Towards A Biblical Thomism

Thomas Aquinas and the Renewal of Biblical Theology

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Introduction

In his introductory monograph Aidan Nichols tentatively argued for a new renaissance in the study of the thought of Thomas Aquinas.[1] The large number of introductions to his thought and translations of his works, which have subsequently appeared, attest to the fact that a growing number of scholars today find his thought still worth reading and understanding.[2] From a Catholic perspective, this renaissance inevitably means engaging in reflections on the way in which Thomism can be renewed after the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965) and what it means to be a Thomist today.[3] Such a *post*-conciliar renewal of Thomism, in particular in a context of prolonged postmodernity, will exhibit the features of a new phenomenon which is being coined in relation to a previous form of thought.[4]

The typically modern separation of speculative theology and biblical exegesis is foreign to the mind of Thomas Aquinas.[5] In fact, as Gilbert Dahan has observed,

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[1] Aidan Nichols, *Discovering Aquinas. An Introduction to his Life, Work and Influence* (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 2002).

[2] Some recent examples are Philip McCosker & Denys Turner, ed., *The Cambridge Companion to the Summa Theologiae* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2016); Volker Leppin ed., *Thomas Handbuch* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck 2016); Jason Eberl, *The Routledge Guidebook to Aquinas' Summa Theologiae* (Oxford: Routledge 2016); Pasquale Porro, *Thomas Aquinas: a historical and philosophical profile* (Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America Press 2016).

[3] See Joseph A. DiNoia., "Thomism After Thomism: Aquinas and the Future of Theology," in *The Future of Thomism*, ed. Deal W. Hudson and Dennis William Moran (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), 231-245; John Haldane,"Thomism and the Future of Catholic Philosophy", *New Blackfriars* 80 (1999), 158-169; Serge-Thomas Bonino, "To be a Thomist," *Nova et Vetera* 4 (2010), 763-773; Idem, "Le thomisme de 1962 à 2012. Vue panoramique," *Nova et Vetera* (Fribourg) 87 (2012), 419-446; Thomas J. White, "Thomism after Vatican II," *Nova et Vetera* 12 (2014), 1045-1062.

[4] Tracy Rowland, *Culture and the Thomist Tradition. After Vatican II* (Routledge: London-New York 2003).

[5] Matthew Levering, *Participatory Biblical Exegesis: A Theology of Biblical Interpretation* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame, 2008). On the origins of this separation see C. Kavin Rawe and Richard B. Hayes, "Biblical Studies," *The Oxford Handbook of Systematic Theology*, John

Thomas Aquinas is situated in the final phase of the process of differentiation of speculative theology and biblical exegesis, or in other words, he is still able to combine them despite their differences at a time when many of his contemporaries thought that the two disciplines would diverge and create alternative worlds.[6] In fact, for a medieval *Magister in Sacra Pagina* such as Thomas Aquinas, the Master's threefold office of *lectio*, *disputatio* and *preaedicatio* constitute such a unity that the expressions *sacra doctrina*, *theologia* and *sacra Scriptura* are considered to be synonyms and "designate the whole of divine teaching foundation on Revelation."[7]

Thomas Aquinas is indeed a witness of the times in which the transition from the narrative typology of monastic theology, based on a *lectio divina*, to the scholastic version of biblical exegesis, emphasizing the *quaestio* as an interpretative tool for understanding Revelation, took place.[8] The *sacra doctrina*, which grew out of this scholastic perspective, however, is not intended on 'freezing' the intellectual reflection on Revelation but remains located within a creative tension between biblical exegesis and speculative understanding. This creative tension offers a framework in which ever deepening reflection is not restricted but on the contrary functions as a fertile environment corresponding to, as Henri de Lubac observed, the Latin term *humus*.[9] Aquinas' exegesis is explicitly and implicitly imbued with metaphysics for

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Webster, Kathryn Tanner, and Iain Torrance eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 435-455.

[6] Gilbert Dahan, "Thomas Aquinas: Exegesis and Hermeneutics," in *Reading Sacred Scripture with Thomas Aquinas. Hermeneutical Tools, Theological Questions and New Perspectives*, eds. Piotr Roszak and Jörgen Vijgen (Turnhout: Brepols, 2015), 45-70, here 45. For an introduction into this *lectio divina* see Duncan Robertson, *Lectio Divina: The Medieval Experience of Reading* (Collegeville, Minn. : Liturgical Press, 2011).

[7] Gilles Emery, "Biblical Exegesis and the Speculative Doctrine of the Trinity in St. Thomas Aquinas's Commentary on St. John', in *Reading John with St. Thomas Aquinas, Theological Exegesis and Speculative Theology*, ed. by Michael Dauphinais & Matthew Levering (Washington D.C.: CUA Press, 2005), 23-61, here 56. See also Petrus Cantor, *Verbum adbreuiatum*, textus prior, I : "In tribus igitur consistit exercicium sacre Scripture: circa lectionem, disputationem et predicationem […]. Lectio autem est quasi fundamentum et substratorium sequentium quia per eam cetere utilitates comparantur. Disputatio quasi paries est in hoc exercicio et edificio ; quia "Nichil plene intelligitur fideliterue predicatur nisi prius dente disputationis frangatur". Predicatio uero, cui subseruiunt priora, quasi tectum est tegens fideles ab estu et a turbine uiciorum. Post lectionem igitur sacre Scripture et dubitabilium disputationem et inquisitionem, et non prius, predicandum est, ut sic cortina cortinam trahat, etc." (CCCM 196 A, 14-15, ll. 37-48).

[8] Philip Rosemann, "What is an Author? Divine and Human Authorship in Some Mid-Thirteenth-Century Commentaries on the Book of Sentence," *Archa Verbi* 12 (2015), 35-64; Mireille Chazan, Gilbert Dahan eds., *Le méthode critique au Moyen Age* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2006).

[9] Henri de Lubac, *Medieval Exegesis. Volume 1: The Four Senses of Scripture* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1998), 75-82.

speculative reasoning is regarded as an integral tool for explicating the biblical message and not as a hindrance to its meaning.[10] Many centuries before, Jerome already emphasized that the Gospel does not consist in the words of Scripture but in the meaning: "it is not [hidden] in the leaves of mere words but in the root of reason."[11] Gadamer's view that the task of hermeneutics should consist in awakening the word from its imprisonment in the text resembles Thomas' idea of the task of exegesis and theology (*sacra doctrina*) which is born from reading Sacred Scripture. For Thomas theological reflection should ultimately contemplate the fittingness (*convenientia*) of God's activity in history and try to discover that the Word is not a 'dead' text but is charged with interpretations which human words cannot fully exhaust. Such a theological reflection contains in itself therefore a pedagogical dimension, teaching how to respond to the self-revelation of God, whose testimony is Scripture.[12]

Towards defining Biblical Thomism

Among many attempts to deal with the heritage of Thomas Aquinas, there is one particular type of Thomism which tentatively starts to play its role, namely Biblical Thomism. Its origins may be found in the works of the Belgian Dominican Servais Pinckaers[13] and have been creatively developed by Matthew Levering and others.

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[10] Influential in this respect is Matthew Levering, *Scripture and Metaphysics. Aquinas and the Renewal of Trinitarian Theology* (Oxford: Blackwell 2004). It is worthwhile emphasizing the central role of contemplation in theological practice and Christian biblical exegesis as preparing Aquinas' position. It formed a crucial part in the exegesis of the School of St. Victor and in particular in Hugo of St. Victor's *Didascalicon*. Cf. Piotr Roszak, "Exégesis y metafísica. En torno a la hermenéutica bíblica de Tomás de Aquino," *Salmanticensis* 61 (2014), 301-323.

[11] Jerome, *Commentary on Galatians*, Book 1, trans. Andrew Cain (Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America Press 2010), 127. Cf. Aline Canellis, "Jerome's hermeneutics: how to exegete the Bible?," in *Patristic Theories of Biblical Interpretation. The Latin Fathers,* ed. Tarmo Toom (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 2016), 49-76.

[12] On the relationship between the Revelation and Holy Scripture in Thomas Aquinas' works see Piotr Roszak, "Revelation and Scripture. Exploring the Scriptural Foundation of *sacra doctrina* in Thomas Aquinas," *Angelicum* 93 (2016), 191-218.

[13] Tracey Rowland, *Ratzinger's Faith. The Theology of Pope Benedict XVI* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 27. In this regard Rowland notes that a central element in Pinckaers' thought is a focus on the telos of the human person in light of the believer's response to the call of the Triune God as revealed in Scriptures and tradition. See also John Berkman, C. Steven Titus (eds.), The *Pinckaers Reader* (Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2005). It was Thomas O'Meara who coined this term in his description of Servais Pinckaers' Thomistic ethics: "Interpreting Thomas Aquinas: Aspects of the Dominican School of Moral Theology in the

Although the study of Scripture, and in particular Thomas Aquinas' interpretation, and of the Church Fathers[14] set the tone, Biblical Thomism does not intend to introduce yet another type of Thomism as the use of the adjective 'biblical' might suggest. Nor is it primarily concerned with materially retrieving Aquinas' thought or to present his biblical exegesis as a culmination point in the history of biblical exegesis. It rather seeks to understand and employ the praxis of *sacra doctrina*, as exemplified primarily by Thomas Aquinas, and the pivotal role of Scripture in such a speculative engagement with Revelation as a way to overcome modern separations.[15] Hans Urs von Balthasar once observed that modern liberal exegesis functions as an intellectual cordon, paradoxically making access to Jesus more difficult. He compared it to the crowd and its scribes and Pharisees, the exegetes of the Old Law, who surrounded Christ and formed a cordon which made it difficult for Mary and Jesus' relatives to approach Christ.[16] Biblical Thomism thus aims at a vision of the *whole* of Scripture.

The whole of Scripture includes the role of the *auctoritates*, an insight which is paradoxical from the modern viewpoint of a separation between disciplines. For Aquinas *sacra doctrina* is understood as the link that maintains a life-giving relationship with other branches of knowledge. In other words, theology cannot be the 'queen of the sciences' once it isolates itself from other spheres of knowledge. The authority of these sources is not negative as in closing an investigation nor dialectical as in demonstrating the existence of contrary or even contradictory positions but rather follows the logic of the *catena*, the chain, in which each link is important and cannot be ignored on the way to the truth. Engaging the thought of Aquinas or practicing theology with Aquinas without taking into consideration his approach to the *auctoritates* and concentrating on his solutions runs the risk of repeating without understanding.[17] For this reason the exegesis of the Church Fathers plays an im-

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Twentieth Century," in *The Ethics of Aquinas*, ed. Stephen J. Pope (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2002), 363–366.

[14] See also Reinhard Hütter and Matthew Levering eds., *Ressourcement Thomism: Sacra Doctrina, the Sacraments, and the Moral Life* (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2010).

[15] Piotr Roszak, "Biblia i metafizyka: ku tomizmowi biblijnemu," in Tomasz z Akwinu, *Wykład Listu do Kolosan, Super Epistolam B. Pauli ad Colossenses lectura* (Toruń: Wydawnictwo Naukowe UMK, 2012), 9-21.

[16] Hans Urs von Balthasar, *Does Jesus know us? Do we know Him?* (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1983); for an analysis of Balthasar's highly nuanced position on the historical-critical method see Edward T. Oakes, "Balthasar's Critique of the Historical-Critical Method", in *Glory, Grace and Culture. The Work of Hans Urs von Balthasar*, ed. Ed Block jr. (Mahwah NJ : Paulist Press, 2005), 150-174.

[17] Juan J. De Miguel, "Los Padres de la Iglesia en la criteriologia de Santo Tomás de Aquino," *Scripta Theologica* 7 (1975), 125-161; Leo Elders, "Thomas Aquinas and the Fathers of the

portant part in Biblical Thomism. Thomistic biblical exegesis, moreover, draws our attention to the ecclesial nature of biblical exegesis, that is to the community of the Church as the proper hermeneutical space for reading Scripture (*in medio Ecclesiae*).

The variety of these voices expresses Thomas' conviction that the Word of God has unlimited possibilities which can never be exhausted. Its nature is infinite like God himself who does not only speak in words but also through the events of salvation history. Thomas is convinced that the Bible is a unique book because, unlike other books, it includes not only 'words' but also 'events.' God uses both words and events which the words describe. What happened in the past is rendered with the help of inspired words and opens interpretative possibilities which are handed down through the literal and spiritual meanings. As such medieval biblical hermeneutics does not treat history in a modern, linear way but emphasizes its participatory function within God's providential plan.[18] Thomas' reading of the Bible originates from this insight and is therefore based on the primacy of the 'event' over the 'text', of the *res* over the *enuntiabile*.[19] Given the infinite nature of God and His Word, Thomas does not view the Bible *unisono* but allows for the multiplicity of interpretations on different levels. His favorite *Denkform* is that of 'symphonicity' in which the same truth is illuminated from many perspectives and resounds in many tunes. For this reason, the frequent use of the Latin *vel* (or) in his search for the meaning of a biblical passage is not indicative of an intellectual incapacity but is a charateristic feature of his exegesis.

It is because of this symphonicity that Thomas' exegesis constantly displays a shift of perspectives and offers options of alternative interpretations which are rarely judged in terms of being right or wrong although Thomas frequently states that a given interpretation is better (*melior est*). His exegetical procedures play an important role here. One of these is citing or juxtaposing several quotations from different books of Scripture. These are not meant as a mere documentation but as a confirmation of the correctness of his interpretation, a kind of a "railroad switch" which frequently guides to an unexpected track.[20] Mutual conversation and interaction between citations serves the purpose of embedding the reader in a new interpretative

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Church," in *Theological innovation and the Shaping of Tradition. The Reception of the Church Fathers in the West from the Carolingians to the Maurists*, ed. Ignaz Backus (Leiden: Brill, 1996), 337-366; Piotr Roszak, "Wokół konceptu auctoritas w teologii św. Tomasza z Akwinu," *Człowiek w Kulturze* 22 (2011/2012), 67-90.

[18] *Participatory Biblical Exegesis: A Theology of Biblical Interpretation* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2008).

[19] *ST* I-II, q. 1, a. 2 arg. 2.

[20] For a more detailed analysis see Piotr Roszak, "The Place and Function of Biblical Citations in Thomas Aquinas' exegesis," in *Reading Sacred Scripture with Thomas Aquinas. Hermeneutical*

context as if searching for a better light to illuminate a biblical passage and in doing so to facilitate contemplation. After all, the outcome of this exegetical practice is not the intellectual fulfillment of the reader but an intense *praedicatio,* namely the proclamation of the kerygma which results in a change of life.

Aquinas's biblical commentaries versus the Summa Theologiae

Biblical commentaries do not constitute an isolated area of Thomas' work but are deeply connected to other forms of doing theology and in particular to his *Summa Theologiae*. One only has to recall that the writing of biblical commentaries and systematical works were often parallel efforts. For instance, in Orvieto he simultaneously interpreted the Book of Job, worked on the Third Book of the *Summa Contra Gentiles* and made preparations for the *Secunda Pars* of his *Summa Theologiae*. He worked in a similar manner on the commentary on the Letter of Paul to the Romans and the treatise on grace in the *Summa*.[21] But there is more. His deeper penetration of certain passages from Scripture leads Aquinas to develop his thought. As Daria Spezzano[22] has shown with reference to 2 Peter 1:4 ("Thus he has given us, through these things, his precious and very great promises, so that through them you may escape from the corruption that is in the world because of lust, and may become participants of the divine nature"), Thomas at some stages of his life emphasizes more the first part of the quotation, namely the greatness of promises given to man in Christ and at other stages the second part of the passage, i.e. the results of these promises: the participation in the divine nature. This example shows that for Thomas the interaction with Scripture as part of his academic duties of *lectio* and *praedicatio* allowed for a multiplicity of theological questions but it also shows that biblical citations do not merely function as ornaments nor as arguments but also constitute a trace of the origin of a particular insight of Aquinas. His biblical commentaries can also be helpful in understanding his *Summa*. In the *sed contra* there are citations which Thomas does not develop. In order to reconstruct his thought and understand the argumentative force of the citation, it is therefore necessary to return to the com-

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Tools, Theological Questions and New Perspectives, eds. Piotr Roszak and Jörgen Vijgen (Brepols, Turnhout 2015), 115-139.

[21] Shawn M. Colberg, "Aquinas and the Grace of Auxilium," *Modern Theology* 32 (2016), 187-210.

[22] Daria Spezzano, *The Glory of God's Grace. Deification according to St. Thomas Aquinas* (Ave Maria FL: Sapientia Press, 2015).

mentaries and understand the whole context of his thought. Biblical commentaries reveal the importance and priority of Revelation in Scripture for theological reflection but also the place of philosophical reflection, for the insertion of philosophical arguments within his biblical commentaries show an exegete and theologian at work trying to bring faith and reason into harmony.[23]

Trying to establish the value of the biblical commentaries for understanding Aquinas' thought should not therefore proceed according to the part: part principle. That is to say, the complementary nature of both types of works is not of primary importance but more so the reconstruction of a specific chain of thought (*catena*) originating from the Bible. In other words, the goal is not to look for what is missing from his commentaries or from the *Summa* but to understand more clearly the way in which Aquinas does theology.

The contribution of this volume

The essays in this volume are intended as a continuation of earlier research.[24] In Part One, three essays approach Aquinas' exegesis from the perspective of the heuristic tools he employs to engage with Scripture.

Anthony Giambrone investigates the function of the prologues to Aquinas' fourteen commentaries on the Letters of Paul. Historically, he argues for a strong conceptual link between these prologues and Aquinas' inaugural lecture *Hic est Liber*. In terms of the formal conventions and innovations, he explores the ways in which the prologues form a mendicant fusion of the monastic and school traditions. In Aquinas' identification of ecclesial grace in Head and Members as the comprehensive subject of the Pauline corpus, Giambrone sees a theological aesthetic at work which assumes the Scriptures' harmonious polyphony. On the basis of these insights he proposes two ways in which modern insights into the Pauline corpus can be put in dialogue with Thomas' reading.

Randall Smith argues that an analysis of Aquinas' inception address as Regent Master in Theology at the University of Paris (1256), known as *Rigans montes*, provides us with a valuable clue to how these medieval masters viewed the Scriptures but also with important insights into how medieval theologians were trained and

[23] Jörgen Vijgen, "The use of Aristotle in Aquinas's biblical commentaries," in *Reading Sacred Scripture with Thomas Aquinas. Hermeneutical Tools, Theological Questions and New Perspectives*, eds. Piotr Roszak and Jörgen Vijgen (Turnhout: Brepols 2015), 287-346.

[24] Piotr Roszak, Jörgen Vijgen (eds.), *Reading Sacred Scripture with Thomas Aquinas. Hermeneutical Tools, Theological Questions and New perspectives*, Brepols, Turnhout 2015.

what habits of mind they developed, that is, what conditions ought to characterize masters and students and how the doctrine of Scriptures ought to be communicated. Smith argues that Aquinas has an implicitly incarnational approach to teaching and learning based on a sacramental metaphysics of teaching.

