important of them is fear which is the foundation for the emergence of such factors as low self-esteem, a high degree of pessimism, a low degree of self-efficacy, openness to new experiences, a high level of political alienation, and no need to respect norms and principles.⁹⁴

It should be agreed that both Almond and Verba's view and Laswell and Inkeles's approach are important for the consolidation of democracy and for protecting it against the so-called hard populism. In this regard, the level of civic political competences is an interesting issue – it reflects not only a psychological predisposition, but also the degree to which democracy is rooted in a specific society.

All this considerably influences the quality of social security. While social slogans may favour the development of populist attitudes, they may also significantly contribute to the shaping of citizen behaviours, thus, consolidating democracy. There is no doubt that it is a consequence of capital that everyone has, and which can – under the influence of both a family and communities – transform into the capital serving the whole society.

⁹³ See: Ch. Welzel, *Nowoczesność jednostki*, [in:] *Zachowania polityczne*, ed. by R.J. Dalton, H.D. Klingemann, Warsaw 2010, pp. 233–257.

⁹⁴ A. Turska-Kawa, *Psychologiczne uwarunkowania zachowań wyborczych*, „Preferencje Polityczne”, 2010, no. 1, pp. 101–122. See: D. Plecka, A. Turska-Kawa, *Anxiety determinants of Populist Attitudes among Young People*, “Athenaeum. Polish Political Science Studies”, 2016, no. 52, pp. 256–273.

Social security models

As was mentioned earlier, social security is determined by a number of different factors. The most important of them include: the mentality of a society, its history, needs, the economic condition of the society and state, and equally important capitals: human and social. Thus, the level of social trust, people's level of education and the degree of democratic consolidation are also significant. These and other factors determine social security models. Basically, it may be said that just like political culture does not exist in a pure (ideal) form, social security models are only a point of reference for the solutions adopted in particular communities.

Scandinavian model⁹⁵

The Scandinavian model is often referred to as the Nordic one. It occurs, in close to perfection forms, in such European countries as Denmark, Sweden, Norway and Finland. It is based on a few basic pillars. First of all, it involves extensive state interventionism. We may also observe the state's high involvement in the redistribution of goods and social issues. It is citizenship that makes people entitled to social aid: this model excludes relations between professional activity and the possibility of obtaining support from the state. It stems from the conviction that every person deserves a decent life and that the state should make sure that none of its citizens is threatened by social exclusion. Hence, in Sweden, for example, people also receive vouchers for press and books as part of state aid. It is thus justifiable to say

⁹⁵ The model names were used by Bogusław Jagusiak, who accurately defined all social security models. In this paper, they were used as the basis for building models of social security. See: B. Jagusiak, *Bezpieczeństwo socjalne*, op.cit., pp. 122–142.

that social benefits have a universal character and citizens' expectations regarding the sphere of social security are met by the state on the highest possible level.

Such a high level of state interventionism is possible owing to, among other things, the mixed economy model existing in Scandinavian countries. It combines market mechanisms with the implementation of the social security strategy. It means that there are spheres in social life that are free of market mechanisms. They include healthcare, education, etc. Moreover, the state strives to reduce unemployment and if it occurs at all, it should be only a temporary phenomenon. In this case, the state's task is to implement the principle of full employment, which becomes possible thanks to public institutions' activity in the labour market.

The broad scope of competences in the social sphere is connected with strong social acceptance for the accomplishment of the tasks of a welfare state. This is in line with the principle of democracy and a high degree of the consolidation of civil society. It concerns not only procedures and the functioning of institutions, but also their underlying values. These values include, first of all, public debate, tolerance, respect for minorities and the conviction that all people are equal. Civil society is based on social capital manifested in a wide network of different organizations established on the grassroots level in order to cooperate with the state in implementing the principles of social security.

Human rights, which underlie the Scandinavian model of social security, constitute a sphere in which the good of an individual can be pursued. Obviously, it would not be possible without the other participants in the activities for the sake of social security: social capital and the state. Although it is the state that has the biggest contribution, in the Scandinavian model, all three pillars of social security must go hand in hand.

Anglo-Saxon model

The situation is quite different in the case of the Anglo-Saxon model. It directly refers to the neoliberal principles governing the state's role in the field of social security. That is why social policy pursued by the state is not comprehensive, but quite selective. This model is often referred to as a "marginal strategy," i.e. the one which "is based [...] on the belief that well-functioning markets and family support are the best ways of satisfying human needs."⁹⁶

The state's role is of marginal importance here. It is an individual and his or her closest circle – family and local communities – that are first of all responsible for the success of social security. When they fail to satisfy social needs, non-governmental organizations should take over their role. When NGOs fails as well, it is time for the government to step in and guarantee a subsistence existence.⁹⁷ It stems from the conviction that extensive state intervention in social security has negative consequences. As it was emphasized before, the state's excessive involvement has a destructive influence on citizen attitudes regarding social security – it entails the lack of motivation for the development of individual competences, limits freedom, and is immoral, especially in the dimension of social relations (working social groups are impoverished by communities living on state welfare support).

Another characteristic feature of the Anglo-Saxon model is the low degree of institutionalization of the labour market. There are no sufficient regulations regarding, e.g. wages or employment protection. These problems are solved mainly by individuals themselves and by means of industrial relations. Each citizen has a right (as well as an obligation) to take care of his or her economic position in the society.

⁹⁶ B. Jagusiak, *Bezpieczeństwo socjalne*, op.cit., p. 132.

⁹⁷ Por. E. Karpowicz, *Modele polityki społecznej. Kierunki zmian polityki społecznej w Polsce*, BsiE, no. 1249, pp. 4–5.

The state guarantees only a subsistence minimum, which is sufficient in case of an illness or being unemployed. Citizens can secure themselves a higher level of security through additional, private insurance or thanks to accumulated savings.⁹⁸ In this model, the state's limited role in shaping social security is supplemented by individual and community activity – the state provides social security only when other forces fail. It should be added that this happens on the minimum level or, as Hayek put it, the level of commutative justice.⁹⁹

Continental model

This model is frequently referred to as the German model as it reflects the philosophy of the state and community based on social free market economy derived from the doctrine of ordoliberalism. This model of social security is founded on the conviction that the functioning of free market economy is justified on the condition that its principles are controlled by the state. This does not mean that the state should be strongly involved in market regulations, but that it should safeguard freedoms in the economic sphere. Thus, the state should make efforts to prevent the oligarchization of the economy and make sure that it is competitive. Faith in market mechanisms is supplemented by the belief that citizens must be comprehensively supported.

However, the continental model does not involve as high degree of respect of human and civil rights as it is the case in the Scandinavian one. The state's welfare activity is based on a citizen's economic involvement. In practice, this means that work is not people's privilege, but their duty and an obligation to their family. It is these pillars –

⁹⁸ M. Księżopolski, *Polityka społeczna w różnych krajach i modele polityki społecznej*, [in:] *Polityka społeczna*, ed. by G. Filrit-Fesnak, M. Szyłko-Skoczny, Warsaw 2007, p. 155.

⁹⁹ Hayek.

work, which makes it possible “to contribute to the budget,” and a family – which have shaped the German model. Thus, if one of the family members is active in the labour market, the other members become entitled to state welfare. This means that people’s needs “should be satisfied in accordance with the criteria of work experience, one’s position in the labour market, achievements and efficiency. In this model, the state [...] makes the efficiency (amount) of social benefits conditional on the status of a given person in the job market.”¹⁰⁰

The relation between one’s activity in the labour market and state support is a consequence of the universality of insurances both in subjective and objective sense. We may say that they originate from the tradition initiated by Otto von Bismarck in the 19th century. They cover both working people and their families, taking into consideration all accidents which restrict or deprive a person of the ability to earn income. It should be noted that, in this model, the wide scope of the state’s competences in the sphere of social security is accompanied by the need for an individual to get involved in the process of reinforcing it. Therefore, human capital is conducive to the low degree of poverty in a society because it is distinguished by a high level of education.¹⁰¹

In this system, an important role is played by social partners. This is connected with citizens’ strong participation not only in the political sphere, but first of all on the company level. The characteristic features are employees’ engagement in managing enterprises and locating trade unions outside companies. It is a very interesting formal solution because in this way both unionized workers and those who do not belong to the unions become responsible for the condition and development of their firm. Trade unions are in turn industry associations, which try to find the best solutions for employees and do not

¹⁰⁰ B. Jagusiak, *Bezpieczeństwo socjalne*, op.cit., p. 133.

¹⁰¹ E. Karpowicz, *Modele...*, op.cit., p. 5.

require much financial investment – their activists are not paid, working pro publico bono.

What is the priority in the assumptions of the continental model is the principle of subsidiarity, which involves the conviction that social programmes introduced by the state should not disturb market mechanisms – their primary task is to support citizens in difficult situations, without interfering too much. What is more, the state is not the first catalyst of changes “for better,” because the prevailing view is that all problems should be solved by an individual in the closest family circle and the family should also be able to provide support to him or her.

South European model

The South European model is quite an interesting solution in the field of social security. First of all, because it marginalizes the state’s role in the activities taken in this sphere; what is more, it is based on closed social capital.

The state plays quite a limited role here. Although, under the constitution, it pledges itself to protect an individual against threats to social security, citizens are not actually guarded in the legal or institutional sense.¹⁰² Moreover, institutions working for the needy are likely to develop a network of informal contacts; thus, they are more conducive to the emergence of pathologies in the system rather than supporting citizens. It should be stressed here that these institutions are usually not autonomous and their employees are rarely considered to be professionals. It may even be said that state welfare does not actu-

¹⁰² M. Książepolski, *Polska polityka społeczna na tle modeli występujących w Europie*, [in:] *Europa socjalna. Iluzja czy rzeczywistość?*, ed. by W. Anioł, M. Duszczyk, P.W. Zawadzki, Warsaw 2011, p. 264.

ally exist in the South European model.¹⁰³ It comes down to providing social benefits to selected social groups.

It is only citizens who work that are entitled to state aid, so, just like in the German model, they have their share in the formation of the social system resources. However, a certain limitation appears here: the system favours those who already work (these people are well protected in the labour market) at the expense of those who enter this market. In practice, it is difficult to sack an employee, even for incompetence, in order to employ competent people. This is because of the strong position of trade unions the activity of which is centralized. Although they cooperate with employers' representatives, this cooperation is limited to the establishment of work and pay conditions, which is quite a difficult task for employers.

The state's weakness in shaping social security was replaced by the involvement of the family, non-government organizations, and, especially, the Catholic Church. They are obviously backed by the state, but this support is insufficient to satisfy the needs of individuals. This favours the development of closed social capital, which marks the boundaries of aid provided to specific social groups depending on their belonging to a given community, e.g. the Catholic Church will not support people who are not members of a Catholic community. Thus, the activity in the field of social security basically relies on the family.

We should add here that the family has an exceptional value in the Mediterranean system. Even though its status had to change because of the new model of marriage, an increase in the number of divorces, decreasing birth rate and population ageing, it is the family in the micro-scale that is responsible for the success of its members in the sphere of social security. As Gary Becker put it, a „multigenerational

¹⁰³ B. Jagusiak, *Bezpieczeństwo socjalne...*, op.cit., p. 135.

and numerous family is the best protective net for a person when health, financial and personal problems appear in his or her life.”¹⁰⁴

The South European model of social security is an attempt to combine the continental and Anglo-Saxon model. At the same time, it is significantly influenced by societies’ culture and mentality. In none of the previously mentioned models, the family is as important element of the formation of the social security model as in the South European system.

East European model

The East European model of social security emerged after the collapse of the so-called Eastern bloc at the turn of 1980s and 1990s. This model is one of the most eclectic ones; it may even seem to be an attempt to adapt social security instruments to the needs of specific national communities. It is difficult to find identical points of reference in it, but we may indicate some regularities of the model. First of all, it definitely breaks with the provision of social guarantees by the state, which was the characteristic feature of centrally planned economy. We may thus observe that the state withdraws from social activity and the focus shifts towards an individual in this respect. Hence, the state’s role radically changes: a welfare state is replaced by a neoliberal one (“night watchman”). In accordance with this ideology, it is an individual and his or her closest relatives that are responsible for social security. The state obviously still provides some “social services,” but only to a limited extent, at a low cost and in the cases that may be classified as necessary. They are mainly aimed at ensuring short-term support to citizens so that they would not become socially excluded. These activities are not of a protective character, supporting the de-

¹⁰⁴ As cited by A. Skrabacz, *Bezpieczeństwo społeczne*, op.cit., p. 207.

velopment of an individual, and, what is more, they are not the element of any comprehensive strategy.

At the same time, the authorities openly maintain that it is the state that bears the biggest responsibility for social security. However, it also creates the conditions for the development of new spheres of social activity, e.g. through stimulating NGOs, or through establishing a formal and legal framework for private insurers and for providing services which are complementary or substitute to social insurance.¹⁰⁵

What is of the biggest importance in the East European model is development capital which is created owing to closed social capital that tends to transform into bridging capital. As it was mentioned earlier, it is an eclectic model, which evolves depending on the economic development of a society and on the budgetary capacity of the state.

¹⁰⁵ B. Jagusiak, *op.cit.*, p. 56–58.

Immigrants in Poland. On Diverse Attitudes to Foreigners in the Light of the Socio-Economic Situation and the Benefits of Immigration

Tolerance is the subject of studies of sociologists, anthropologists and historians. In the context of the current international circumstances, one must ask a question as to what degree we are ready to accept someone's views and beliefs if they are not entirely consistent with our perception of the world.

There is no doubt that the situation of societies and countries is strongly affected by the phenomenon of immigration. It should be emphasized that the scale of migration processes has been considerably increasing in recent years. We are observing an inflow of people from abroad to Poland, and a number of Poles are leaving their home country at the same time. Because of the difficult demographic situation, these phenomena should become the subject of a serious debate.

The aim of this paper is to present Polish people's attitude to other nations, ethnic minorities, immigrants and refugees based on the analysis of public opinion surveys, politicians' statements, and ordinary people's behaviours observed in the streets. In this context, we should analyze the causes of changes in the attitudes towards people of a different race, religion or culture. It is also important to find the answer to the question whether and if so, to what degree, immigration is beneficial to the economic development of Poland. What is

more, we should address the issue of what efforts must be taken in order to create conditions conducive to the assimilation of immigrants under the current social and political circumstances.

Attitudes towards immigrants in Poland

Poland has always been an ethnically diverse and religiously tolerant state. As Mikołaj Wiśniewski from the Centre for Research on Prejudice at the University of Warsaw points out, "(...) in the times of the Polish-Lithuanian Union and Commonwealth ("The Republic of the Two Nations"), Poland accepted Jews forced into exile from Spain and Portugal, and tolerated the Hussites. The same cannot be said about contemporary Poland (...)." ¹ Despite our history, in which, for hundreds of years, we have been open to other religions, it is striking that Poles today are generally quite intolerant towards people who look different and behave in a different way. Other ways of thinking and other religions are disapproved of. The majority of the society are against accepting refugees in Poland – in April 2016, 61% of the respondents objected to offering help to people leaving war-stricken areas. ²

In 1918, when Poland regained independence, it was a multinational state. S. Łodziński points out that representatives of national and ethnic minorities accounted for one third of the population. After World War Two, the People's Republic of Poland was an almost homogenous country. The then authorities thought it was their great success that they had formed a nation state. According to Łodziński, Poland was no longer ethnically diverse due to the following reasons:

¹ As quoted by: M. Chrzczonowicz, *Gowin zachwycony polską tolerancją*, 19.06.2016, <https://oko.press/gowin-zachwycony-polska-tolerancja-racje/>.

² Ibidem.

the extermination of Jewish and Romani people, the change of country borders, war and after-war migrations (among others, the repatriation of Poles, the expulsion of Germans, the relocation of national minorities in the Soviet Union or moving them to different parts of the country; this especially concerned Ukrainians).³ The change in the line-up of powers in Central and Eastern Europe in the 1990s and the political transformation resulting in democratization have brought about new conditions for national minorities in Poland. They can now openly display their ethnic identity guaranteed by international law and by the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2 April 1997.⁴

Nowadays, although some Poles have quite a positive attitude to people of other nationalities, quite a large number of others express their antipathy or even hostility towards them. In general, however, public opinion polls show that Polish people like to view themselves as a tolerant nation. The report of the Public Opinion Research Centre (*Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznych*, CBOS) from 11–17 September 2014 showed that the vast majority of the respondents, i.e. almost 91%, would have no problem with having neighbours of a different race or nationality.⁵ On the other hand, as Magdalena Chrzczonowicz points out, the results of the European Social Survey of 2014–15 indicate that 56% of the Poles believe that it “it is a lot better for the country to have all citizens sharing the same customs and traditions.”⁶ It should be noted, however, that 66% of the respondents expressed

³ S. Łodziński, *Powrót do różnorodności. Mniejszości narodowe i etniczne w Polsce po 1989 roku*, Warszawa, pp. 12–13.

⁴ *Ibidem*, pp. 15–46.


⁵ CBOS: *Polacy są tolerancyjni wobec innych ras i narodowości, boją się członków sekt*, 4.11.2014, <https://wiadomosci.wp.pl/cbos-polacy-sa-tolerancyjni-wobec-innych-ras-i-narodowosci-boja-sie-czlonkow-sekt-6027718703441025a>.

⁶ M. Chrzczonowicz, *Gowin zachwycony...*, op.cit.

a view that “the presence of foreigners has a positive impact on culture and the level of tolerance.”⁷

Figure 1.

Does the presence of foreigners enrich cultural diversity and make people more open to others?



Source: K. Kowalczyk, *Przybysze z daleka i z bliska, czyli o imigrantach w Polsce*, Report from the CBOS study, no. 93/2015, Warsaw, June 2015, p. 2.

After the accession to the European Union, Poland became the country affected by the “migration revolution.” The statistics of the Main Statistical Office (*Główny Urząd Statystyczny*, GUS) show that in 2016 approximately 2,515 million Polish citizens stayed abroad on a temporary basis (the data concern periods longer than three months),

⁷ See: K. Kowalczyk, *Przybysze z daleka i z bliska, czyli o imigrantach w Polsce*, Report from the CBOS study, no. 93/2015, Warsaw, June 2015, p. 2.

by 118,000 (4.7%) more than in 2015.⁸ According to some experts, in future, the number of immigrants to Poland will exceed the number of Polish emigrants. Konrad Pędzwiatr points out that “Poland will experience the ‘migration transition’, i.e. it will change from an emigration state to an immigration one.”⁹

Table 1.

Estimated number of Polish immigrants (temporary stay) in the years 2004–2016^a (*number of people staying abroad at the end of the year*)

Country of stay	Number of immigrants in thousands								
	2004	2005	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Total	1000	1450	2000	2060	2130	2196	2320	2397	2515
Including Europe	770	1200	1685	1754	1816	1891	2013	2098	2214
European Union (28 countries)^b	750	1170	1607	1670	1720	1789	1901	1983	2096
including:									
Austria	15	25	29	25	28	31	34	36	39
Belgium	13	21	45	47	48	49	49	52	54
Cyprus	.	.	3	3	2	1	1	1	1
Czech Republic	.	.	7	7	8	8	9	9	9
Denmark	.	.	19	21	23	25	28	30	32
Finland	0,4	0,7	3	2	2	3	3	3	3
France	30	44	60	62	63	63	63	64	64
Greece	13	17	16	15	14	12	9	8	8
Spain	26	37	48	40	37	34	32	30	29
Netherlands	23	43	92	95	97	103	109	112	116
Ireland	15	76	133	120	118	115	113	111	112
Germany	385	430	440	470	500	560	614	655	687
Portugal	0,5	0,6	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Sweden	11	17	33	36	38	40	43	46	49
Great Britain	150	340	580	625	637	642	685	720	788

⁸ GUS, *Informacja o rozmiarach i kierunkach czasowej emigracji z Polski w latach 2004–2016*, 16 October 2017, p. 1, <https://stat.gov.pl/obszary-tematyczne/ludnosc/migracje-zagraniczne-ludnosci/informacja-o-rozmiarach-i-kierunkach-emigracji-z-polski-w-latach-20042016,2,10.html>.

⁹ K. Pędzwiatr, *Imigranci w Polsce i wyzwania integracyjne*, „Infos”, no. 1 (184), 15 January 2015, [http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/wydbas.nsf/0/b154060c37557e-78c1257dcb004c62c3/\\$file/infos_184.pdf](http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/wydbas.nsf/0/b154060c37557e-78c1257dcb004c62c3/$file/infos_184.pdf).

Italy	59	70	92	94	97	96	96	94	93
Non European Union states	20	30	78	84	96	102	112	115	118
including:									
Norway	.	.	50	56	65	71	79	84	85

^a The data concern the number of people staying abroad on a temporary basis: for years 2004–2005 – more than two months, for years 2010–2016 – more than three months.

^b For years 2004–2005 25 countries, for years 2010–2012 27 countries.

Source: GUS, *Informacja o rozmiarach i kierunkach czasowej emigracji z Polski w latach 2004–2016*, Warsaw, 16 October 2017, p. 2, <https://stat.gov.pl/obszary-tematyczne/ludnosc/migracje-zagraniczne-ludnosci/informacja-o-rozmiarach-i-kierunkach-emigracji-z-polski-w-latach-2004-2016,2,10.html>.

In recent years, we have witnessed an increasing inflow of immigrants, who usually come to Poland for work purposes.¹⁰ The statistics of the Office for Foreigners (*Urząd do Spraw Cudzoziemców*, UdSC) show that foreigners are lodging an increasing number of applications to legitimize their stay in Poland. In 2017, the Department of the Legalization of Residence of the Office for Foreigners ruled in 7,844 cases and issued 5,742 decisions (25% more than in the previous year, when 4,608 decisions were issued). In 2017, 53 residence permits for the members of repatriates' family were issued.¹¹

Political and economic transformations have made more and more job seekers come to Poland. They come not only from the neighbouring countries, but also from more remote parts of the world.¹² It

¹⁰ Idem, *Imigranci w Polsce i wyzwania integracyjne*, „Studia BAS” 2014, no. 4 (40), p. 139, www.bas.sejm.gov.pl.

¹¹ Sprawozdanie 2017 z działalności Urzędu do Spraw Cudzoziemców w zakresie zadań Departamentu Legalizacji Pobytu, <https://udsc.gov.pl/statystyki/raporty-okresowe/raport-roczny-legalizacja-pobytu/2017-2/> [access: 15 March 2018].

¹² K. Pędziwiatr, *Imigranci w Polsce i wyzwania integracyjne*, „Studia BAS”, op.cit., p. 136.

The analysis of the Main Statistical Office shows that immigrants usually settle in large cities. The map below presents the number of foreigners residing in Polish provinces.

Provinces with the largest immigrant population.




Source: K. Pędziwiatr, *Imigranci w Polsce i wyzwania integracyjne*, „Studia BAS” 2014, no. 4 (40), p. 141, www.bas.sejm.gov.pl.

¹³ Ibidem, p. 137.

When writing about foreigners in Poland, we should also address the issue of the implementation by the RP of the obligations pursuant to the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees of 18 July 1951¹⁴ and related to considering applications for granting the refugee status to foreigners seeking asylum within the territory of Poland. According to the Head of the Office for Foreigners, 8,285 decisions on granting or refusing to grant the refugee status were issued in 2014.

Figure

The number of people in relation to whom the Head of the Office for Foreigners issued a decision concerning the granting of the refugee status in the RP in 2014




Source: *Information of the Head of the Office for Foreigners on the application in 2014 of the Act of 13 June 2003 on granting protection to aliens within the territory of the Republic of Poland (Journal of Laws of 2003, no. 128, item 1176 as amended) with regard to the fulfilment of the obligations of the Republic of Poland pursuant to the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the New York Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees*, Warsaw, March 2015, p. 4, <https://udsc.gov.pl/uchodzcy-2/uchodzcy/sprawozdania/>.

¹⁴ <http://prawo.sejm.gov.pl/isap.nsf/download.xsp/WDU19911190515/O/D19910515.pdf> [access: 15 March 2018].

Figure

The number of people in relation to whom the Head of the Office for Foreigners issued a decision concerning the granting of the refugee status in the RP in 2014



Source: *Information of the Head of the Office for Foreigners...*, op.cit.

Polish people exercise the right of movement, labour and residence.¹⁵ In the first decade of the 21st century, research showed that they were getting less reserved and adverse to foreigners, becoming a more open nation. It was commonly believed that immigrant labour brought social and economic benefits to the national economy and entrepreneurs. Since 2006, however, we have witnessed a steady increase in the negative sentiments, largely related to fears that one's career prospects may deteriorate.¹⁶

¹⁵ For more details see: I. Grabowska-Lusińska, M. Okólski, *Emigracja ostatnia?*, Warsaw 2009.

¹⁶ K. Kowalczyk, *Przybysze z daleka i z bliska...*, op.cit., pp. 5–7.

Table 2.

In your opinion, does the work of non-EU foreigners in Poland bring advantages or disadvantages to:	2006			2015		
	favourable	unfavourable	difficult to say	favourable	unfavourable	difficult to say
	in percents					
– you personally	23	34	43	25	43	32
– Polish economy	45	34	21	43	37	20
– employees	23	59	19	25	57	18
– people employing foreigners	72	11	17	76	10	14


Source: K. Kowalczyk, *Przybysze z daleka i z bliska...*, op.cit., p. 7.

What should be emphasized is the fact that Poles are definitely more favourably disposed to people coming from the European Union states or the West. They also express positive opinions about Ukrainians, Vietnamese, Belarusians or Russians. As Katarzyna Kowalczyk points out, they are the representatives of numerous groups that have stayed in Poland for a long time and have dealt with low-paid jobs. They also work in commerce, food industry and construction.¹⁷

What is more, the vast majority of Poles (69%) are aware of the benefits of employing immigrants, especially in the industries that suffer from the lack of workers. There is a widely held view that the state should create legal and institutional conditions that will make it easier for foreigners to seek jobs. Every fourth respondent (23%) is of the opposite opinion, claiming that the state should not establish any system of support even if there is labour deficit.

¹⁷ Ibidem, p. 7.

Figure 2.
Attitudes towards foreigners in Poland.



Source: K. Kowalczyk, *Przybysze z daleka i z bliska...*, op.cit., p. 8.

Table 3.

Attitudes to the issue of creating a system of supporting immigrants in the labour market.

Do you think that the state should help foreigners from outside the European Union seek jobs in Poland if there are no Polish people who would be willing to work in a given position?	2006		2015	
	as a percentage			
Definitely yes	26	71	20	69
Rather yes	45		49	
Rather not	15	21	15	23
Definitely not	6		8	
Difficult to say	8		7	

Source: K. Kowalczyk, *Przybysze z daleka i z bliska...*, op.cit., p. 10.

On 1–8 February 2018, the Public Opinion Research Centre conducted a survey on a representative sample group of adult Polish citizens (333). The survey was entitled “Aktualne problemy i wydarzenia” (“Current issues and events”) and showed that Poles are becoming less sympathetic to the representatives of other nations. Among the least liked nationalities are Russians, Romani and Arabs, while we have a positive attitude towards Czechs, Italians, Americans, as well as Slovaks, Hungarians and the English.¹⁸ According to experts, this survey shows a significant decrease in the general level of liking towards foreigners. For example, in 2017, Czechs were viewed positively by 59% of the respondents, i.e. 15% more. The level of liking towards Slovaks and Italians decreased by 13%, while in the case of Americans – by 11%. Adam Traczyk from the think tank Global.Lab points out that Polish people’s attitude to the neighbouring nations is the least positive in 20 years.¹⁹ We are increasingly hostile to Germans


¹⁸ See also: W tym sondażu to nie podium zaskakuje najbardziej. Polacy coraz mniej lubią wszystkich, 13 March 2018, <http://wiadomosci.gazeta.pl/wiadomosci/7,114883,23135736,w-tym-sondazu-to-nie-podium-zaskakuje-najbardziej-polacy-coraz.html>.

¹⁹ Ibidem.

and Ukrainians, giving them the worst notes in ten years. We are also less favourably disposed towards the French, the level of liking to whom is the lowest in 25 years.²⁰

Figure 3.

Poles' attitude towards other nations.



Source: https://twitter.com/CBOS_Info?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw&ref_url=http%3A%2F%2Fwiadomosci.gazeta.pl%2Fwiadomosci%2F7%2C114883%2C23135736%2Cw-tym-sondazu-to-nie-podium-zaskakuje-najbardziej-polacy-coraz.html [access: 12 March 2018].

It should also be noted that the level of declared fondness is related to one's educational background and place of residence. The respondents with university education living in large cities more frequently

²⁰ Sondaż: Polacy coraz gorzej nastawieni do innych narodowości. Szczególnie nie lubimy Arabów i Rosjan, 13 March 2018, <http://www.polsatnews.pl/wiadomosc/2018-03-13/sondaz-polacy-coraz-gorzej-nastawieni-do-innych-narodowosci-szczegolnie-nie-lubimy-arabow-i-rosjan/>.

declared their liking towards other nations.²¹ Moreover, a positive attitude to people of different nationalities was expressed by the respondents with the highest income, people in the age between 18 and 24, those not participating in religious practice, and by people with leftist views.²²

Benefits from immigration for the accepting country

The research concerning the attitude to immigrants in Germany reveals that almost two-thirds of Germans believe that “immigration is a burden on the German social system.” However, we should compare the respondents’ opinions with the data on immigrants’ influence on the Germany economy, which show “that average foreigners pay a good 3,000 euro more in taxes and social contributions in Germany than they receive in the form of benefits over the course of their life time.”²³

Sweden has similar experience regarding immigrants’ contribution to GDP. According to experts of the independent think tank Arena Idé, since 1950, Sweden “has taken in an average of SEK 65 billion per year from taxes paid by immigrants.” The report indicates that “without immigration, Sweden would have 2.5 million fewer inhabitants and the economy would be one fifth smaller than it is today. If we compare the costs of immigration with the intake from it since 1950,

²¹ Ibidem.

²² CBOS: Polacy najbardziej lubią Czechów i Włochów. Z dystansem podchodzimy do Rosjan i Arabów, wPolityce.pl, 12 March 2018, <https://wpolityce.pl/spoleczenstwo/385575-cbos-polacy-najbardziej-lubia-czechow-i-wlochow-z-dystansem-podchodzimy-do-rosjan-i-arabow>.

²³ M. Bölinger, *Germany profits from immigration*, 27 November 2014, <http://www.dw.com/en/germany-profits-from-immigration/a-18095858>.

we might assume that there has been a profit of SEK 900 billion.” Moreover, “the group of 1.6 million people in Sweden born abroad has a larger percentage of people of working age and fewer cost-intensive elderly people than those born in Sweden. This allows the immigrants to cover their own social costs, even if their rate of unemployment is higher.” What is equally important – according to the authors of the report – “the costs of immigration are initially higher, but it should be seen as an investment. It is similar with children, who cost a lot while growing up but start paying back when they begin working.”²⁴

It should also be pointed out that the data published in the report of the National Academies reveal that “26 million foreigners in the American labour market added some \$2 trillion to the American economy in 2016.”²⁵ The authors of the report list the benefits from immigration. Among other things, “immigrants are younger. They are slowing the aging of the workforce. Low-skilled immigrants may increase the labour supply of high-skilled natives, say, by providing cheap childcare and releasing mothers to work. High-skilled immigrants contribute disproportionately to innovation, seeking patents at a higher rate than natives.”²⁶ Thus, they contradict the statements that “increased immigration into a country is a sign of weakness, not strength.”²⁷

According to the report of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS), entitled *The Economic and Fiscal Consequences of Immigration*, “Immigrants are essential to the economic growth in America.” The

²⁴ *Profit from immigration: SEK 900 billion*, 1 July 2015, <http://sverigesradio.se/sida/artikel.aspx?programid=2054&artikel=62027050>.

²⁵ E. Porter, *How to Make America Greater: More Immigration*, 7 February 2017, <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/07/business/economy/restricting-immigration-would-make-america-smaller-not-greater.html>.

²⁶ Ibidem.

²⁷ Ibidem.

report confirms that “immigration supplies workers, which increases GDP [gross domestic product] and has helped the United States avoid the fate of stagnant economies created by purely demographic forces – in particular, aging (and, in the case of Japan, shrinking) workforce. The authors of the report also quote the results of the study conducted by the Small Business Administration, which show that “immigrant business owners make significant contributions to business income, generating \$67 billion of the \$577 billion in U.S. business income, as estimated from 2000 U.S. Census data.”²⁸ Moreover, “They generate nearly one-quarter of all business income in California – nearly \$20 billion – and nearly one-fifth of business income in New York, Florida, and New Jersey.”²⁹

What is more, the American immigration experts emphasize that immigrants’ contribution to human and physical capital formation, entrepreneurship, and innovation are essential to long-run sustained economic growth.”³⁰ They also indicate that “what is even more important than the contribution to labour supply is the infusion of human capital by high-skilled immigration that has boosted the nation’s capacity for innovation and technological change.” They point out that “innovation carried out by immigrants also has the potential to increase the productivity of natives, very likely raising economic growth per capita.”³¹

Given the above data, it is surprising that despite problems in the labour market that Polish employers are facing and despite a threat of

²⁸ S. Anderson, *3 Reasons Why Immigrants Are Key To Economic Growth*, 2 October 2016, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/stuartanderson/2016/10/02/3-reasons-why-immigrants-key-to-economic-growth/#33d0375a7dab>. See also: *The Economic and Fiscal Consequences of Immigration*, <http://www8.nationalacademies.org/onpinews/newsitem.aspx?RecordID=23550>.

²⁹ Ibidem.

³⁰ Ibidem.

³¹ Ibidem.

demographic collapse, some political circles keep feeding the atmosphere of distrust. Mass media reports of foreign tourists or students being assaulted are increasingly frequent. Most of these incidents involve people of dark complexion. The language used in public places has also often caused hostility. Thus, in the declarative dimension, we are tolerant, but the reality is quite different. The number of hate crimes committed out of prejudice is rising.³² In 2015, the number of race crimes committed in Poland (1,548 open cases) increased two-fold in relation to 2013 (835 open cases). In April 2016, 61% of Polish citizens were against accepting refugees.³³

How do foreigners find living in Poland in the atmosphere of increasing distrust or even hostility to strangers? Can they feel at home or do emotions felt by the society, often cynically fuelled by politicians, hamper their normal existence in the country they have chosen as their new home? A question also arises whether Polish politicians are aware of the problems that immigrants encounter every day. What steps are taken and what laws are adopted to protect people who want to find a job in Poland, live here on a permanent basis, wishing to contribute to the economic and cultural development of the country?

There is no doubt that the country with a low rate of natural increase should reject prejudice and help entrepreneurs find employees among immigrants. When asked how to motivate foreigners to settle in Poland, Jan Cipiur advises to look at Germany. He believes that prosperity and diverse, intensively developing economy are the answer to this question.³⁴

³² Tolerancja po polsku – jedno mówimy, drugie robimy, PolskieRadio.pl, 25 January 2013, <https://www.polskieradio.pl/7/129/Artykul/769180,Tolerancja-po-polsku-jedno-mowimy-drugie-robimy>.

³³ M. Chrzczonowicz, *Gowin zachwycony...*, op.cit.

³⁴ J. Cipiur, *Korzyści z imigracji wciąż przebijają minusy*, 31 January 2015, <https://www.obserwatorfinansowy.pl/tematyka/makroekonomia/korzysci-z-imigracji-wciaz-przebijaja-minusy/>.

As Krystyna Slany and Magdalena Ślusarczyk point out, “decisions to emigrate are determined by a number of factors. Sometimes, migration is motivated by a fear of death in a war, ethnic conflicts or by religious persecution (refugees). Another group of determinants includes those related to one’s own choice, the freedom of decision and calculating the potential profits and losses (highly-skilled workforce, people reuniting with their families, re-emigrants). Between these two opposite groups are labour migrants (registered and unregistered).”³⁵

A number of experts on migration emphasize that diversity brings benefits both to culture and to economy. They believe that integration will not be possible without accepting differences. According to Sayaki Osanami Törngren from the University of Malmö, immigrants should be offered care and protection so that they could become a part of the society³⁶. On 14 February 2018, a debate entitled *What are the economic costs and benefits of migration?*, was held as part of the project „Pytania o Europę” (“Questions about Europe”), owing to the support of the European Parliament, Friedrich Ebert Foundation and the Institute of Public Affairs. During the debate, Paweł Kaczmarczyk said: “Jerzy Zubrzycki, Polish sociologist, who established the basic framework for the Australian system of diversity, pointed out that integration is based on three pillars. The first pillar is the assumption that integration is beneficial culturally, socially and economically. The second pillar is the statement that immigrants must be willing to adapt to the existing rules of play. The third one refers to the aware-

³⁵ K. Slany, M. Kucharczyk, *Instytucjonalne bariery integracji – doświadczenia migrantek w Polsce*, „Biuletyn RPO – Materiały” 2009, no. 66: Migracje zagraniczne a polityka rodzinna, p. 148, https://www.rpo.gov.pl/sites/default/files/Biuletyn_RPO_Materialy_nr_66_-_Migracje_zagraniczne_a_polityka_rodzinna.pdf.

³⁶ Jakie są ekonomiczne koszty i korzyści z migracji? Debata z cyklu „Pytania o Europę”, ISP, 13 March 2018, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C-QkdBP5tsul>.

ness of social roles – the newcomers have to know their roles in the social and economic life.” P. Kaczmarczyk quotes the statistics of the Centre for Migration Studies according to which “immigration is advantageous to the national economy, not only because foreigners usually do low-paid jobs. They also work in the industries in which there is labour deficit. Immigrants can contribute more in taxes to the system than they obtain from social benefits, if only the conditions for making their jobs legal are created.” According to P. Kaczmarczyk, the state should adopt laws and regulations that will guarantee the permanent employment of immigrants and will motivate them to accept Polish citizenship.³⁷

It is obvious that the demographic situation connected with the negative rate of natural increase significantly affects the condition of the labour market in Poland. What is more, the large scale emigration enhances the negative effects of the aging of the Polish society. The experience of the countries accepting refugees shows that immigrants can effectively help to reverse this process, which harms the national economy, becoming a serious issue for private businesses and public finance.³⁸

A few words about the atmosphere accompanying the process of the assimilation of immigrants in Poland

It must be emphasized that nationalist and xenophobic tendencies are present in most European societies. They are the result of, among other things, globalization processes and the accompanying fears that

³⁷ Ibidem.

³⁸ MPiPS, Informacje nt. zatrudniania cudzoziemców w Polsce, April 2015, https://www.mpips.gov.pl/gfx/mpips/userfiles/_public/1_NOWA%20STRONA/rynek%20pracy/Migracje/Zatrudnienie%20cudzoziemcow_IV%202015.pdf.

national culture may be harmed and national identity may be lost. Thus, as Nataliia Shypka rightly notes, a responsible government should draw up policies based on the activities aimed at including the immigrant community in the public life of the state, e.g. through granting foreigners a proper legal status, ensuring them a right to education or access to political activity.³⁹ It must be stressed that the education of immigrants is an extremely important component of the assimilation process. Scholars emphasize that “work needs to be done in terms of education for second-generation immigrants. While 40% of the children of German immigrants achieve a higher degree of education than their – mainly unskilled – parents, there are still 60% who do not. If the younger generations of immigrants were better integrated in the job market, the non-German population would be contributing four times as much to the public finance.”⁴⁰

In 2018, the Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research (SETA) published the third edition of the *European Islamophobia Report (EIR)*, which looks into the issue of Islamophobia in Europe. It presents the result of the study of Islamophobia in 33 countries, including almost all EU member states and some other countries, such as Russia and Norway in the year 2017.⁴¹

The authors of the report quote the words of the director of the European Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA), Michael O’Flaherty, who “stressed that their survey clearly contradicts the claim that Muslims are not integrated into European societies. On the contrary, the survey found that the trust of Muslims in the democratic institutions

³⁹ N. Shypka, *Kwestia nacjonalizmu w europejskich procesach integracyjnych*, [in:] *Mniejszości narodowe i etniczne w Polsce i Europie. Aspekty polityczne i społeczne*, ed. by A. Sakson, Toruń 2014, pp. 152, 159.

⁴⁰ M. Bölinger, *Germany profits...*, op.cit.

⁴¹ *European Islamophobia Report 2017*, ed. by E. Bayrakli, F. Hafez, Istanbul 2018, p. 7.

of Europe is higher than much of the general population.” [...What is more] “O’Flaherty pointed out that “every incident of discrimination and hate crime hinders their [Muslims’] inclusion and reduces their chances of finding work. We risk that we alienate individuals and their community from us, with all possible consequences.”⁴²

As Anna Piela and Anna Łukjanowicz point out, despite the assurances of the government of Law and Justice party, the problem of Islamophobia and racism in Poland is increasingly serious. The data of the Ministry of Internal Affairs show that in 2017 there were 664 hate crime proceedings where Muslims had been targeted, and 193 (29%) of those resulted in an indictment.⁴³ According to both scholars, “Islamophobia has entered the Polish mainstream and has become a tool of political warfare.”⁴⁴ The political situation in Poland appears to contribute to the “fast-growing number of hate crime incidents, including physical and verbal abuse as well as vandalism.”⁴⁵ A. Piela and A. Łukjanowicz note that Muslim community organizations have been signalling recently that the police often ignore notifications of hate crimes.⁴⁶ They quote the results of the study conducted in September 2017 for the Commissioner of Human Rights among Polish secondary school students. They reveal a worrying tendency of the growth of anti-refugee, xenophobic, Islamophobic and homophobic sentiments. “The youth w Polsce tend to view Muslims as potential terrorists and do not wish to welcome Muslim refugees.” The situation will certainly not be improved by the declaration of the Ministry

⁴² Ibidem. As quoted by: FRA, “Press Release: Muslims in the EU: High Levels of Trust Despite Pervasive Discrimination”, Vienna, September 21, 2017.

⁴³ A. Piela, A. Łukjanowicz, *Islamophobia in Poland: National Report 2017*, [in:] *European Islamophobia Report 2017*, ed. by E. Bayraklı, F. Hafez, Istanbul 2018, p. 466.

⁴⁴ Ibidem, p. 468.

⁴⁵ Ibidem, p. 469.

⁴⁶ Ibidem, p. 470.

of Education, which announced that it will “close anti-discrimination programmes in Polish schools and that education will be based on promoting patriotism and a national and cultural Polish identity.”⁴⁷

Unquestionably, the government should actively help and create proper conditions for foreigners in their new environment, using instruments it has in hand. This concerns both the economic sphere of life and its quality in the social dimension. In the process of the adaptation of people who have made a difficult decision to start living in a new country, it is important to establish mechanisms which will guarantee a decent living standard for their whole family. This also refers to their educational, social and welfare needs being satisfied. What is of fundamental importance is the comfort of life, good neighbourly relations in the place of residence and at work. Meanwhile, racist incidents involving violence are not a rare occurrence any longer.

Krzysztof Łabędź points out that Polish people have quite a reserved attitude to foreigners, which is reinforced by politicians’ Euro-sceptic statements calling for the rejection of the Western model. They emphasize the status of their own nation, claiming that it has the fundamental role to play.⁴⁸

As some politicians disseminate fears related to the inflow of new, culturally alien people to Poland, they also put a spin on reality, claiming that “Poles are an open and tolerant society, contrary to what others often say.” There is no doubt that the situation of immigrants is not easy.⁴⁹ Politicians have been using the language of hate for months. Leaders of political parties have been making statements in a similar vein. In the Sejm debate on accepting refugees on 16 September 2015, Jarosław Kaczyński, the leader of Law and Justice, said that they were

⁴⁷ Ibidem, p. 471.

⁴⁸ K. Łabędź, *Polacy wobec innych narodów, mniejszości narodowych i uchodźców*, „Chorzowskie Studia Polityczne” 2015, no. 10, p. 160.

⁴⁹ M. Chrzczonowicz, *Gowin zachwycony...*, op.cit.

a serious danger and a decision to accept refugees in Poland will “trigger the process which will consist of the following stages: first, the number of foreigners grows rapidly; then, they declare that they are not going to obey our law and customs; and finally or simultaneously, they impose their norms and moral standards on us in various spheres of life, often doing this in an aggressive and violent way. If anybody claims this is not true, let them look around Europe. Let them look at Sweden, for example, with 54 zones with sharia law without the control of the state. School authorities are afraid to hang the Swedish flag, because there is a cross on it. It appears that even Swedish girls, schoolgirls, will not be allowed to wear short skirts as it may be found inappropriate (...) What is happening in Italy? Churches are occupied by immigrants, who often treat them as toilets. What is going on in France? Constant fights, sharia law introduced in numerous areas and patrols which safeguard the Islamic law. Look at London, or at Germany, seemingly the toughest and strictest country in this regard, where such incidents also occur. Do you want such phenomena to become a part of Polish reality, too? Do you want us to stop being hosts in our own country? Is it what you really want? (...) I want to state it very clearly – Polish people do not want it and neither does Law and Justice!”⁵⁰

At an election rally in Maków Mazowiecki in October 2015, commenting on the European Union’s recommendation that Poland should accept 100,000 refugees, Kaczyński said: “These are issues related to a number of different threats in this sphere. We know that some very dangerous illnesses, which have been non-existent in Europe for a long time, have reappeared in Europe: cholera in Greek islands, dysentery

⁵⁰ Jarosław Kaczyński’s speech in the Sejm debate concerning the acceptance of refugees, 16 September 2015, min. 2:50–4:52, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N1A4V2HBZDk>.

in Vienna, all kinds of parasites, protozoa, which are not dangerous to them, but may be dangerous to us. This does not mean that we should discriminate anyone... But this needs to be checked (...).⁵¹

In a TV show “Jeden na jeden” (“One against one”), broadcast on 23 March 2017, Prime Minister Beata Szydło said that “it is impossible to differentiate between Muslim refugees/immigrants and terrorists.” She added that every “Muslim refugee has to be considered a potential terrorist.”⁵²

The wave of hate also reached Joanna Grabarczyk, the coordinator of Akcja HejtStop (Stop Hate Campaign),⁵³ who submitted a crime report, notifying that an ex-strongman, currently MMA athlete, Mariusz Pudzianowski, had used his Facebook profile to refer to refugees as “human trash that should be beaten with a baseball bat.” In revenge, Pudzianowski wrote a post which was liked by 60,000 Internet users and shared 27,000 times. The post included words such as “Judeopolonia,” “Jew,” “a snitch,” and “a frustrated woman full of complexes,” as well as offensive references to the appearance of Joanna Grabarczyk.⁵⁴ Paweł Kukiz, the leader of Kukiz15 party, made an equally hateful comment on his Facebook profile, saying: “I don’t blame

⁵¹ Kaczyński: Pasożyty i pierwotniaki w organizmach uchodźców groźne dla Polaków, 13 October 2015, <http://www.newsweek.pl/polska/jaroslaw-kaczynski-o-uchodzcach,artykuly,372175,1.html>. See also: <https://video.wp.pl/i,kaczynski-o-imigrantach-sa-juz-objawy-cholery-pierwotniaki-pasozyty,mid,1801147,cid,4051,klip.html?ticaid=61b0e2>.