The contribution by Michał Mrozek intends to offer us an exhaustive and detailed quantitative and qualitative analysis of the use of Scripture in the *Summa Theologiae* I-II, qq. 49-70, a large treatise dealing with habits, virtues, gifts and fruits of the Holy Spirit and the beatitudes and in which both philosophy, and in particular Aristotle, and Scripture are the dominant sources for Aquinas. Following the work of Pim Valkenberg, he distinguishes between three levels (macro-level, meso-level, and micro-level) of the use of Scripture according to its function in the text. For Mrozek, Scripture allows Aquinas to reread and refine Aristotle but Aquinas also reads Scripture through the lens of mainly Aristotelian categories. There exists therefore a real and deeply reciprocal influence between Scripture and philosophy.

In Part Two of the volume, two contributions deal with various aspects of Aquinas' Christology. Piotr Roszak analyses Aquinas' eschatological terminology for describing the 'last judgment' in his biblical commentaries. The analysis reveals both his understanding of history and salvation as well as Christ's dignity as judge of history. After discussing the nature of divine judgment and its criteria (the priority of the good and the fruits of human life under grace, understood as *pondus animae*), Roszak discusses the features of Aquinas' eschatology and its consequences for the Christian moral life.

Mateusz Przanowski engages in a careful textual comparative analysis of Aquinas' commentary on Philippians 2:7 and John 1:14 as exhibiting two seemingly opposed Christological traditions. He argues that Aquinas' method of biblical exegesis and in particular his manner of citing Scriptural passages *per ideam* enables Aquinas to overcome this opposition but also to place Phil 2:6-11 in a broader context than contemporary exegesis is able to do.

The Third Part of the volume deals with important aspects of the moral life. Michael Sherwin offers a preliminary "sketch" of the manner in which Thomas Aquinas in his biblical commentaries employs the psychology of love he develops in his systematic works. His investigation shows that the two main elements of his systematical psychology of love can also be found in these commentaries, i.e. love as an affective principle of action and the will's love as a twofold love (loving something for itself and loving something in relation to another), whereby one wills good to another. Although Thomas avoids some of the technical vocabulary he employs in the *Scriptum* and the *Summa*, he nonetheless applies his understanding of love as passive

principle and of love as act to help the reader better understand the biblical message concerning love, both human and divine.

Enrique Alarcón argues that the harmony of faith and reason, which Thomas illustrated on the basis of Aristotle's philosophy, also extends to the coherence between Aristotelian ethics and the evangelical morality of the Beatitudes. Although Thomas holds that ultimately happiness is beyond even the most perfect natural human life and is only given by a supernatural participation in the very life of God, the morality of Aristotle is, as Thomas explains, not contrary to it.

In his contribution Cajetan Cuddy starts by recounting, with the help of Joseph Ratzinger, how the promised renewal of postconciliar moral theology resulted in the abandonment of both the Bible and the natural law. The Pontifical Biblical Commission's 2008 document *The Bible and Morality: Biblical Roots of Christian Conduct* attempts to overcome this abandonment. Cuddy turns to Thomas Aquinas for some direction with regard to the document's main thesis: the relationship between the Bible and the natural law in moral theology. He analyzes Aquinas' comments on Romans 1:18-32 and 2:14-15 in relation to his summary of natural law inclinations in *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 94, a. 2 and argues for a theonomic orientation within natural law.

Paul Rogers draws on Aquinas' commentary on chapters 12 and 14 of Paul's First Letter to the Corinthians in order to shed light on how Aquinas sees the social function of prophecy in the Church (and, by extension, the Church's function in the world) to testify to the truths of the Christian faith and, especially, to moral truth. He argues that Thomas' treatment of Paul's teaching about the superiority of prophecy over the gift of tongues revives an important theme for moral theology today: namely, how the members of the Church are called to live as effective witnesses to the truths of faith and, particularly, to moral truths as taught within and by the ecclesial community and shaped especially by prayer — both public and private.

Jörgen Vijgen deals with an often-neglected aspect of Aquinas' and the Catholic Church's understanding of marriage as a *remedium concupiscentiae*. Drawing on Thomas' commentary on 1 Corinthians 7: 1-9 he explores five presuppositions at work in the background of this text: medicinal grace, the hierarchy among essential ends, the nature of concupiscence and pleasure, the need for sacramental grace and original sin. A correct and comprehensive account of these presuppositions is needed, so he argues, to account for the intelligibility of marriage as *remedium concupiscentiae*.

Matthew Levering offers an extensive systematical and biblical analysis of Aquinas' reasons for the indissolubility of marriage. He first explores Thomas Aquinas' arguments for the natural indissolubility of marriage, as these arguments are found in his systematical work. Second, he investigates his view on supernatural

or sacramental indissolubility, especially in light of his Commentary on Ephesians (specifically Ephesians 5). Third, he examines Aquinas's discussion of two seeming exceptions to the indissolubility of marriage: the so-called "Pauline privilege," which allows the marriage of unbaptized persons to be dissolved, and Jesus' allowance for divorce in cases of porneia in Matthew 19:9. In doing so, he attends both to his Commentary on the Sentences as well as to his Commentary on Matthew. As a final step, he compares Aquinas's position with that of leading contemporary historical-critical scholarship. In doing so, he argues for a fruitful interplay of Aquinas's philosophical theology with biblical exegesis.

It will be clear that the essays share a perspective on Aquinas' thought as rooted in and emerging from Scripture. Precisely as a theological and speculative exegesis of Scripture, Aquinas' thought can contribute to building a bridge between biblical and systematic theology.

Part 1
Heuristic tools

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Anthony Giambrone, O.P.

The Prologues to Aquinas' Commentaries on the Letters of St. Paul

The rhetoric of St. Thomas is marvelously succinct. In that spirit, I will not burden my short contribution on Thomas' Pauline prologues with a lengthy prologue of my own. Instead, I simply pose the question: How shall we read these fourteen fascinating introductions to the *Lectura super epistolas S. Pauli*? How do these texts function and what light do they offer for understanding the theology of both St. Thomas and St. Paul? I structure my essay in four parts.

1. Historical Context

No consideration of Aquinas as a biblical theologian should neglect the unique importance that St. Paul's letters held within his vision.[1] William of Tocco informs us that Brother Thomas "valued the epistles of Paul above all writings, the Gospels alone excepted."[2] It is also surmised that Aquinas applied himself twice to lecture

[1] Other works have often overshadowed Aquinas' Pauline commentaries. The *Super Iohannem* have been lauded since the early 1300s and the *Expositio super Job* has likewise long attracted attention. See Christopher Baglow, *Modus et Forma: A New Approach to the Exegesis of St. Thomas Aquinas with Application to the Lectura Super Epistolam ad Ephesios* (Rome: PIB, 2002), 23-29.

[2] "Scripsit super epistolas beati Pauli omnes, quarum scripturam preter euangelicam super omnes alias commendabat, in quarum expositione Parisius visionem prefati apostolic dicitur habuisse." Thomas was also said to have a "special devotion" (*specialem devotionem*) for St. Paul. William of Tocco, *Ystoria sancti Thome de Aquino* §§60 and 17-18. On Tocco's work, see Jean-Pierre Torrell, *Saint Thomas Aquinas: Volume 1: The Person and His Work* (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America, 1998), 318.

on the Pauline corpus, a mark of attention he seems to have accorded to no other biblical text.[3]

Although there are reasons to question the idea, if a double cycle were accepted, these two rounds of Pauline lectures would form a perfect frame around Thomas' theological career.[4] On the far end, in harmony with the testimony of both Tolomeo (XIII, 9) and Tocco (§60), the second round of lectures is conventionally placed in Naples near Thomas' death. It is likely necessary to imagine the textual activity of this period as focused largely on Romans (especially the first eight chapters) and ultimately issuing in an incomplete revision of some earlier treatment (e.g. *postillae*).[5] As Tugwell cautiously draws the framework, "It is not impossible that the bulk of the *reportatio* goes back to the first regency, and that Thomas did some editorial work on it later on."[6] This limited, later redaction might in turn explain both the scattered presence of late elements across the commentaries as well as the catalogues' distinction between the *Super epistolam ad Romanos* and *Super primam ad Corinthios capitula XI* on the one hand and the *Lectura super Paulum a XI capitulo prime ad Corinthios usque ad finem*, ranged among the *reportationes* made by Reginald of Piperno, on the other.[7] If the more extensive first round of *lectura* is thus less authoritative and mature on one score, it would be the more interesting and decisive on

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[3] Unless his stories have been garbled, Tocco preserves knowledge of two separate series of lectures, one in Paris and one in Naples. See Simon Tugwell, *Albert & Thomas: Selected Writings* (New York: Paulist, 1998), 247-248.

[4] On the basis of the manuscript evidence, Robert Wielockx ("Au sujet du commentaire de saint Thomas sur le 'corpus paulinum' critique littéraire," in *Doctor Communis* [Vatican City: Pontificia Academica Sanctae Thomae Aquinatis, 2009] 150-184) challenges the view that two courses of lectures were in fact given.

[5] "La tradition manuscrite comporte aussi la preuve de ce que saint Thomas a fait une révision de son cours sous forme d'annotations rapides et sporadiques, qui étaient de peu de quantité textuelle: dans au moins un cas une addition était relativement longue. Cette révision a concerné simplement l'épître aux Romains et elle ne s'est pas étendue au-delà de la leçon 3 du chapitre 13," Wielockx, "corpus paulinum," 177; cf. 151.

[6] Tugwell, *Albert & Thomas*, 248.

[7] Tolomeo speaks broadly of *postille super omnes epistolas Pauli*, adding, however, "preter epistolam ad Romanos quam ipse notavit, quas vidi et legi." The presence of late elements throughout the commentaries indicates that at least certain sections had not reached a final form until after Thomas' second regency, e.g. an allusion in Colossians §41 to Proclus' *Elements of Theology*, which did not appear in Latin translation until 1268. See Tugwell, *Albert & Thomas,* 247. The work of Wielockx ("corpus paulinum," 166–170) urges caution in making such arguments, however, e.g., regarding Thomas' use in *Sup. I Cor.* §13 of either the *Vetus* or *Moerbakana* edition of Aristotle. The chapters missing from the middle of the commentary on 1 Corinthians (7:10–10:33) and filled in with the commentary of Peter of Tarantaise could be due to any number of factors, including the simple absence of the reporter. See Torrell, *Thomas Aquinas*, 254.

other grounds.[8] Dated by Mandonnet to 1259–65,[9] by Torell tentatively to 1265–68 (before later changing his opinion),[10] the matter is reckoned by the *Oxford Handbook of Aquinas* as simply "very difficult to establish."[11] In this vein, Robert Wielockx has recently offered a near counsel of despair. "On se rend compte que presque tout a été proposé et qu'il n'est physiquement guère possible d'ajouter une hypothèse nouvelle."[12] He accordingly turns to the manuscript evidence in hopes of some *soulagement*. Unfortunately, the disorderly codicological data is not easily resolved — there are gaps in the text, for instance, occasional double recensions (e.g. Hebrews), and poor attestation for some of the letters — and its definitive presentation remains unpublished.[13] The one firm paleographical fact is that the publication of the commentaries commences in Naples; but, as Wielockx himself appreciates (*pace* Torrell), it would be a mistake to identify this with the time and place that Thomas actually did the work.[14]

Although Wielockx's methodological intervention is meant to displace an approach keyed to internal evidence, he has overstated the exhaustion of the issue and his principal arguments all remain negative. He merely exposes some dead-end reasoning that was too quickly accepted, primarily a couple fragile claims of possible external citations, along with Mandonnet's widespread idea that Thomas'

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[8] One should be cautious here. *Pace* Mandonnet and some who follow him (e.g. Walz, Weisheipl), there are no certain indications from Ptolemy of Lucca, any of the medieval scribes, Thomas himself, or any other 13th-century commentator that the term *lectura* designated works originating in oral lectures. It carried rather a sense closer to "reading" or "interpretation." I thank Timothy Bellamah for this terminological observation.

[9] Pierre Mandonnet, "Chronologie des écrits scriptuaires de saint Thomas d'Aquin," *Revue Thomiste* 33 (1928), 211-245, here 222 and 241-244.

[10] Noting how occupied Thomas was at Orvieto (1261-1265), Torrell asked, "Would it have been physically possible for Thomas to teach simultaneously on Saint Paul? If we must retain the hypothesis of a first teaching on Saint Paul, we would be inclined to think that the period that would best fit was the Roman sojourn (1265-1268)." See Torrell, *Thomas Aquinas*, 250-257 and 340. Cf. Jean-Pierre Torrell, *Saint Thomas Aquinas: Volume 1: The Person and His Work* (2nd edition; Washington, DC: Catholic University of America, 2002), 366-372.

[11] "Chronological List of Aquinas's Writings" in Brian Davies and Elenor Stump, eds., *Oxford Handbook of Aquinas* (Oxford: Oxford University, 2012). See also Pasquale Porro, *Thomas Aquinas: A Historical and Philosophical Profile* (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America, 2016), 189.

[12] Wielockx, "corpus paulinum," 177.

[13] See Louis Jacques Bataillon, "La diffusione manoscritta dei commenti biblici di San Tommaso d'Aquino," *Angelicum* 71 (1994), 579-590. Fr. Gilles de Grandpré of the Canadian section (Ottawa) of the Leonine Commission is preparing the edition for the commentary on St. Paul and Wielockx relies upon some advance indications of this work.

[14] Wielockx, corpus paulinum," 174–75; cf. Torrell, *Thomas Aquinas*, 253.

teaching on drunkenness developed over time.[15] In the end this critique simply amounts to a demonstration that new arguments must be found to pin the commentary to a specific time and place. Here Wielockx has overlooked one additional, physically possible hypothesis, however, which is never considered in his article, but which is, in fact, rather compelling. Thus, despite the many genuine difficulties in tackling the question, I remain enticed by Thomas Prügl's fugitive suggestion that the lectures must be placed directly after Aquinas' inaugural lecture *Hic est Liber,* during his first regency in Paris in the late spring of 1256.[16] This would fit with Tocco ("expositione Parisius"), help clarify the catalogues, and present a very interesting scenario. Indeed, the commentary on Paul would form the first subject elected by the precocious new *magister in sacra pagina* for the formal exercise of his theological office.[17]

I would here like to develop the importance of Prügl's solution and add an additional argument in its defense, based upon an examination of Aquinas' prologues. Prügl points above all to the peculiar omission in *Hic est Liber* of any discussion of Paul's epistles. After a brief *commendatio* of Scripture, Thomas discusses each scriptural division in turn, Law, Prophets, Writings, etc. Yet, after outlining in general the three divisions of the New Testament — the Gospels, Paul's letters, and the other writings — then mapping these three textual divisions onto three respective modalities of grace — its origin (*de gratiae origine*), its virtue (*de gratiae virtute*), and its exercise (*de virtutis executione*) — Aquinas suddenly leaps from the Gospels directly to the other writings in his subsequent expansion. This jump over Paul is indeed quite striking, especially since, as Franklin Harkins has observed, "This most basic division of Scripture highlights Thomas' conviction that the letters of St. Paul stand at the center, both canonically, and theologically, of the body of saving truths revealed by God."[18] Some explanation for this glaring gap in *Hic est Liber* is required.

A second gap must also be filled, moreover; for after decisively removing the *Super Matthaeum* from consideration as the first text commented by the young Thomas *in actu regens*, Torrell offers no replacement suggestion ("quel que soit le

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[15] Wielockx, "corpus paulinum," 152–58, 161–63.

[16] Thomas Prügl, "Thomas Aquinas as Interpreter of Scripture" in *The Theology of Thomas Aquinas,* eds. Rik van Nieuwenhove and Joseph Wawrykow (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame, 2005), 386-415, esp. 388-391 and above all note 68 on p. 414.

[17] Thomas was confirmed in his post *licentia docendi* without having the requisite age of 35. See Torrell, *Thomas Aquinas*, 50-51.

[18] Franklin Harkins, "Docuit excellentissimae divinitatis mysteria: St. Paul in Thomas Aquinas" in *A Companion to St. Paul in the Middle Ages,* ed. Steven Cartwright (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 240.

livre commenté a cette époque").[19] Our reconstruction of this first Parisian period is thus massively aided by Prügl's chronology — indeed, much more than he indicates with his passing proposal. Furthermore, an obvious thematic continuity, not mentioned by him and missed also in Elisabeth's Rheinhardt's study on the Inauguration Lectures, in fact binds Thomas' description of the New Testament in *Hic est Liber* with the presentation of Paul's writings laid out in the prologue to Romans.[20] Just as a grace *in tres partes* was the principle of unity and division in the lecture, so an intricate, triplex *doctrina de gratia Christi* is Thomas' organizing principle of Pauline theology. The whole wonderful architecture as laid out in the Romans prologue is well known to those who have worked on the commentaries and is outlined in the appendix.[21]

Other thematic affinities also connect the Pauline commentaries with Thomas' first regency in Paris. The significance of the *De Vertitate* should not be overlooked in this connection. The long *quaestio* on predestination that promptly interrupts the commentary on Rom 1:4, for instance, bears an unmistakable resemblance to the treatment of the same theme in *De Veritate* Q. 7, which differs from the *Summa*'s later presentation, as Michal Paluch has observed.[22] Making the lectures on Paul and the *De Veritate* contemporaneous would also help explain the doctrine of grace in the latter, moreover. It stands to reason, specifically, that Thomas' recognizable shift on the created character of grace from the *Sentences* to *De Veritate* should owe

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[19] Jean-Pierre Torrell, *L'Initiation à Saint Thomas d'Aquin: Sa personne et son ouvre* (Paris: Cerf, 1993), 84. Cf. Jean-Pierre Torrell, *L'Initiation à Saint Thomas d'Aquin: Sa personne et son ouvre* (Paris: Cerf, 2015). The *Super Mattheaum* is now thought to belong to Thomas' second sojourn in Paris (1269-1270).

[20] Elisabeth Rheinhardt, "Thomas Aquinas as Interpreter of Scripture in Light of His Inauguration Lectures," in *Reading Sacred Scripture with Saint Thomas Aquinas: Hermeneutical Tools, Theological Perspectives, and New Perspectives,* eds. Piotr Roszak and Jörgen Vijgen (Turnhout: Brepols 2015), 71-90.

[21] Although Torrell (*Thomas Aquinas*, 255-256, 340) correctly understands that this coverall prologue could not have been placed at the head of the commentary at the time of the second version, since Thomas refers to the plan in the prologues of other epistles, Torrell fails to reckon with the implications this earlier dating carries.