⁵² Doniesienie do prokuratury na premier Beatę Szydło ws. wypowiedzi o imigrantach, 22 May 2017, <https://ndie.pl/doniesienie-prokuratury-premier-beate-szydlo-ws-wypowiedzi-o-imigrantach/>.

⁵³ See: <http://hejtstop.pl/>; <http://projekt-polska.pl/projekty/promowanie-wartosci-liberalnych-i-swiatopogladowe-korzenie/hejtstop/>; https://www.facebook.com/pg/zobaczniawisc/photos/?ref=page_internal.

⁵⁴ Kompromitujący wpis „Pudziana”. Z kijem w rękę zapowiada agresję, 22 January 2016, <http://wiadomosci.gazeta.pl/wiadomosci/1,114871,19515688,pudzianowski-o-uchodzcach-mam-problem-z-tymi-sku-i-pokazuje.html>.

Joanna... If I were her, I would also dream of immigrants in the context of New Year's Eve.”⁵⁵

The Polish Internet is full of hateful comments which refer to the most serious offences and Holocaust crimes. As Grzegorz Formanik wrote in the article in “Duży Format” magazine, a meme with Muslims and rail tracks leading to a death camp in Birkenau was liked by 5,000 people in Poland.⁵⁶

Anna Piela and Anna Łukjanowicz quote the data published by the National Prosecutor's Office for the first half of 2017, according to which “39.5% of all hate crimes in Poland (including crimes against different national, ethnic, religious, and sexual minorities) were committed in cyberspace.”⁵⁷ It should be mentioned here that acts of hate motivated by race, national or religious prejudice are objected by civil society. The two authors point out that various organizations, such as „Stowarzyszenie Nigdy Więcej (Never Again Association),⁵⁸ Hejtstop (Stop Hate), and Ośrodek Monitorowania Zachowań Rasistowskich i Ksenofobicznych (the Centre for Monitoring Racist and Xenophobic Behaviours),⁵⁹ together with “Zero tolerancji” (Zero Tolerance) campaign,⁶⁰ (...) continue their systematic engagement in monitoring online and offline hate crime.”⁶¹

⁵⁵ „Na jej miejscu też marzyłbym o imigrantach”. Szokujący wpis Kukiza, 8 February 2016, <http://wiadomosci.gazeta.pl/wiadomosci/1,114871,19599751,-na-jej-miejsku-tez-marzylybym-o-imigrantach-skandaliczny-wpis.html>.

⁵⁶ G. Szymanik, *Dlaczego 5 tys. Polaków polubiło mem z muzułmanami i torami do Birkenau*, „Duży Format”, 29 July 2015, <http://wyborcza.pl/duzyformat/1,127290,18447691,dlaczego-5-tys-polakow-polubilo-mem-z-musulmanami-i-torami.html>; M. Chrzczonowicz, *Gowin zachwycony...*, op.cit.

⁵⁷ A. Piela, A. Łukjanowicz, *Islamophobia in Poland...*, op.cit., pp. 473–474.

⁵⁸ <http://www.nigdywiecej.org/en/>.

⁵⁹ <http://www.otwarta.org/osrodek-monitorowania-zachowan-rasistowskich-i-ksenofobicznych/>; <https://www.facebook.com/osrodek.monitorowania>.

⁶⁰ <http://zero-tolerancji.pl/>.

⁶¹ A. Piela, A. Łukjanowicz, *Islamophobia in Poland...*, op.cit., p. 478.

When asked how they feel in Poland and whether Polish people are a tolerant nation, two students – one from Azerbaijan and the other from Turkey – gave the following answers:

Ahmet B., a student from Turkey

„I have lived in Poland since 2012. A few years ago I didn't hear about any tolerance issues in Poland.

It is now that Polish politicians assure that 'Poles are tolerant.'

When I came to Poland I had no problems whatsoever, no one treated me unkindly. I had lived in Kaliningrad before and I often invited my colleagues from Russia to Poland. We never experienced any signs of aggression, we felt good here. What has changed in recent years?:

- *People often look at me suspiciously; they point at me in the streets, in shops, at bus stops, and on buses or trams; even children do it,*
- *some of them even spit with disgust when they see me,*
- *they shout: „terrorist, Arab, Chechen, immigrant.”*

In my opinion, this proves the lack of education at schools and universities regarding cultural and religious diversity. Due to widely held stereotypes in the Polish society, if you have a dark skin colour, you may expect insults from Poles, no matter where you come from and whether you speak Polish or not.

- *when I'm on the bus or tram, no one ever wants to sit beside me,*
- *when I walk across the street using the pedestrian crossing, it happens that drivers do not brake or they even accelerate (this is what a priest driving a car did once),*
- *in clubs, if you want to dance with a Polish girl, both you and the girl can become the subject of aggression. I've already had to flee from a party twice because of that,*
- *Polish people find it hard to accept a relationship between a Polish girl and a foreigner with dark complexion, they make strange faces, they insult you or even actually use violence,*

- *you may be taunted in the streets (although this rarely happens in larger cities).*

I've already reported to the police a few incidents in which my safety was under threat. They included offensive posts in social sites and damaging my property. All in vain. My fellow foreigners, who run a restaurant, got the windows broken on the first night after the opening. They didn't go to the police, though, as they found it pointless. They took steps to ensure protection on their own. They don't feel safe in Poland, though. They say the atmosphere is full of fear and uncertainty.

I believe that the fact that former Minister of Internal Affairs and Administration Mariusz Błaszczak justified such nationalist and xenophobic behaviours and that they do not receive a response from the present authorities gives consent to this type of aggressive actions."

Goskar M., a student from Azerbaijan

„I have lived in Poland for six years. I have a lot of good friends here. I have never had any problems, except for one situation at work, which was quickly resolved. I have a feeling that it is the older part of the Polish society that shows less tolerance, although – as I believe – it all depends on the person. I have a very good opinion of Poland and Polish people. I like this country and I like living here."

There is a growing number of media reports of assaults on foreign students in Poland. At present, 2,500 young people from India study in our country. Out of 21 attacks on Indian students abroad, nine have taken place in Poland. Thus, we are at the top of the ranking of the least hospitable countries prepared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of India.⁶² In recent years, foreign students have been brutally assaulted in a number of Polish cities, including Toruń, Bydgoszcz, Gdańsk, Łódź, and Białystok.

⁶² Ataki na studentów z Indii. Polska w czołówce nieprzyjaznych krajów, 25 January 2018, <https://wiadomosci.wp.pl/ataki-na-studentow-z-indii-polska-w-czolowce-nieprzyjaznych-krajow-6213253985687169a>.

Konrad Dulkowski, the coordinator of the Centre for Monitoring Racist and Xenophobic Behaviours, estimates that up to 100 foreigners are attacked in Poland every day. These alarming statistics do not receive a proper response from the government. Dulkowski lists: “The assault on a Cuban dancer in Wrocław, not letting a black child in a church, demolishing a flat of a Polish-Lebanese family in Lubawa, the attack on the Orthodox Church procession in Przemyśl, a Ukrainian woman battered in the centre of Lublin, assaults on Erasmus students, corporations warning their foreign employees not to leave their homes on the Independence Day, Polish people in interracial relationships asking on Facebook whether they can safely spend holidays with their children, husbands, wives in Poland... This goes on and on (...).” Dulkowski points out that politicians set an example and, as a result, one can express their racist views in the Internet without any threat of punishment, and any objections are seen as anti-Polish. On Internet forums, “action taken against any strangers is praised as a duty of a real Pole; patriotic tattoos and shirts are in fashion, adding to the nationalist atmosphere.”⁶³

All this undoubtedly proves that a negative change in the perception of foreigners has taken place in the Polish society. The government’s reaction to racist behaviours and campaigns launched by organizations fighting intolerance to diversity should bring a positive effect, preventing such racist, discriminating and vulgar acts in the streets.

It should be noted that despite the words of former Minister of Internal Affairs Mariusz Błaszczak, who assured that there is no issue of Islamophobia in Poland, the official statistics of the ministry show the opposite. According to them, in 2017, there were 664 hate crime

⁶³ Ośrodek Monitorowania Zachowań Rasistowskich i Ksenofobicznych udostępnił(a) post użytkownika „Cudzoziemiec – taki sam człowiek jak Ty”, 29 August 2017, <https://www.facebook.com/osrodek.monitorowania/posts/613761398798997>.

proceedings where Muslims had been targeted, and 193 (29%) of those resulted in an indictment.⁶⁴

In response to numerous acts of violence, the Conference of Rectors of Academic Schools in Poland (*Konferencja Rektorów Akademickich Szkół Polskich*, KRASP) issued an Appeal concerning the assaults on foreign students. 107 Rectors signed the following text: "Following reports of numerous outrageous xenophobic incidents against foreign students in Poland, we express our deep concern about and we strongly protest against such behaviours, at the same time once again (the Conference issued a similar statement in May) appealing to the respective forces of the State to effectively ensure safety to students from abroad. (...)" KRASP points out that "repeated acts of physical and verbal abuse against foreign students and the lack of respect to their culture discredit the image of Poland and make the academic community ashamed." Bianka Siwińska, PhD, the coordinator of Study in Poland programme of the Educational Foundation Edukacyjnej „Perspektywy”, indicates that the problem of aggression against students from abroad is really serious. She says that "each such incident does irreversible harm to the image of a university. Students use social sites and information about such unpleasant events spread quickly." Despite Rectors' appeals and experts' opinions, Minister of Science and Higher Education Jarosław Gowin seems to ignore the issue. He often declares that "Poland is a friendly country to foreign students." He believes that "although the number of foreigners studying at Polish universities is constantly increasing, we are still not satisfied with the level of internationalization in our country."⁶⁵

⁶⁴ A. Piela, A. Łukjanowicz, *Islamophobia in Poland...*, op.cit., p. 473.

⁶⁵ S. Klauziński, Rektorzy polskich uczelni: Ataki na zagranicznych studentów wywołują wstyd w środowisku akademickim, 1 December 2016, <http://wyborcza.pl/7,75398,21059731,rektorzy-polskich-uczelni-ataki-na-zagranicznych-studentow.html>.

Krzysztof Łabędź lists the following causes of intolerance and xenophobia among Poles:

- “the fear of the unknown,
- the feeling of being threatened economically,
- frustration caused by failures, which gives rise to aggression and the need to find the ‘scapegoat’,
- the distorted history of mutual relations,
- using negative stereotypes,
- treating one’s own nation as a homogenous group, a community with different values and norms (often seen as better),
- emphasizing the reluctance of the representatives of other nationalities to assimilate,
- national megalomania.”⁶⁶

The results of a survey conducted by the Institute of Media Monitoring show that people who are against accepting refugees in Poland usually express fears related to economy. Internet users write in their comments about “taxes,” “social welfare” and “sources of livelihood.” They seldom refer to the issue of cultural and religious differences, or to the threat of terrorism and crime.⁶⁷

It is unquestionable that a responsible government should first diagnose a problem and take steps to eliminate social attitudes and behaviours that hinder the assimilation process. According to K. Pędziwiatr, although the population of immigrants in Poland is still far from being large, it has been gradually increasing, especially over the last decade. What should be stressed is the fact that people in the age below 50, who come to our country to seek a job, represent the biggest group among incomers.⁶⁸

⁶⁶ K. Łabędź, *Polacy wobec innych narodów...*, op.cit., p. 151.

⁶⁷ Internet nie ma litości. Zamiast „fali imigrantów”, fala nienawiści [Raport], 16 July 2015, <http://www.newsweek.pl/polska/imigranci-w-polsce-komentarze-nienawisc-krytyka-hejt,artykuly,366907,1.html>.

⁶⁸ K. Pędziwiatr, *Imigranci w Polsce i wyzwania integracyjne*, „Infos”, op.cit.

Studies of migration show that immigrants actively participate in the economic development of a country, at the same time adding to its cultural and demographic diversity.⁶⁹ On the one hand, politicians admit that Polish immigrants have contributed to the strength of, for example, the British economy. On the other hand, they refer to prejudices and stereotypes in the debate on the inflow of foreigners to Poland. They avoid mentioning benefits from migration, such as the inflation of wages, the acceleration of the economic growth, creating new work place, the growth of consumption and demand, or the development of small business.⁷⁰

There is no doubt that, as Brygida Solga rightly indicates, “The migration policy in a country like Poland should be an important tool for minimizing losses and maximizing benefits resulting from international mobility.”⁷¹ Therefore, it is necessary to establish mechanisms which will help foreign residents to fully integrate into the Polish society.

Thus, how should we help immigrants who decided to settle in Poland? Firstly, some groups may see the lack of the authorities’ reaction to nationalist incidents as consent to such behaviours. The government should send a clear signal – there is no approval for the acts or publications which discriminate other nationalities or profane sacred places and sites of memory. Secondly, immigrants must be provided with the possibilities of developing their skills. Efforts should also be taken to solve their problems with integration, as defined in the document of 31 July 2012, entitled “The Migration Policy of Poland – the

⁶⁹ Ibidem.

⁷⁰ K. Kobylarz, *6 korzyści dla gospodarki, jakie niosą ze sobą uchodźcy*, 17 November 2015, <http://markets.info.pl/6-korzysci-dla-gospodarki-jakie-niosa-ze-soba-uchodzcy/> [access: 15 March 2018].

⁷¹ B. Solga, *Polityka migracyjna Polski i jej regionalny wymiar*, „Studia Ekonomiczne. Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego w Katowicach” 2016, no. 290, pp. 58–59.

Current State of Affairs and Recommended Action,” formulated by the working group for preparing the migration strategy of Poland, established as part of the Team for Migration. It concerned the following problems: “legal migrations, preventing illegal migration, integration, providing foreigners with international protection, emigration, the efficient functioning of the legal and institutional system, and monitoring migration processes.”⁷²

According to K. Pędziwiatr, the regulations which liberalize the principles of stay for foreign students and graduates of Polish universities are a good example of changes in the Polish immigration law. Emphasis must also be put on the education of immigrant children and on the simplification of the principles of foreigners’ stay and work. What is equally important are the efforts to make the Polish society aware of the role of immigration in the future development of the country. A good example of such an activity is the campaign organized by the Office for Foreigners, “*Polska. Tu mieszkam*” (Poland. This is where I live).⁷³ Mass media also play a significant role in the process of the integration and strengthening of the pluralistic society. They should provide more information about the life, achievements, tradi-

⁷² <https://www.mswia.gov.pl/pl/aktualnosci/10149,Rada-Ministrow-przyjela-dokument-Polityka-migracyjna-Polski.html>. See also: http://www.migration-info.de/sites/migration-info.de/files/documents/strategiedokument_polnische_migrationspolitik.pdf.

⁷³ K. Pędziwiatr, *Imigranci w Polsce i wyzwania integracyjne*, „Infos”, op.cit. See also: Polityka migracyjna Polski – stan obecny i postulowane działania, 31 July 2012, pp. 14–16. “(...) The aim of the campaign is to present the new immigration regulations to the largest possible audience, as well as improving the perception of foreigners by Polish people. The campaign used the images of widely unknown, »ordinary« foreigners, who have legally lived and worked in Poland. They are shown in their work environment (...)”, „POLSKA. TU MIESZKAM” – kampania informacyjna Urzędu do Spraw Cudzoziemców poświęcona wejściu w życie nowego prawa imigracyjnego, 19 October 2014, <http://udsc.gov.pl/polska-tu-mieszkam-kampania-informacyjna-urzedu-do-spraw-cudzoziemcow-poswiecona-wejsciu-w-zycie-nowego-prawa-imigracyjnego/>.

tions, culture, customs, religion, and values of immigrant groups. Informing about social and cultural events or about business initiatives will certainly help to fight anti-immigrant sentiments and accelerate the assimilation process. As Tadeusz Skoczek emphasizes, journalists should promote the “model of harmonious coexistence, tolerance and respect for others as the fundamental condition for building the new order in modern Europe, free of nationalist conflicts and chauvinism.”⁷⁴



Source: <http://udsc.gov.pl/polska-tu-mieszkam-kampania-informacyjna-urzedo-spraw-cudzoziemcow-poswiecona-wejsciu-w-zycie-nowego-prawa-immigracyjnego/>.



Source: https://www.google.pl/search?q=kampania+%E2%80%9EPolska.+Tu+mieszkam&client=firefox-b&dcr=0&source=lnms&tbm=isch&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjltcr7zonaAhXJ0aYKHdCmChwQ_AUICigB&biw=1920&bih=966#imgsrc=N4WA7xQJQXjZM.

⁷⁴ T. Skoczek, *Narodowa czy narodowościowa*, [in:] *Mniejszości narodowe i etniczne w mediach elektronicznych. Modele, wizerunek, oczekiwania*, ed. by A. Sadowski, T. Skoczek, Białystok 2012, pp. 22–23.

Polska Tu mieszkam

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Новое иммиграционное право
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Karine Hovsepyan
pochodzi z Armenii

Source: https://www.google.pl/search?q=kampania+%E2%80%9EPolska.+Tu+mieszkam&client=firefox-b&dcr=0&source=lnms&tbm=isch&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjltcr7zonaAhXJ0aYKHdCmChwQ_AUICigB&biw=1920&bih=966#imgsrc=iTY9ymDqdsGj1M.

Polska Tu mieszkam

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Akhtar Mahmood
pochodzi z Pakistanu

Source: https://www.google.pl/search?q=kampania+%E2%80%9EPolska.+Tu+mieszkam&client=firefox-b&dcr=0&source=lnms&tbm=isch&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjltcr7zonaAhXJ0aYKHdCmChwQ_AUICigB&biw=1920&bih=966#imgdii=zinemnzIH0FyOM:&imgsrc=iTY9ymDqdsGj1M.

It is obvious that the inflow of foreigners to Poland is a serious social problem, which – like in other countries of Western Europe – is determined by social and economic fears. Psychological and social

phobias connected with the need for establishing proper relations with culturally different people are another reason for concern.⁷⁵

According to researchers, an immigration friendly country should meet a number of criteria. Firstly, the new legislation must eliminate impediments to the integration of incomers. Secondly, a government should establish the framework of a coherent and open immigration policy covering different groups of immigrants. Thirdly, integration programmes should be developed with the help of migration policy experts. They should take into consideration “differences in, among other things, the character of migration, immigrants’ needs, cultural gender, period of stay.”⁷⁶

In the literature, it is pointed out that certain balance between immigrants’ expectations and the rules of the accepting country must be maintained. The new country should provide immigrants with decent conditions of living and make them feel an important part of the society. As Slany and Kucharczyk stress, in accordance with the European Union standards, immigrants should be granted social, economic, cultural and welfare rights. What is more, due to belonging to a different culture and ethnic group and having a different religion, they should have a right to assemble and manifest their views and celebrate their customs. Immigrants should also be aware of and be willing to adopt the structural and institutional regulations of the accepting country.⁷⁷

Conclusions

According to immigrants, Poland is not a friendly country to foreigners. The government is not interested in building a system of sup-

⁷⁵ S. Łodziński, *Powrót do różnorodności...*, op.cit., p. 59.

⁷⁶ K. Slany, M. Kucharczyk, *Instytucjonalne bariery integracji...*, op.cit., p. 166.

⁷⁷ Ibidem, p. 150.

port for immigrants thanks to which they could easily function in the society and become its fully integrated part.⁷⁸

In 2017, upon the motion of Minister of Internal Affairs and Administration Mariusz Błaszczak, the government invalidated “The Migration Policy of Poland” as being “incongruent to the problems that our country faces” and “not taking into consideration the migration crisis that has affected Europe.”⁷⁹

Błaszczak said that “the migration policy should be reasonable rather than being based on political correctness.”⁸⁰ Deputy Minister Jakub Skiba pointed out that “the previous policy framework did not enable the government to react to the migration crisis and economic migration from Ukraine.” He also stressed that the new migration regulations in Poland would help differentiate between refugees and labour immigrants, object to the mechanism of automatic relocation, and set up a policy towards economic migrants from Ukraine.” As the priorities of the migration policy, he indicated the following actions: “the precise monitoring of migration processes, long-term approach to the integration or assimilation of economic migrants, and ensuring safety from terrorism.”⁸¹

The Law and Justice government’s announcement of a new migration policy along with the intensification of nationalist sentiments in

⁷⁸ Ibidem, p. 166.

⁷⁹ Rząd unieważnił dokument dotyczący polityki migracyjnej Polski. Na wniosek Błaszczaka, 21 March 2017, <https://dorzeczy.pl/kraj/24785/Rzad-uniewaznil-dokument-dotyczacy-polityki-migracyjnej-Polski-Na-wniosek-Blaszczaka.html>.

⁸⁰ Błaszczak: Poprawność polityczna przynosi śmiertelne żniwo, 22 August 2017, <http://fakty.interia.pl/polska/news-blaszczak-poprawnosc-polityczna-przynosi-smiertelne-zniwo,nId,2431698>. For more details see: http://fakty.interia.pl/polska/news-blaszczak-poprawnosc-polityczna-przynosi-smiertelne-zniwo,nId,2431698#utm_source=paste&utm_medium=paste&utm_campaign=firefox.

⁸¹ J. Mikulski, Rząd unieważnił dokument dot. polityki migracyjnej Polski, 20 March 2017, <http://www.rp.pl/Polityka/170329876-Rzad-uniewaznil-dokument-dot-polityki-migracyjnej-Polski.html> [access: 26 March 2018].

the Polish public debate and in the streets, which often involve acts of hostility towards foreigners, pose a serious problem in the process of the integration of immigrants. The results of migration studies, which confirm the social, economic and cultural benefits of immigration, are ignored and the fear of refugees is fuelled. Unfortunately, again there is no time for a serious discussion in the Polish debate. This discussion – as Paweł Sztompka puts it – should be open and with the participation of “a number of scholars in the conditions of the *ideal communication situation*, i.e. the full freedom of speech, equal position of the participants, lack of any external pressures and populist arguments. Such a democratic discourse should produce knowledge that will be free of any subjective distortions.”⁸² Meanwhile, opinions expressed in the ongoing debate are often unfair, based on stereotypes and prejudices. Driven by their own benefit, politicians contribute to the radicalization of the Polish society. The main motive behind their activity is their own particular interest. In the public debate, we ignore the importance of education and we forget about people in need. As a result, everyone loses, not only in the humanitarian, but also economic aspect. To conclude, let us quote Henry Bischoff, who, referring to the experiences of the countries accepting immigrants, said that immigration „provides more workers and consumers, and immigrants themselves do not cost anything; they pay.”⁸³ Therefore, immigrants are the value added for the accepting country rather than a threat to its citizens.

⁸² T. Skoczek, *Narodowa czy narodowościowa*, op.cit., pp. 22–23. As quoted by: P. Sztompka, *Socjologia. Analiza społeczeństwa*, Kraków 2002, p. 24.

⁸³ H. Bischoff, *Immigration issues*, Westport–London 2002, p. 281.

About Poles Abroad in the Election Campaign of 2015

When competing for voters' support, politicians trip over themselves to present rhetorically attractive promises to public opinion. In doing so, they are full of bitter words about their rivals. What has been the characteristic feature of the Polish political scene for years is the lack of content-related, substantive debate. Politicians' speeches are tinged with negative emotions and confined to the assessment of their opponents' activity. This evaluation is usually in line with their party's policy and is resistant to any counter-arguments. There is no room for a serious discussion in the political battle between parties. Voters, who are increasingly more critical about the political class, are nothing more than the audience watching the political monologues of adversaries, who rarely propose any changes based on experts' opinions.

The election campaigns of 2015 (both the presidential and parliamentary one) were no different in this respect. Politicians of all hues agreed about one thing – changes were necessary. They spoke about economy, science, public finance, the constitution, the army, social and health policy, retirement issues, energy, foreign policy, and emigration. All these issues, however, were addressed in a fairly general way. Law and Justice, the party which led in pre-election polls, declared that it would prepare a programme that would make Polish citizens change their decision to leave Poland. Forecasting a wave of returns from immigration, Law and Justice politicians also unequivocally blamed the previous government, formed by Civic Platform and

the Polish Peasants' Party, for the phenomenon of increasing emigration.

The parliamentary election of 25 October 2015 ended with the victory of Law and Justice, which gained 37.58% of the votes cast, thus winning 235 seats in the Sejm of the RP of the 8th term. As a result, Law and Justice was able to form its own government and implement the programme it had presented in the election campaign. In the autumn of 2017, Law and Justice had already been in power for two years. It is a good time to analyze whether Beata Szydło's government has fulfilled any of the promises concerning returns from emigration, so energetically presented in the election campaign.



After Poland's accession to the European Union, Poles obtained the same rights and freedoms as the other EU citizens, including the free movement of persons in the European Union, as regulated by art. 3 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), art. 21 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), title IV and title V of TFEU and art. 45 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

It should be noted that art. 9 of TEU established European Union citizenship. Under this article, "every national of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union. Citizenship of the Union shall be additional to and not replace national citizenship."

The principle of the free movement of persons constitutes one of the fundamental freedoms of the internal market of the European Union.¹ It is the foundation for building a community free of intole-

¹ O. Marzocchi, *Swobodny przepływ osób, Parlament Europejski do Waszych usług*, 06/2017, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/pl/displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_2.1.3.html [accessed: 10 October 2017].

rance and discrimination, particularly when it comes to employment, pay and work conditions. EU citizens are free to travel within the whole territory of the Community, stay there, settle, seek a job, work, run business activity or be educated in the school or university of their choice. They are also entitled to social rights in any member state. The detailed principles of the free movement of persons are stipulated by the provisions of Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member State.²

The scale of migration, which is the phenomenon accompanying the globalization processes (to a different degree, though), is determined by a number of political and socioeconomic factors. While the first group of factors concerns mainly the sphere of citizens' liberties and freedoms, the other one involves: unemployment level, the condition of the national economy and its development prospects, the living standard, the relationship between wages and prices of goods and services, family reunification, demographic pressure, and opportunities for developing one's own professional career.³ It should be

² Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 *on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC*, "Official Journal of the European Union," 30 April 2004, L 158, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32004L0038&rid=1> [10 November 2017]. See also: Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council *on guidance for better transposition and application of Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States*, Brussels, 2.7.2009 COM(2009) 313 final, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2009:0313:FIN:EN:PDF> [12 November 2017].

³ See, among others: *Wpływ emigracji zarobkowej na gospodarkę Polski*, Department of Analyses and Forecasts, Ministry of Economy, Warsaw, February

noted here that the state's economic growth significantly reduces the scale of economic migration.

Researchers into the phenomenon of migration point out that it has an impact not only on emigrants and their families, but also on the situation of the country they come from. In particular, migration processes influence such spheres as: national economy, public finance, inflation, wages and employment, public services and the healthcare system. The positive effects of migration include those which are related to the improvement of the living standard of a family, the motivation to gain better education and higher qualifications, and to accomplish professional ambitions, knowledge of a foreign language, the creation of new effective channels of communication between the country of emigration and the country of origin, increasing mobility, the elimination of the phenomenon of frustration resulting from low material status, streamlining the transfer of knowledge and financial resources, and promoting entrepreneurship.⁴

As Bogusława Puzio-Waławik points out, the strongest arguments against migration are those which refer to the depopulation of regions and the loss of human capital. They are the consequence of the so-called brain drain of well-educated and attractive employees tempted by higher salaries and better social conditions.⁵ Another issue concerns the shortage of labour force in the countries which migrants come from. According to B. Puzio-Waławik, other negative effects of migration include: the social status of migrants, which does

2007, http://www.fise.org.pl/files/1bezrobocie.org.pl/public/migracje/migracje_raport_mgip.pdf [12 November 2017].

⁴ B. Puzio-Waławik, *Spółeczno-ekonomiczne skutki migracji Polaków po akcesji Polski do Unii Europejskiej*, „Zeszyty Naukowe” 2010, no. 8, pp. 179–183.

⁵ See also: M. Duszczyk, J. Wiśniewski, *Analiza społeczno-demograficzna migracji zawodowej Polaków do Państw EOG po 1 maja 2014 r.*, ISP, Warsaw 2007, pp. 14–18.

not meet their expectations and qualifications, being employed on the positions below one's skills and knowledge, permanent specialist staff shortages, serious problems in the functioning of different sectors of the economy, few opportunities for growth, serious difficulties in various sectors of the economy, losses for the country as people educated by its schools and universities flee abroad, and the reduction of human capital resources.⁶ Migration has also implications for families, not only positive, which have been mentioned before, but also negative ones, which radically change the existing model. Very often, emotional ties are broken, which may be the result of the lack of time and of being overloaded with new chores. Research shows that it is the children of emigrants, referred to as Euro-orphans, who carry the heaviest social burden. In turn, those children who emigrate together with their parents often feel alienated and rejected, having to live in a totally new environment. The system of values also changes, with consumer attitudes becoming prevalent.⁷ It should be pointed out here that, by joining the European Union, Poland entered the system of the mutual recognition of professional qualifications. Consequently, a large number of medical staff, both doctors and nurses, fled to other countries.⁸

According to experts, Western employers highly value Polish workers' skills, eagerness and diligence. Maciej Duszczczyk indicates that without Polish employees, who are still relatively cheap labour force,

⁶ B. Puzio-Waławik, *Spółeczno-ekonomiczne skutki migracji...*, op.cit., p. 182–183.

⁷ Ibidem, p. 190.

⁸ See also: Agnieszka Makulec, *Konsekwencje migracji wysoko wykwalifikowanego kapitału ludzkiego dla krajów wysyłających i migrantów na przykładzie personelu medycznego*, Centre for Migration Studies, CMR Working Papers, 61/119, Warsaw, February 2003, http://www.migracje.uw.edu.pl/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Makulec_CM_R_WORKING_PAPER_FIN_1.pdf [11 November 2017].

a lot of entrepreneurs from Western Europe would find it difficult to sell their products. Their prices would have to go up due to higher costs related to the necessity of employing local workers.⁹

The effects of the increasing scale of migration can already be observed in Poland. The ageing of the Polish society is beginning to be a worrying problem, affecting the systems of healthcare and education. It is people in the productive age who emigrate and a new generation of Poles are born abroad. The problem is really serious, so the authorities can no longer ignore it. It is necessary to come up with new solutions, which may encourage those thinking of emigration to stay at home. It will be possible only if they are provided with proper conditions, particularly in the sphere of material security. However, a rational approach to the phenomenon of migration in the world must be adopted, especially after Poland's accession to the European Union, although it must be admitted that it cannot be eliminated completely. Mobility and the freedom of movement is a great value, after all. People have a right to seek a more prosperous and more comfortable life. Therefore, one must agree with Anna Komorowska, who – being interviewed by Monika Olejnik in Radio Zet – said that emigration was not always a tragedy, but that it could also be an opportunity.¹⁰

There is no doubt that emigration is a hot subject in the contemporary political debate. Politicians address the issue of its negative effects during election campaigns. Each consecutive prime minister emphasizes the need to formulate specific policies that would make it

⁹ M. Duszczyk, *Swoboda przepływu pracowników – dylematy związane z integracją Polski z Unią Europejską*, „Studia Europejskie” 1999, no. 2, p. 96, http://www.ce.uw.edu.pl/pliki/pw/2-1999_Duszczyk.pdf [accessed: 20 October 2017].

¹⁰ Anna Komorowska: Emigracja to nie dramat, a szansa, Fakt24.pl, 4 April 2016, <http://www.fakt.pl/wydarzenia/polityka/anna-komorowska-emigracja-to-szansa/f4pg3pw> [accessed: 16 May 2017].

easier for Poles to return to their home country.¹¹ In the presidential campaign of 2015, most candidates agreed that emigration had become a problem which must be addressed by the government. Paweł Kukiz, the leader of the Kukiz '15 movement, blunt as usual, pointed out that emigration was “staggered extermination,” and that Polish emigrants could only be encouraged to come back by “having Poland returned to citizens.”¹² According to Jacek Wilk, just after the accession to the European Union, “Polish people began to flee abroad on an unprecedented scale in history.”¹³ Other candidates implied that it was the fiscal crisis and failures in the area of pro-family policy that were among reasons for which Polish citizens decided to emigrate. Andrzej Duda said that “the scale of emigration, especially of young people, is alarming, and steps must be made to prevent it.”¹⁴ When he was already the president-elect, during a meeting with Poles at the embassy in London, A. Duda stated: “You did not leave because you wanted to leave your home country. You left because there were no conditions in Poland for you to develop yourselves, find any job or find a job that would provide you with decent wages so that you could

¹¹ For more details: M. Lesińska, *Emigracja i diaspora w dyskursie politycznym w Polsce w latach 1991–2015*, Centre for Migration Studies, CMR Working Papers, 83/141, <http://www.migracje.uw.edu.pl/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/WP83141-1.pdf> [accessed: 10 October 2017]. See also: T. Gackowski, M. Łączynski, *Monitoring wyborczy telewizyjnych audycji publicystycznych. Wybory parlamentarne 2015. Raport podsumowujący*, KRRiT, Warsaw 2015.

¹² *Migracje w kampanii wyborczej*, „Magazyn Migracyjny” 2015, no. 51, <http://www.biuletynmigracyjny.uw.edu.pl/51-czerwiec-2015/migracje-w-kampanii-wyborczej> [accessed: 10 October 2017]. See also: Paweł Kukiz: *Emigracja Polaków „za chlebem” to eksterminacja rozłożona w czasie*, w *Polityce*.pl, 29 April 2015, <https://wpolityce.pl/polityka/242618-pawel-kukiz-emigracja-polakow-za-chlebem-to-eksterminacja-rozlozona-w-> [11 November 2017].

¹³ *Migracje w kampanii wyborczej*, „Magazyn Migracyjny” 2015, no. 51, <http://www.biuletynmigracyjny.uw.edu.pl/51-czerwiec-2015/migracje-w-kampanii-wyborczej> [accessed: 10 October 2017].

¹⁴ *Ibidem*.

fulfil your life ambitions, expectations, or just support your families.” He also declared that, as the head of state, he would “make sure that <good changes> will be implemented.”¹⁵

Law and Justice politicians pointed out that it was the previous governments of Donald Tusk and Ewa Kopacz that were responsible for the wide wave of emigration from Poland. Thus, Jarosław Kaczyński’s party made almost the same diagnosis as the leftist party Razem. Its leader, Adrian Zandberg, speaking in the election campaign, stressed the need for stopping the migration crisis as soon as possible. He also indicated that the recipe for keeping young people in Poland was simple: stable work, cheap rental housing, abolishing the so-called “junk employment contracts,” and raising minimum wages.¹⁶

In her exposé, Prime Minister Beata Szydło, while discussing the government’s foreign policy priorities, declared support for business-people, because – as she emphasized – it was the area of “particular importance for young people so that they would not have to emigrate to European countries for economic reasons.” She also assured that “We will decrease taxes for young entrepreneurs, and reduce CIT for small companies by 15%. Owing to young Poles, we will develop knowledge-based and innovative economy. (...) We have a programme which will help small companies to become medium ones, medium companies to become large ones, and large companies to compete in the global market.”¹⁷

¹⁵ Prezydent do Polaków w Londynie. „Dzisiaj nie powiem: pakuj się, wracaj do Polski”, 15 September 2015, <https://www.tvn24.pl/wiadomosci-z-kraju,3/andrzej-duda-w-londynie-nie-powiedzialbym-polakom-wracajcie,577295.html> [accessed: 20 October 2017].

¹⁶ Partia Razem chce przeciwdziałać emigracji, *dziennik.pl*, 22 October 2015, <http://wiadomosci.dziennik.pl/wybory-parlamentarne/artykuly/503692,partia-razem-emigracja-jest-kryzysem-i-trzeba-ja-zatrzymac.html> [accessed: 20 October 2017].

¹⁷ 62 minuty exposé Beaty Szydło! Premier przedstawiła priorytety na pierwsze 100 dni rządów. „Priorytetem mojego rządu będzie bezpieczeństwo Po-

It should be stressed, however, that Law and Justice's campaign declarations concerning the reduction of emigration brought no real effects. More and more people are leaving Poland and the government's policy in this respect is ineffective. Neither social campaigns, such as "Tutaj zostaję" ("I'll stay here"),¹⁸ nor special internship programmes, e.g. "Opolskie – tutaj zostaję" ("Opolskie Province – I'll stay here"),¹⁹ have been successful. Despite the lack of tangible effects, new projects of this kind are initiated. They are implemented at the regional level with the European Union's support. In 2016, the programme „Śląskie. Tu pasuję” (“Śląskie Province. I fit in here”)²⁰ was launched in Śląskie Province. In the same year, the implementation of the programme “Nie emigruję – tu zostaję” (“I’m not going to leave – I’m going to stay here”) – co-financed by the EU within the framework of the European Social Fund – began.”²¹

Economists are concerned that the scale of emigration from Poland is not decreasing, and the situation has not improved even

laków!”, wPolityce.pl, 18 November 2015, <https://wpolityce.pl/polityka/272214-sejm-o-1100-expose-beaty-szydlo-wystapienie-ma-potrzwac-15-godziny-relacja-na-zywo?strona=2> [accessed: 15 October 2017].

¹⁸ Polacy emigrują i nie chcą wracać. „Bądźmy realistami. Oni nie wrócą. Chyba że po śmierci”, 4 December 2014, <http://tvn24bis.pl/z-kraju,74/polacy-emigruja-i-nie-chca-wracac-badzmy-realistami-oni-nie-wroca-chyba-ze-po-smierci,495947.html> [accessed: 15 October 2017].

¹⁹ See: Opolskie – tutaj zostaję. Są staże w ramach projektu, „Nowa Trybuna Opolska”, 2 August 2011, <http://www.nto.pl/strefa-biznesu/pieniadze/a/opolskie-tutaj-zostaje-sa-staze-w-ramach-projektu,10278210/> [accessed: 30 October 2017]; R. Dimitrow, Opolskie. Jednak tutaj nie zostaję. Co robią bohaterowie głószonej kampanii, „Nowa Trybuna Opolska”, 12 December 2014.

²⁰ „Śląskie. Tu pasuję”. Województwo rozpoczyna nową kampanię promocyjną, 17 May 2016, <http://katowice.wyborcza.pl/katowice/1,35063,20089832,slaskie-tu-pasuje-wojewodztwo-rozpoczyna-nowa-kampanie.html> [accessed: 25 October 2017].

²¹ See: the website of the project „Nie emigruję – tu zostaję”, 13 December 2016, <http://www.fres.org.pl/node/525> [accessed: 25 October 2017].

thanks to the fulfilment of promises included in Law and Justice's pre-election political programme, such as the Family 500+ programme or the Mieszkanie + programme (offering flats for Polish families). The five-point plan of Vice-Minister and Minister of Finance Mateusz Morawiecki has not helped, either. Morawiecki presented his strategy during, among others, lectures and meetings in Great Britain. According to the plan, the process of returns to Poland will soon begin, because: "1) it is forecast that wages will rise; 2) it is expected that the number of cheap flats for rent will increase; 3) the government is going to help families by providing them with various benefits; 4) the government will ensure long-term care for old-age pensioners, owing to which young people will not have to look after old and decrepit members of their family, and thus leave the job market; 5) the government will provide guarantee to large families that they will not be stricken by poverty."²² During his foreign trips and meetings with Poles living abroad, Morawiecki urges: „Come back to us, please.” Minister of Foreign Affairs Witold Waszczykowski often speaks in a similar vein: „Your home country calls and wants you to return!”²³

Both experts and Poles living abroad believe that Family 500+ programme, providing an additional benefit to families with two or more children, and Vice-Minister Morawiecki's vague promises, are not enough to make them return. According to Professor Izabela Grabowska from the University of Social Sciences and Humanities, “good

²² K. Wojciechowski, *Dlaczego Polacy nie chcą wracać z Wielkiej Brytanii do dobrej zmiany?* „W Polsce czuję się jak niechciane dziecko”, 24 February 2017, <http://wiadomosci.dziennik.pl/opinie/artykuly/543452,niedoczekanie-rzadu-na-milion-polakow-emigracja-wyspy-mateusz-morawiecki-dobra-zmiana-pis.html> [accessed: 10 October 2017].

²³ M. Święchowicz, *Widziane z zagranicy. Bezpowrotni*, „Newsweek” 2017, no. 43, 16–22 October 2017, p. 36.

economic climate, which, after all, may also be observed in the West, is not a sufficient argument.”²⁴

Figure 1.

The promotional poster of the programme „Opolskie. Tutaj zostaje!”



Source: „Opolskie – tutaj zostaje”, 4 January 2010, <http://fakty.interia.pl/opolskie/news-opolskie-tutaj-zostaje,nId,1224354> [accessed: 10 October 2017].

The data concerning the scale and directions of temporary emigration from Poland, published by the Main Statistical Office on 16 October 2017, show that 2.5 million Poles lived abroad in 2016. The number is by 118,000 (4.7%) bigger than in 2015. A large part of these people (approximately 2.1 million) live in the European Union. Poles living in the UK represent the biggest Polish diaspora (788,000), and – which is worth emphasizing – another 68,000 Polish people decided to leave to this country in 2016 (9.4% more than in 2015). The number of Poles living in Germany is also steadily rising (there are 687,000 of them, including 32,000 people who emigrated there in 2016 – a 5% rise as compared to the previous year). Other countries with a rela-

²⁴ Ibidem.

tively large Polish population include: the Netherlands (116,000), Ireland (112,000), Austria (39,000), Belgium (54,000), Denmark (32,000) and Sweden (49,000). 85,000 Poles live in Norway, which is not an EU member state. In each of the above-mentioned countries, we observe a steady increase in the number of Polish residents.²⁵

Having the above statistics in mind, it is also worth analyzing the data included in the report *Migracje zawodowe Polaków* (*The economic migrations of Poles*) prepared on a regular basis by the experts of Work Service. According to the report, the number of people considering economic emigration has increased by 4% since the autumn of 2015. What should be stressed is the fact that as many as 23% of the respondents admitted that the introduction of regulations reducing social benefits in the European Union states would be an argument not to leave. 1.5 million Poles declared that they had already decided to move abroad, and more than 17% of them were thinking of permanent emigration (in November 2016, the number was 900,000, with 21% declaring permanent stay). What is certainly very worrying is the fact that as many as 19% of professionally active people or potential participants of the Polish labour market – being motivated by the opportunity to earn more – are thinking of leaving Poland in the year to come. The authors of the report point out that terrorist attacks are an important argument which discourages people from leaving – 38.2% of the respondents were of this opinion, while for 53.2% it did not matter.²⁶

²⁵ Main Statistical Office, *Informacja o rozmiarach i kierunkach czasowej emigracji z Polski w latach 2004–2016*, Department of Demographic Studies and Labour Market, Warsaw, 16 October 2017, pp. 1–4, <https://stat.gov.pl/obszary-tematyczne/ludnosc/migracje-zagraniczne-ludnosci/informacja-o-rozmiarach-i-kierunkach-emigracji-z-polski-w-latach-20042016,2,10.html> [accessed: 20 October 2017].

²⁶ Work Service report entitled *Migracje zawodowe Polaków* (*The Economic Migrations of Poles*), May 2016, p. 6, <http://www.workservice.com/pl/Centrum-prasowe/Raporty/Raport-Migracyjny/Migracje-zarokowe-Polakow-IV-maj-2016> [accessed: 30 October 2017]. See also: Work Service report entitled

The report also included the profile of a potential Polish emigrant:

- „**62%** are young people, below 35 years of age;
- **53%** are non-workers: unemployed people or learners;
- **38%** people live in the country;
- **32%** are people with a basic education;
- **32%** come from the eastern part of Poland.”²⁷

In the edition of Work and Service report from November 2016, the profile of an emigrant is as follows:

- „**40%** are people between 24 and 35 years of age;”²⁸
- **66%** of people live in the country or in a city with the population below 100,000;
- **30%** come from the eastern part of Poland;
- **79%** are people with lower education;
- **76%** are employed people.”²⁹

There is no denial that the quality of the Polish public debate allows formulating diagnoses and proposals, which are quite general and remain in the sphere of wishful thinking. The government consults its policy with its political background. There is no doubt that bitter words can be said about the Polish political class, about its incompe-

Migracje zawodowe Polaków (The Economic Migrations of Poles), November 2016, p. 6, <http://www.workservice.com/pl/Centrum-prasowe/Raporty/Raport-Migracyjny/Migracje-zarobkowe-Polakow-V-listopad-2016> [accessed: 30 October 2017].

²⁷ Work Service report entitled *Migracje zawodowe Polaków (The Economic Migrations of Poles)*, May 2016, op.cit., p. 6.

²⁸ Similar data were revealed in the poll conducted by Millward Brown for the news programme “Fakty” on TVN in March 2015. 41% of the people under survey in the age 24-34 declared then that they were thinking of leaving Poland. See: *Sondaż dla „Faktów” TVN: młodzi wciąż chcą emigrować*, 22 March 2015, <https://www.tvn24.pl/wiadomosci-z-kraju,3/sondaz-dla-faktow-tvn-mlodzi-wciaz-chca-emigrowac,526652.html> [accessed: 25 October 2017].

²⁹ *Work Service report entitled Migracje zawodowe Polaków (The Economic Migrations of Poles)*, November 2016, op.cit., p. 6.

tence, short-sightedness and superficiality of actions. However, the promises made in the election campaign – concerning the creation of a climate conducive to returns from emigration – were not and still are not incidental. Politicians addressed their declarations to Poles both home and abroad. Practice shows that it is doubtful whether they really believed that their proposals may come into effect. Is it possible that the party which claims to listen to citizens is not aware of the real causes of emigration and the reasons for which they do not want to stay in Poland, even this better Poland – designed by Law and Justice? From what Poles living abroad say, we cannot expect the wave of returns to the country, because there are still no clear tax regulations in Poland. What is more, the government has not introduced any solutions to facilitate small business growth and has not curbed bureaucracy. Polish emigrants have a better living standard abroad; they are provided with generous social benefits and have access to luxury goods. They also have much wider opportunities for development and education. Western societies are more open. Emigrants find Poland xenophobic and racist.³⁰ Living conditions in Poland are more difficult and unstable, and the healthcare system is inefficient. Life in Poland involves a lot of stress and is a daily battle for the minimum material security. What is more, the experience gained abroad paradoxically does not make it easier to seek a job. Quite the opposite, it may be some kind of a barrier to find employment, because of the increased competition in the job market in Poland caused by the inflow of cheap labour force from Ukraine.

Politicians appeal: “Do not leave” and ask emigrants: “Come back!” They should listen more carefully to what Polish people who consider moving abroad have to say. The analysis of the factors which could

³⁰ K. Wojciechowski, *Dlaczego Polacy nie chcą...*, op.cit.


change people's decision to leave provides interesting information. The most important considerations include those related to family, culture, health and qualifications. There is little that the government can do here. On the other hand, properly designed long-term social policy could definitely have a preventive effect. Data concerning the potential barriers to emigration show that by guaranteeing the sufficient level of material security we could encourage most Poles who now declare their willingness to leave to stay in the country, among their family and friends.

It should be added that the data provided by the British statistical office, the Office for National Statistics, show that the number of Poles in the United Kingdom has increased almost 20-fold since 1 May 2004.³¹ Some mass media predicted that the UK's decision to leave the European Union will motivate some Polish residents to come back to their home country. Such speculations seem to be pre-mature, though. Let us remind here that until the breakout of the financial crisis, Poles had accounted for 10% of the population of Iceland. As Krzysztof Czerkas pointed out, the bankruptcy of the state did not make Polish people leaving the island move back to Poland. Quite the opposite, they sought a new life in Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland or Canada.