[22] See Michał Paluch, "Saint Augustin et Saint Thomas. Le De praedestinatione sanctorum dans l'oeuvre de Thomas d'Aquin," *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 86 (2002), 641-647, here 646; and *La profondeur de l'amour divin: Évolution de la doctrine de la predestination dans l'oeuvre de saint Thomas d'Aquin* (Paris: Vrin, 2004), 249-253. See also the discussion of Wielockx, "corpus paulinum," 171-174. It is not necessary to resolve the issue of whether or not Thomas knows and/or relies upon Augustine's *De praedestinatione sanctorum* XV in the commentary in order to maintain that an appreciable difference in the presentation of the issue separates *Sup. Rom*. from the *Tertia Pars*. This difference contrasts suggestively with the at times verbatim resemblance to the treatment offered in *De Veritate*.

something to his sustained engagement with the topic in commenting on the Pauline corpus.

Thomas' particular interest during this period in grace as a structuring principle of the canon also points to another development. It is very interesting, namely, that Thomas' later handling of the Gospels was not attuned to the grace-based outline of his inaugural lecture in any obvious or flagrant way — to judge at least from the two prologues preserved in the *Catena Aurea* and the *Lectura super Iohannem*. In the prologue to the *Catena* (1265–68), for instance, we learn that the evangelical teaching essentially delivers four things: Christ's divinity, his humanity, his death, and his resurrection. Ezekiel's four living creatures are then used to illustrate these four themes and divide them in various ways among the four evangelists. No word, however, about the Gospels as *de gratiae origine*. Similarly, in the prologue to his commentary on John (1269–72), the text is read through Isa 6:1 as a book whose matter is principally concerned with the contemplative life. Despite the Fourth Gospel's own contention that "Grace and truth came through Jesus Christ" — a foundational text in the schema of *Hic est Liber* — this proposition altogether fails to shape the prefaced remarks to Thomas' commentary. A measurable thematic drift from the New Testament program that he outlined in 1256 thus separates the Gospel from the Pauline prologues.

The strong conceptual link forged between the Pauline *Lectura* and *Hic est Liber* allows us to envision the latter, Aquinas' professional debut, even as a kind of prolegomena to his proposed lectures on Paul, a fifteenth prologue in effect (or, if you prefer, also a universal prologue to every subsequent commentary, an omni-prologue that ultimately failed to function). Whatever one makes of the story of Aquinas' initial perplexity about the subject he should treat in his *principium* and the apparent vision of St. Dominic that eventually resolved the question, the announced objective of the freshly minted Master was to deliver a scriptural program of study, focused on the power of grace.[23] Free to choose any text from the *Sentences* to the Scriptures, Thomas took up the task of *legere* with considered intent, declining the chance to round out his still unfinished commentary on the *Sentences* and also breaking from the scriptural *cursus* that ruled from Jerome to Stephan Langton and traditionally began with the sapiential books. Neither the Psalms nor the Gospels provided the material the young *magister* sought. For Thomas, the entire New Testament spoke of grace, yet Paul in a very particular way. Romans, being that text, moreover, concerned with grace *secundum se*, enjoyed a pedagogical primacy, not only within an exposition of Pauline literature, but within the whole broad horizon

[23] On this story, see Torrell, *Thomas Aquinas*, 51.

of *sacra doctrina*. If the *Summa Theologica* opts to begin with questions *de Deo uno*, Thomistic scriptural logic suggests a different entrée into the theological circle: *de Gratiae*.[24]

The historical perspective proposed here further allows us to envision Thomas' minute handling of each individual Pauline text as the seamless continuation of an unbroken *divisio textus* applied to the entire Christian Bible. Thomas commences in *Hic est Liber* with a neat *partitio* separating the Old Testament from the New, then proceeds systematically down to individual corpora and subdivisions therein; he then picks up directly in the *Lectura* at the level of books, chapters, verses, and words. Contrary to Gilbert Dahan's remark, that the *divio textus* begins with the first line of text and "échappe généralement au prologue proprement dit," Thomas' prologues thus stand squarely within such a procedure, extended to encompass the full, global unity of the divinely revealed *Liber*.[25] Only when this single massive act of analytic division is continually reduced back to its unified origin can we apprehend the ultimate significance of each sub- or sub-subunit and its full theological context. Thomas' use of the Old Testament to interpret Paul's letters is, thus, not confined to the thousands of individual citations within the *Lectura*. Paul's elaborate doctrine of grace is positioned in direct relation to the salvific *utilitas* of all scripture, in open contrast with the command character of the Old Covenant.

This complex interplay between higher-level unities, visible and outlined in a global treatment, and the lower-level divisions of more detailed study flags an important and difficult hermeneutical issue: the often-uncertain relationship governing synthetic prefatory material and subsequent analytic content in Thomas' exegesis.

2. Formal Conventions and Innovations

Aquinas was certainly not the first to comment on St. Paul's writings, nor was he the first to write prologues to his commentary.[26] The ambitious scope of the pro-

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[24] For an exchange on the question of whether the Summa is likewise organized on a principle of grace, see Thomas O'Meara O.P., "Grace as a Theological Structure in the *Summa Theologiae* of Thomas Aquinas," *Recherches de Théologie et philosophie médiévales* 55 (1988), 130-153; and Romanus Cessario, "Is Aquinas' Summa Only About Grace?" in *Ordo Sapientiae et Amoris,* ed. Pinto de Oliveira Carlos-Josaphat (Fribourg: Éditions universitaires, 1993), 197-209.

[25] Gilbert Dahan, *Lire la Bible au Moyen Âge: essais d'herméneutique médiévale* (Geneva: Droz, 2009), 79.

[26] See Pierre Boucaud, "Corpus Paulinum. L'exégèse grecque et latine des Épitres au premier millénaire," *Revue de l'histoire des religions* 230 (2013), 299-332; and Karlfried Froehlich, "Paul

ject — 418 separate lectures — is nevertheless worth observing.[27] It is interesting in this connection that an exegete as productive and influential as Jerome commented on only four of the epistles, for instance.[28] It is also interesting how little apparent impact Jerome's commentaries had on Thomas. Peter Lombard's complete *Collectanea* shows an important influence, by contrast; but the *Glossa*, in fact, seems to have been Thomas' primary source. From this, of course, he had access to a wealth of ancient material, for along with the Psalter and the Song of Songs, the Pauline Epistles were among the most frequently glossed texts from 600–1200. Several of the prologues to the *Glossa ordinaria* on Paul survive, and from these it is apparent how distant Thomas also stands from this whole tradition. These brief historical notices and summary arguments bear next to no resemblance to Thomas' fourteen prologues.

The formal character of Thomas' biblical prologues is clear. Randall Smith has recently observed the strong similarity between Aquinas' biblical prologues and his understudied sermons.[29] Exceptions exist, notably Job and Matthew; but for Paul the case is clear. The prologues share essentially the same form as the sermons. The same literary structure, we may add, applies also to *Hic est Liber*. This should caution against imagining too narrow a *Sitz-im-Leben* for the sermonic form, while also helping us see the *principium* as a type of prologue. In any case, Thomas prefaces to each epistle a short homiletic introduction in the form of the 13th century *sermo modernus*, a sermon mnemonically structured around a scriptural epigram or *thema*. In contrast to the sermons, however, where the *thema* is normally (not always) governed by the Dominican lectionary for the day and thus almost always drawn from the Gospels or the Psalms, Thomas' epigrams in the Pauline prologues draw mainly on the Old Testament historical and wisdom books. Titus is the sole prologue to use a Gospel text. What if anything may have controlled Thomas' selection of his *thema*

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and the Late Middle Ages" in *A Companion to Paul in the Reformation.* ed. R. Ward Holder (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 15-40, esp. 20-31.

[27] The breakdown of lectures derives from the Marietti edition and cannot be considered definitive. Nevertheless, as a measure it as follows: 67 Rom; 124 I-II Cor; 85 Gal-Eph; 88 Phil-Phlm; 54 Heb. If one reckons on the supposed 75 lecture days per year, this program would extend over a period of approximately five and a half years and reach into Thomas' time in Orvieto. Naturally, it is precarious to lean too heavily upon such calculations and account must also be made for the probability of preparing a course in advance of its full delivery.

[28] In each case Jerome was manifestly reliant upon the work of Origen, who reportedly treated the entire Pauline corpus. See Caroline Bammel, "Origen's Pauline Prefaces and the Chronology of his Pauline Commentaries," in *Origeniana Sexta: Origène et la Bible,* ed. Gilles Dorival and Alain Le Boulluec (Leuven: Peeters, 1995), 495-513.

[29] Randall B. Smith, "How to Read a Sermon by Thomas Aquinas," *Nova et Vetera* 10 (2012), 775-803, esp. 793. See also Randall B. Smith, *Reading the Sermons of Thomas Aquinas: A Beginner's Guide* (Steubenville, OH: Emmaus Academic, 2016).

remains difficult to determine, but a matter of high interest. The epigram of *Hic est Liber*, drawn from Baruch 4:1 ("This is the book of the commandments of God"), was a traditional *thema*;[30] but this is less clear for the prologues to the letters. Possibly, we should imagine the use of some instrument like Hugh's *Concordantia* (completed by 1240) as an aid in Thomas' text selection. Such a practice seems almost certain, at any rate, in the development of the *thema* in the body of the sermon/prologue.

The variable length and character of the fourteen Pauline prologues generally accords well with Thomas' similarly variegated series of 18 extant *sermones* and *collocationes*. In this light, each prologue might be profitably analyzed according to the various methods of *divisio* and *dilatio* also exemplified in his sermons. Thomas' startlingly short prologue to the lectures on Galatians, for instance, begins with a citation of Lev 26:10: "You shall clear out the old to make way for the new." Thomas then proposes a fourfold division: there is an oldness of error, of figure, of guilt, and of punishment. This is contrasted with a corresponding fourfold newness: the newness of Christ's doctrine, of his real presence in grace, of justice, and of glory. Both lists of the old and the new are illustrated by biblical verses keyed to the words *vetus* and *novus,* for instance Isa 26:3, *vetus error abiit*, and Mark 1:27, *quae est haec nova doctrina*. The sequence of the *divisio* itself appears to be ordered according to the so-called *order of delivery*.[31] Namely, the Lord first instructs the faithful; he then initiates them into sacramental grace, by which he justifies them, and finally leads them to eternal glory. All is exposed with austere succinctness, but with a compact virtuosity quite visible to an experienced eye.

The introduction of the *artes praedicandi* into Aquinas' prologues occasions no surprise, even if he stands on the cusp of the development, for it is a wide phenomenon in medieval biblical commentaries, as Dahan has shown.[32] What is also widespread, but more peculiar, perhaps, is the hybridizing of these preaching techniques with an *accessus* template drawn from the faculty of arts and based on the four Aristotelian causes.[33]

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[30] The *principium*-like Pentateuch prologue of Nicholas of Gorran adopts Bar 4:14 as its *thema*, for example. Dahan (*Lire la Bible*, 71) calls it "un verset qui a souvent servi de thème dans des textes de réflexion exégétique."

[31] On this sermonic technique, see Smith, *Reading the Sermons*, 54.

[32] See Gilbert Dahan, "Les prologues des commentaires bibliques (XII^{e}–XIV^{e} siècle," in *Les prologues médiévaux: Actes du colloque international organize par l'Academia Belgica et l'Ecole française de Rome avec le concours de la FIDEM, Rome, 26–28 mars 1998,* ed. Jacqueline Hamesse (Turnhout: Brepols, 2000), 427-470. On the tradition of prologues to the biblical texts themselves, see Maurice E. Schild, *Abendländische Bibelvorreden bis zur Lutherbibel* (Güttersloh: Mohn, 1970).

[33] On this form, see Prügl, "Thomas Aquinas as Interpreter," 399-401. Theresa Gross-Diaz (*The Psalms Commentary of Gilbert of Poitiers: From Lectio Divina to the Lecture Room* [Leiden:

While Thomas only averts explicitly to the four causes briefly in a kind of appendix to the Ephesians prologue — a very strange specimen for multiple reasons, the Romans prologue, really a general prologue, manifestly works on the same model (cf. *Sup. Rom. Prol.* §10). It identifies, specifically, the *auctor* (efficient cause, Paul), the *modus* (formal cause, i.e. literary style, letter), the *materia* (material cause, grace/Christ), and the *usus* (final cause evangelization) of the whole corpus. Built upon Acts 9:15 as a *thema* — *"this is my chosen vessel"* — Thomas focuses above all on the person of Paul. This sustained concentration on the one *auctor* of all the letters is successful in forging the *Lectura* in some way into a single giant commentary. Reinforcing this literary unity is the fact that Acts 9:15 is the only *thema* to be reused repeatedly within many of the lectures (8 or 10 times in all). Thomas' devotion to the name and person of Paul is quite evident; as he proves anew each time he must comment on the word *Paulus* in the greeting. Nevertheless, as the question of authenticity is only raised for him in the case of Hebrews, all the other prologues are free to ignore the *auctor* and simply identify the *materia* of the letter. Several prologues do for this reason glance back to the Romans outline to contextualize the contents, but in many cases the *materia* is presented as though the letter were simply self-contained.

In creating in this way an internally coherent chain of biblical prologues, strung together through a continuity of authorship and interrelated content, Thomas is apparently innovating — or, we might say, responding to the distinct task of writing a scholastic commentary on Paul.[34] Rabanus Maurus had, for instance, written a monastic style prologue to Romans, which also served as a general prologue, where he outlined the canonical sequence of Paul's epistles as series of successive grades in spiritual perfection. Thomas' shift from this *via perfectionis* perspective to a properly scholastic reading, even while importing a quasi-liturgical tone foreign to Lombard and the *Postillae*, illustrates nicely how Thomas presents us with exactly the sort of mendicant fusion of the monastic and school traditions that Beryl Smalley so ably exposed.[35]

Brill, 1996], 75) maintains that the *accessus* form is attributable to Gilbert of Poitiers, but this is incorrect. See Alastair J. Minnis, *Medieval Theory of Authorship: Scholastic Literary Attitudes in the Later Middle Ages* (University of Pennsylvania: Philadelphia, 2010), 40-72; also Alastair J. Minnis and A. Brian Scott, *Medieval Literary Theory and Criticism* (Oxford University: Oxford, 1988), 28-29. The medieval development of scriptural commentary prologues in dialogue with the faculty of arts (cf. Minnis, *Medieval Theory of Authorship*, 9-39) has an interesting parallel in Origen's adoption of prologue protocols drawn from the Alexandrian grammarians.

[34] A commentary on the Twelve Minor Prophets would be the closest real analogy to such a chain of prologues; but here the changing authorship and diversity of material prevents anything quite like Thomas' creation.

[35] Beryl Smalley, *The Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1952).

For many today, Thomas' sermonic prologues will compare unfavorably with Jerome and Ambrosiaster and their heirs, whose Pauline prologues are essentially centered upon the historical context of each letter. Such comparison can be misleading, however. In effect, the seemingly 13th century identification of the personal *auctor* as the efficient cause of each letter — a judgment we, who would want to include a whole range of social circumstances, might contest — explains the strange displacement from the prologues proper of what minimal historical information Thomas does provide.[36] Often this information is shifted to the beginning of the first lecture, prior to the first division of the text. Thomas' own intuition that such circumstantial details are proper to the prologue occasionally intervenes, however, despite the force of the generic Aristotelian convention.

In the end, the interlocking network of prologues remains a set of highly formalistic texts, however variable Thomas' performance in each instance remains. The texts intone a remarkably fluid transition, moreover, between *praedicatio* and *lectio*. Unanswered questions, particularly about the epigrams, nevertheless, leave it difficult to follow the precise navigation leading from one operation to the other.

3. Identification of the *Materia*

When Gilbert of Poitiers names the *totus Christus* as the *materia* of the Psalter, he stands solidly in the tradition of Augustinian prosopological exegesis.[37] Thomas' articulation of ecclesial grace in Head and Members as the comprehensive *materia* of the Pauline corpus is a much more original move by contrast. But where precisely does this judgment come from? Peter Lombard's *accessus* prologue in the *Collectanea* saw part of Paul's greatness in his "commendation of grace," but this is hardly a programmatic hermeneutic principle. Has Thomas simply extended this insight, which

[36] In fact, this identification of the *auctor* as the efficient cause is extraordinarily broad, as it implies a mode of secondary (≠ instrumental) causality, coordinate with God's own primary causation. The biblical authors' intentionality thus specifically concurs with the divine intellect and will, which stands as the primary efficient causality behind all Scripture and the whole world. Under the Neo-Platonic influence of the recently diffused *Liber de causis*, Aristotle's efficient causality was widely conflated with secondary causality by Thomas' time. University commentators, particularly Dominicans, accordingly described scriptural authors as secondary efficient causes and could effectively presume (i.e. ignore) the primary divine causation. This precision must be understood in Thomas' application of the *accessus* prologue. On this theory of authorship, see Minnis, *Medieval Theory of Authorship*, 73-117.

[37] Gilbert of Poitiers in the preface to the gloss on Psalms, says, "The whole Christ head and members, is the material of this work."

finds echoes from Augustine to Abelard, in a systematic way to cover all the letters? Perhaps, but Thomas' arrangement remains original enough that his sources serve at best a distant role.[38] Hints, indeed, exist that the identified *materia* of individual letters owes something to the tradition. Ambrosiaster already identified persecution as the topic of 1 Thessalonians, for instance, and Jerome saw the cessation of the old Law and coming of the new as the basic subject of Galatians. Still, there is a selective and synthetic mastery of such *ad hoc* (often conflicting) patristic remarks that betrays Thomas as a commentator of very special genius.

The precise mechanics of his genius, unfortunately, are not always perfectly evident. Indeed, concrete exegetical strategies for authenticating the proposed *materia* of each letter, not to say the whole grand design of Pauline doctrine, are very difficult to trace. The sporadic occurrence of scholastic *quaestiones* within the commentary proper, for instance, is difficult to link to any specific motifs announced in the prologues. (Thomas might have followed Origen, for example, in naming predestination the subject of Romans.) At the same time, although amply studded with biblical citations, references within Thomas' prologues to the actual letter under study are curiously quite rare. For all their integrating purpose, the prologues are isolable compositions. In fact, outside Romans, only the prologues to Philippians, 1 Timothy, and Hebrews make any such internal allusions at all.[39]

The prologue to Philippians once cites Phil 2:15, for instance, "you shine like stars"; yet this verse serves a peripheral point and does not really touch on what Thomas identifies as the letter's central theme: the consolidation of ecclesial unity.[40] Ultimately, Thomas grounds the letter's supposed preoccupation with progress in unity by an appeal to the entire text: *ut patet per totam epistolam.* Even if plausible as a general impression, however, such vague gestures are as rare in the prologues as they are imprecise and honestly unhelpful.

A similar broad appeal is made in the prologue to 1 Timothy to the entire block of texts addressed to the prelates: *patet materia harum epistolarum, quia est*

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[38] It is likely that the selection of Acts 9:15 as the *thema* for the Romans prologue is indebted to Jerome's prominent use of that same verse in his *Epistula 53 ad Paulinum*, prefixed to most Vulgate Bible manuscripts in the form of a preface. See Froehlich, "Paul and the Late Middle Ages," 28. In a similar way, it seems that Thomas relies upon Lombard's prologue in his own prologue to Hebrews.