³¹ Brexit: Polacy nie będą masowo wracać do Polski, wybiorą inny kierunek emigracji, <http://www.polskieradio.pl/42/275/Artykul/1755396,Brexit-Polacy-nie-nie-beda-masowo-wracac-do-Polski-wybiora-inny-kierunek-emigracji> [accessed: 20 October 2017].

Diagram 1.
Barriers to emigration

What are the reasons that could change your decision on emigration?



Source: Work Service report entitled *Migracje zawodowe Polaków* (*The Economic Migrations of Poles*), November 2016, p. 16, <http://www.workservice.com/pl/Centrum-prasowe/Raporty/Raport-Migracyjny/Migracje-zarobkowe-Polakow-V-listopad-2016> [accessed: 30 October 2017].

For a great many Poles living abroad, the decision to emigrate was not exclusively based on their willingness to gain a better-paid job. It was also the foundation of building a new life in emigration. The re-

turn to the homeland entails the necessity of starting from scratch again. What is more, it may be difficult for children, for whom it means having to adapt to a new reality. The return is actually tantamount to emigration for the new generation.³² This issue is addressed by the report entitled *(Nie)łatwe powroty do domu?* ((Not) easy returns home?), which shows that the Polish educational system is not prepared to accommodate children who have been studying in foreign schools so far.³³

It should also be mentioned here that the results of studies of the emigration phenomenon prove that “migration experiences make us perceive emigration as a potential choice and increase the probability of moving abroad again the future.”³⁴ Moreover, every other person returning from emigration does not rule out the possibility of leaving to a foreign country in the next two years.³⁵ The above conclusions are confirmed by the results of experts’ work as part of the project „Diagnoza Społeczna 2015” (“Social Diagnosis 2015), which indicate that emigration remains to have economic causes.³⁶

³² K. Wojciechowski, *Dlaczego Polacy nie chcą...*, op.cit.

³³ M. Świąchłowicz, *Widziane z zagranicy...*, op.cit., p. 38.

³⁴ J. Czapliński, T. Panek (ed.), *Diagnoza społeczna 2011. Warunki i jakość życia Polaków*, „Contemporary Economics” 2011, vol. 5, Issue 3, p. 143, http://www.diagnoza.com/pliki/raporty/Diagnoza_raport_2015.pdf [accessed: 20 October 2017].

³⁵ K. Slany, B. Solga (koordynacja), *Społeczne skutki poakcesyjnych migracji ludności*, Warsaw 2014, p. 54, http://www.wp.ajd.czyst.pl/dz/uploads/Raport_KBnM_PAN_Spo%C5%82eczne_skutki_poakcesyjnych_migracji_ludno%C5%9Bci_Polski.pdf [accessed: 20 October 2017].

³⁶ J. Czapliński, T. Panek (ed.), *Diagnoza społeczna 2015. Warunki i jakość życia Polaków*, „Contemporary Economics” 2015, vol. 9, Issue 4, p. 150, http://www.diagnoza.com/pliki/raporty/Diagnoza_raport_2015.pdf [accessed: 20 October 2017].

Table 1.

Declared reasons for moving abroad according to gender

Declared reason for the willingness to move abroad*	Men	Women	Total
I lost hope to find any job in my home country	16,94	20,62	18,34
I lost hope to find a job that would suit my qualifications in Poland	9,59	9,94	9,72
I hope I can earn much more abroad	75,95	63,88	71,36
I have no prospects for professional growth in Poland	11,50	10,79	11,23
I am fed up with the overall atmosphere in my home country	25,25	25,85	25,48
In Poland, everything depends on connections and acquaintances rather than personal competences	30,36	30,14	30,28
I hope that social benefits (child benefit, unemployment benefit) will be more generous in another country	7,23	6,64	7,01
I will be able to become more independent abroad	10,84	13,57	11,88
I want to reunite with the rest of my family/partner, who are living abroad	2,19	9,00	4,79
People abroad are a lot kinder and more helpful	9,73	6,84	8,63
It is easier to establish and develop one's own business abroad	6,87	2,29	5,13
My employer is sending me abroad	2,53	1,45	2,12
I want to prove myself	9,45	14,07	11,23
I want to earn money to start my own business in Poland	4,42	4,13	4,31
I want to earn money to satisfy my needs in Poland (supporting a family, paying off loans, buying/building a house/flat, purchasing land, buying work tools)	25,79	24,06	25,13
Another reason	7,57	9,54	8,32


* The respondents were allowed to choose maximum three answers

Source: As cited by: J. Czapliński, T. Panek (ed.), *Diagnoza społeczna 2015. Warunki i jakość życia Polaków*, „Contemporary Economics” 2015, vol. 9, Issue 4, p. 150, http://www.diagnoza.com/pliki/raporty/Diagnoza_raport_2015.pdf [accessed: 20 October 2017].

What is worth emphasizing, the authors of the Work Service report of May 2016, which we have quoted above, draw similar conclusions. The diagram below presents the most important factors determining Polish people's decision to leave the country.

Diagram 2.

The most important reasons for the emigration of Poles, May 2016.




Source: Work Service report entitled *Migracje zawodowe Polaków* (*The Economic Migrations of Poles*), May 2016, p. 15, <http://www.workservice.com/pl/Centrum-prasowe/Raporty/Raport-Migracyjny/Migracje-zarokowe-Polakow-IV-maj-2016> [accessed: 30 October 2017].

Both regularly conducted polls and interviews with Polish emigrants show that the decision to leave abroad is also determined by factors such as: more opportunities to travel and visit new places (44%), a better tax system (15.6%), friendly public administration

(11.7%), and the safer location of a country (11.4%).³⁷ In November edition of Work Service report, the reasons for the emigration of Poles were as follows:

Diagram 3.

The most important reasons for the emigration of Poles, November 2016.



Source: Work Service report entitled *Migracje zawodowe Polaków* (*The Economic Migrations of Poles*), November 2016, p. 15, <http://www.workservice.com/pl/Centrum-prasowe/Raporty/Raport-Migracyjny/Migracje-zarobkowe-Polakow-V-listopad-2016> [accessed: 30 October 2017].

³⁷ *Kolejna fala emigracji: 4 mln Polaków chce wyjechać*, Newsweek.pl, 11 May 2016, <http://www.newsweek.pl/polska/emigracja-ponad-4-mln-polakow-chce-wyjechac-na-zachod-raport,artykuly,385406,1.html>, as cited by: Work Service report entitled *Migracje zawodowe Polaków* (*The Economic Migrations of Poles*), May 2016, op.cit., p. 15.

Among other factors which could encourage them to return from emigration, the respondents mentioned: family/relatives living or intending to live abroad (19%), better social conditions (19%), a more favourable tax system (18%), more friendly public administration (16%) and safer geopolitical location (6%).³⁸

Practice shows that both government programmes and European Union regional projects are unsuccessful. Therefore, they should be seen only as a rhetoric figure presented in the incessant election campaign in Poland. Superficial activities and decisions are insufficient. What could thus make emigrants wish to come back to their homeland? The existing body of literature provides four basic reasons for a return:

“– because of the lack of success abroad – a sense of failure and difficulties in adapting to a new environment make people (...) return;

- intended – the most frequent reason. It concerns those emigrants who left abroad with an intention to return later. It is the most common reason for coming back to Poland;
- with hope for success – emigrants who have been successful abroad come to realize that they still feel like strangers in a new country. At the same time, they observe the improvement of the social and economic situation in their home country, so they decide to come back to pursue a career in <their own land>;
- to spend retirement years home – it refers to those people who have lived abroad for a long time, but plan to spend their old days in the home country.”³⁹

³⁸ Work Service report entitled *Migracje zawodowe Polaków (The Economic Migrations of Poles)*, November 2016, op.cit., p. 15.

³⁹ *Polscy emigranci. Dlaczego wracają?*, 7 January 2012, <https://praca.trojmiasto.pl/Polscy-emigranci-Dlaczego-wracaja-n54357.html> [accessed: 30 October 2017].

Scheme 1.

Reasons for returning from emigration in the declarations of Poles living abroad



Source: Phot. A. Kotlicka, Bankier.pl, <https://www.bankier.pl/wiadomosc/Brytania-wychodzi-oni-zostaja-Polacy-na-Wyspach-mowia-dlaczego-nie-chca-wracac-7504549.html> [accessed: 20 October 2017].

In this context, the study entitled *Społeczne skutki poakcesyjnych migracji ludności* (*The Social Effects of the Post-Accession Migrations of the Population*), conducted by the experts from the Committee for Migration Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences, shows that post-accession return migrations are predominantly motivated by

failures rather than being innovations.⁴⁰ When asked about the possible reasons for returning home, Polish emigrants answer that the potential reason for such a decision may be the necessity of taking care of their parents or a satisfying, well-paid job. As Malwina Wrotniak accurately points out, “the emigrants who have been turned away are still a political success” for the government. This is why new promises concerning an easier entry to a job market and the recognition of qualifications obtained abroad are made over and over again. Politicians make theatrical gestures, asking: “Come back to our country!” The analyses of the Polish Academy of Science show, however, that these political incentives are actually empty words, because a return usually means a job demotion and weakening social relations, constituting one of the most important factors increasing chances for employment.⁴¹

As it was mentioned earlier, after the accession to the European Union, Polish people exercise the right of the free movement of people and employees. However, declarations are usually presented in official speeches and are not followed by any decisions. This is not enough. A decision to return could be influenced by specific actions, which could help people to re-adapt in their home country.⁴² At present, we certainly observe the consequences of emigration, and they will become even more evident in the future. According to experts, the resulting changes in the population structure pose a serious threat to our system of social security. We need a serious, content-related

⁴⁰ K. Slany, B. Solga (coordination), *Společné skutki...*, op.cit., p. 53.

⁴¹ Ibidem, p. 54. See also: M. Wrotniak, *Brytania wychodzi, oni zostają. Polacy na Wyspach mówią, dlaczego nie chcą wracać*, 14 March 2017, <https://www.bankier.pl/wiadomosc/Brytania-wychodzi-oni-zostaja-Polacy-na-Wyspach-mowia-dlaczego-nie-chca-wracac-7504549.html> [accessed: 20 October 2017].

⁴² K. Slany, B. Solga (coordination), *Společné skutki...*, op.cit., p. 57.

debate, followed by thoroughly prepared actions in the sphere of social policy, taking into consideration long-term implementation prospects. Only such well-designed strategies can prevent or weaken the effects of “negative demographic trends and the shortage of professionally active population.”⁴³ The importance of well-thought out social policy cannot be overestimated here. It is a chance for maintaining a safe level of the human and intellectual potential of Poland. It constitutes an efficient tool, which may help to reduce emigration and intensify remigration processes.⁴⁴

⁴³ Ibidem, p. 58.

⁴⁴ Ibidem, p. 59.

Refugee Crisis and Security

The reasons for the increased migration, which was particularly high in 2015, can be found in many factors, both global, regional and local. However, decisions about changing the place of residence or necessity to change it always boil down to the individual dimension of people who decide to leave their previous place of residence. Bringing the causes of the refugee movement down to the situation of the population where they live does not provide a full answer to the question of why so many refugees appeared in Europe in 2015. The basic category that marks the reality of this period is “security.” Safety has become the destination of trips in search of it, and it is also a concept that concerns, at least in part, the community of countries to which culturally different newcomers come. The definition of this ‘safety’ is an important issue here. Is it a search for a place where one can ensure one’s physical survival in connection with a threat to life in a place where one has lived so far (war, persecution). Or rather, the aim is to ensure economic security with the hope of a ‘better life’. Or is it an escape from environmental changes caused by nature (environmental degradation, drought)? On the other hand, there are fears of newcomers who might culturally dominate native societies by introducing cultural and social rules, which were the reason for their escape to the tolerant and liberal societies of the West? Security, in turn, is understood here in the context of the threat which may be the undermining of the current well-being (status quo) of Europe.

The multitude of reasons for the increased migration flows was recognized by the European Commission, which acknowledged that the situation that had arisen was the result of wider processes related to globalization and the communication revolution, on the one hand, and crises, including those of a military nature, in such parts of the world as the Middle East, Ukraine or North Africa.¹

The concept of environmental refugees, which also includes the term climate refugees,² also seems to be interesting. According to some mass media, the 2011 conflict in Syria may have been partly caused by climate change, hence the emergence of the term “First Climate War of the 21st Century.”³ This factor was also pointed out by Pope Francis, who, apart from war, hunger and persecution, mentioned natural disasters as a reason for the displacement of the population.⁴ In this context, migrants may be considered as people seeking environmental security.

Attention should also be paid to the status of people leaving their place of residence, which does not necessarily mean that they move outside their own country. A significant number of refugees globally are so-called internally displaced persons. Moreover, the refugee problem does not only concern Europe. At the height of the migration

¹ Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. The European Agenda on Migration, 13 May 2015.

² More on this subject in: C. Jakobeit, C. Methmann, *Klimaflüchtlinge Die verleugnete Katastrophe*, Hamburg 2007.

³ T. Ulanowski, *Jalowy półksiężyc, czyli pierwsza wojna klimatyczna XXI w.*, http://wyborcza.pl/1,75400,17508155,jalowy_polksiezyc_czyli_pierwsza_wojna_klimatyczna.html [20 May 2018].

⁴ Orędzie „Przyjmować, chronić, promować i integrować imigrantów i uchodźców” na Światowy Dzień Migranta i Uchodźcy, który jest obchodzony 14 stycznia 2018 r., <http://papiez.wiara.pl/doc/4127726.Przyjmowac-chronic-promowac-i-integrowac> [20.05.2018].

problem in Europe, in mid-2015, North and South America recorded some 750 000 foreign refugees and some 6.5 million internally displaced persons (Colombia), while Asia and the Pacific recorded some 3 million internally displaced persons and some 3.8 million foreign nationals.⁵ In 2016, there were 65.6 million forcibly displaced people globally.⁶ The geography of migration coincides with the geography of conflicts. The civil war in Syria, which began in 2011 and was accompanied by the expansion of the Islamic State (ISIS, DAESH), has resulted in population movements of millions of people, both within the country and to neighbouring and other countries, including European ones. In the first years of the crisis, people leaving Syria went to Turkey, where in April 2018 there were 3,586,679 refugees), Lebanon (986,942), Jordan (661,859), Iraq (249,641) and Egypt (128,956).⁷

What was an important factor in strengthening migration trends in Syria was the intensification of fighting in the country in 2014, which resulted in a significant increase in the number of refugees from the beginning of 2015, particularly in the Turkish direction. The number of victims in Iraq increased considerably as a result of the intensified fighting with the Islamic State. In 2012 it was 4,500 people, in 2014 it was 20,000, in 2015 it was 16,000. As a result of the fighting and the search for safe shelter, about 3.2 million people left the endangered areas.⁸

At the beginning of the second decade of the 21st century, the security environment in North Africa changed considerably, with the

⁵ *UNHCR Mid Year Trends 2015*, <http://www.unhcr.org/statistics/unhcrstats/56701b969/mid-year-trends-june-2015.html> [20 May 2018].

⁶ This is calculated by both UNHCR and UNRWA. <http://www.unhcr.org/pl/2858-wojny-przemoc-i-przesladowania-przyczyna-rekordowej-liczby-przymusowych-przesiedlen.html> [20 May 2018].

⁷ <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria> [20 May 2018].

⁸ <http://kurdystan.caritas.pl/uchodzcy-w-iraku/> [20 May 2018].

so-called Arab Spring, which, contrary to expectations,⁹ did not bring stability but, on the contrary, chaos and the threat of the Islamic radicals taking power. The Tunisian “jasmine revolution” was the self-immolation of the unemployed Mohammed Bouazizi on 17 December 2010, who carried out this action in response to the seizure of a market stall on which he traded fruits illegally. His suicidal death was the cause of social unrest and ended with the overthrow of President Ben Ali. During these events, fears arose that Islamic groups would take power, as shown by a demonstration organized by opponents of religious extremism on 7 July 2011 in Tunis. Supporters of Islamic groups were also particularly active at that time.¹⁰

Political and economic factors became the main cause of the demonstrations in Egypt, which started with “Day of Anger” (25 January 2011). As a result of democratic elections, at the turn of 2011 and 2012, the Muslim Brotherhood (Party of Freedom and Justice) took over power and determinedly proceeded with the implementation of radical Islamisation of the social, political and economic space of Egypt.¹¹ The radicalism of the Muslim Brotherhood and its policies have led to new protests, this time supported by the army, which resulted in the group’s removal from power and another ban on its activities. Other countries in the region have also been affected, but the protests there were actually much less important. It should be noted

⁹ Events in this part of the world were enthusiastically received in the USA and in European countries, where they were interpreted as the fourth wave of democratization. K. Kozłowski, *Kolory rewolucji*, Warsaw 2012, p. 46.

¹⁰ J. Armbuster, *Arabska wiosna: rewolucja w świecie islamskim*, Wrocław 2012, p. 236.

¹¹ M. Lipa, *Przemiany polityczne w Egipcie po dymisji Husniego Mubaraka*, [in:] “Arabska wiosna rok później” (ed.) J. Zdanowski, “Krakowskie Studia Międzynarodowe” 2012 no. 1, p. 77; C. Rosefsky-Wickham, *Bracia Muzułmanie po upadku Mubaraka. Kim są Bracia i jaką rolę odegrają w przyszłości?*, „As-Salam”, 2012, no. 1, pp. 9–10.

that protests of varying intensity and impact took place in Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Djibouti, Iraq, Iran, Yemen, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Mauritania, Oman, Somalia, Sudan and Syria.

The events in Libya were of particular importance for European security and the “refugee crisis.” Social discontent and unrest were caused by similar origins as in other Arab Spring countries – difficult economic situation, unemployment, corruption, restrictions on civil liberties, authoritarian rule of the head of state (Muammar al-Gaddafi). The demonstrations that began in January 2011 finally turned into a civil war, as a result of which (not without the help of Western states, including Poland) Muammar al-Gaddafi’s government was overthrown.¹² As a result of the chaos that had arisen, Libya has become a country in which Islamic extremists had settled quite well.¹³ In the Index of Fallen Countries, the country moved up 60 positions in 2012, which indicates a significant deterioration of its situation. The Islamic State founded its centres there and took over Derna and Sirta.¹⁴ Libya started to play a significant role in this organization’s plans, as a possible bridgehead for action against targets in Europe. According to Abu Arhim al-Libim, ISIS representative, “God has given Libya a strategic position and huge potential from which we can

¹² K. Kozłowski, op.cit., p. 151. P. Wiśniewski, *Polska dostarczała broń do Libii?* <http://www.pomorska.pl/polska-i-swiat/art/7241924,polska-dostarczała-bron-do-libii,id,t.html> [20.05.2018]; P. Wroński, *Polska wysłała broń libijskim rebeliantom*, http://wyborcza.pl/1,76842,10150513,Polska_wyslała_bron_libi-skim_rebeliantom.html [20 May 2018].

¹³ *OC Coptic Christians In Mourning Over Mass Execution Of Brethren In Libya*, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V44oxVdOSJw> [20 May 2018]; *Witness to Islamic State Atrocities (Extra Scene from 'Libya's Migrant Trade'*, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QsdYXjzB9Yw> [20 May 2018].

¹⁴ In fact, these cities were taken over by Ansar al-Sharia in 2014, an organization which cooperates with the Islamic State. <https://www.tvn24.pl/wiadomosci-ze-swiate,2/islamski-terroryzm-najgrozniejsze-organizacje,596655.html> [accessed: 20 May 2018].

draw great benefits. It has a long coastline and easy access to the southern European countries of the Crusaders. They can be easily reached from here, even by boat (...) From Libya to the Crusader cities, we can get them by boat – as illegal immigrants who take hundreds of people to Europe.”¹⁵

Another country with a large scale of migration is Somalia, which became a failed state in 1991 and is the undisputed leader among countries of this type.¹⁶ Ethiopia had more than 740,000 refugees in 2017, and Kenya and Uganda each received between 500,000 and 600,000 Somali refugees. In Somalia alone, there were 4.5 million IDPs in the world at the beginning of the 21st century.¹⁷ Active terrorist activity in the country is carried out by the al-Qaeda network-associated organisation al-Shabaab. The situation is similar in the Central African Republic, where, as a result of the fighting in 2012, more than 1 million people were internally displaced and 500,000 fled. As a result of Boko Haram's activities in Nigeria, a total of 2.5 million people had to leave their homes to flee to Cameroon and Niger, among others. In 2015, the organization announced its subordination to the Islamic State.

A specific direction, with a centuries-old tradition from which migrants come, is Asia, which is also characterized by a high level of internal migration. Intra-Asian destinations are mainly Brunei, Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan, with Bangladesh, Burma,

¹⁵ Abu Arhim al-Libim, *Libia: strategiczna brama dla Państwa Islamskiego*, cyt za: M. Urzędowska, *Kalifat: wtargniemy do Europy jako emigranci*, http://wyborcza.pl/1,76842,17429589,Kalifat__wtargniemy_do_Europy_jako_imigranci.html [accessed: 20 May 2018].

¹⁶ M.Tul, *Państwa afrykańskie w Indeksie Państw Upadłych*, https://pcsa.org.pl/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Michal.Tul-Panstwa.afrykanskie.w.Indeksie.Panstw.Upadlych_PCSA_2014.pdf

¹⁷ <https://reliefweb.int/reprt/central-african-republic/user-country-report-sudan-statistics-refugees-and-other-uprooted> [accessed: 20 May 2018].

Cambodia, China, India, Indonesia, Laos, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka and Vietnam as the main destinations.¹⁸ 2.5 million people have fled to Pakistan and Iran as a result of the conflicts in Afghanistan.

In almost all of the countries where there has been an increase in the number of refugees, armed conflicts have occurred or are taking place. Many, such as Libya, Syria, Iraq and Nigeria, have terrorist groups, some of which are active in selected European countries. The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (Taliban) is active in Afghanistan, and the Kurdish Ansar al-Islam, which has been active in Iraq since 2004, has conducted recruitment activities in Italy and Spain. According to the German Federal Office for the Protection of the German Constitution, there were around 100-150 supporters of the organization in 2005.¹⁹ The organization's ideologist, Mullah Krekar, who lives in Norway, directly threatened to die in 2011 if he was deported from this country.²⁰ There is also Ansar as-Sunna in Iraq, which cooperates with al-Qaeda. He, like Ansar al-Islam, is in control of the Koranic order in the areas he has conquered. This organization was also active in Italy, where the American intelligence service (CIA), in cooperation with the Italian military intelligence service, took imam Abu Umara, a recruiter, to Ansar al-Islam and Ansar as-Sunna and handed him over to the Egyptian authorities.²¹

In 2002, Jama'at Ahl al-Sunna li ad-Dawa wa al-Jihad was founded in Nigeria, also known as Boko Haram. This organisation strives to islamize the whole of Nigeria. The most radical faction is in favour of close cooperation with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb Countries

¹⁸ J. Łupińska, *Migracje w regionie Azji i Pacyfiku*, <http://www.psz.pl/168-archiwum/migracje-w-regionie-azji-i-pacyfiku> [accessed: 20 May 2018].

¹⁹ K. Izak, *Leksykon organizacji i ruchów islamistycznych*, Warsaw 2016, p. 57–58.

²⁰ Ibidem, p. 58.

²¹ Ibidem, p. 63.

and with Harakat ash-Shabb al-Mudjahidin in Somalia.²² Harakat ash-Shabb al-Mudjahidin (Mujahedin Youth Movement) was founded in 2006 in Somalia and aims to create a Koranic state. It is also active in Uganda.