[39] The citation of 1 Tim 1:9 in the prologue to that letter seems to indicate for Thomas the letter's specific *utilitatis*—"all iniquity is execrable; the law is not made for the just man." Hebrews is the one case where a prologue somewhat substantively engages the text of the letter, citing it three different times (i.e. Heb 1:3; 3:6; 10:4).

[40] The language of "perfection/progress" (*ex profectu/ad perfectem diem/perfectum est*) does appear in both the Pauline text and Thomas' commentary.

ad instructionem rectorum populi fidelis. This appeal underscores a basic element in Thomas' original *diviso*, namely the mapping of Paul's distinct addressees onto the head and members of the Mystical Body. Here one may well touch the most primitive insight in Thomas' theological construction of Pauline doctrine.

In the end, Thomas' preferred language for identifying the letters' *materia* is probably the most revealing index of his method. With impressive regularity he speaks in terms of *convenentia,* when using the scriptural epigrams to illustrate a letter's theme. He thus adopts an argumentation from fittingness and assumes the scriptures' harmonious polyphony. Old Testament texts can somehow appropriately express the essential substance of Paul's writings. A theological aesthetic thus guides Thomas' reasoning, which, channeled through the conventions of a *sermo* style *accessus*, leads him to use scripture to give depth, order, and ornament, i.e. form to scripture's matter, through the choice and exposition of *themata*. In the last analysis, Thomas appears to know the *materia* of scripture by some intellectual instinct, a light informed by learning and tradition; we may call it a theological habitus or even the Spirit's gift of understanding. His ability to orchestrate this knowledge in a symphonic structure has everything to do with the view from above, his contemplation of the scriptures' canonical form. Thomas knows where any text of scripture fits because all scripture has one selfsame end: leading mankind to life, as he says in *Hic est Liber*.

4. Constructing a Pauline Theology

Attractive as Thomas' global construction of Pauline doctrine is — at least to a Dominican mind — many of his foundational exegetical judgments remain hidden from our inspection, thus hard to evaluate by more than our own theological instincts. The profound distance separating contemporary, historical modes of thought from the synchronic, systematic impulse of the medieval spirit does not make such evaluation any easier. Further investigation will certainly deepen our understanding of Aquinas' hermeneutics of the *materia* of the Scriptures; but the issue might also be approached from the reverse angle. How can modern insights into the Pauline corpus be put in dialogue with Thomas' reading? I would like to gesture at just two of many possible lines of reflection.

When Karl Barth famously threw his bombshell into the theologians' playground with his commentary on the letter to the Romans, one of the first and most significant effects was Rudolph Bultmann's prompt invention of *Sachkri-*

tik.[41] This theoretical precursor to his later program of "demythologization" is more sober and intriguing than that more famous and radically destructive technique. As the name itself (often poorly translated and understood) indicates, *Sachkritik* is an effort at modern *materia* criticism, an effort to somehow pass, on the basis of internal criteria, directly to the central theological substance of a text. If for the Lutheran Bultmann, the essential Pauline *Sache* was predictably a doctrine of *sola fide* (existentially understood), reasoned to on the basis of specific strategically important passages, there may be more convincing textual ways to leverage a Thomistic reading of the Pauline *materia*. My own present work on Paul leads me to accord 1 Corinthians 15 and the ubiquitous theme of the resurrection a logical centrality, or rather a controlling telic finality in Pauline thought. I take the *Sache,* in short, to be ecclesial participation in Christ's eschatological *doxa*.

Thomas' own vision appreciates grace as the universal *materia* of the entire New Testament, of course. Paul's particularity is a revelation *de gratiae virtute*. Such virtue or *dynamis* of grace, moreover, bears the articulated ecclesial form of the *totus Christus*, in other words, of a participatory union. This comes to best expression in the prologue to Hebrews, where the flow of life-giving grace from Head to members is most openly intoned. This leads me to a second and final observation.

We have decapitated Pauline theology. In removing Hebrews and the Pastorals from serious consideration as Pauline texts, and marginalizing Ephesians and Colossians to the extreme, the canonical nexus of *capital grace* has effectively been excised from the theological system, and with it the locus of grace's unifying effect according to Thomas. It is no surprise that an impoverished, horizontal ecclesiology, voided of the full valence of divine union, is characteristic of the protestant Paul that emerges. The shared glory of the many-membered body is a non-disputed Pauline principle, of course, and Christ's headship is also indisputably a Pauline thought. Still, these thoughts rest on the margins of the *Hauptbriefe*. Rightly apprehending the participatory and ecclesial effect of grace, i.e. union, depends on a more robust vision of Headship than a truncated Paul can provide. To this extent, a Thomistic Paul can only be recovered as a canonical Paul. The theological *Sache* will only emerge from contemplating Paul's place within the *Gestalt* of the full Christian Scriptures.

[41] See Robert Morgen, "*Sachkritik* in Reception History," *JSNT* 33 (2010), 175-190.

Appendix

Division and Order of the Pauline Epistles *(Prologue Rom. §11)*

[ABC] Triple Audience: Gentile Church, Prelates, People of Israel

Scripsit enim ***quatordecim epistolas*** *quarum*

[A] *novem instruunt* ***ecclesiam gentium****;*

[B] *quatuor* ***praelatos et principes Ecclesiae****, id est reges;*

[C] *una* ***populum Israel****, scilicet quae est ad Hebraeos.*

[CBA] Triple Consideration of Grace in Mystical Body: Head, Principal Members, Church

Est enim haex doctrina tota de gratia Christi, quae quidem ***potest tripliciter considerari***

[C] *Uno modo secundum* ***quod est in Capite****, scilicet Christo et sic commendatur in esistola ad Hebraeos.*

[B] *Alio modo secundum* ***quod est in membris principalibus Corporis Mystici****, et sic commendatur in epistolis quae sunt ad praelatos.*

[A] *Tertio modo secundum* ***quod in ipso Corpore Mystico, quod est Ecclesia****, et sic commendatur in epistolis quae mittuntur ad gentiles, quarum haec est distinctio:*

[A^{1-9}] Triple Consideration of Grace Itself: Itself, Instruments, Effect

nam ipsa gratia Christi ***tripliciter potest considerari***

[A^{1}] *Uno modo* ***secundum se****, et sic commendatur in epistola as Romanos*

[A^{2-4}] *Alio modo secundum quod est* ***in sacramentis gratiae***
et sic commendatur in duabis epistolis ad Corinthios, in quarum
prima agitur ***de ipsis sacramentis,***
in secunda ***de dignitate ministrorum,***
et in epistola ad Galatas in qua excluduntur ***superflua sacramenta*** *contra illos qui volebat vetera sacramenta novis adjungere****;***

Triple Consideration of Unity: Institution, Confirmation, Defense

[A$^{5-9}$] *Tertio consideratur gratia Christi secundum* ***effectum unitatis*** *quem in Ecclesia fecit.*

Agit ergo Apostolos
primo quidem, ***de institutione ecclesiasticae unitatis*** *in epistola ad Ephesios;* [cf. B^{1}]
secundo, ***de eius confirmation et profectu*** *in epistola ad Philippenses;* [cf. B^{2}]
tertio, ***de eius defensione****,*
contra errors *quidem, in episola ad Colossenses* [cf. B^{3}]
contra persecutiones [cf. B^{2}]
vero ***praesentes*** *in I ad Thessalonicenses*
contra ***futuras*** *vero et praecipue tempore anti-Christi in secunda*

[B$^{1-4}$] Triple (+1) Instruction of Prelates: Institution, Confirmation, Defense

Praelatos vero Ecclesiarum instruit et spirituals et temporalis

[B^{1}] *Spirituales quidem* ***de institutione, instructione et gubernatione ecclesiasticae unitatis*** *in prima ad Timotheum*
[B^{2}] ***de firmitate contra persecutors*** *in secunda*
[B^{3}] *tertio* ***de defensione contra hereticos*** *in epistola ad Titum.*
[B^{4}] ***Dominos vero temporalis*** *instruit in epistola ad Philemon.*

Et sic patet ratio dictionionis et ordininis omnium epistolarum.

Towards A Biblical Thomism
Thomas Aquinas and the Renewal of Biblical Theology
Edited by Piotr Roszak and Jörgen Vijgen

Randall B. Smith

Thomas Aquinas's *Principium* at Paris

The young candidate — some thought too young (including the candidate himself) — sat behind a large podium at the front of the room. To his left in a long line seated in chairs were the junior masters of the university; to his right, the chancellor and all the senior masters. The previous evening had been spent responding to bachelors and masters in a complex series of "disputed questions." But now the presiding master stood and placed on his head a biretta and said aloud: "I place on you the magisterial biretta in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit. Amen." The young candidate had become a master, and after birettas had been distributed to the other masters to place on their own heads, the gathered company sat down to hear the new master deliver his inaugural lecture: the *principium*. It was spring, 1256, and the new master was Friar Thomas d'Aquino, the son of a minor nobleman from Italy, who had grown up in a small castle not too far from the site of the great Benedictine abbey at Monte Cassino, where the newly incepted master had studied as a youth.[1]

Every Regent Master in Theology at the University of Paris in the thirteenth century had to receive his position in an official inception ceremony, usually held in the great hall (the *aula*) of the Bishop of Paris, during which the candidate would deliver a brief sermon that came to be known as the *principium in aula*. Sometime later, usually the next day or on the first day before classes were scheduled to begin, the new Master was also required to deliver a *resumptio* (a "resumption" address), which constituted his first act as a fully-incepted Master.[2] There were clear rules in

[1] For the chronology of Thomas's life and work, see Jean-Pierre Torrell, O.P., *Saint Thomas Aquinas: The Person and His Work*, tr. Robert Royal (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1996).

[2] For an invaluable introduction to the inception ceremony and to the entire genre of the medieval *principium* address, see also the dissertation by Nancy Spatz, *Principia*: *A Study and*

the University's documents about what the subject-matter of these two addresses should be: the *principium in aula* was to contain "a commendation of Scripture and a comparison of Scripture to other fields of study, and the *resumptio* was to set forth a "division and description of the books of the Bible."[3]

Thomas's two inception addresses can be found under several different titles and are sometimes confusingly called Thomas's two *principium* addresses, but they can be more reliably identified by their "incipits": the first words of the biblical verse on which each is based. The first of these, Thomas's *principium in aula* was based on the passage from Psalm 103:13 beginning *Rigans montes de superioribus*; the second, Thomas's *resumptio*, is known by its beginning phrase taken from Baruch 4.1: *Hic est liber mandatorum*.[4]

Edition of Inception Speeches Delivered Before the Faculty of Theology at the University of Paris, ca. 1180-1286 (Cornell University Dissertation, 1992), esp. 39-50. All contemporary descriptions of the inception ceremony for the masters at Paris are based ultimately on the early fourteenth century document that can be found in the *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis*, II, 693-694. See also the description of the inception ceremony in James Weisheipl, *Friar Thomas d'Aquino: His Life, Thought, and Works* (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1974, 1983), 96-110.

[3] See Spatz, 62. What was common to all these addresses, as Ms. Spatz study shows, was (A) some sort of commendation suggesting that the wisdom provided by the Scriptures was superior to that derived from other sources, and (B) some sort of *divisio* of the text of the Sacred Scriptures. For a nice comparison of the extant *principa in aula*, see Spatz, 130-145; for a similar sort of comparison of the extant *resumptio* addresses, see Spatz, 145-155.

[4] Both are sometimes found under the general heading: *Commendatio Sacrae Scripturae*, although this can vary. In the "Brief Catalogue of Authentic Works" at the back of Weisheipl's 1974, 1983 biography *Friar Thomas d'Aquino*, for example, no. 35 on p. 373 reads: "*Commendatio Sacrae Scripturae*: Two *principia* (Paris, April or May 1256)." For an invaluable discussion of the two addresses and their place in the context of the entire inception ceremony, see Weisheipl, 96-110. Specifically on Fr. Weisheipl's claim that the second of the two addresses, *Hic est liber mandatorum*, was also given as part of the inception ceremony, and was *not* from an earlier period when Thomas was a *cursor biblicus*, see 103-104.

The "Brief Catalogue of the Works of Saint Thomas Aquinas" by Giles Emery at the back of Fr. Torrell's more recent biography of St. Thomas (published 1993 in French and 1996 in English) contains on p. 338 the entry: "Principium 'Rigans montes de superioribus' and 'Hic est liber mandatorum.'" In the description that follows, Fr. Emery describes these, in agreement with Weisheipl's judgment, as "two *Principia*, i.e., inaugural lectures ... held on the occasion of the *inceptio* of the new *magister in actu regens* in Paris between 3 March and 17 June 1256." On the website corpusthomisticum.org, one will find the first *principium* address under the title "Principium Rigans montes" under the heading "Opuscula theologica," while the second *principium* address, "Hic est liber," is found further down, in the "Opera probabilia Authenticitate" section under "Sermones" with the heading "Principium biblicum," suggesting that the editors of the corpus thomisticum are not yet in agreement with Weisheipl and Torrell's judgment that this was *not* a *principium* address from Thomas's days as a *cursor biblicus*.

Reading these *principia* provide us a valuable clue to how these medieval masters viewed the Scriptures. They also provide us important insights into how medieval theologians were trained and what habits of mind they developed. There is not space here to discuss both of Thomas's inception addresses, so I will confine my comments to the first of the two, his *principium in aula*: the sermon he had to give during the ceremony where he received his biretta and was finally made Regent Master at the University of Paris.

The Circumstances and Origins of Thomas's *Principium*

All new masters at the University of Paris were required at their inception ceremony to engage in a series of disputed questions and deliver two public addresses, which we would describe as "sermons" because of their style, except they weren't delivered in a liturgical context. As the thirteenth century progressed, these *principium* addresses took on a distinctive style — what would later be called the *sermo modernus* ("modern sermon") style of preaching, according to which the preacher would take on opening biblical verse, the *thema*, and divide it usually into three or four parts, and then develop (or "dilate") the sermon based upon those three or four *divisiones*.

The *thema* verse on which the first of Thomas Aquinas's two addresses at his inception was based was the passage from Psalm 103(104):13: *Rigans montes de superioribus suis de fructu operum tuorum satiabitur terra* ("Watering the mountains from places above them, the earth is sated with the fruit of your works"). Although the manuscripts of Thomas's *principium* address and his *resumptio* were not discovered until the late nineteenth century,[5] scholars had known since Thomas's death the *thema* verse he used at his inception because the story about how Thomas was given it was legendary.

Finally, one will find English translations of both *principia* addresses on Thérèse Bonin's superb web site "Thomas Aquinas in English: A Bibliography"(www.home.duq.edu/~bonin/thomasbibliography.html) under the general heading "Commentaries on Scripture," by clicking on the link "*Commendatio Sacrae Scripturae* (2), Thomas' inaugural lectures," which will take one to an on-line version of Ralph McInerny's English translations of both *principia* which appeared first in: *Thomas Aquinas: Selected Writings*, edited and translated with an introduction and notes by Ralph McInerny (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1998), 5-17. On the linked web site, however, one will find, somewhat oddly, the second of the two *principia* ("Hic est liber") listed first, and the first of them ("Rigans Montes") below it.

[5] The manuscript of two *principia* were discovered together in the late nineteenth century by Pietro Antonio Uccelli in the convent library at Santa Maria Novella in Florence (Florentine MS G. 4. 36) and were first published in 1912.

Thomas and his Dominican confreres faced a great deal of opposition at Paris from the secular masters in the spring of 1256 when Thomas was appointed Regent Master. There is no need to go into great detail about the particularities of the affair here, other than to say that the situation had become increasingly tense from 1250 on, and by1253, the secular masters had forbidden their students to take courses with the regulars (that is, with the Dominican or Franciscan friars) and had even taken the radical step of attempting to excommunicate them. It was only due to the forceful intervention of Pope Alexander IV that the excommunication against the Dominicans was lifted and the order given that they be admitted straightaway to the faculty. Thomas was the one chosen to take the chair designated for the Dominicans, even though he was not yet the required age, being only thirty-one or thirty-two while the University statutes stipulated masters not incept before age thirty-five.[6]

"Thomas was terribly upset," Fr. Weisheipl tells us in his biography of St. Thomas, basing his judgment on several contemporaneous sources. At first the young friar "tried to excuse himself on the grounds of insufficient age and learning," but his efforts were for naught. "Since obedience left him no escape," writes Fr. Weisheipl, "he had recourse as usual to prayer."[7] What happened next is attested to by an equally large number of contemporary sources.[8] "With tears," writes Thomas's medieval biographer Bernardo Gui, Thomas begged "for inspiration as to the theme he should choose for his inaugural lecture." Afterward he fell asleep and seems to have had a very clear dream, in which, according to Benardo Gui:

> He seemed to see an old man, white haired and clothed in the Dominican habit, who came and said to him: "Brother Thomas, why are you praying and weeping?" "Because," answered Thomas, "they are making me take the degree of master, and I do not think I am fully competent. Moreover, I cannot think what theme to take for my inaugural lecture." To this the old man replied: "do not fear: God will help you to bear the burden of being a master. And as for the lecture, take this text, "Thou waterst the hills from thy upper rooms: the earth shall be filled with the fruit of thy works" [*Rigans montes de suprioribus suis de fructu operum tuorum satiabitur terra*]. Then he vanished, and Thomas awoke and thanked God for having so quickly come to his aid.[9]

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[6] The whole affair is described succinctly by Torrell, 50-1 and by Weisheipl at more length, 79-83.

[7] Weisheipl, 96.

[8] Cf. K. Foster, *The Life of Saint Thomas Aquinas*, 69. "The story has been transmitted by three different sources," Fr. Torrell tells us in his biography of St. Thomas, "all of which lead back to Thomas himself." See Torrell, 51.

[9] Quoted from Weisheipl, 96.

Among those attesting to the authenticity of the story — at least as far as it originating with Thomas himself — was Peter of Montesangiovanni, a monk at the Cistercian monastery of Fossanova where Thomas fell ill and died on his way to the Council of Lyons, who testified under oath during Thomas's canonization hearing that he heard Thomas tell this story to the then-prior of Fossanova at the request of his *socius*, Reginald, several days before his death. Jean-Pierre Torrell mentions in his biography of Aquinas that,

> According to the testimony of Peter of Montesangiovanni, a monk of Fossanova, at [Thomas's] canonization process, Thomas himself told this story to the prior of Fossanova in the presence and at the request of Reginald, several days before his death. Peter of Caputio, another witness at the process in Naples, reported that he had learned this fact when he was in the priory of Saint-Jacques, during the reading that was done to the friars at times of bleeding. He adds that all the friars in Paris were convinced that the *frater antiquus* who appeared had been none other than Saint Dominic himself. Except for this last detail, where the hagiographical process seems to be at work, the different stories agree, and historians have every reason to believe that we have here a personal confidence that goes back to Thomas himself.[10]

Modern readers may remain skeptical about whether the source of the verse was St. Dominic — St. Thomas never identified the man — but it is noteworthy that Thomas doesn't get from the man in the dream what his subject matter should be or what points he should make. What comes to Thomas in the dream is simply the mnemonic text — the *thema* verse — that will serve as a structuring device for everything else that follows.

In his own way, Thomas experienced in a very dramatic way the truth of the promise Christ made when he told his disciples not to be anxious about what they should say when they were brought before the authorities, "for the Holy Spirit will teach you in that very hour what you ought to say" (Luke 12:12; cf. Mark 13:11; Matthew 10:19). People sometimes imagine that this process would be something like a divine dictation: that God would whisper in our ears the words exactly as we are meant to say, like Cyrano whispering to young Christian what he is to say to Roxanne standing at her window. Thomas's experience was different. The first step was to remember the words God had *already given* in the Scriptures. The key was to call to mind *just the right set of words* for the occasion. Once Thomas had the right key words, he could proceed from there, and the Spirit would teach him what to say, as if God's promise had been: "Don't worry what you are to say, Brother Thomas; I'll

[10] Torrell, 51.

give you the right biblical verse to prompt you, and from those words, you'll be able to derive a clear set of points that will impress that unruly and unforgiving audience of university officials."

As I pointed out above, University statutes stipulated that the *principium* address be "brief" and "quickly terminated." Thomas's *principium* was both. What is fascinating for our purposes is how much he was able to compress into a small space by means of the *sermo modernus* style and its method of using a biblical verse as a mnemonic structuring device.

Water from the Mountains: Teaching through Intermediaries

Thomas begins, as he does in all his sermons, with a Bible verse — in this case from Psalm 103:13 (in the Latin Vulgate, Ps. 104): "Watering the mountains from places above them, the earth is sated with the fruit of your works" (*Rigans montes de superioribus suis de fructu operum tuorum satiabitur terra*).[11] The rest of this Psalm

[11] I have translated the Latin text more literally here than does Fr. Weisheipl in his English translation of the account of the vision given by Bernardo Gui, quoted above. In his translation, Fr. Weisheipl uses the standard King James version of the Psalm verse that reads: "Thou waterst the hills from thy upper rooms: the earth shall be filled with the fruit of thy works." This is actually a more felicitous, if not quite as literal, translation.

The context makes it clear that God is the one doing the "watering" from above," and since it is not at all uncommon for translators to render a Latin present participle with a simple present verb, the result is we get "Thou waterest the hills" instead of "Watering the mountains." (I'm not so favorable to translating *montes* with "hills," however, given that image of "height" is necessary to the sense of what Thomas is trying to communicate.)

I have also chosen to render the Latin *de superioribus suis* with the phrase "from places above them" (that is to say, from places above the mountains), even though "from thy upper rooms" is more poetic. It is important in what follows for the reader to understand that the water comes from a place *far above* the mountains. The mountains, on this view, *mediate* the rain water between the heavens and the dry plains below — plains that rarely get any direct rain.

Once the translator made the decision to go with the second person singular verb "*Thou* waterest" instead of the present participle "watering," then he was forced to render the third-person plural *suis* in the phrase "*de superioribus suis*" as "thy" (second person singular), suggesting (quite rightly, in fact) that they are *God's* upper rooms. But what they Latin says literally is that they are "their" (that is, the mountain's) upper places — or as I have rendered it: "the places above them."

In the remainder of this chapter, I will be quoting from the English translation done by Ralph McInerny, revised and edited by Joseph Kenny, found on-line at: http://www.scottmsullivan.com/AquinasWorks/Principium.htm#2. The Latin texts have also been taken from here.

to this point is a praise of God as the creator of all things in terms reminiscent of the Genesis creation account. There is nothing on a surface reading of this text that would suggest it as ideal for the purposes for which Thomas used it: that is, as a passage in praise of Sacred Scripture.

Thomas's interpretive approach to his biblical *thema* verse is achieved by prefacing his comments with a statement from Pseudo-Dionysius's *Celestial Hierarchy* 5 which declares that "It is the most sacred law of the divinity that things in the middle should be led to his most divine light by first things" (*per prima media adducantur ad sui divinissimam lucem*). Reversing the order, Thomas then states the principle this way: "The King and Lord of the heavens set down this law from all eternity that the gifts of his Providence should come to the lower through intermediaries."[12] There are, from the very outset, two directions in view here: one that comes down from heaven through intermediaries, the other that leads above from below through intermediaries, both of which are under the direction of –indeed, directed by "the most sacred law of"– divine providence.

By choosing this text from Pseudo-Dionysius, Thomas reminds his listeners that God comes to us through regularly through *intermediaries* and not always by direct divine inspiration. What are the sacraments, the Church, and the Bible, indeed creation itself, other than *intermediaries* that mediate divine wisdom to us so we may be led, step by step, back to God? They are intermediaries as was also the flesh of the Son of God incarnate. We come to know the incarnate God first *through the senses*. Thomas moves directly from Dionyius's statement on intermediaries to a quote from Augustine's *De Trinitate* to bear witness to the idea that there is in nature a hierarchy of moving principles, all of them meant to coming under the guidance and direction of the divine wisdom.

Mining the metaphorical potential of his *thema* verse, Thomas draws an analogy between the physical and spiritual realms; just as the mountains are watered from above and send forth streams to water the valley below, so God sends forth his grace to masters so that they may teach His wisdom to their students.

> It is plain to the senses that from the highest clouds rain flows forth by which the mountains and rivers are refreshed and send themselves forth so that the satiated earth can bear fruit. Similarly, from the heights of divine wisdom the minds of the learned, represented by the mountains, are watered, by whose ministry the light of divine wisdom reached to the minds of those who listen.[13]

[12] Thomas Aquinas, *Rigans Montes*, proemium.

[13] *Rigans Montes*, proemium.

An Implicitly Incarnational Approach to Teaching and Learning

Setting his *principium* in this context allowed Thomas, in a sermon stipulated by regulation to be in praise of sacred Scripture, to address not only the dignity of the Scriptures, but also the dignity with which the teachers and students of sacred doctrine were supposed to be imbued. Just as the rains come forth from above and water the mountains, and the streams flow downward into the rivers so the earth can be irrigated and made to bear fruit, so too divine wisdom comes down first to the "learned" — the Latin has *mentes doctorum*, "minds of the doctors," or "teachers" in the proper sense of *doctores*, which comes from the Latin *doceo*, "to teach" — and from them it flows down to the students. The rain that waters these mountains is the sacred teaching of the Scriptures. The teachers who have been refreshed by these sacred waters are then in turn to pour forth this wisdom on their students, as the mountains pour forth water onto the plains, irrigating them so they might bear much spiritual fruit.

Using this image, Thomas reminds his audience that we come to know God through intermediaries: teachers and the created things in the world. Students do not learn directly from God, nor are they always able to learn from the Scriptures on their own without being taught to read and interpret the word-signs correctly. If students of the Scriptures are to be enabled to read and interpret these word-signs correctly, they must first come to a greater understanding of the things in the world from which our minds ascends by stages, beginning with our senses, to a progressively fuller knowledge of the Creator. Indeed, the nature of the *principium* itself suggests the practice. From our knowledge about physical things — in this case mountains, flowing water, plains, and fruit-bearing plants — we come to know (under Thomas's tutelage as teacher) some important lessons about how we come to know about God.

There is an implicit incarnational mentality underlying Thomas's *principium*. The classic statement of the relationship between "signs" and "things" is found in Augustine's *De Doctrina christiana*, who suggests that we know signs (and words for Augustine are a type of sign) by knowing the things these signs represent.[14] And yet we also learn from words. From the inspired words of Sacred Scripture, for example, we learn about the Word made flesh who teaches us in and through His incarnation that the created realities of this world are "signs" that point us to the uncreated Word through whom "all things were made" and without whom "nothing was made that has been made (Jn 1:3). As we'll see shortly, this "incarnational" approach allows

[14] See Augustine *De doctrina christiana*, esp. bk 1.

Thomas later on in his *principium* to set as the paradigmatic model for both masters and students the simultaneous "dignity" and "humility" of Christ.

Using this same image of the mountains being watered from above, Thomas can remind the masters in his audience where the source of all true wisdom lies: in God as He has revealed Himself to us in His Word (Christ), and as we come to know him in his word (the Sacred Scriptures). Wisdom, he reminds them, is from above, not first and foremost from masters. Masters are called, like St. Paul, to "pass on what they themselves received" (1 Corinthians 15:3), not to imagine that they are supposed to set forth their own doctrines or pretend to possess their own wisdom. What this role as an *intermediary*, not an ultimate source, of divine wisdom requires of them is that they live the noblest form of life, freeing themselves from all their "base" desires for status and prestige, as did Christ, the teacher who was both one with God, and yet emptied himself of His divinity to take on our humanity.

A Sacramental Metaphysics of Teaching

Fr. Simon Tugwell suggests that Thomas has in mind a related philosophical theme. As Tugwell notes, Thomas wrote the short work *On Being and Essence* during the years before he graduated as a master, probably while he was working on his commentary on the first book of Peter Lomabard's *Sentences*.[15] This work, says Tugwell, helped solidify Thomas's deep lifelong conviction "that there can never be any separation between God and his creatures."

> The idea that God somehow "withdraws" in order to give his creatures space to be could never begin to make sense to Thomas; if God withdrew then being is the last thing any creature could achieve. The freedom and inner consistency of creatures is not something that has to be defended against divine interference; it is precisely the gift that is made by the divine presence. The fact that things exist and act in their own right is the most telling indication that God is existing and acting in them.[16]

Fr. Tugwell rightly sees that, for Thomas, human teaching should be seen as "one aspect of the more general and extremely important question of whether secondary causes of any kind exercise any authentic causality."[17]

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[15] Simon Tugwell, "Aquinas: Introduction," in *Albert and Thomas: Selected Writings*, The Classics of Western Spirituality (New York: Paulist Press, 1988), 214.

[16] Tugwell, 215.

[17] Tugwell, 268-69.

Do teachers really teach? Or does only God teach? Christ warns in Matthew 23:10 that none was to call himself "teacher" (*magister* in the Latin Vulgate): *nec vocemini magistri quia magister vester unus est Christus* ("nor shall you be called teachers because one is your teacher, Christ"). So what did Thomas think he would be doing as an incepted *magister* or "teacher"?

Father Tugwell points out that some of Thomas's contemporaries had interpreted St. Augustine's argument in *De Magistro* to imply that no human being strictly-speaking should be called a "teacher." William of Auxerre seems to interpret him this way.[18] Thomas, as we have seen, does not take this approach. He would argue more fully in the following year in his *Disputed Question on Truth* (*De Veritate*), q. 11, a. 1, against Avicenna's notion that, in learning, "intelligible forms flow into our mind from the agent intelligence" (*formae intelligibiles effluent in mentem nostram ab intelligentia agente*), the teacher being there merely as an instrument that prepares the material for the reception of these forms (*omnia inferiora agentia naturalia non sunt nisi sicut praeparantia materiaum ad formae susceptionem*), and against the early Platonic conception, such as can be found in the *Meno*, that teaching is helping the student remember what was already present.[19]

Thomas rejects both positions for the same reason: each rules out the possibility that natural or "secondary" causes — "secondary" to God's "primary" causality — can act as true causes in the world. Thomas rejects the Avicennian position because it rules out any possibility of a chain of causes, since on this view, the first cause, as the "giver of forms," is the only real cause. He rejects the Platonic conception too because a cause that only removes an impediment is also not a cause in the truest sense. For Thomas, any approach to the nature of teaching that diminishes the status of secondary causality in the world, that "attributes to first causes along all effects coming about in inferior things," not only "derogates from the order of universe, which is woven together by the order and connection of causes" (*derogatur ordini universi,*

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[18] See *Summa Aurea* IV, ed. Jacques Ribaillier (Paris : Éditions du Centre national de la recherche scientifique, 1980-1986), pp. 88, 97, 116. In these passages, however, William is discussing the powers imputed to the baptized, not teachers *per se*. William's approach to the question of human teachers in these passages is similar to one Bonaventure and other Franciscans will champion decades later: the exterior human teacher does nothing without Christ, the interior teacher, illuminating the mind. See, for example, the passage on p. 88: "Sic enim predicatores dant gratiam per verbum predicationis, tamen ipsi non docent proprie loquendo, ut dicit Augustinus, in libro *de magistro*, immo proprie solus Deus. Quod patet, quia, cum aliquis dicit verbum aliquod, nec concedimus nec negamus donec prius consuluerium interiorem magistrum."

[19] Throughout this section, I am quoting the English translation of *De Veritate* 11.1 in: Robert W. Mulligan, James V. McGlynn, and Robert W. Schmidt, trans., *Truth*, 3 vols., Library of Living Catholic Thought (Chicago: Regnery, 1952–54; reprint, Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994).

qui ordine et connexione causarum contexitur); worse, it insults God, who "out of the eminence of his goodness not only makes things to be but also to be causes" (*ex eminentia bonitatis suae rebus aliis confert non solum quod sint, sed et quod causae sint*.)

Saying a teacher does not really teach is, for Thomas, like saying that a physician does not really treat disease or that medicine does not really cure disease.[20] When we deny that the physician treats disease or that medicine cures disease in the belief that only God truly cures, this for Thomas is to deny natural causality and God's power as Creator to make things exist such that they can act as true causes in the world. Thomas would insist that both the medicine and God cured the man, each in its own domain, just as the medicine and the physician cured the man, each in its own way. To assert God's divine causality is not to deny the natural causes we see around us in the world. Quite the contrary; for Thomas, "The fact that things exist and act in their own right is the most telling indication that God exists and is acting in them."[21]

On Thomas's account, things would not exist and would have no causality if it were not for God. To deny things their proper causality is to deny God's power and goodness to impart true causality to them. It is to treat God as if He were jealous of the doctor or the medicine, which would be absurd, since both owe their existence and causality entirely to God. The healing power of the physician and the medicine each plays its own role in God's creative and redemptive plan, a plan revealed most fully in the Incarnation. What God reveals through Christ in the Incarnation is the truth of creation — the truth that all of creation is created through God's Word and is thus an expression, an embodiment, and an instrument of God's creative and redemptive love. This is a sacramental notion of creation in which things in the world, including human persons, are meant to see themselves as instruments of God's grace because, in fact, that is what they were created to be.

A Real Relationship between Teacher and Students: The Duties of Teaching and Learning

On this view, physicians, teachers, and all others should understand themselves not as parallel entities having no causal connection with others — a view akin to modern "parallelist" forms of body-soul dualism, such as that of Leibniz, according

[20] This analogy is suggested by Thomas himself through his *responsio* in *De Ver.* 11.1: e.g., "as the physician in healing is the minister of nature which principally acts by aiding nature and providing medicine which nature uses as instruments in healing."

[21] Tugwell, 215.

to which the body and soul do not influence one another, they merely act *as if* they were interacting because they both operate according to a pre-established harmony set in place by God.[22] If this were true, then the physician acts and I am cured, not because the physician acted with knowledge and skill, but only because God chose to cure me while, quite separately, the physician was acting. If this were true, the physician would not have been a true cause; his was merely a parallel action. Thomas's view suggests a true causal interaction. Teachers don't merely perform an act while God is teaching. Thomas's view insists that there be a personal connection between teacher and student, not one which is merely extrinsic.

And yet on Thomas's view, neither the physician nor the teacher should see him- or herself as the *sole* cause of the healing or the teaching. Both physicians and teachers are creatures with capacities given to them by God, creatures called upon to deal intelligently with other creatures created by God, all of which operate according to their intrinsic natures just as we humans do. A physician cannot merely cure by an act of will, nor can a teacher simply place ideas into the student's head like he was placing a bird in a cage. The teacher and student should both see themselves as cooperators with God, not as either replaced by God or replacements for God. Just as a physician must operate in accord with the created laws of physics and human biology in order to heal the patient, so too a teacher must act in accord with the created nature of the human mind in order to teach.

How do human beings learn? How do they arrive at the truth? And what does it tell us about teaching? Thomas holds that "certain seeds of the sciences preexist in us" (*praeexistunt in nobis quaedam scientiarum semina*). These are "the first concepts of understanding, which by the light of the agent intellect are immediately known through the species abstracted from sensible things." These "first concepts of understanding" include things like the notions of being and the one, which the intellect grasps immediately.[23] According to Thomas, "When, therefore, the mind is led from these general notions to actual knowledge of the particular things, which it knew previously in general and, as it were, potentially, then one is said to acquire knowledge."[24]

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[22] For a brief introduction, the reader might consult the article on the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy by Mark Kulstad and Laurence Carlin, "Leibniz's Philosophy of Mind," *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2013 Edition).

[23] *De veritate*, q. 11, a. 1 resp.: "primae conceptiones intellectus … sicut ratio entis, et unius, et huiusmodi, quae statim intellectus apprehendit."

[24] Ibid.: "quando ergo ex istis universalibus cognitionibus mens educitur ut actu cognoscat particularia, quae prius in universali et quasi in potentia cognoscebantur, tunc aliquis dicitur scientiam acquirere."

This can sometimes be done by the student alone — we learn many things by ourselves — but it can also be aided by a teacher who helps show the student the proper path such discursive reasoning should take. One man is said to teach another, says Thomas, when he shows the student the course of reasoning (*decursum rationis*) that he himself followed. The student, attending to what has been proposed, comes to knowledge of what he previously did not know.[25] Although knowledge pre-exists in us potentially, in "seeds" as it were, what is in us potentially must be "brought to actuality from this state of potency through a proximate external agent, and not through the first agent alone."[26] This is not to deny the role of the first cause it merely affirms that the agency of the first cause does not preclude the role of another, proximate agent that helps the intellect to learn. "Therefore, says Thomas, "just as the doctor is said to heal the patient through the activity of nature, so a man is said to cause knowledge in another through the activity of the learner's own natural reason, and this is teaching."[27]

The human mind too is a true cause. Human thinking, real discursive reasoning, not mere illumination without ratiocination, is a reality.[28] Thomas is clear in *De Veritate* that the natural light of reason is from God, and *in this sense*, we owe all to God. Be what we also owe to God is the realization that we are made capable of thinking on our own. On Thomas's account, this is what a good teacher helps a student learn to do. Students can and often learn to do this on their own. But the teacher can be an example and guide. And yet, the student can also check the teacher by working through the arguments for him- or herself. As Thomas argues in *Quodlibet* 3, q. 4, a. 2, students are not excused from error when they submissively follow the false opinions of their teachers.

The teacher cannot (and should not try to) replace the student's own mind, any more than God simply replaces any learner's mind. The student and teacher must be in a cooperative relationship: the student cooperating with the teacher as guide, and the teacher cooperating with God's Truth, the divine light, as it has been revealed in and through (a) creation, (b) the Word made flesh, and/or (c) God's Scriptural

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[25] Ibid.: "unus alium dicitur docere quod istum decursum rationis, quem in se facit ratione naturali, alteri exponit per signa et sic ratio naturalis discipuli, per huiusmodi sibi proposita, sicut per quaedam instrumenta, pervenit in cognitionem ignotorum."