In Iraq, in 2006, a coalition was formed between Sunni groups that formed the Islamic State of Iraq (Dawlat al-Iraq al-Islamiya). The organization was led by Abu Hamza al-Muhajir, who had previously taken over the management of al-Qaeda in Iraq, after the assassination of Abu Musaba al-Zarkawi.²³ Previously, al-Qaida in Iraq (al-Qaida – the Jihadist Organisation in the Two Rivers Country, al-Qaida – the Jihadist Group in Iraq) was activated in the country. It was founded on the basis of the Jamat al-Tawhid al-Jihad group, established in 2003 in response to the actions of Western countries in Iraq.²⁴ In 2012, Abu Umar al.-Baghdadi announced the establishment of the Islamic State in Iraq and Levant, and in 2014, the Islamic State was announced to include Syria, Iraq and Lebanon.

Tunisia has an Islamic Group fighting in Tunisia (Al-Jama'al-Islamiya al-Mukatila fi Tunisia), which is interested in being active in Europe. In 2003, for example, there was information that the organization was involved in activities in France.²⁵

In Syria, Jabhat al-Nusra (Levant's Population Defence Front), a Syrian al-Qaeda organization, is active outside the Islamic State. It controlled part of north-west Syria. In 2016, after the fall of Aleppo, a number of changes took place in organizations fighting government forces,

²² Ibidem, p. 74.

²³ Ibidem, p. 81. According to other sources, the organisation was led by Abu Umar al-Baghdadi.

²⁴ S. Kulczyński, *Przegląd najważniejszych organizacji terrorystycznych*, [in:] *Współczesne zagrożenia terroryzmem*, ed. by K. Jałoszyński, Szczytno 2013, p. 206.

²⁵ K. Izak, op.cit., p. 123.

including Islamic radicals, hence the emergence of a new name al-Nusra: Jabhat Fath ash-Sham (Levant's Conquest Front).²⁶

The activities of terrorist groups are not the only reason for their departure from the area of their activity. We should also mention the actions of the authorities themselves, the difficult economic situation and the intervention and conflict with other countries. The situation is complicated in Afghanistan, where there has been a conflict since 1979, first between the USSR and the Mujahedin, and since the end of 2001 between the Taliban and first, the US forces and then with NATO, which was there as part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operation. We should also mention the conflict in Ukraine over the occupation of Crimea by the Russian Federation and the fighting in the east of the country.

At the beginning of the 21st century, Europe's terrorist activity collapsed, current trends or terrorist organizations were decomposed or fought against. The terrorism that was known had evolved but did not disappear. It seemed that after the wave of activities of the Red Brigades, Direct Actions, the Red Army Faction and similar organizations, there would be no followers or followers of their political ideas or ways of fighting, while in Greece, the Conspiratorial Fire Cells appeared, and in Germany, the autonomy and anarchists resorted to violence in defence of their values and way of life.²⁷ Peace in Northern Ireland does not mean that all supporters of terrorism have abandoned arms. The Continuation of the Irish Republican Army (CIRA) and the Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA) still operate.

²⁶ R. Stefanicki, *Syryjscy rebelianci dzielą się i łączą. Radykałowie górą*, <http://wyborcza.pl/7,75399,21317596,syryjscy-rebelianci-dziela-sie-i-lacza-nie-widac-konca-blisko.html> [accessed: 20 May 2018].

²⁷ A. Hołub, *Współczesny radykalizm lewicowy wobec przemocy jako środka działania politycznego*, [in:] *Siły zbrojne w walce z terroryzmem*, ed. by M. Wiatr, J. Stelmach, M. Busłowicz, Wrocław 2016, p. 66–68.

Both these organizations rejected the possibility of peacefully achieving the goal of merging Northern Ireland with the Republic of Ireland. They have been recognised as terrorist organisations by the US Department of State²⁸ and the European Union.²⁹ In Spain, too, the largest separatist terrorist organisation has been liquidated. The Basque Country and Freedom organisation (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, ETA), which has been operating since 1959, announced in May 2018 that it had dissolved itself and completely ceased its activities.³⁰

Two separatist organizations are still active in Corsica. Front de Libération Nationale de la Corse (FLNC) has been active since 1976 and the Corsican Army (d'Armata Corsa)³¹ was founded in 1999. A similar programmatic character was enjoyed by the Brittany Liberation Front (FLB) operating in the 1960s, which in 1971 was transformed into the Breton Revolutionary Army (also active in the 21st century).³² Bretoners from this organisation have maintained contacts with ETAs and extremists from Corsica.³³

²⁸ *Foreign Terrorist Organizations*, <https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm> [accessed: 20 May 2018].

²⁹ Council common position 2009/468/CFSP of 15 June 2009 updating Common Position 2001/931/CFSP on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism and repealing Common Position 2009/67/CFSP <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/pl/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32009E0468&qid=1412596355797&from=EN> [accessed: 21 May 2018]. In 2017, these organizations were not included on the EU's list any longer. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/PL/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32017D1426&from=pl> [accessed: 21 May 2018].

³⁰ *El Fin de ETA*, <https://elpais.com/especiales/2017/desarme-definitivo-de-eta/> [21.05. 2018]. *Vigipirate à Paris suite aux menaces d'Armata Corsa*, http://www.ina.fr/video/CA_C01005643 [accessed: 28 May 2018].

³¹ *Vigipirate à Paris suite aux menaces d'Armata Corsa*, <http://www.ina.fr/video/CAC01005643> [accessed: 28 May 2018].

³² K. Niklewicz, *Francja. Regionalizm. Bretania*, <http://wyborcza.pl/1,75248,140831.html?disableRedirects=true> [accessed: 22 May 2018].

³³ B. Bolechów, *Terroryzm w świecie podwubiegunowym. Przewartościowania i kontynuacje*, Toruń 2003, p. 199.

According to Europol, there were 99 terrorist incidents in Europe in 2016 of an ethnocentric or separatist nature. The groups responsible for such events include the dissident republican groups in Northern Ireland (RIRA), the Kurdistan Workers' Party (Kongra Gel, PKK), which operates in European countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Switzerland), the ETA, which was still active in 2016, and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (Tamil Tigers of Tamil Eelam),³⁴ which has been registered in Switzerland. Germany had a Nationalist Socialist Underground Organisation (Nationalsozialistischer Untergrund, Zwickauer Terrorzelle, NSU), which was liquidated in 2011 after a series of killings of people considered hostile to the nation and to Germany itself. According to the indictment, NSU members committed ten murders (nine of them were immigrants and one policeman) and two terrorist attacks.³⁵

At the same time, a series of attacks against critical infrastructure (railways, means of transport for logistics companies and troops) by extreme left-wing groups against the buying back of tenement houses in the Kreuzberg district of Berlin and against the foreign policy of the German authorities continued in Germany.³⁶ In 2009, the 42 Bundeswehr vehicles were destroyed in the same way in Dresden by the extreme left-wing autonomy, and in October 2016, 18 army vehicles were set on fire in Bremen.³⁷ In March 2016, the Bundeswehr vehicles were also set on fire in Leipzig by the Autonome Group of Joachim

³⁴ *European Union Terrorism situation and Trend Report 2017*, European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation 2017.

³⁵ Proces NSU: mowa oskarżycielska ma trwać 22-godzin, <http://www.dw.com/pl/proces-nsu-mowa-oskar%C5%BCycielska-ma-trwa%C4%87-22-godzin/a-39751158> [accessed: 22 May 2018].

³⁶ A. Hołub, op.cit., p. 67.

³⁷ *Polizei geht von Brandstiftung aus*, <http://www.taz.de/!5348163/> [accessed: 22 May 2018].

Gauk and Ursula von der Leyen.³⁸ The basic slogans of German autonomy are anti-fascism, antiracism, antisexism, the fight against state violence, the fight for free space and the fight against gentrification.³⁹ Alternative environments, including autonomy, are opposed to changes in the ownership and thus social structure of the Berlin district of Kreuzberg, where there has been an increase in the buying back of real estate by representatives of the wealthy part of the population. Their form of opposition includes attacks on railway infrastructure elements using incendiary devices, among other things.⁴⁰ The targets of the attacks included both the railway infrastructure (November 2009 vehicles belonging to the railways in Berlin and Hamburg; October 2011 – the Berlin-Hamburg line and the railway station in Berlin) and the means of transport of forwarding companies (2009 DHL vehicles; 2014 Sodexo vehicles; 2015 – Sodexo and Wisag Lichtenberg).

In Poland, in 2016, a group of anarchists attempted to set fire to vehicles belonging to the police in the Warsaw-Włochy unit. This was to be done as a retaliation for the anarchists' earlier detention during one of their actions in Poznań.⁴¹ The anarchists in Italy, too, have decided to act again in accordance with the principle of 'propaganda through action'. The informal Anarchist Federation (FAI), the Lambros Fountas Revolutionary Chamber, admitted sending explosive shipments to the Embassies of Chile and Switzerland in Rome in

³⁸ Ibidem. After the attack in Leipzig, the left's extreme website was accompanied by a statement of authorship: 'No more war! No more fascism!'. *Autonome – Selbstverständnis und Aktionsfelder*, <http://www.verfassungsschutz.sachsen.de/1928.htm> [accessed: 22 May 2018].

³⁹ Ibidem.

⁴⁰ A. Hołub, op.cit., p. 67.

⁴¹ P. Machajski, *Warszawa. Anarchiści chcieli podpalić radiowozy. Przedłużony areszt*, <http://warszawa.wyborcza.pl/warszawa/1,34862,20584548,warszawa-anarchisci-chcieli-wysadzic-radiowozy-przedluzony.html> [accessed: 22 May 2018].

2010. Two people were injured in the coup d'état. Previously, in 2002 and 2003, parcels of explosive devices had been sent to the President of the European Commission, Romano Prodi.⁴² In March 2011, the FAI stated that it had carried out a similar attack on an Italian Army officer, the Swiss nuclear company Swissnuclear and the management of the Koridallós penal facility in Greece, as a sign of its solidarity with the Greek Conspiratorial Fire Cell.⁴³ In 2016, 27 extreme left-wing organisations carried out attacks in Spain, Italy and Greece.⁴⁴

The activities of traditional extremist groups and the terrorist attacks they organize were unrelated to the migration crisis in Europe. However, the migration problem is related to the activities of NSU and the attacks carried out by Anders Brevik from Norway in 2011.

Refugees 2015

The situation of the migration crisis in Europe, its origins and the course of the years 2015-2016 correspond to the Everetta S. Lee “pull-push factory theory,” according to which the “push factors” are the threats described here in the country of departure (war with external intervention, internal conflict, persecution due to religion or belief, including terrorism, environmental and economic crisis). The attraction factor is the incentive to come due to the needs of the economies, opportunities and social and material offer of the target countries. One should not focus on one of the factors in question. The visible “politicization” of the problem of population movement is noticeable in the

⁴² *Włoscy anarchiści przyznali się do zamachów na ambasady*, <https://www.wprost.pl/swiat/224102/Wloscy-anarchisci-przyznali-sie-do-zamachow-na-ambasady.html> [accessed: 22 May 2018].

⁴³ Komunikat Nieformalnej Federacji Anarchistycznej „Nie mówicie, że jest nas niewielu”, Nieformalna Federacja Anarchistyczna. Narodziny nowego insurekcjonizmu, „Grecja w Ogniu” 2013, p. 3.

⁴⁴ European Union Terrorism Situation...

propaganda of individual media centres. The more left-wing preferences are, the more often the term refugees is used, with an emphasis on the need for refugees to preserve their lives. The more right-wing preferences are, the more often the term migration is used, immigrants, and among the causes of this phenomenon the economic and even axiological ones (cultural conquest of host countries) will be emphasized.

For whatever reason, the emergence of a large number of people in Europe from outside Europe is a fact and a problem which individual countries and the European Union are trying to tackle with a range of institutional and legal solutions.

According to FRONTEX, there are several routes to Europe that are used by people who want to enter Europe illegally: the western Mediterranean, which links Morocco with Spain and the Spanish ex-claves Ceuta and Melilla, from which Moroccans, Guinea, Mali and Côte d'Ivoire benefit; the western Mediterranean, which leads from Morocco to the Canary Islands (the largest groups are from Guinea, the Gambia and Côte d'Ivoire); the Central Mediterranean from Algeria, Tunisia and Libya to Italy (Tunisians, Nigerians, Eritreans, Sudanese and Pakistanis); the Eastern Mediterranean from Turkey via the Mediterranean to Italy, Greece and Cyprus. There is also a land route from Turkey to Greece or Bulgaria. The route is mainly used by Syrians, Afghans, Iraqis and Cameroonians. The Western Balkan route passes through the Balkans to Croatia, Slovenia and Hungary mainly through Syrians and Afghans; Vietnamese, Afghans and Syrians from Ukraine and Belarus enter the European Union via the Eastern European route. The Murmansk route leading through Russia to Norway is mainly for Syrians.⁴⁵

⁴⁵ Migratory Map, <https://frontex.europa.eu/along-eu-borders/migratory-map/> [accessed: 22 May 2018]. Różne oblicza problemów migracyjnych/ucho-

While the routes and countries of origin have been relatively well identified globally, the exact numbers of refugees cannot be determined. It points out the shortcomings, or omissions, in terms of registration or identification on the part of the European Union's border states, which did not register the arriving persons but allowed them to continue. What was an important fact that contributed to this situation was the suspension by Angela Merkel's government of the application of the Dublin Convention of 1990 (replaced by another "Dublin II" and, as of January 2014, by Dublin III).⁴⁶ According to the regulations of this convention, a refugee may lodge an application for protection in only one country, in the first country he or she has arrived in.⁴⁷ Germany thus decided to relieve the burden on the countries reached by people from outside the European Union – Italy, Malta and Greece – with the proviso that this only applies to refugees from Syria.⁴⁸

Among the refugees there are representatives of various social strata and professions. These are people who are forced to seek refuge from persecution, as well as economic refugees. It has been noted that former or current security officers may also be present. The uncontrolled movement of people facilitates the penetration of foreign countries, especially as European countries are critical of the authorities, such as Syria and Iran. Population movements can also be a con-

dżcych i politycznych w Europie, „Biuletyn Migracyjny” no. 53, 12 May 2015, p. 3.

⁴⁶ R. Romaniec, *Niemcy przestają stosować Konwencję dublińską*. „Akt solidarności”, <http://www.dw.com/pl/niemcy-przestaj%C4%85-stosowa%C4%87-konwencj%C4%99-dubli%C5%84sk%C4%85-akt-solidarno%C5%9Bci/a-18671830> [accessed: 22 May 2018].

⁴⁷ Dublin Convention determining the State responsible for examining applications for asylum lodged in one of the Member States of the European Communities, 15 June 1990 (Official Journal of the European Union 2005, no. 24, item 194).

⁴⁸ R. Romaniec, op.cit.

venient way for members of organized crime groups, as well as extremist groups and organisations, to move. The issue of movement within the European Union is important in so far as it is one of the fundamental tasks, in addition to controlling and combating the financing of terrorism, of preventing the free movement of members of terrorist organisations. It was already Security Council Resolution 1373 of 28 September 2001 which pointed out the need to combat terrorist financing and prevent the movement of terrorists and terrorist groups through effective border control and supervision of the issuing of identity and travel documents.⁴⁹ In September 2006, the UN General Assembly adopted the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, which also stated that border and customs control systems needed to be modernised and that travel documents had to be made more secure in order to prevent the movement of terrorists and the transfer of illegal materials.⁵⁰ The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy (EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy), adopted in December 2005, provided for measures to make it more difficult for terrorists to plan their communications and travel within the EU and elsewhere.⁵¹ However, in 2015, the entry into the Schengen area enabled people coming from outside Europe to move within the area without major obstacles.

In December 2005, in addition to the Strategy for Combating Terrorism, the European Union Strategy for Combating Radicalisation

⁴⁹ S. Pawlak, *Kolektywne działania państw w walce z terroryzmem międzynarodowym*, [in:] *Ocena poziomu zagrożenia terroryzmem i organizacji systemu antyterrorystycznego w Polsce*, ed. by P. Bogdalski, Z. Nowakowski, K. Rajchel, Warsaw 2012, p. 372.

⁵⁰ <http://www.unic.un.org.pl/terroryzm/strategia.php> [accessed: 22 May 2018].

⁵¹ *The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy*, 14469/4/05, <https://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2014469%202005%20REV%204> [accessed: 22 May 2018].

and Recruitment to Terrorism was adopted as the second key document in the fight against terrorism in Europe.⁵² It contains provisions anticipating situations and concerns related to the increased refugee movement in Europe in 2015. The document states that it is necessary to correct the “unfair and stereotyped” vision of Islam and Muslims (e.g. to avoid combining this religion only with terrorism) and to eliminate the structural factors contributing to the development of social radicalisation, i.e. inequality, discrimination, through intercultural dialogue, debate and long-term integration.⁵³

The threat of terrorism from members of terrorist organisations or from individuals who may penetrate European countries is a separate problem. The main issue in relation to any movement of people between countries is the nature and way of crossing borders and the status within the country in which they have arrived. On the one hand, we are talking about illegal border crossings and, on the other hand, about organized crime, which makes it easier to cross borders and drive to another country.

There is a risk that the vast majority of refugees who arrived in Europe during the first wave of the migration crisis in 2015 and 2016 used the services of criminal organized groups, for whom illegal migration is a profitable undertaking. These organizations deal with smuggling and trafficking in human beings by charging specific fees for ‘assistance’. It is not possible to determine the amount and specific amounts. According to Katarzyna Głąbicka, in 1999, the transport to Poland from European countries cost “from 1,200 USD to 2,400 USD. It cost, \$1,400–2,500 to come from Moscow to Poland. The most expensive is the journey from Afghanistan, where an adult has to pay

⁵² <https://www.ms.gov.pl/resource/466d2bf9-c927-402d-9310-f0a25eb21d61> [accessed: 22 May 2018].

⁵³ Ibidem.

\$14,000 and a child 50% of the price. Crossing the western border of Poland sometimes costs an additional 200–500 USD.”⁵⁴ In 2006, Marta Studzińska stated that “illegal immigrants must pay between €3,500 and €11,250 for smuggling into any EU country.”⁵⁵ According to other figures, boarding a boat carrying immigrants from Africa to Italy cost between EUR 2,000 and EUR 4,500 in 2018.⁵⁶ According to media reports, a cruise from Libya to Italy cost about 1,000 USD and from Turkey to Greece about 500–700 USD.⁵⁷

In Italy alone, 444 people trafficking in human beings were apprehended as part of Frontex’s activities in 2016. At the same time, the action revealed 4.1 tonnes of drugs and cases of arms smuggling.⁵⁸ In the trial of an organized criminal group operating in Rome in 2015, it was revealed that the mafia receives more income from refugees than from drug crime.⁵⁹ In 2017, the Italian police detained members of the Ndrangheta mafia of Calabria, who controlled the activities of one of the largest centres for migrants (there were about 1,500 people there) in Isola di Capo Rizzuto, Calabria.⁶⁰ Organized crime groups profit from trafficking in human beings and do not limit themselves

⁵⁴ K. Głębicka, *Przerzut migrantów do lub przez terytorium Polski*, Ośrodek Badań nad Migracjami Instytut Studiów Społecznych UW, February 1999.

⁵⁵ M. Studzińska, *Nielegalna imigracja – nowe wyzwanie dla bezpieczeństwa europejskiego*, „Rocznik bezpieczeństwa międzynarodowego” 2006, p. 201.

⁵⁶ <https://tvn24bis.pl/ze-swiate,75/przemyt-nielegalnych-imigrantow-to-lukratywny-biznes,535486.html> [accessed: 24 May 2018].

⁵⁷ J. Mielnik, *Napędzanie migracji*, <https://www.wprost.pl/tygodnik/10064289/Napedzanie-migracji.html> [accessed: 24 May 2018].

⁵⁸ *FRONTEx, Press Pack*, Warsaw 2016, p. 23–28.

⁵⁹ *Mafia włoska przejęła przemyt i opiekę nad imigrantami*, <http://www.fron-da.pl/a/mafia-wloska-przejela-przemyt-i-opieke-nad-imigrantami%2C91549.html> [accessed: 24 May 2018].

⁶⁰ *Włochy: mafia prowadziła jeden z największych ośrodków dla imigrantów. Aresztowano 70 osób*, <https://www.pch24.pl/wlochy--mafia-prowadzila-jeden-z-najwiekszych-osrodkow-dla-imigrantow--aresztowano-70-osob,51632,i.html> [accessed: 24 May 2018].

to charging only for smuggling. The cost of smuggling can be combined with the obligation to work on it. An example is the action of Nigerian groups smuggling people for their commitment to earn travel expenses to a European country. These groups offer smuggling to Europe for about 50–70,000 Nigerian nairós (about 250 euros). This package covers transport by land, sea or air using false documents. By accepting such an offer you agree to pay the travel costs upon arrival at the place where it turns out that the debt is converted into 50–70,000 Euros. In this case, the debt can be repaid, for example, by working as a prostitute, which can last up to three years.⁶¹ Victims of human trafficking are also attracted by the offer of marriages of convenience and, upon arrival, are sexually abused. Persons using false documents (passports) can also be intimidated by traffickers, upon arrival, into disclosure and are also sexually abused.⁶² Interestingly, even in Libya, the smugglers are still able to 'sell' refugees to gangs who then resell them for forced labour or to public houses, such as Tripoli. It is possible to buy the abducted person and the price reaches 10,000 USD.⁶³ In March 2016, a group of teenagers from Eritrea was kidnapped in Syria and transported to the ISIS training camp, where they were prepared for military action by the organization.⁶⁴ Migrants can also join organized crime groups that form international cooperation networks in both smuggling (trafficking) in human beings and using the same metastatic channels – drugs and arms.⁶⁵ By using illegal chan-

⁶¹ *Global Report on Trafficking in Persons 2016*, United Nations, New York 2016, p. 64.

⁶² *Ibidem*.

⁶³ M. Micallef, *The Human Conveyor Belt: trends in human trafficking and smuggling in post-revolution Libya*, *Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime*, Genewa 2017, p. 44.

⁶⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 45.

⁶⁵ W. Pływaczewski, *Relacje pomiędzy zjawiskiem nielegalnej imigracji a przestępczością oraz innymi przejawami zachowań patologicznych w różnych ich postaciach*, [in:] *Polska w Schengen*, ed. by M. Zdanowicz, Białystok 2009, p. 228.

nels, by holding false travel documents (passports), these people, aware of their involvement in the sphere of extra-legal ‘illegality’, will continue to be exposed to the status of a person living outside the law (illegal employment) or to the assistance of other persons who operate outside the law of the country in which they are located.

According to Save the Children, an organization that addressed the issue of the exploitation of children who have arrived in Italy as refugees, many of them have been subjected to sexual exploitation (girls from West Africa) or forced begging (boys from North Africa and South Asia).⁶⁶ These figures correspond to those of the Social Research Centre of the International Organisation for Strategic Research in Ankara, according to which approximately 10,000 under-age boys have been trafficked for sexual purposes.⁶⁷ There is a suspicion that the reason for the disappearance of some refugees in Europe is the trade in organs for transplantation.⁶⁸

In the context of cooperation with human smugglers, non-governmental humanitarian organizations are being presented, particularly in Italy, where in April 2017 accusations of such cooperation were made in the press.⁶⁹ Vessels belonging to these organisations would take refugees off the smugglers’ boats. Smuggler boat refugees are still being loaded in Libyan territorial waters, among others, by SOS Méditerranée, Sea-Watch, Save the Children, Migrant Offshore Aid Station Foundation (MOAS, which has been operating in the area since 2014),

⁶⁶ Global Report on Trafficking..., p. 54.