[26] Ibid.: "formae enim naturales praeexistunt quidem in materia, non in actu, ut alii dicebant, sed in potentia solum, de qua in actum reducuntur per agens extrinsecum proximum, non solum per agens primum."

[27] Ibid.: "sicut igitur medicus dicitur causare sanitatem in infirmo natura operante, ita etiam homo dicitur causare scientiam in alio operatione rationis naturalis illius: et hoc est docere."

[28] I am not referring to anyone specifically with this comment. Bonaventure's position, for example, is more complex.

word. These three for Thomas would not be mutually exclusive, but rather mutually inclusive and reinforcing.

Thomas's view is both contemplative and active, with action directed by a vision of the world that is fundamentally contemplative and receptive. Our task is to attend to the order of the created, natural realm closely and carefully and then act as best we can in harmony with the order instilled in it and us by the Creator.

What duties follow for a teacher given such a view? The first is that teachers should make good arguments. The second is that they ought to live a holy life. Both are essential.

Consider again the analogy of the teacher and the physician. The physician cannot simply stand aside and let God cure; he or she must know the principles of human biology and anatomy and know how to apply them to the particular matters of healing. And yet the physician must also recognize that he or she is not the ultimate lord of nature to command as he or she wills; that there are domains beyond his or her control; but that he or she can foster cures when he or she understands and acts in accord with the given natures of things as God has created them. Often enough, however, they happen in ways that simply exceed the abilities, the effective causality, of the physician's knowledge and craft. The physician should be thankful (a) for the knowledge and ability he or she has been given, and (b) for the good he or she can do. These two dimensions — reliable knowledge of the craft and the wisdom to use it rightly — are both essential to a good physician.

What is called for is constant training in the application of principles to particulars and constant prayer that one might be guided in learning and in the proper use of one's craft. Prayer without pursuing knowledge can be disastrous and is an insult to the universe and to God as Creator. Learning without prayer can be disastrous in a different way; it can lead to overweening pride in one's ability to control nature rather than to learn from it — a pride that can lead to a refusal to work with and for others rather than merely operate on them as another species of "thing" subject to one's putative control.

So too with teachers: Teacher must learn to make good arguments — learn to see the relationship between principles and conclusions — in order to guide their students. Personal holiness is not enough. The discussion of this section should suggest the importance Thomas attached to getting the metaphysical principles right. Getting them wrong can lead even very holy people to make serious mistakes, such as not taking their sick child to the doctor in the mistaken belief that it would demean God's power not to let God cure their child, as if God and human doctors and natural medicines were in competition rather than in providential cooperation as Creator and creature, primary and secondary causes.

And yet good teachers must also understand that they do not teach *their own* truth, but God's. The teacher has no business trying to make disciples for himself, for it is not *his* truth he shares. Teachers, like the mountain, reflect light from above. On their own, without the reflected light of the sun, they bring darkness and shadows.[29]

Masters, insists Thomas, must excel in both intellect and holiness; not merely in intellect alone (consider the example of Abelard) or holiness alone (as those pious persons untrained in the metaphysics of secondary causality might have done were they to deny the natural causality of doctors and medicine). Thomas stresses that students must be able to *look up to* their teachers, making in this way a fruitful use of the "mountain" imagery supplied by the biblical *thema* verse he received in a dream the night before his inception,

And yet students also have obligations: they are called upon to cooperate and become like the master in their dedication to both holiness and learning. The student must learn to "look up" and receive the life-giving rains from above: both by praying for wisdom and guidance, but also through study, learning to use the reason God has given them correctly. In their teachers, students should see an embodiment of their own vocation to become *like the mountains*, defending the faith as the mountains protect the land from invaders, and eager to transfer the wisdom they have been given as a gift from above, never portraying themselves arrogantly as the source of the truth they teach, nor seeking disciples of their own. Their goal is to learn to teach others as they have been taught. They must learn as well that what the teacher does is not inconsequential — they can have a real effect on their students — but they must learn as well that as much as they water, God alone gives the growth.

In his essay on Thomas's *principium*, Fr. Tugwell insists on two fundamental points. The first is that, "in line with the Dionysian principle with which he begins his lecture, Thomas always insists that God's providence does disposes things in such a way that creatures do have a real effect on one another."[30] The second: "Thomas, conscious of the high role of the teacher as an instrument of divine providence, says … it is only by God's gift that anyone could be adequate for the task, so he needs to ask God to make him adequate."[31]

With Fr. Tugwell's inspiration, I have introduced material here from Thomas's more developed reflections in *De Veritate*. Since this disputed question was finished

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[29] The attentive reader will note that I have changed Thomas's image slightly while retaining his central Pseudo-Dionysian idea of mediation. Thomas pictures the mountains as a medium that transfers rain. I have suggested an image in which the mountains reflect light. In both cases, they can only provide what they have gotten from above.

[30] Tugwell, 268-69.

[31] Tugwell, 269.

within the first several years after Thomas's inception, we can imagine that these thoughts were not far from his mind.[32]

The *Divisio* and *Dilatatio*

After stating the *thema* of the sermon — "Watering the mountains from places above them, the earth is sated with the fruit of your works" (*Rigans montes de superioribus suis de fructu operum tuorum satiabitur terra*) — the next task for any medieval preacher would be to make an appropriate *divisio* of the *thema* in order to establish the basic structure of his sermon and then to develop or "dilate" each of the parts. Common ways of dividing the *thema* would have included a twofold *divisio* (e.g., Watering the mountains from the places above them / the earth is sated with the fruit of your works), a threefold *divisio* (e.g., Watering the mountains / from the places above them / the earth is sated with the fruit of your works), or a fourfold *divisio* (e.g., Watering the mountains / from the places above them / the earth is sated / with the fruit of your works).

Thomas begins not with the *divisio,* but by identifying the four subjects he wishes to correlate with his opening biblical verse: the *height* of the spiritual doctrine to be taught; the *dignity* that should exist in those who teach this spiritual doctrine; the *condition* or qualities required of the listeners; and the *manner of communicating* this spiritual doctrine.

Thomas's usual practice in his later Sunday sermons would be to take up topics in the order they appeared in the opening *thema* verse. From those examples, we might have expected Thomas to coordinate his opening fourfold division — height, dignity, condition, and order — with the four parts of the opening biblical verse in, say, this manner: (1) *watering the mountains* (the "height" of the doctrine suggested by the word "mountains"); (2) *from the places above them* (the "dignity" of the teachers suggested by the words "places above"), (3) *the earth is sated* (the "condition" of the students suggested by the lowliness of the earth), and (4) *with the fruit of your works* (the order or manner of communicating suggested by either "fruit or "works"). This, as I have said, would have been a reasonable-enough expectation given knowledge of Thomas's customary practice in his later Sunday sermons.[33] And indeed, this approach likely would have worked perfectly well. But this is not what Thomas does.

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[32] On the dating, see the "Brief Catalogue" in Torrell, 334.

[33] I do not mean to suggest that Thomas *never* reversed the strict ordering of the parts of his opening *thema* verse, only that it is rare. See the analytical outlines of each of Thomas's sermons at the back of *Reading the Sermons of Aquinas: A Beginner's Guide*.

Rather, Thomas allows himself more freedom to range back and forth among the images as needed, so that the first topic, the *height* of the spiritual doctrine, is suggested not by the word "mountains" (*montes*), which is earlier in the sentence, but by the words "from the places above" (*de superioribus suis*), which appear later. The dignity of those who teach, which is the second topic, is suggested by the word "mountains" (*montes*), which appears earlier in the sentence. The reason for the transposition likely had to do with Thomas's desire to draw a picture in which, although the masters have (or are supposed to have) a certain height, they must still understand that they would be "desiccated" and "dry" if they did not receive watering from above themselves. They are, on this view, not the *source* of the water that flows down from them, merely the conduit through which that water is meant to flow.

After the *height* of the spiritual doctrine to be taught (associated with the word *superioribus*) and the *dignity* that should exist in those who teach this spiritual doctrine (associated with the word *montes*), the third topic is the *condition* or qualities required of the listeners, which Thomas associates with the word *terra* ("earth"). And finally, at the end of his address, Thomas touches upon various issues related to the *manner of communicating* the spiritual doctrine, which he associates, interestingly, with the order of the words in the Psalm verse, which was an uncharacteristic approach to "dilating" the content of a sermon.

Thomas treats three points within each *divisio*, so that the overall structure may be outlined as follows:

A) Height of Spiritual Doctrine ("from the places above") — due to:
   1. Origin (from above)
   2. Subtlety of Matter (beyond human comprehension)
   3. Sublimity of the End (life eternal in heaven)

B) Dignity Required of Teachers ("mountains")
   1. Keep their minds set on things above (so that they may *preach*)
   2. Be illuminated by the sun's rays first (so that they can *teach*)
   3. Defend the faith from errors as the mountains protect from enemies (in *disputation*).

C) Condition Required of Listeners ("the earth is sated with fruit")
   1. Lowliness of humility
   2. Stable and firm in rectitude
   3. Fruitful in listening

D) Manner of Communicating (relationship between "places above" and "mountains")
   1. The order of communicating
      (a) Masters should not teach everything they know

(b) The minds of the doctors cannot possess all of divine wisdom; nor can the students

2. God possesses this wisdom by nature, humans only by participation
3. God communicates this wisdom by his own power, masters only as ministers

In what follows, we will consider each of these in the order Thomas treats them.

Height

We begin with "height."[34] Recall that "height" is not associated with the masters, but with the doctrine they are called upon to teach. The "height" of the spiritual teaching the masters are responsible for passing on to their students is suggested by the words *de superioribus* ("from the places above") in the opening *thema* verse. The "height" of the teaching is due to three things, says Thomas: First, because of its origins, for it is "from above" (*sursum*). Second, because of the "subtlety of its matter" (*ex subtilitate materiae*), because it concerns matters "so high" that they are beyond the comprehension of human beings.

We might also imagine Thomas wants his audience to think of the "subtlety" of the clouds or of the ethereal spheres on which the stars and planets were fixed. There are some things, says Thomas, that all know, such as the existence of God; other things, however, are higher (*altiora*) and require the wisdom of the wise. Still others are so high (*altissima*) that they entirely transcend the grasp of human reason, but these have been made known by the Holy Spirit through the text of Sacred Scripture.

The "height" of the spiritual teaching is also due, says Thomas, to "the sublimity of the end" (*ex finis sublimitate*), for the end is the highest, namely life eternal in heaven with Christ at God's right hand. Thus if we were to ask of masters what should be their end, their ultimate goal — prestige? distinction among their colleagues? a devoted following of disciples? — according to Thomas, their goal should be no less than the salvation of souls. Such is Thomas's exalted sense of the vocation of the teacher. Note in all this how Thomas is progressively drawing the eye of the mind upward, from the sky above the mountains, to the spheres above the sky, and finally to the outermost sphere, the empyrean or uppermost heaven.

[34] "Height" is the subject of *Rigans montes*, section 1 (hereafter *Rigans montes*, 1).

Dignity

We should not fail to appreciate the wonderful transition between the last Scripture passage on the "height" of the spiritual doctrine and the next section on the "dignity" the masters are called to possess — a *dignity* he associates with the word "mountains" (*montes*). He ends the first section on the "height" of spiritual doctrine with the passage from Colossians 3:1-2: "Therefore, if you have risen with Christ, seek the things that are above, where Christ is seated at the right hand of God. Mind the things that are above, not the things of earth." He begins his next section on the responsibility of the masters saying: "Thus the holy teachers by despising earthly things cleave to heavenly things alone," just as the mountains rise above the earth and are "neighbors" (*vicini*) of the heavens.[35] His point is this: Because the masters are called upon to help their students get to heaven, so too they must have their sights set on heavenly things. The "dignity" of the masters must be in accord with the "height" of the spiritual doctrine they are called upon to deliver. They must raise their eyes and their minds to the things above, for if they have their minds focused solely on earthly things — power, prestige, position, or status — they will not gain the waters from above they need to nourish their students below.

The second way the masters should be like mountains is that, just as the mountains are the first to be illuminated by the rays of the sun, so too should masters be the first to be illumined by the light of divine wisdom.

And finally the third way masters should be like mountains is that, just as mountains protect a kingdom from its enemies, so too the masters must defend the faith against errors.

Thomas then associates the three kinds of *dignity* he has just identified (all suggested by the word "mountains") with the three duties of the master: *praedicare*, *legere*, and *disputare*, (to preach, to read, and to dispute).[36] Masters should have their hearts and minds "fixed in highness of life," like the mountains are fixed in the heavens, so they may fittingly *preach*. They should seek to be "illumined" (*illuminati*) by the rays of divine light, so they might fittingly "teach by reading" (*doceant legendo*) — an obvious reference to the way in which medieval masters would often teach by reading and commenting upon a text. And finally, masters should seek to be "armed" (*muniti*) with divine wisdom so they might "refute errors in disputation" (*ut errores confutent disputando*), protecting the faith from errors just as the mountains protect the kingdom from its enemies.

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[35] "Dignity" is discussed in *Rigans montes*, 2.

[36] This threefold list can be traced back to a comment by Peter Cantor (d. 1197) in the first chapter of the *Verbum Abbreviatum*.

Condition Required of Students

From here, Thomas moves on in an orderly fashion, as we would expect, to the next words in his mnemonic *thema* verse: the words "the earth is sated" (*satiabitur terra*).[37] The word "earth" here suggests the condition necessary to be a student of this divine doctrine, at least some of whom were likely in attendance when Thomas gave his *principium* address. They would have noticed that, even in a remarkably short address, Thomas was not willing to skip over their responsibilities and obligations.

As the earth is the lowest, so too, says Thomas, the students should be "low" as the earth in humility. As the earth is stable and firm, so the students should be stable and firm with the sense of rectitude, not tossed to and fro and carried about by every wind of change. And finally they should be fruitful, as the earth bears fruit. "Therefore *humility* is required of the students with respect to the learning that comes from listening," says Thomas, "*rectitude* of the senses with respect to the judgment of what is heard," and "*fruitfulness* in discovery, by which from a few things heard, the good listener pronounces many things."

In the final section of the *principium*, Thomas does not turn, as his later practice and the canons of the *sermo modernus* style might have led us to expect, to the remaining words in the opening biblical verse from the Psalms, which are "from the fruit of your works" (*de fructu operum tuorum*) but turns instead back to the first two parts of the verse he had already "dilated": "Watering the mountains" (*rigans montes*) and "from the places above them" (*de superioribus suis*).[38] This is the only place I have found in Thomas's extant sermons where he goes back to the beginning of the *thema* verse rather than moving on. Whether this was due to the fact that this was an early example of the art of preaching; whether it had to do with verse's coming in a dream or vision; or whether we simply don't possess sufficient examples of Thomas's sermons to make a suitable comparison; — the fact remains that Thomas does not go on to "the fruit of your works," he goes back to the beginning of the *thema* verse to discuss the last of the four topics he set out initially to cover.

Manner of Communicating

Having dealt with the *height* of the spiritual doctrine, the *dignity* that ought to characterize the masters, and the *condition* that ought to characterize the students,

[37] *Rigans montes*, 3.
[38] *Rigans montes*, 4.

he now turns to the manner in which this spiritual doctrine ought to be communicated, suggested by the relationship between "the mountains" and "the places above them."

First, says Thomas, masters should not try to preach to "the simple" (e.g., their students) everything that they know, by which I take it he means that teachers should not presume to suggest to their students that they, as teachers, have a complete, comprehensive vision of things; because, says Thomas (with greater wisdom than many of us), teachers should realize they cannot grasp everything contained in divine wisdom. They are unable to know how many divine mysteries there are and how many and varied the sources of divine wisdom might be, especially from places other than those they themselves have explored. As a complement to his advice to students to embrace humility, Thomas advises the masters to embrace and exemplify their own brand of humility before the vastness of divine wisdom.

Whereas God has wisdom "naturally" (*per naturam*) — the "upper places" are said to be "his" (*de superioribus* ***suis***) — masters merely "participate" (*participant*) in that divine wisdom. They share something that does not have its source in them. This is why teachers are said to be, like the mountains in the Psalm verse, "watered from on high." While God communicates wisdom by his own power (*Deus propria virtute sapientiam communicat*) — he by himself is said to water the mountains — masters, says Thomas, do not communicate wisdom "except as ministers" (*non communicant nisi per ministerium*). The water that nourishes the plains and causes them to bear much fruit should be understood to have its source from *above* the mountains, and not from the teachers themselves. "Although no one by himself, of himself, is sufficient for such a ministry," says Thomas, "he can hope to have this sufficiency from God."

> "Not that we are sufficient of ourselves to think anything as from ourselves, but our sufficiency is from God" (2 Cor 3:5). Thus "if any of you is wanting in wisdom, let him ask it of God, who gives abundantly to all men ... and it will be given to him" (James 1:5). Let us pray Christ will grant it to us. Amen.[39]

[39] *Rigans montes*, 5.

Getting the Most from the Gift: Communicating a Lot in a Short Time

With this "Amen," Thomas finishes with an address delivered "briefly" (*breve*) and "quickly terminated" (*celeriter terminato*) as per University regulation[40] — a little over ten minutes, by my reckoning, if read out loud — and yet remarkably full. In that short space, Thomas managed to: praise the Scriptures due to its *height* ("places above"); exhort the masters to a greater *dignity* ("mountains"); exhort the students to the appropriate *humility* ("earth"), and give advice on the proper manner of communicating the divine teaching: the "places above" do not rain down all their water upon the mountains, and the mountains should not flood the plains beneath them nor pretend they have sucked the heavens dry of all the moisture they have to give. Above all, he continually directed the attention of his listeners *above*, to the divine source of true wisdom, and not merely at himself or at Paris and its various disputes. All in all, we'd have to say it was an inspiring and full ten-minute address, more easily recollected if one can remember its opening *thema*: "Watering the mountains" (masters) / "from his places above" (divine wisdom) / "the earth" (the students) / "is sated with the fruit of your works" (the students are to bear fruit by receiving the divine wisdom that comes from heaven through the mediation of their masters). Such is the mnemonic power of the *sermo modernus* style of preaching.

Thomas got a lot out of the gift he was given in his dream. But he also had resources from his human teachers: those who had taught him grammar, rhetoric, and logic, the Scriptures, the thought of Pseudo-Dionysius, and the relationship between primary and secondary causality. He also had the gift of his own creative intellect and profound desire for the truth. All of these, under God's divine providence, allowed him to bring the gift of that dream to fruition. This alone would have been a good, solid example of "height" connected to "humility" for his fellow friars, students, and masters to emulate.

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[40] Cf. *Chart. Univ. Paris*. II, 693 (final lines): *statim magister novellus cum benedictione incipit suum breve principium de commendatione de Scripture sacre. Quo celeriter terminato ....*

Towards A Biblical Thomism
Thomas Aquinas and the Renewal of Biblical Theology
Edited by Piotr Roszak and Jörgen Vijgen

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The Use of Scripture in Aquina's Summa Theologiae I-II, qq. 49-70

1. Introduction

Status quaestionis

St. Thomas Aquinas continuously contemplated and taught the Holy Scriptures. This duty was comprised within the ordinary task of the *Magister in sacra pagina*. It is necessary to "read and use in a much deeper fashion these biblical commentaries in parallel with the great systematic works", if we do not want to risk misinterpretations of the *Summa of Theology*.[1] At the same time Aquinas's use of the Scripture, and more widely, of the *auctoritates* is not as easy to describe as one may assume. Some authors, like Marc Aillet in his book *Lire la Bible avec S. Thomas*,[2] try to identify a certain general rule of Aquinas's use of Scripture, usually taken from the first question of the *Summa Theologiae*. But this method, like any general approach, risks overlooking many other possibilities with regard to the use of the Scriptures in Aquinas's *Summa of Theology*.[3] Certainly, the literal and allegorical meaning of the Scripture is fundamental, but Aquinas uses Scripture for reasons that exceed the

[1] Jean-Pierre Torrell, *Saint Thomas Aquinas. Volume I, The Person and his Work* (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2005), 55.

[2] (Fribourg, Suisse: Éd. Universitaires, 1993).

[3] See for example Michael M. Waldstein, "On Scripture in the Summa Theologiae," *Aquinas Review* (1994) 73-94, https://thomasaquinas.edu/pdfs/aquinas-review/1994/1994-waldstein.pdf, access 21.07.2017, and John F. Boyle, „St. Thomas Aquinas and Sacred Scripture" https://www3.nd.edu/~afreddos/papers/Taqandss.htm, access 4.08. 2017. Both authors approach the subject of the use of Scripture in the *Summa of Theology* in a very generic way.

strictly theological, for example as a point of reference for certain word uses or as a kind of note for the identification of some patristic source.[4]

This article follows a twofold inspiration. The first comes from Pim Valkenberg's *Words of the Living God: Place and Function of Holy Scripture in the Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas*.[5] The second comes from Jörgen Vijgen's article „The Use and Function of Aristotle in Aquinas's Biblical Commentaries".[6] Vijgen collected all of the quotations of Aristotle from the Scriptural Commentaries of Aquinas. Following his manner this article intends to present a complete presentation of biblical references which can be found in the questions 49-70 of the *Prima Secundae*.

Valkenberg attempts to show the limitations of the neo-scholastic way of treating Scripture in Aquinas uniquely for the purposes of defending and confirming sound doctrine. Considering these two criteria: 1) the literary genre of the text, and 2) the meaning of the biblical text prior to its use in the theological text he proposes to identify three ways of using the Scriptures: *macro-level*, *meso-level*, and *micro-level*.[7] According to Valkenberg the use of the text within the argumentation (crucial for such authors like Von Hertling) is the *micro-level*. When one considers the function of the text according to the literary genre: "this is its meso-level". "The purpose of the text: continues Valkenberg: determines the functions of the Scripture at the macro-level."[8]

The main advantage of Valkenberg's proposal is the indication of the hierarchical role of the Holy Scripture in Aquinas's writings. Such a hierarchy, however, can be constructed in various ways. Its criteria in this article are considerably reworked. The role of the macro-level manifests here the direct influence of the Scriptures on Aquinas structure of the *Summa of Theology*. It can take the form of a presentation of some theological topic along with commentary on certain biblical passages,[9] or as a basic source for doctrinal ideas, or finally of some important methodological observations. In our section (*Prima Secundae*, q. 49-70) this type of influence can be seen

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[4] The former can be seen for example in q. 58, a. 1, and the latter in many places, for example q. 55 a. 4 ad 6.

[5] (Leuven: Peeters, 2000). First published in the q. 58, this is frequent mistake, unfrotunately as *Did Not Our Heart Burn: Place and Function of Holy Scripture in the Theology of St Thomas*' (Katholieke Theologische Universiteit te Utrecht, 1990).

[6] *Reading Sacred Scripture with Thomas Aquinas: Hermeneutical Tools, Theological Questions and New Perspectives*, eds. Piotr Roszak and Jörgen Vijgen (Turnhout: Brepols, 2015), 287-346.

[7] Wilhelmus Valkenberg, *Words of the Living God: Place and Function of Holy Scripture in the Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas* (Leuven: Peeters, 2000), 49.

[8] *Ibidem*.

[9] For example the treatise on creation in *Summa Theologiae* (hereafter *ST*) I, q. 65-74 can be compared with Genesis 1 and its account of creation.

for example in case of the theological virtues (q. 62), and the final three questions (q. 68-70) on the gifts, the beatitudes and the fruits, as well as in case of distinction between the virtues and gifts in the q. 68, a. 1.

To the meso-level belong the biblical references which play a positive role in theological reasoning: as an example, premise or its part, illustration, image, etc. It is important to notice their place in the structure of the article: whether they are a part of the *sed contra* (sc), *corpus* (c), objections (arg.) and their solutions (ad). Sometimes this type of placement within the article can be misleading in determination of the role of the quotation. For example, the references in the *sed contra* usually express and strengthen Aquinas's own position. Sometimes, however, *sed contra* is used as the second line of objections, for example this is the case of q. 69, a. 3, sc 1 and sc 2. Analogically sometimes in the *corpus* (and very rarely in the answers to the objections) Aquinas presents a complex discussion, starting usually from a critique of other positions. In such cases, he may quote Scripture as a part of somebody else's position and its justification, which can be further criticised by Aquinas. In the objections, for pedagogical reasons, Aquinas may cite the Scriptures accurately or not.

The third and last class (micro-level) comprises the places where the Scriptures play an instrumental and secondary role. There is no need for denying such uses. The Bible can play a key role in some places, whereas a mere secondary role in others. St. Thomas refers to Scripture not only in order to corroborate the doctrine, but also for some practical purposes, giving a biblical quotation as an indication of the place of the commentary, or a linguistic illustration of a meaning of certain word, like in q. 58, a. 1.

Taking this into account I propose the following hierarchy of biblical references, divided into three general levels (1-3), subdivided further into three categories (A-C).[10]

1. **Biblical references of crucial importance**
   - 1 A. Direct impact on the structure of the *Summa Theologiae*, or an important methodological feature
   - 1 B. Bible as the source of the key-notions
   - 1 C. Direct biblical influence on posing or solving certain question or problem[11]

[10] Hereafter quoted as 1A, 1B... 3B, 3C.

[11] To this category belong or the quotations contained in the *sed contra*, where Aquinas gives often decisive *auctoritas* as the solution, or questions like the order of gifts, beatitudes and fruits, etc.

2. **Quotations which support the line of systematic reasoning and its place in the article**
   - 2 A. Biblical reference (as a premise, example, basis for allegorical interpretation, etc.) which plays an important role in the reasoning contained in the *corpus* or in the *sed contra*
   - 2 B. Biblical reference in the answer to objections
   - 2 C. Biblical reference in the objections used properly
3. **The instrumental use of the Scripture**
   - 3 A. Overinterpretation of equivocal biblical references in the objections
   - 3 B. Bibliographical indication
   - 3 C. Linguistic use

As a biblical reference, we recognise each place which refers clearly to a specific place in the Bible. This includes more than direct citations. For instance, in *ST* I-II, q. 63, a. 4, arg. 3 and ad 3, Aquinas refers to the moment of creation or to the healing of the man blind since birth. Here there is no quotations *sensu stricto*, but it is easy to identify the biblical passages to which Aquinas alludes (Gn 2,7 and Jn 9). Such an approach makes the task of enumerating references more complex but also more interesting and complete. Sometimes doubts arise about how to count these references. Shall we count biblical abbreviations without a citation? What do we do with the quotations within citations, or with biblical paraphrases? I have chosen a wide formula for computing these biblical references, in order to facilitate as comprehensive an account as possible.

The purpose of this article consists in complete presentation of the use of Scripture within q. 49-70 of the *Prima Secundae*.

2. The Use of Scripture in General in q. 49-70

The Structure of the Moral Part of the Summa Theologiae

When Aquinas begins his consideration of *habitus* in the prologue, he reminds his reader that this is a continuation of his anthropological considerations, as the basis for analysis of the *principia actionis*.[12] In this way Aquinas shows and repeats his

[12] *ST* I, q. 49, prologue: „Et primo, de principiis intrinsecis [humanorum actuum]; secundo, de principiis extrinsecis. Principium autem intrinsecum est potentia et habitus; sed quia de potentiis in Prima Parte dictum est, nunc restat de habitibus considerandum."

basic anthropological schema, which is the key for understanding the structure of the *Summa*. The basis for it is the essence of human being (*ST* I, q. 75-76). The next layer of consideration consists in the analysis of the powers (*potentiae*) of the soul (*ST* I, q. 77-83). Although Aquinas quotes Pseudo-Dionysius' terms *essentia, virtus* and *operatio*, in his *Summa of Theology* these terms become *essentia, potentiae*, and *actus*.[13] In this way Aquinas connects his anthropological considerations with the Aristotelian theory of potency and act. Aquinas begins with the potency / power (these double meaning is contained in the word *potentia*) and then proceeds to his consideration towards their actualisation. So after the analysis of the human powers (*potentiae*) Aquinas considers human acts, first the intellectual (I, q. 84-89) and then, as promised, the moral (I-II, q. 6-21 *actus*).[14] One can ask here about the limitations of just one schema of the structure of the *Summa of Theology*, like the well-known and widely-criticised neo-Platonic movement of exit and return (Chenu)[15], or others.[16]

After the introduction on disposition in general (q. 49-54), Aquinas considers good dispositions: both the virtues and the gifts (as *habitus*, q. 55-68), and then the beatitudes and the fruits as acts (*actus*, q. 69-70). However, considering the biblical references to the Scripture one can divide these two treatises into three parts:

–Treatise on dispositions, q. 49-54;

–Treatise on virtues, q. 55-67;

–Gifts of the Holy Spirit, beatitudes, and the fruits q. 68-70.[17]

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[13] See the quotation from Pseudo-Dionysius in the *ST* I, q. 75, prologue: „Et quia, secundum Dionysium, 11 cap. *Angel. hier.* tria inveniuntur in substantiis spiritualibus, scilicet *essentia, virtus et operatio*; primo considerabimus ea quae pertinent ad essentiam animae; secundo, ea quae pertinent ad virtutem sive potentias eius, tertio, ea quae pertinent ad operationem eius". In the structure of Aquinas's anthropology these terms become *potentiae* and *actus*.

[14] *ST* I, q. 84, prologue: „Consequenter considerandum est de actibus animae, quantum ad potentias intellectivas et appetitivas, aliae enim animae potentiae non pertinent directe ad considerationem theologi. Actus autem appetitivae partis ad considerationem moralis scientiae pertinent, et ideo in secunda parte huius operis de eis tractabitur, in qua considerandum erit de morali materia. Nunc autem de actibus intellectivae partis agetur."

[15] Cf. Pim Valkenberg, "Scripture", section "The Role of Sacred Scripture in the *Summa Theologiae*" p. 56-59, in: *The Cambridge Companion to the Summa Theologiae*, ed. Philip McCosker, Denys Turner (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 48-61 and Christopher T. Baglow, "Sacred Scripture and Sacred Doctrine in St. Thomas Aquinas," in *Aquinas on Doctrine: A Critical Introduction*, eds. Thomas Gerard Weinandy, Daniel Keating, John Yocum (London, Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2004), 12-13.

[16] For example see Andre Hayen, *Saint Thomas d'Aquin et la vie de l'eglise* (Louvain: Publications Universitaires, 1952), summarised by Baglow in "Sacred Scripture", p. 12-13.

[17] Hereafter this section will be called "the gifts, etc."

The proportions found here are as follows: dispositions: 24 %, virtues: 58,6 %, and the gifts etc.: 17,4 %.[18] A quarter of his considerations in this part are dedicated to the *habitus*. In comparison to his contemporaries Aquinas devotes the most space to this subject.[19]

Statistics of Scriptural Quotations in q. 49-70

The presence of the Scriptures forms a kind of *crescendo* from one part to the other. The number of biblical references is as follows:

–3 in the part about the *habitus*;

–90 in the treatise on virtues;

–100 in the gifts, etc. (q. 68-70).

The proportion of these references (193 references = 100 %) in the whole section q. 49-70 is as follows:

–The treatise on dispositions: 1,6 %

–The treatise on virtues: 46,6 %

–The gifts, etc.: 51,8 %.

Computing the number of references per 1 000 words gives the results:

–The treatise on dispositions - 0.19

–The treatise on virtues - 2.39

–The gifts, etc. - 9.08.

Thus, in the treatise on disposition, one quotation falls on two questions, which means here one reference per eight articles. In the treatise on virtues the average is 1.38 references per article, and in the gifts, etc. (q. 68-70) the average is 6.25 per article.[20]

This quantitative presentation already gives us some idea of the presence of the Scripture in this section. Even a cursory review of the sources reveals that the treatise on *habitus* is dominated by Aristotle. The treatise on the virtues contains numerous references to Aristotle, to the Fathers, and to the Scriptures; whereas the questions

[18] The whole treatise (*ST* I-II, q. 49-70) in Latin version taken from *corpus thomisticus* contains 378 546 characters without spaces; q. 49-55: 90.881 characters, q. 55-67: 221 947, and at the end q. 68-70 contain 65 718 characters.

[19] Ghislain Lafont, *Structures et méthode dans la Somme Théologique de Saint Thomas d'Aquin* (Paris : Desclée de Brouwer, 1961), 218.

[20] In the treatise on virtues there are 90 references per 65 articles, and in the last three questions there are 100 references per 16 articles.

on the gifts, etc. are in fact a theological commentary to the Bible. Some Thomists, like Herwi Rikhof, say, that the key to reading many of the treatises can be found at their end. In this case, such an approach would confirm that the treatise on the principles of human action should be read in the light of the highest possible human acts, accomplished because of the grace at work through the gifts and fruits.

3. Detailed use the Scripture

3.1. *De habitibus in generali (q. 49-54)*

In this section, Aquinas comments almost exclusively on Aristotle. The structure of this small treatise on disposition is: so to speak: quite philosophical. At first, Aquinas considers the substance of the dispositions (q. 49), their subject (q. 50), their cause (q. 51), how they change (q. 52-53), and how they can be distinct (q. 54). Nearly all these places are inspired by the Aristotelian tradition with two small and important exceptions: dispositions in angels (q. 50, a. 6), and the infused habits (q. 51, a. 4).

Only three times Aquinas quotes the Scripture in the q. 49-54: once in the *corpus* and twice in the *sed contra*:

No.	*Location and the title of the article*	*Category*	*The role in the article*	*Biblical reference*
1.	q. 50, a. 2 Utrum anima sit subiectum habitus secundum suam essentiam, vel suam potentiam	2 A	corpus	2 P 1,4 *consortes naturae divinae*
2.	q. 51, a. 4 Utrum aliqui habitus sint hominibus infusi a Deo	1 C	sc	Sir 15,5 *Implevit eum Dominus spiritu sapientiae et intellectus*
3.	q. 52, a. 1 Utrum habitus augeantur	1 C	sc	Lk 17,5 *Adauge nobis fidem*

Each quotation plays an important role. In the first case the quotation confirms that there is a certain habitus in the soul, which makes human being participant of a higher nature. Other two quotations directly answer the theological questions by scriptural examples.

3.2. *De virtutibus (q. 55-67)*

The Structure of the Treatise on Virtues

In the prologue to the q. 55, Aquinas introduces the further structure of his considerations. He will explain the good dispositions (virtues and gifts, q. 55-68), and what is related to them (beatitudes and fruits, q. 69-70). Aquinas structures his presentation on virtues with similar notions as in case of dispositions.[21] It can be seen in the following table:

	disposition / habitus	***virtue / virtus***
essence / *essentia*	q. 49	q. 55
subject / *subiectum*	q. 50	q. 56
cause / *causa*	q. 51	q. 63
growth, diminishing, and destruction / *augmentum, diminutio, corruptio*	q. 52-53	-
distinction / *distinctio*	q. 54	q. 57-62
properties / *proprietates*	-	q. 64-67

Aquinas applies advanced philosophical vocabulary in order to explain his theological notions. In some cases, the reverse is the case: he explains biblical idea of the theological virtues (q. 62). This demands a modification of the cause of virtues by introducing the idea of their direct infusion (q. 63, a. 3), and difference in species in relationship to their natural counterparts (a. 4).

[21] In a similar way Aquinas structures his considerations of vices and original sin (q. 71-89).

General Overview of the Auctoritates in the q. 55-67

In general, we can see here that the inspiration comes from Aristotle, especially his *Nicomachean Ethics*. Question 55 is structured according to the elements of definition of virtue according to St. Augustine; but Aristotle is quoted circa three times more often than Augustine; the q. 56 follows suit. In the q. 57 except for usual dominant number of quotations from Aristotle there are some quotations from *Moralia* of St. Gregory, *De libero arbitrio* of St. Augustine, sometimes from Cicero and Macrobius. In the q. 58 there are many references to the *Nicomachean Ethics,* sometimes St. Augustine and Cicero, not often to Pseudo-Dionysius, St. Gregory, and anonymously to Andronicus. In the q. 59 there are few quotations from St. Augustine's *De civitate Dei*, frequently from Cicero, and sometimes from Sallustius. Altogether, however, the number of quotations from Aristotle surpasses all those *auctoritates* taken together. The same emphasis on Aristotle can be observed in the q. 60.

In the q. 61 there are references to St. Ambrose, St. Gregory, Cicero, St. Augustine, and Macrobius. In this place, if we gather all of these references together, they will be more numerous from Aristotle alone. A. 5 is a commentary to fourfold distinction of virtues according to Macrobius in his *Super somnium Scipionis*. Aquinas gives his interpretation of this often commented *auctoritas*.

In the q. 62, consecrated to theological virtues, the Scriptures finally becomes the most quoted source, 10 times, accompanied by 2 quotes from Aristotle and one from St. Augustine. This is the first case of such proportions of the sources in one *quaestio*.

In the q. 63 (*causa virtutum*) there are quotes from St. John Damascene, Pseudo-Dionysius, St. Augustine; and sometimes references to the Gloss attributed to St. Augustine or St. Jerome. Aristotle is quoted as well, but less than other *auctoritates* taken together. This situation changes in the next question: *De medio virtutum* (64). Here Aquinas comments exclusively on the Stagirite, and he quotes Boethius once.