⁶⁷ *A dlaczego nikt nie mówi o przestępczości wobec uchodźców?*, <https://pl.sputniknews.com/opinie/201602031988747-przestepczosc-uchodzcy-ofiary/> [accessed: 28 May 2018].

⁶⁸ Ibidem.

⁶⁹ *Organizacje humanitarne pomagają przemytnikom z Libii – włoski prokurator*, <https://euroislam.pl/organizacje-humanitarne-pomagaja-przemytnikom-z-libii-wloski-prokurator/> [accessed: 28 May 2018].

Médecins Sans Frontières, Lifeline, Saving Lives and others.⁷⁰ In addition to international organizations, smaller NGOs from European Union countries are involved in the transport of refugees across the Mediterranean. In August 2017, the Jugend Rettet organisation from Germany, which provided assistance to approximately 14,000 people, was suspected of working with Libyan human smugglers.⁷¹ The Italian coastguard directed the *Iuventa* to the port of Lampedusa, where it had been searched and where crew members had been charged with aiding and inciting illegal border crossings' during three rescue operations in September 2016 and June 2017, and it was considered that the material collected showed that the organization had provided more assistance to the smugglers than to the refugees.⁷²

Inflows of people of different cultures can cause a number of conflicts. They concern contacts between newcomers and local residents. Paradoxically, cultural and ethnic conflicts can affect the refugees themselves, who may not tolerate the diversity of their companions. Hence, the events in the refugee centres, where battles between their inhabitants take place. In May 2018, in the refugee camp on the island of Lesbos, Arab refugees from Syria, Iraq, Yemen and Algeria attacked the Kurds for not following the rules of the Ramadan month.⁷³ Within

⁷⁰ <https://wpolityce.pl/swiat/351572-ludzki-tasmociag-rybinska-w-sieci-organizacje-pozarzadowe-sa-wspolodpowiedzialne-za-to-ze-interes-przemytnikow-ludzi-dalej-sie-kreci> [accessed: 28 May 2018]; M. Micallef, *The Human Conveyor Belt : trends in human trafficking and smuggling in post-revolution Libya, Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime*, Genewa 2017, p. 57. According to M. Micallef, these are: Sea Watch, SOS Mediterranee, Sea Eye and Proactiva Open Arms, Migrant Offshore Aid Station (MOAS), Medicines Sans Frontieres. Ibidem.

⁷¹ M. Klint, *C. Lobenstein, Retter oder Schlepper?*, <https://www.zeit.de/2017/33/jugend-rettet-migranten-schmuggel-anschuldigung> [accessed: 28 May 2018]

⁷² Ibidem.

⁷³ https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=12&v=474Ie16cWJY [accessed: 28 May 2018].

the illegal immigrant camps in Calais, France, there have also been conflicts between refugees, representatives of different national and religious groups. At the beginning of 2018, a conflict between Eritreans and Afghans took place here, in which about 300 people participated.⁷⁴ As a result of this incident, 4 Eritreans were shot and several people were injured. There are more potential places where there can be a conflict between Muslims from different parts of the world. In front of the An-Nur mosque in Mulhouse, France, there was a clash between Chechens and Arabs from the Maghreb countries, in which six people were injured and the warring parties had to be separated by French police and reinforcements from Strasbourg.⁷⁵

In the context of the refugee crisis, it is also important to mention the countries of origin of people coming to Europe. Paradoxically, mass emigration, although with the possibility of saving or improving the quality of life, has a negative impact on the home country. One of the arguments for accepting immigrants into European countries were high professional qualifications, the fact that they certainly include engineers or doctors who are so necessary on the European labour market. However, this means that there will be a shortage of these people in their countries of origin, and encouraging them to come to another country is linked to a 'brain drain' or a 'job drain'. In this context, the expected positive economic effects (strengthening of labour potential) may have a negative impact on the countries of origin. Attention should also be paid to the demographic impact on both the countries of destination and those of origin. The opponents of

⁷⁴ *Walki między imigrantami w Calais, 4 ciężko rannych*, (accessed: 2 February 2018), <https://euroislam.pl/walki-miedzy-imigrantami-w-calais-4-ciezko-rannych/> [accessed: 26 May 2018].

⁷⁵ K. Izak, *Ograniczenia i problemy w zwalczaniu terroryzmu i przestępczości imigrantów w Europie*, „Przegląd Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego” 2017, no. 17, p. 108.

admission stress the risks associated with the reproductive capacity of the arriving group and its ability to gain demographic advantage within a short period of time. However, in the countries of origin, this process may also be perceived as negative, as leaving the country by relatively young people, who are therefore of childbearing age, may have a negative impact on demographic security. Separation from families left behind in the country of origin can also have negative social consequences.⁷⁶

Threat of terrorism

As indicated, the increased migration flows have been recognized by extremists from the countries of origin. Both ISIS and other terrorist organizations saw the opportunity to enter hated Western countries in a situation of reduced border control. In 2018, Marco Minniti, Minister of the Interior of the Italian government, pointed out the possibility of ISIS members being among the refugees, which was to be related to the disasters suffered by ISIS in Syria and Iraq.⁷⁷ The defeat of ISIS in Syria and Iraq affected the tactics of the organization in 2018, but as early as in 2016, Hans-Georg Maassen, head of the German counter-espionage (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, BfV), stated in an interview for ZDF television that he could confirm that terrorist groups were sending their combatants to Europe, hiding

⁷⁶ These effects are highlighted by Z. Kawczyńska-Butrym, *Migracje. Wybrane zagadnienia*, Lublin 2009, p. 66-69; P. Lubiewski, *Nielegalna imigracja. Zagrożenia bezpieczeństwa*, part 1, Szczytno 2016, p. 81.

⁷⁷ Szef MSW Włoch przyznaje: W łodziach z imigrantami mogą przyplwać bojownicy ISIS, <http://www.fronda.pl/a/szef-msw-wloch-przyznaje-w-lodziach-z-imigrantami-moga-przyplywac-bojownicy-isis,108441.html> [accessed: 23 May 2018].

them among Middle Eastern refugees.⁷⁸ It is worth noting that the presence of terrorists, dissidents, military evaders and intelligence agents from the countries of origin among migrants has been noted by Paul Bayle, Keith Halfacree and Vaughan Robinson, who have placed these “categories” in the paradigm of international migration between the “voluntary migrants” and “social and political reasons.”⁷⁹ In March 2018, in France, the French services (Direction générale de la sécurité intérieure, DGSI) detained an Iraqi who had previously claimed to be a refugee and was charged with directing a ‘crime against humanity’ in barracks in Iraq, where ISIS members murdered 1,700 recruits of the Iraqi army in 2014.⁸⁰

Groups that consider violence to be a convenient and effective means of achieving their goals and that consist of people who have come to this country have been active in European countries for a long time. In Germany, these groups are concentrated in three strands: the Islamic, the Nationalist and the Left-extremist.⁸¹ Since 1960, the Muslim Brotherhood (Al-Ichwan al-Muslimun) has been operating in Germany and is known here as the Islamic Community in Germany (IGD). Illegal since 2003, Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami (the Islamic Liberation Party, HuT) has also been operating there. The People’s Mujahedin Organisation of Iran (Mujahedin-e Khalq Organisation,

⁷⁸ Szef niemieckiego kontrwywiadu BfV potwierdza: terroryści przyjeżdżają do Europy przebrani za uchodźców, https://wiadomosci.wp.pl/szef-niemieckiego-kontrwywiadu-bfv-potwierdza-terrorysci-przyjezdza-do-europy-przebrani-za-uchodzcow-60252611_14991745a [accessed: 24 May 2018].

⁷⁹ E. Czapka, *Stereotyp uchodźcy*, Olsztyn 2006, p. 41.

⁸⁰ *Lisieux: un réfugié politique irakien soupçonné d'avoir été un cadre de Daech arrêté en France pour «crimes contre l'Humanité»*, <http://islamisation.fr/2018/06/07/lisieux-un-refugie-politique-irakien-soupconne-davoir-ete-un-cadre-de-daech-arrete-en-france-pour-crimes-contre-lhumanite/> [accessed: 8 June 2018].

⁸¹ A. Hołub, *Zagraniczne ugrupowania ekstremistyczne w RFN*, [in:] *Narody XXI wieku*, ed. by A. Hołub, Olsztyn 2007, p. 253.

Volksmoudjahedin Iran-Organisation MEK), Hizb Allahh, HAMAS, Arab Mujahedini (al-Qaeda organisation in Germany) have their supporters.⁸² Germany was also the target of ISIS recruitment activities in Syria and Iraq. It should be noted that the natural recruitment base of Islamic extremist groups in Germany is that of emigrants from countries considered to be Muslim.⁸³ The German counter-intelligence noted attempts (340 events) to recruit new members by radical Islamists in asylum shelters.⁸⁴ The radar's contacts with newly arrived refugees are intensified in refugee aid centres and religious places of worship. The radicals are exploiting the plight of these people by offering them in-kind assistance and support in difficult situations.

The problem of radicalism in France, in addition to the leftist period of Actione Directe's activity, has been growing over a long period of time and is mainly related to the dissatisfaction and frustration of the descendants of Algerian refugees who came to France after Algeria gained independence. Moroccan immigrants are also a large group. It should be noted that France has been and still is a destination of migration for many groups. One can mention, for example, the numerous exits from Poland after the fall of the November Uprising in the 19th century. In France, there were representatives of both the conservative and left-democratic factions of the Polish independence movement. France also struggled with the activities of ETA, which dissolved its structures here too by handing over its stockpiles in

⁸² Ibidem, p. 256–259.

⁸³ F. Heckmann, *Islamische Milieus: Rekrutierungsfelder für islamistische Organisationen*, [in:] *Texte zur Innern Sicherheit, Extremismus in Deutschland*, Bundesministerium des Innern, Berlin 2004, p. 273.

⁸⁴ Szef kontrwywiadu RFN: *Islamiści rekrutują w schroniskach azylanckich*, <http://www.dw.com/pl/szef-kontrwywiadu-rfn-islami%C5%9Bci-rekrutuj%C4%85-w-schroniskach-azylanckich/a-19474257> [accessed: 22 may 2018].

2018. In 2015, out of the total of 5,000 volunteers from Western Europe, 1,700 people from France fought in the ISIS ranks.⁸⁵ The results of the research carried out by the Centre de Prévention contre les dérives sectaires liées à l'Islam (CPDSI) seem to be interesting. According to this organization, the radicalisation of the immigrant environment in France is a process consisting of several stages:

Isolating an individual from their social environment: depriving young people of confidence in society and in adults; creating a climate of paranoia and the belief that everyone lies; requiring the individual to break four times: abandon friends, school, leisure, family; breaking up the individual's identity and further isolating himself.

The destruction of individual identity in favour of group identity: emphasis on similarities in favour of annihilation of individual individuality; the destruction of identity contours through clothing (traditional Muslim costumes for women and men in place of Western freedom); the destruction of old identity attributes: feelings, memories, etc.; replacement of independent reasoning with repetition and imitation with the support of group exaltation.

Membership in ideology and jihadist community: faith in being elected and belonging to a group that possessed truth (concept of purity and primacy of the group); the adaptation of jihadist ideology to cognitive and emotional aspirations of the individual (humanity, end of the world, fight against Bashar al-Assad soldiers); change in the way of thinking, acting and speaking (cognitive transformation).

The dehumanization of recruited and future victims: the utopia of access to unlimited power over human life through the acceptance of human victims; the trivialization of cruelty and death; taking a global perspective on the consequences of our actions ("we will win, because

⁸⁵ B. Pasamonik, *Fenomen europejskich dżihadystów*, „Multicultural Studies” 2016, no. 2, p. 2.

we love death more than you love life”); the dehumanization of victims – who does not belong to our group is not one of us.”⁸⁶

What seems to be a particularly important factor is the isolation of the immigrant community in the communities of the target countries. The suburbs of Paris, the Molenbeek district in Brussels, and Neukoeln in Berlin are examples of the ongoing process in European cities, where immigrants arrive and appropriate environments culturally and ethnically. This facilitates functioning in the new place on the basis of already existing social structures created by people who have arrived earlier. The concentration of immigrants from different cultures, religions, nationalities and ethnic backgrounds means that zones are inadvertently created where communities are homogeneous and different from the surrounding social environment. If we consider the fact that arrivals are often illegal, and newcomers are unemployed or unable to meet their living needs, these neighbourhoods are becoming ‘poor’ districts, where organized crime can dominate, offering residents a kind of help in their time of need. The emergence of such areas gives rise to a wide discussion, from denial of their existence (left)⁸⁷ to their recognition as a real problem for the internal security of the state – an area excluded from the jurisdiction of the state or where there is a major problem with law enforcement. However, there is a noticeable concentration of new arrivals in London, Manchester, Birmingham, Bradford, Paris, Lyon, Marseille, Lille, Berlin, Cologne, Munich, Rome, Milan, Turin, Amsterdam, The Hague, Antwerp, Brussels, Stockholm, Malmö, Gothenburg, Copenhagen, Roskilde, Oslo, Bergen, Trondheim. Migrants “form compact com-

⁸⁶ Ibidem, p. 10.

⁸⁷ A. Puchejda, *Muzułmanskie dzielnice „no-go”, czyli fantazje polityków i mediów*, <https://oko.press/muzulmanskie-dzielnice-no-go-nie-istnieje/> [accessed: 22 May 2018]. The author states that “There are no “no-go” zones in Europe today.”

munities, so-called small homelands, usually covering several streets or entire districts, in which they function in isolation from the wider social context and constitute a target area for further inflows of immigrants (including illegal immigrants) and asylum seekers.”⁸⁸ Simply “closing” oneself off by choice or necessity creates barriers between the two societies.⁸⁹ Isolation is further exacerbated by the activities of juvenile criminal groups. Under these conditions, the second and subsequent generations of immigrants are subject to easy religious radicalization, seeing them as a better place to live. In these semi-enclosed enclaves, natural environments are being created where the promoters of radicalism and extremism can carry out their activities. It should be pointed out that supporters of extremism and violence, viewed in terms of events in the Middle East, may be subject to radicalization by being influenced by two main factors: the environmental factor, which may be the descendants of their parents or grandparents who have come to Western Europe from an Islamic country or who have converted without previous contact with Islam.⁹⁰

In 2016, Europol stated that the threat was increasing, as the Islamic State, in its tactics, considered it necessary to turn to attacks outside the controlled areas. In addition, the threat from Islamic extremists is subject to a similar process. The propaganda impact, including recruitment, by the Islamic State on Sunni groups who have come to Europe, will be facilitated by the fact that they are susceptible to radicalization. It was already recognized at that time that there was a real

⁸⁸ B. Olszewski, *Bieguny antaganizmów. Europejskie strefy NO-GO*, „Multi-cultural Studies” 2017, no. 2, p. 34.

⁸⁹ A. Suchocka, I. Królikowska, *Bariery integracyjne jako czynnik generujący zachowania terrorystyczne w ś rodowisku imigrantów na przykładzie Wielkiej Brytanii*, „Zeszyty naukowe Akademii Marynarki Wojennej”, 2011, no. 1, p. 195.

⁹⁰ B. Ober-Domagalska, *Psychospołeczne determinanty aktywności europejskiej młodzieży w strukturach islamistycznych organizacji przestępczych*, „Władza Sądzenia” 2015, no. 7, p. 97.

risk that foreign fighters would be hiding among the refugees.⁹¹ Social, political and economic factors hindering or even preventing the effective integration of immigrants into society were also pointed out. In both the UK and the Netherlands, the main factors contributing to dissatisfaction or even frustration are: insufficient representation of this group in various levels of government, difficulties in meeting educational needs, insufficient job offer, and in the case of vacancies, these may be occupations or activities that do not require special skills, such as services.⁹² A factor related to international conflicts is also important, especially in the countries or regions of origin of immigrants, as exemplified by the Middle East and, in particular, the conflict between Palestinians and Jews. In a broader context, this concerns the conflict between the Muslim world and the West and the imaginary injustices suffered by Arabs from the 'Crusaders', as the radicals and Islamic extremists are trying to illustrate.⁹³

The factors influencing the acceptance of terrorism include, in addition to mental ones (dyssocial personality, mental disorders), external factors that can cause emotional states such as frustration. The most important are the quality of life and living conditions associated with the socio-economic environment in which an individual lives. The escalation of negative incentives can lead to the acceptance of

⁹¹ *Europa na celowniku terrorystów. 211 ataków w 2015 roku*, <http://www.defence24.pl/europa-na-celowniku-terrorystow-211-atakow-w-2015-roku> [accessed: 22 May 2018].

⁹² D. Szlachter, W. Kaczorowski, Z. Muszyński, P. Potejko, P. Chomentowski, T. Borzoł, *Podobieństwa i różnice w czynnikach mogących sprzyjać radykalizacji poglądów w Wielkiej Brytanii i Holandii*, [in:] *Radykalizacja poglądów religijnych w społecznościach muzułmańskich wybranych państw Unii Europejskiej. Polska-Holandia-Wielka Brytania*, ed. by D. Szlachter, W. Kaczorowski, Z. Muszyński, P. Potejko, P. Chomentowski, T. Borzoł, b.m.w., b.d., p. 21–23.

⁹³ J. Balicki, *Radykalizacja muzułmanów w Europie – przypadek Wielkiej Brytanii*, [in:] *Kryzys migracyjny w Europie. Wyzwania etyczne, społeczno-kulturowe i etniczne*, ed. by J. Balicki, W. Necel, Warsaw 2017, p. 130.

extreme violent actions. The environment conducive to extremism and terrorism is primarily marked by:

- the existence of social and political conflicts of different nature and origin (e.g. cultural, political, ethnic, socio-economic, demographic);
- the absence or low level of a conciliation model for dispute resolution resulting in political violence;
- internal armed conflict (civil war);
- the method of exercising authority (dictatorship);
- state of occupation;
- illegality of the government (lack of legitimacy of the government)
- corruption;
- dysfunction of the democratic political system (lack of democracy)
- lack of the rule of law (prerogative state instead of rule of law);
- lack of civil liberties;
- economic crisis;
- dysfunctionality of state institutions;
- discrimination on ethnic grounds;
- discrimination on religious grounds;
- experience of social injustice together with social stratification (sense of injustice and numerous humiliations on the part of authorities, e.g. occupying authorities).⁹⁴

In the individual dimension, factors such as the following seem to be important:

- a sense of harm
- a sense of powerlessness resulting in frustration
- escalation of frustration

⁹⁴ J. Horgan, *Psychologia terroryzmu*, Warszawa 2008, p. 102–103.

- trauma experience (experience of violence, loss of a loved one).⁹⁵

Bartosz Bolechów points to Michel Tousignant's thesis, which is important from the perspective of susceptibility to the radicalization of immigrant communities, according to which the psychological resilience of individuals is reduced by: loneliness (associated with isolation from the environment, alienation from rooting out, a sense of lack of identity); sense of meaninglessness, lack of order, chaos; a sense of humiliation, lack of control, desire for retaliation.⁹⁶

An important factor in the acceptance of terrorism is the vulnerability to propaganda by terrorist organizations and those whose aim is to convince societies of the (radical) image of the surrounding social, political or economic reality. The most active organizations trying to influence the immigrant environment in Europe include Hizb ut-Tahrir, ISIS and the Dawa movement. The greatest threat is seen from the Salafist and Wahhabi movements. Salafism (Arabian Salaf – ancestors) became an important movement in its slogans to return to the basic principles of religion at the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries. Its origins are connected, among others, with the establishment of the Society for the Propagation of Islam (Tablighi Džamaat) in India in 1927. The goal was to get Muslims back on track by closely following the Prophet and his companions.⁹⁷ In this way, any undesirable changes that have taken place in Islam (ummie) will be rejected. The creator of the movement recognized the personal responsibility of believers for spreading the faith, therefore their fellow believers should proclaim their faith (call to Islam) while travelling around the

⁹⁵ A. Kruszewska, *Przewodnik do analiz w zakresie profilowania potencjalnych sprawców zamachów terrorystycznych*, bm, bd, p. 12.

⁹⁶ B. Bolechów, *Procesy radykalizacji mniejszości islamskiej w Unii Europejskiej. Od czynników permissywnych do przemocy politycznej*, [in:] D. Szlachter, W. Kaczorowski, Z. Muszyński..., p. 56.

⁹⁷ M. Sageman, *Sieci terroru*, Kraków 2008, p. 6.

world. This goal was to be achieved by means of systematic and evolutionary actions. An interesting phenomenon is the use of Tablighi by radical Islamists for their purposes. The return to the basics of religion results in the recognition of Koranic law alone, with the simultaneous denial of state law. Strict adherence to religious principles is accompanied by the slogan of isolation from non-Muslims. In this way, the idea of a parallel Muslim world in Western society is promoted.⁹⁸ The aim of the Salafists is to create a theocratic state with the elimination of freedoms and liberties that form the basis of a democratic system. In addition to political engagement in Libya, Tunisia, Yemen, Gaza, Jordan and Syria, Salafi has particularly active communities in Germany, France, the United Kingdom (Birmingham) and Brussels, where they have taken over the influence of the mosques.⁹⁹ Salafists are active in immigration centres, where they try to influence young people in particular. They provide material assistance there, but also in other matters, such as contacts with the authorities (translations). Material assistance, e.g. giving out clothes to women, is connected with ideology, because it is a reason for fearing that women will not dress in Western style clothes.¹⁰⁰ Refugees are invited to visit mosques under the influence of radicals, and if they feel alone or lack help from another side, they are in the Salafist circle.

⁹⁸ *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2013*, Berlin 2014, p. 221.

⁹⁹ K. Bokhari, *Salafizm i arabska demokratyzacja*, <https://euroislam.pl/salafizm-i-arabska-demokratyzacja/> [accessed: 22 May 2018]; *Salafici kontrolujq meczety w Brukseli*, <https://euroislam.pl/salafici-kontroluja-meczety-w-brukse-li/> [accessed: 22 May 2018]; M. Svirsky, *Belgian Government Admits It Has Lost Control of No-Go Zone*, <https://clarionproject.org/belgian-government-admits-it-has-lost-control-no-go-zone-2/> [accessed: 22 May 2018].

¹⁰⁰ „Wechselwirkungen von Extremismen: Die aktuelle Sicherheitslage in Deutschland” Rede von BfV-Präsident Dr. Hans-Georg Maaßen beim Mönchengladbacher Bündnis “Aufstehen! Für Menschenwürde – Gegen Rechtsextremismus” am 23. Mai 2016, <https://www.verfassungsschutz.de/de/oeffentlichkeitsarbeit/vortraege/rede-p-mg-buendnis-2016-05-23> [accessed: 22 May 2018].

The character and contemporary shape of Islamic fundamentalism were strongly influenced by the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood (founded in 1928) – Hasan Al-Banna and Sajjid Kutb (Qutb). The aim of this organization was to create a state based on the Koran as its constitution and a “Muslim order” based on religious law.¹⁰¹ Sayyid Kutb proclaimed the need to combat non-Islamic rule, which he considered heretical. In his slogans, too, we can see the demand for separation from the disbelievers and the creation of a parallel Muslim society (Muslim spaces). This thinker preached the need for a fight (holy war – jihad) aimed at creating a system based on caliphate, introducing Sharia and the general rule of Islam. In Europe, the Brotherhood operates as the Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe (FIOE). In Germany, the supporters of this organization are concentrated mainly in the Islamic Community in Germany. (Islamische Gemeinschaft in Deutschland e. V., IGD). According to the German counter-intelligence, the Brotherhood influences Muslim centres in Munich, Nuremberg, Stuttgart, Frankfurt am Main, Cologne, Marburg, Braunschweig and Münster.¹⁰² It is important to note that radical ideas do not directly involve Muslims in terrorist activities.¹⁰³

With the emergence of a wide wave of refugees from Islamic countries, their behaviour in the target countries began to be monitored more closely. The right-wing media in particular emphasized the risks and opportunities of increasing the level of risk associated with migrants. The radicals and Islamist extremists were keen to take advantage of these fears. It was also used by extreme right-wing radicals.

¹⁰¹ H.A. Jamsheer, *Historia powstania islamu jako doktryny społeczno-politycznej*, Warsaw 2009, p. 184.

¹⁰² *Islamist organisations*, <https://www.verfassungsschutz.de/en/fields-of-work/islamism-and-islamist-terrorism/figures-and-facts-islamism/islamist-organisations-2015> [accessed: 22 May 2018].

¹⁰³ K. Izak, *Leksykon organizacji i ruchów islamistycznych*, Warsaw 2014, p. 289.

People who have committed acts considered terrorist include current immigrants or representatives of the second generation of migrants. Since the attack against the French publishing house Charlie Hebdo on 7 January 2015 to 29 May 2018, there have been 128 terrorist incidents in Europe caused by Islamic radicalism.¹⁰⁴

The attack on Charlie Hebdo was caused by the offensive attitude of the magazine towards Islam, which was unacceptable to radicals. Earlier in 2011, an attempt had been made to arson the editorial office when it issued a new issue entitled 'Charia-Hebdo' with a commentary on the parliamentary elections in Tunisia. In 2005, Mohammed's cartoons published in Danish Jyllands-Posten, by Kurt Westergaard, were condemned. The publication resulted in protests and riots in front of Danish embassies in Muslim countries, as well as in Great Britain, Australia and New Zealand.¹⁰⁵ The embassies of Denmark and Norway were burnt down in Syria and Lebanon. Despite these events and the fierce opposition of Muslims, Mohammed's cartoons continued to appear, and the radicals outraged by them attacked their authors.¹⁰⁶

The attack on Charlie Hebdo was carried out by 32-year-old Cherif and 34-year-old Said Kouachi, whose parents came to France from Algeria. Born in Paris, they were a perfect example of a radicalized

¹⁰⁴ <https://www.thereligionofpeace.com/attacks/europe-attacks.aspx> [accessed: 22 May 2018]. Belgium: 6 attacks; France-46; Netherlands: 1; Germany: 20; Austria: 6; Russia: 15; Sweden: 5; UK: 16; Spain: 4; Finland: 1; Italy: 5). In addition, 12 attacks of the same origin were reported in Turkey during this period.

¹⁰⁵ *Danish Cartoon Controversy*, <https://www.nytimes.com/topic/subject/danish-cartoon-controversy> [accessed: 22 May 2018].

¹⁰⁶ In 2010, Somali Mohamed Geele made a failed assassination attempt on the life of a draughtsman. Another author of the caricature of the Prophet Lars Viks was attacked in Sweden in the same year as the Islamic State was to award the bomber prize for his death. In 2004, for his film about the oppression of women, Moroccan Dutch citizen, Theo van Gogh was murdered. *Zamachy na krytyków Islamu*, <https://wiadomosci.wp.pl/zamachy-na-krytykow-islam-6043601587627137g/5> [accessed: 22 May 2018].

second generation of immigrants. Moreover, it should be noted that the place where they could undergo this process was a mosque in the district of Stalingrad, where Farid Beneyettou taught, at the same time leading a “Buttes-Chaumont net” recruiting fighters to fight in Iraq.¹⁰⁷ Amed Coulibaly, their associate shot a policeman and the next day assaulted a kosher shop, where he shot four people. During this attack, an employee of Lassana Bathily’s shop helped several customers by hiding them in the backroom. It turned out that Lassana Bathily was a Muslim and an immigrant from Mali waiting for French citizenship, which after this act of courage the French authorities decided to admit to him.

Descendants or Muslim migrants also took part in the subsequent attacks. In February 2015, in Copenhagen, a Palestinian Danish, Omar al-Hussein, attacked a café and a synagogue, killing two and injuring five people.

One of the biggest simultaneous attacks took place in Paris in November 2015. The targets were Bataclan’s concert hall (130 victims), Petit Cambodge Restaurant and Carillon Bar, Stade de France Stadium (the perpetrators of the attack were prevented from entering the stadium where the sporting event was taking place) and Les Halles Shopping and Entertainment Centre. Of the seven attackers, Ismael Mostefai (of Algerian origin, born in France), Jean Salah Abdeslam and Ibrahim Abdeslan were depicted as residents of the Molenbeek district in Brussels, Sami Amimour, residing in Dranca, a suburb of Paris, Ahmad Al Mohammad used his Syrian passport and entered France via the Greek island of Leros and Serbia. Abdelhamid Abaaoud,

¹⁰⁷ *Komisja śledcza francuskiego parlamentu: Wywiad poniósł porażkę, nie zapobiegł atakom. Należy utworzyć agencję do walki z terroryzmem*, <https://wpolityce.pl/swiat/299492-komisja-sledcza-francuskiego-parlamentu-wywiad-poniosl-porazke-nie-zapobieglo-atak-om-nalezy-utworzyc-agencje-do-walki-z-terroryzmem?strona=2> [accessed: 22 May 2018].

who was considered the main organizer of the coup, was born in Belgium into a Moroccan immigrant family and lived in the Molenbeek district.¹⁰⁸

In March 2016, three coordinated terrorist attacks took place in Belgium, killing 32 people. Among the perpetrators were the Khalid brothers and Ibrahim El Bakraoui, whose father was an emigrant from Morocco, Najim Laachraoui born in Morocco, Mohamed Abrini born in Belgium as a son of immigrants from Morocco, and Osama Krayem with Swedish citizenship, who had left Syria via the Greek island of Leros and the local refugee centre.¹⁰⁹

Mohamed Lahouai Bouhlel, a Tunisian citizen of France, took part in the next attack. In July, using a truck, he entered the promenade in Nice killing 84 people.¹¹⁰ Also using a truck, in December 2016, Amis Amri from Tunisia entered Berlin and drove into a crowd at a Christmas fair killing 12 people. Interestingly, within a few days, the bomber reached Italy, where he was shot near Milan. In March 2017, British-born Adrian Russell Ajao – Khalid Masood used the same method for the attack on. Uzbek national, Rachman Akilov used a truck to attack in April 2017 in Stockholm. Five people died and eight were injured during the attack.¹¹¹ In Uzbekistan, he was consid-

¹⁰⁸ *Zamachy w Paryżu. Co wiemy do tej pory?*, <http://www.newsweek.pl/swiat/zamachy-w-paryzu-ataki-terrorystyczne-we-francji-najwazniejsze-informacje,artykuly,373992,1.html> [accessed: 22 May 2018].

¹⁰⁹ *Osama Krayem: Swedish jihadist linked to Brussels bombings charged with 'terrorist murder' over Paris attacks* <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/osama-krayem-swedish-jihadist-linked-to-brussels-bombings-charged-with-terrorist-murder-in-paris-a6993236.html> [accessed: 22 May 2018].

¹¹⁰ *Kontrterroryzm. Siły specjalne. Działania. Wydarzenia w 2016 roku*, K. Jałoszyński, W. Zubrzycki, Jabłoński, Szczytno 2017, p. 171.

¹¹¹ <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/stockholm-attack-sweden-lorry-truck-crash-terror-isis-islamic-state-manhunt-latest-suspect-police-a7673527.html> [accessed: 22 May 2018].

ered a religious extremist and was wanted by the authorities.¹¹² It should be recognized that all attacks have been and are intended to provoke retaliation by Western societies and are mainly signalled by ISIS.

Terrorist attacks and linking them to the migrant community, or rather to their centres – Paris suburbs, the Molenbeek district – are not the only security problem in European countries. The issue of physical security of the citizens of these countries is also mentioned.

In 2017, about 30% of those suspected of pocketing were refugees, asylum seekers or so-called tolerated migrants, and 10% of those suspected of burglary were also representatives of this group. Data on sex offenders, where they account for 15.9%, are of particular interest. This year, 15.2% of refugees were suspected of being injured.¹¹³

Statistical data show that representatives of countries such as Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco are most likely to commit crimes, while former Syrian, Iraqi and Afghan residents are least likely to do so.¹¹⁴ This is due to the opportunities to stay in the target country. The less likely the chance is, the greater the propensity to commit a criminal offence. Syrians and Afghans do not want to squander their chances of obtaining a residence permit.

Another problem is the scale of sexual offences committed by immigrants in Germany, for example. According to the Ministry of the

¹¹² *Władze Uzbekistanu: Ostrzegliśmy Szwecję przed zamachowcem ze Sztokholmu*, <http://wiadomosci.dziennik.pl/swiat/artykuly/547491,zamach-w-sztokholmie-uzbekistan.html> [accessed: 22 May 2018].

¹¹³ *Najnowsze statystyki policji. Uchodźcy stanowią 8,5 proc. wszystkich podejrzanych*, <http://www.dw.com/pl/najnowsze-statystyki-policji-uchod%C5%BAcy-stanowi%C4%85-85-proc-wszystkich-podejrzanych/a-43579558> [accessed: 22 May 2018].

¹¹⁴ *Niemcy: wzrost przestępczości wśród imigrantów z Afryki Płn. „Brak obecności kobiet”*, <http://www.dw.com/pl/niemcy-wzrost-przest%C4%99pczo%C5%9Bci-w%C5%9Br%C3%B3d-imigrant%C3%B3w-z-afryki-p%C5%82n-brak-obecno%C5%9Bci-kobiet/a-42015940> [accessed: 22 May 2018].

Interior, “in 2016 in Stuttgart 5,406 crimes of a sexual nature took place (in 2015 there were 5,447 of them), including 803 (in 2015: 817) rapes and sexual violence. 482 of this number of crimes in 2016 (and 256 in 2015) were committed by asylum seekers. This corresponds to around 9% of about 15% of the offences. Compared to 2015, the proportion of asylum seekers and refugees in sexual offences almost doubled in 2016 (from 236 to 480). The leaders are Afghans: 87 suspects (19 in 2015) and Syrians: 85 suspects (22 in 2015). The number of cases of sexual abuse has risen by 116.8% from 167 in 2015 to 362 in 2016, a figure that is also the highest for Syria (13 in 2015 and 80 in 2016) and Afghanistan (15 in 2015 and 49 in 2016).¹¹⁵

After analyzing approximately 4,000 court rulings in Sweden in sex offense cases between 2012 and 2017, Joakim P. Jonasson, said that: 95.6% of the rapes were of foreign origin; the majority were carried out by Somalis, Eritreans, Algerians, Iraqis and Gambians; most of them were carried out in Stockholm, Hudiksvall and Eskilstuna; 84% of the heavy rapes were carried out by people of foreign origin, primarily Somalis, Iraqis and Afghans, followed by Swedes; 66% of the heavy rapes were committed by asylum seekers or persons who have obtained a residence permit in the country; the most likely national groups to commit serious rape are Algerians, Afghans, Tunisians, Moroccans and Palestinians; 90% of the mass rapes were committed by men from other countries; one in four rapists in the group was an Afghan; only 6.7% of the perpetrators were ethnic Swedes. Most of the rapists in the group have been convicted in Ystad, Eksjö and Uppsala; foreigners are much more likely to attack Swedes than other foreigners; there has been a dramatic increase in homosexual rape in

¹¹⁵ *Zahl sexueller Straftaten durch Migranten gestiegen*, <https://www.welt.de/politik/fluechtlinge/article166743220/Zahl-sexueller-Straftaten-durch-Migranten-gestiegen.html> [accessed: 22 May 2018].

recent years; 85% of those convicted for participating in group gay rapes are Afghans.¹¹⁶

It is important not to equate crime statistics, data and the number of acts committed with the number of refugees. However, these data may be used to build negative images of refugee groups.

The more vulnerable this group's situation is, the easier it is for Europe's immigrants to act as radicals. The fear and frustration caused by their location grows. The radicals are trying to create a conflict between immigrants and the society of the countries of destination, which is to be served by their attacks on the symbols of Western culture. In this way, they are counting on retaliatory action by radical groups on the extreme right, which could in turn cause the conflict to escalate. This tactics is symptomatic of extremists counting on the unwise actions of the authorities and on the reaction of the society. The emergence of an increasing number of foreign visitors and the publicization of terrorist acts by the media of terrorist acts, particularly social and right-wing, with the indication of the origin of the perpetrators, have led to an increase in xenophobic attitudes and criminal acts committed against this background.¹¹⁷

In response to government policies, grassroots civil initiatives to defend national identities have emerged (*Identitaere bewegung*), and anti-immigrant extreme right-wing parties have begun to receive increased support. New initiatives have emerged in line with the party

¹¹⁶ *Ny undersökning om utlänningar och sexualbrott*, <https://pjonasson.word-press.com/2017/10/23/ny-undersokning-om-utlannningar-och-sexualbrott/> [29.05.2018]; *Ny undersökning om sexbrott: 95,6 procent av överfallsvåld-takter begås av invandrare*, <http://www.friatider.se/ny-unders-kning-om-sex-brott-956-procent-av-verfallsv-ldt-kter-beg-s-av-invandrare> [accessed: 22 May 2018].

¹¹⁷ A. Żebrowski, *Migracja zagrożeniem dla bezpieczeństwa wewnętrznego państwa*, „*Annales Universitatis Paedagogicae Cracoviensis Studia Politologica*” XII (2014), p. 54.

model of one case, an example of which is Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), which received considerable support in the Bundestag elections in 2017 (94 seats).¹¹⁸ It bases its political appeal on the slogans: asylum and immigration; Islam and identity; the European Union and its aid; the protection and security of its citizens; and the future 'for our children and families'. According to AfD, too many foreigners are involved in drug crime and violence without proper responsibility. The party's political appeal recognizes that Islam is not part of German culture. It states that this religion does not respect the German legal system and "demands power only for one religion." The AfD wants to "prevent the further spread of isolated parallel Islamic societies in which Muslim "peace judges" apply Sharia law and undermine the state monopoly on prosecution and jurisdiction."¹¹⁹

Another anti-Islamic organisation, Patriotic Europeans against Islamisation of the West (Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes, PEGIDA) was founded in 2014. In its programme, it is the first item to proclaim the slogan of preserving one's own culture together with the need to stop political and religious fanaticism, radicalism, Islamization, genderization, early sexualization.¹²⁰ It calls for an immigration law based on rules that take cultural, economic and demographic factors into account. Migration should be qualitative and not quantitative (mass). Programmatic convergence has made AfD and PEGIDA natural allies cooperating in joint activities. PEGIDA tries to be a pan-European movement, hence the activity of

¹¹⁸ The AfD was created in February 2013 and, in addition to denying immigration, is sceptical of the European Union. *Statistiken zur AfD*, <https://de.statista.com/themen/3260/afd/> [accessed: 22 May 2018].

¹¹⁹ <https://www.afd.de/zuwanderung-asyl/> [accessed: 27 May 2018].

¹²⁰ *Programm. Dresdner Thesen*, <https://www.pegida.de/> [accessed: 22 May 2018].

its supporters in other European countries (Czech Republic, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Spain, Austria, Switzerland).¹²¹

The issue of the refugee crisis became, after 2015, an almost obligatory element of election campaigns to the parliaments of European countries. In Poland, in 2015, the Law and Justice Party came to power promising that it would not fulfil the previous government's obligation to bring several thousand immigrants to Poland. In Hungary, Fidesz, Prime Minister Viktor Orban's party, has also taken a strong position, using the slogan of opposition to the EU authorities imposing the deployment of refugees. In Austria and Italy, sceptics about accepting refugees were a serious group of voters. The British decision to leave the European Union was also influenced by the migration crisis in Europe and the EU's ineffective migration policy.

Anti-migration slogans have appeared in appeals from many European organizations and political parties. The most relevant are Law and Justice in Poland and Fidesz in Hungary. In addition, they operate in other countries, they include Swiss People's Party (Switzerland); Freedom Party of Austria (Austria); Danish People's Party (Denmark); New Flemish Alliance, Flemish Interest, Voorpost (Belgium); Jobbik (Hungary); Finns Party (Finland); Lega Nord, New Force (Italy); Progress Party (Norway); National Front (France); Party for Freedom, Forum for Democracy (Netherlands); Sweden Democrats (Sweden); United Kingdom Independence Party, British National Party, Britain First (United Kingdom); National Democratic Party (Germany); National Movement (Poland).

Not all the inhabitants greeted the newcomers with open arms. With the arrival of more refugees and the need to find places for

¹²¹ *Das sind die Ableger der islamfeindlichen Bewegung in Europa*, https://www.focus.de/politik/deutschland/pegida-kopenhagen-bis-prag-das-sind-die-ableger-der-islamfeindlichen-bewegung-in-europa_id_4415236.html [accessed: 22 May 2018].

them, hostile attitudes to immigrants have emerged. The were particularly evident in Germany in the Eastern Länder.¹²²

Paradoxically, the emergence of people seeking help has exacerbated xenophobic crime. In 2015, there were 1,031 xenophobic attacks, in 2016 about 1,000, including arson, explosions and robberies, in 2017 – 313 attacks on places inhabited by refugees and 1906 attacks on persons.¹²³

The outbreak of violence and clashes between refugees and the inhabitants of Budziszyn (Bautzen) took place in 2016, where reinforced German police forces had to intervene. The aggressive attitude of a few provocateurs – the refugees – was exploited by the extreme right in organizing a demonstration in this city. It should be noted that in February 2016 the hotel where the centre for immigrants was to be located was set on fire in the city.¹²⁴ In 2015, the media reported that “attacks on asylum centres occur almost on a daily basis. In Nauen, a sports hall was completely burnt down on Monday night. It was to be used by refugees seeking asylum in Germany from September onwards.”¹²⁵ In Sweden, 112 cases of arson of refugee camps were reported in 2016.¹²⁶

¹²² K. Ziemer, *Polityka migracyjna w Niemczech. Aktualne wyzwania*, [in:] *Kryzys migracyjny w Europie. Wyzwania etyczne, społeczno-kulturowe i etniczne*, ed. by J. Balicki, W. Necel, Warsaw 2017, p. 225.

¹²³ *Niemcy: Niemal codziennie ataki na ośrodki dla azylantów*, <http://www.dw.com/pl/niemcy-niemal-codziennie-ataki-na-o%C5%9Brodki-dla-azylant%C3%B3w/a-41256712> [22.05.2018]; *Niemcy: ponad 2200 ataków na uchodźców w 2017 r.*, <http://www.dw.com/pl/niemcy-ponad-2200-atak%C3%B3w-na-uchod%C5%BAc%C3%B3w-w-2017-r/a-42765394> [accessed: 22 May 2018].

¹²⁴ *“Sceny jak na polowaniu”*. *Starcia migrantów i mieszkańców w Budziszynie*, <https://www.tvn24.pl/wiadomosci-ze-swiate,2/niemcy-budziszyn-ekscesy-z-udzialem-uchodzcow-i-miejscowych,676439.html> [accessed: 22 May 2018].

¹²⁵ *Podpalenia ośrodków dla uchodźców*. *Okrzyki „Heil Hitler”, Merkel wygwizdana*, <https://www.tvn24.pl/wiadomosci-ze-swiate,2/seria-atakow-na-imigrantow-w-niemczech,571776.html> [accessed: 22 May 2018].

¹²⁶ *Szwecja: Policja podejrzewa, że doszło do podpalenia ośrodków dla uchodźców*, <http://www.gazetaprawna.pl/artykuly/1043625,szwecja-policja-podejrzewa-podpalenia-osrodkow-dla-uchodzcow.html> [accessed: 22 May 2018].

The number of acts related to prejudice (hate crimes), motivated by racism or xenophobia, which are committed in Europe is constantly increasing.¹²⁷ Acts of this kind are committed against persons or property associated with such persons (e.g. vehicles, houses, institutions, community centres, cult objects). They can include offensive inscriptions on buildings or bus stops, violation of inviolability and insults in direct contact, beatings, attacks on the place of residence – flats (breaking windows, arson of doors) and disturbances of cultural events.¹²⁸ In 2014, there were 2019 xenophobic hate crimes in Germany, 2,447 in 2015, and a year later, according to the police, 2,846 such crimes were committed.¹²⁹ In France: 2014: 1,195; 2015: 1,075, of which 336 against Muslims; 2016: 1,195.¹³⁰ In Sweden: 2014 – 3,489 (281 against Muslims, 440 against Christians); 2015 – 4,133 (369 against Muslims, 645 against Christians); 2016 – 4,033 (242 against Muslims, 264 against Christians).¹³¹ In Italy: 2014: 566; 2015:

¹²⁷ According to the definition of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (ODIHR OSCE), ‘a hate crime based on hatred and motivated by prejudice shall be any crime against persons and their property which results in the victim or any other purpose of the crime being chosen on the basis of their actual or perceived association, or to provide support for a group identified on the basis of characteristics common to its members, such as their actual or perceived race, nationality or ethnic origin, language, colour, religion, sex, age, physical or mental disability, sexual orientation or any other similar characteristic. *Preventing and responding to hate crimes. A resource guide for NGO’s in the OSCE region, OSCEODIHR, Warsaw 2009.*

¹²⁸ *Reaguj na przestępstwa z nienawiści*, <http://uchodzcy.info/reaguj-na-przestepstwa-z-nienawisci/> [accessed: 22 May 2018].

¹²⁹ *Crimes recorded by Police*, <http://hatecrime.osce.org/germany?year=2014;2015;2016> [accessed: 27 May 2018].

¹³⁰ <http://hatecrime.osce.org/france?year=2014;2015;2016> [accessed: 22 May 2018].

¹³¹ <http://hatecrime.osce.org/sweden?year=2014;2015;2016> [accessed: 22 May 2018].

369; 2016: 338.¹³² In the United Kingdom: 2014: 46,432 (of which 3319 on religious grounds); 2015: 52,846 (of which 2,372 against Muslims and 1055 against Christians); 2016: 68,928 (of which 6,097 out of religious motives).¹³³ In Poland: 2014 – 137 (out of religious motives of 14 events); 2015 – 187 (against Muslims 42, against Christians 12); 2016 – 621 (including against Muslims 29).¹³⁴

What is a serious threat to security is not only terrorism, but also common crime. All sides are at risk, both from the community of states providing shelter and from the migrants themselves. Terrorism by Muslim fundamentalists linked to the Islamic State or other Islamic organisations can be accompanied by acts of violence by dissatisfied (frustrated) citizens of the target countries. An example is the case of Anders Brevik, who carried out terrorist attacks protesting against the Norwegian Government's overly open policy. A phenomenon that became apparent during the first years of the migration crisis in Europe was the growing support for far-right and anti-immigrant parties and organizations. An important element of the situation is also the intensified propaganda struggle, in which supporters and opponents select arguments and evidence to support them in a (radically) biased manner. For some, migration and immigrants represent an opportunity and for others they are a threat. Some point to the positive aspects – combating problems with the lack of hands to work, helping refugees in need, cultural richness. Opponents, on the other hand, prefer to talk about the invasion, the threat to culture, the fear of crime, especially sexual crime, and terrorism. Both are right. Not

¹³² [http://hatecrime.osce.org/italy?year=2014; 2015; 2016](http://hatecrime.osce.org/italy?year=2014;2015;2016) [accessed: 22 May 2018].

¹³³ <http://hatecrime.osce.org/united-kingdom?year=2014;2015;2016> [accessed: 22 May 2018].

¹³⁴ [http://hatecrime.osce.org/poland?year=2014; 2015; 2016](http://hatecrime.osce.org/poland?year=2014;2015;2016) [accessed: 22 May 2018].

all newcomers are refugees whose lives have been threatened, and not all of them come from areas of conflict. It cannot be denied that there are political and religious extremists among immigrants and that reports and police statistics on crime are fictional. However, for one reason or another, everyone coming to Europe is looking for security, whether economic or personal, or just wants to live in better conditions.

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