In the q. 65 (*connexio virtutum*) Aquinas quotes St. Ambrose, St. Gregory, St. Augustine, St. Prosper of Aquitaine, and Cicero. When the *Doctor Angelicus* explains the connection of the virtues through charity, the majority of quotations come from the Bible. In q. 66 (*aequalitas virtutum*) we can find: except for quotations from the Bible and Aristotle: few quotations from different works of St. Augustin. The last question on the virtues (67), theological in nature (*duratio virtutum post hanc vitam*), contains quotations from St. Gregory, St. Augustine, Cicero, and the *Liber de causis*, and as always: Aristotle. After this general review of the sources we will look more closely into the biblical references.

Biblical References in the q. 55-67

In the q. 55 (*De essentia virtutis*) there are four quotations from the Scriptures. All of them are used within the objections:

No.	*Location and the title of the article*	*Category*	*The role in the article*	*Biblical reference*
1.	q. 55, a. 3 Utrum virtus humana sit habitus bonus	3 A	arg. 1	1 Cor 15,56 *Virtus peccati lex*
2.	q. 55, a. 3	3 C, *potens* as synonym of *virtuosus*	arg. 2	Is 5,22 *Vae, qui potentes estis ad bibendum vinum, et viri fortes ad miscendam ebrietatem*
3.	q. 55, a. 3	3 A	arg. 3	2 Cor 12,9 *Virtus in infirmitate perficitur*.
4.	q. 55, a. 4 Utrum virtus convenienter definiatur	3 B to St. Augustine	arg. 6	Jn 14,12 *Maiora horum faciet*

In the next two questions: q. 56, *de subiecto virtutum*, and q. 57 *De distinctione virtutum intellectualium*, we have further four quotations:

No.	*Location and the title of the article*	*Category*	*The role in the article*	*Biblical reference*
5.	q. 56, a. 4 Utrum irascibilis et concupiscibilis sint subiectum virtutis	3A	arg. 2	Rm 7,18 *Scio quod non habitat in carne mea bonum*
6.	q. 56, a. 4	2B	ad 2	Rm 6,19 *Membra nostra exhibemus ad serviendum iustitiae*
7.	q. 57, a. 5 Utrum prudentia sit virtus necessaria homini	2C	arg. 3	Wis 9,14 *Cogitationes mortalium timidae, et incertae providentiae nostrae*
8.	q. 57, a. 5	2A	sc	Wis 8,7 *Sobrietatem et prudentiam docet, iustitiam et virtutem, quibus utilius nihil est in vita hominibus*

q. 58 De distinctione virtutum moralium ab intellectualibus

In the next question, again, we have four quotations, and three of them are part of the corpus of the first article. This location, however, in this case is misleading: from the theological point of view all of these quotations play secondary role. Aquinas uses Bible here as a source of examples for the linguistic meaning of the word *mos*.

No.	*Location and the title of the article*	*Category*	*The role in the article*	*Biblical reference*
9.	q. 58, a. 1 Utrum omnis virtus sit moralis	3C	corpus	Ac 15,1 *Nisi circumcidamini secundum morem Moysi, non poteritis salvi fieri.*
10.	q. 58, a. 1	3C	corpus	2 Mach 11,11 *Leonum more irruentes in hostes, prostraverunt eos*
11.	q. 58, a. 1	3C	corpus	Ps 67,7 *Qui habitare facit unius moris in domo*
12.	q. 58, a. 4 Utrum morales virtus possit esse sine intellectuali	2B	ad 2	Mt 10.16 *Estote prudentes sicut serpentes, et simplices sicut columbae*

In the last quotation (no. 12 above) Aquinas uses Mt 10,16 as a part of his explanation in favour of simple people (*simplices*), who may not be shrewd, but who still can have the intellectual virtues of prudence (*prudentia*) and understanding (*intellectus*), at least for the agency according to virtues.

q. 59 De comparatione virtutis moralis ad passionem

No.	*Location and the title of the article*	*Category*	*The role in the article*	*Biblical reference*
13.	q. 59, a. 3 Utrum virtus moralis possit esse cum tristitia	2 C	arg. 1	Wis 8,7 *Sobrietatem et iustitiam docet... prudentiam et virtutem*
14.	q. 59, a. 3	2 C	arg. 1	Wis 8,16, *sapientiae convictus non habet amaritudinem*
15.	q. 59, a. 3	1 C	sc	Mt 26,38 *Tristis est anima mea usque ad mortem*

No.	Location and the title of the article	Category	The role in the article	Biblical reference
16.	q. 59, a. 3	2 A	corpus	1 Jn 1,8 *Sir dixerimus quia peccatum non habemus, nos ipsos seducimus*
17.	q. 59, a. 3	2 A	corpus	2 Cor 7,10 *Quae secundum Deum est tristitia, poenitentiam in salutem stabilem operatur*
18.	q. 59, a. 3	2 B	ad 1	An additional explanation of the citation in arg. 1 (Wis 8,16, *sapientiae convictus non habet amaritudinem*).
19.	q. 59, a. 5 Utrum aliqua virtus moralis possit esse absque passione	3 A and C, this quotation has double role here	arg. 2	Cf. Rm 7,5 *passiones peccatorum*

In q. 59, a. 3 sc (n. 15) once again there is a quotation which directly illustrates and answers the problem. The question of the article is answered by a biblical example: the virtuous man can experience sadness seeing that Christ was sad in the garden of Gethsemane.

In the corpus, Aquinas quotes the Scriptures in order to show that there are reasons for sadness in the case of virtuous people. His argumentation was set against the positions of Stoics, quoted after St. Augustine, who held that the wise man is totally free from any kind of sadness.

In q. 60, *De distinctione virtutum moralium ad invicem*, there are no biblical references. In a. 5 one can find the commentary of Aquinas to the list of virtues enumerated by Aristotle in the second book of *Nicomachean Ethics*.

q. 61 De virtutibus cardinalibus

No.	Location and the title of the article	Category	The role in the article	Biblical reference
20.	q. 61, a. 1 Utrum virtutes morales debeant dici cardinales, vel principales	3 B to St. Ambrose	sc	Lk 6,20 *Beati pauperes spiritu*
21.	q. 61, a. 3 Utrum aliae virtutes magis debeant dici prinipales quam istae	3 A	arg. 3	Jm 1,4 *Patientia opus perfectum habet*

No.	Location and the title of the article	Category	The role in the article	Biblical reference
22.	q. 61, a. 5 Utrum virtutes cardinales convenienter dividantur in virtutes politicas, purgatorias, purgati animi, et exemplares	1 C	corpus	General remark about the scripture: *hoc nobis in sacra Scriptura multipliciter commendatur*; this *hoc* refers to the greatest possible closeness with God
23.	q. 61, a. 5	2 A	corpus	Mt 5,48 *Estote perfecti, sicut et Pater vester caelestis perfectus est*

In the q. 61, a. 5, Aquinas, commenting on Macrobius's distinction of virtues, makes a general remark: a human being should refer to God as best as he can. He then adds that this is often recommended in the Scriptures, and gives only one quotation (Mt 5,48). This remark shows how Aquinas reads the Scripture: he pays careful attention to what is recommended, and such an idea becomes for him an important point of reference, for which he may employ some special and representative quote.

The invitation of human beings to as close relationship with God as possible, becomes a bridge between philosophical considerations and theological revelation. In his explanation of the distinction by Macrobius, the neo-platonic author from the Fourth and the Fifth centuries, he shows how one can try to integrate the distinction between the *virtutes purgatoriae* and *virtutes purgati animi* with the Christian theology of growth in the supernatural life of grace.

As we have noticed, the q. 62 will contain more quotations from the Scriptures than all of the rest of *auctoritates* taken together.

No.	Location and the title of the article	Category	The role in the article	Biblical reference
24.	q. 62, a. 1 Utrum sint aliquae virtutes theologicae	1 B	sc	Sir 2,8 *Qui timetis Deum, credite illi*.
25.	q. 62, a. 1	2 A	sc	Sir 2,9 *sperate in illum*
26.	q. 62, a. 1	2 A	sc	Sir 2,10 *diligite illum*.
27.	q. 62, a. 1	2 A	corpus	2 P 1,4 *consortes divinae naturae*
28.	q. 62, a. 1	1 A	corpus	Important methodological remark: *tum quia sola divina revelatione, in sacra Scriptura, huiusmodi virtutes traduntur*

No.	*Location and the title of the article*	*Category*	*The role in the article*	*Biblical reference*
29.	q. 62, a. 3 Utrum convenienter fides, spes et caritas ponantur tres virtutes theologicae	1 B	sc	1 Cor 13,13: *Nunc autem manent fides, spes, caritas, tria haec*
30.	q. 62, a. 3	2 A	corpus	1 Cor 2,9 : *Oculus non vidit, et auris non audivit, et in cor hominis non ascendit, quae praeparavit Deus diligentibus se*.
31.	q. 62 a. 3	2 A	ad 2	1 Cor 1,25: *Quod infirmum est Dei, fortius est hominibus*
32.	q. 62, a. 4 Utrum fides sit prior spe, et spes caritate	3 A	arg. 1	Eph 3,17 *In caritate radicati et fundati*
33.	q. 62, a. 4	2 A	sc	1 Cor 13,13: *Nunc autem manent fides, spes, caritas*

In the *sed contra* (q. 62, a. 1) the quotation from Sir 2,8-10 can be counted either as one longer quotation as three. Aquinas separates this citation into three pieces with the word *item*, in order to underline that each piece refers one by one to each of the theological virtues. For this reason, I count this place as three quotations (no. 24-26 above).

In the corpus of the article, Aquinas underlines that we know the theological virtues exclusively from divine revelation and the Scriptures. This is a primary remark about his use the Scripture, and its deep impact on the structure of Aquina's synthesis: without the Scriptures we would have to cut not only q. 62 from the *Secunda Pars*, but also qq. 1-46 of the *Secunda-Secundae*; the rest of it could be considered as a vast commentary to virtues enumerated in the *Nicomachean Ethics*.

In q. 62, a. 3, ad 2 Aquinas explains that hope as passion is something less than a virtue on the human level but not on the supernatural level. Although faith and hope contain certain imperfections, still they still surpass every natural human virtue by their supernatural character. Aquinas illustrates this with a quotation from 1 Cor 1,25 (no. 31).

Aquinas again quotes 1 Cor 13,13 twice: in q. 62, a. 3 sc. (no. 29), and in q. 62, a. 4 sc. (no. 33). He uses this quotation in two different aspects.

q. 63 De causa virtutum

No.	*Location and the title of the article*	*Category*	*The role in the article*	*Biblical reference*
34.	q. 63, a. 1 Utrum virtus insit nobis a natura	3 B to Gloss	arg. 1	Mt 4,23 *Circuibat Iesus*
35.	q. 63, a. 1	3 A	arg. 3	Jm 31,18: *Ab infantia crevit mecum miseratio, et de utero egressa est mecum*
36.	q. 63, a. 2 Utrum virtutes in nobis causari possint ex assuetudine operum	2 C and 3 B to St. Augustine	arg. 1	Rm 14,23 *Omne quod non est ex fide, peccatum est*
37.	q. 63, a. 2	2 C	arg. 1	Eph 2,8 *Gratia estis salvati per fidem*
38.	q. 63, a. 2	2 C	arg. 2	Wis 8,21 *Didici quod non possum esse aliter continens, nisi Deus det*
39.	q. 63, a. 2	2 A	corpus	Wis 11,21 *numero, pondere et mensura*, jako skrócony cytat *sed omnia mensura et numero et pondere disposuisti*
40.	q. 63, a. 3 Utrum aliquae virtutes morales sint in nobis per infusionem	3 B to Gloss	arg. 3	Heb 1,6 without quotations
41.	q. 63, a. 3	1 C	sc	Wis 8,7 *Sobrietatem et iustitiam docet, prudentiam et virtutem*
42.	q. 63, a. 4 Utrum virtus quam acquirimus ex operum assuetudine, sit eiusdem speciei cum virtute infusa	2 C	arg. 3	Allusion to Gn 2,7 *Deus formavit*
43.	q. 63, a. 4	2 C	arg. 3	Allusion to the healing of the blind man from his childhood Jn 9,1-2.6 (*caecus natus*)[1]
44.	q. 63, a. 4	2 A	corpus	1 Cor 9,27 *castiget corpus suum, et in servitutem redigat*
45.	q. 63, a. 4	2 A	corpus	Eph 2,19 *cives sanctorum et domestici Dei*

1. Cf. Vlg, Jn 9,1-2: "caecum a nativitate", "caecus nasceretur".

Aquinas uses the Scripture in an interesting way in q. 63, a. 4, arg. 3 (no. 42 and 43). The article has a categorical nature: it asks whether the species of the infused and acquired virtue is the same. The biblical references help here to refine this problem by referring to the creation of a man, and to the miracle of healing. Man, created by God, and the eye healed by Jesus, are of the same species like other men and eyes. This becomes part of his analogy: if divine agency produces the same species, this should also be the case for infused and acquired virtues. So in this case the biblical allusions help to refine the philosophical problem of the difference of species.

In the q. 64 *De medio virtutum* there is only one quotation to show that in case of theological virtues it is impossible to sin *per excessum*. The question 65 (*De connexione virtutum*) is a place rich in biblical references.

No.	*Location and the title of the article*	*Category*	*The role in the article*	*Biblical reference*
46.	q. 64, a. 4 Utrum virtutes theologicae consitant in medio	2 A	sc	Sir 43,33 [43:30] *Benedicentes Deum, exaltate illum quantum potestis: maior enim est omni laude*
47.	q. 65, a. 1 Utrum virtutes morales sint ad invicem connexae	3 B to St. Ambrose	sc	Implicitly to Lk 6,20-22 without quotations
48.	q. 65, a. 2 Utrum virtutes morales possint esse sine caritate	2 C	arg. 2	Rm 5,5 *Caritas Dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris per Spiritum Sanctum, qui datus est nobis*
49.	q. 65, a. 2	2 C	arg. 3	Eph 3,19 *Supereminentem scientiae caritatem Christi*
50.	q. 65, a. 2	2 A	sc	1 Jn 3,14 *Qui non diligit, manet in morte*
51.	q. 65, a. 2	2 A and 3 B to St. Augustine[1]	corpus	Rm 14,23 *Omne quod non est ex fide, peccatum est*
52.	q. 65, a. 3 Utrum caritas possit esse sine aliis virtutibus moralibus	3 A	arg. 1	1 Cor 13,4nn *Caritas patiens est, benigna est*, etc.
53.	q. 65, a. 3	2 A	sc	Rm 13,8 *Qui diligit poximum, legem implevit*
54.	q. 65, a. 4 Utrum fides et spes possint esse sine caritate	3 B to Gloss, spiritual meaning	sc	Mt 1,2 without quotations (*Abraham genuit Isaac Isaac autem genuit Iacob*)

No.	Location and the title of the article	Category	The role in the article	Biblical reference
55.	q. 65, a. 5 Utrum caritas possit esse sine fide et spe	2 C	arg. 2	Eph 3,17 *In caritate radicati et fundati*
56.	q. 65, a. 5	2 A	sc	Heb 11,6 *Sine fide impossibile est placere Deo*
57.	q. 65, a. 5	2 A	sc	Prov 8,17 *Ego diligentes me diligo*
58.	q. 65, a. 5	2 A	corpus	1 Jn 4,16 *Qui manet in caritate, in Deo manet, et Deus in eo*
59.	q. 65, a. 5	2 A	corpus	1 Cor 1,9 *Fidelis Deus, per quem vocati estis in societatem Filii eius*

1. Cf. no. 36 (q. 63, a. 2).

In q. 65, a. 4 *sed contra*, Aquinas refers to Mt 1,2 without quotation. This is a point of reference for allegorical reading of the genealogy of Christ: the patriarchs Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob symbolize the generation of theological virtues: *fides generat spem, spes vero caritatem*.

Aquinas appears to like certain images, and then he comes back to them in different ways. For example, Eph 3,17 was quoted earlier in q. 62, a. 4, arg. 1 (no. 32), and now in q. 65, a. 5 (no. 55) it appears again, also as a part of the objection.

The last two quotations in this place (q. 65, a. 5, no. 58-59) in an interesting way combine Aristotle and the Scriptures. The Aristotelian idea of friendship is connected here with the love of God through charity. Friendship presupposes some exchange and communication (Aristotle), which is expressed and confirmed by biblical quotations, and then related to theological virtues.

The next question, *de aequalitate virtutum* (66), addresses the hierarchy of virtues and their proper and stable proportion (equality).

No.	Location and the title of the article	Category	The role in the article	Biblical reference
60.	q. 66, a. 1 Utrum virtus possit esse maior vel minor	2 C allegorical meaning / 3 B to Gloss	arg. 1	Rev 21,16 *latera civitatis Ierusalem* ***sunt aequalia***
61.	q. 66, a. 1	2 A	sc	Mt 5,20 *Nisi abundaverit iustitia vestra plus quam Scribarum et Pharisaeorum, non intrabitis in regnum caelorum*

No.	*Location and the title of the article*	*Category*	*The role in the article*	*Biblical reference*
62.	q. 66, a. 1	2 A	sc	Prov 15,5 *In abundanti iustitia virtus maxima est*
63.	q. 66, a. 1	2 A	corpus	Eph 4,7 *secundum mensuram donationis Christi*
64.	q. 66, a. 1	2 B	ad 3	Eph 4,7 *Unicuique vestrum data est gratia secundum mensuram donationis Christi*
65.	q. 66, a. 2 Utrum omnes virtutes simul in eodem existentes, sint aequales	2 C	arg. 1	1 Cor 7,7 *Unusquisque habet proprium donum a Deo, alius quidem sic, alius autem sic*
66.	q. 66, a. 2	2 C	arg. 2	An allusion to the praise of Abraham's faith, np. Rm 4,3
67.	q. 66, a. 2	2 C	arg. 2	An allusion to the praise of Moses's humility, np. Nb 12,3 *vir mitissimus*, cf. Sir 45,4
68.	q. 66, a. 2	2 C	arg. 2	An allusion to the praise of Job's patience, for example Tb. 2,12: *exemplum patientiae eius sicut et sancti Iob*, or Jm 5,10-11.
69.	q. 66, a. 4 Utrum iustitia sit praecipua inter virtutes morales	3 A	arg. 2	Jm 1,4 *Patientia opus perfectum habet*
70.	q. 66, a. 5 Utrum sapientia sit maxima inter virtutes intellectuales	2 C	arg. 3	Job 36,26 *Ecce Deus magnus, vincens scientiam nostram*
71.	q. 66, a. 5	2 B	ad 1	1 Cor 2,15 *Spiritualis iudicat omnia, et ipse a nemine iudicatur*
72.	q. 66, a. 6 Utrum caritas sit maxima inter virtutes theologicas	3 B to Gloss	arg. 3	Mt 1,2. As above *fides generat spem*
73.	q. 66, a. 6	1 C	sc	Cor 13,13 *Nunc autem manene fides, spes, caritas, tria haec; maior autem horum est caritas*
74.	q. 66, a. 6	2 A	corpus	1 Jn 4,16 *Qui manet in caritate, in Deo manet, et Deus in eo*
75.	q. 66, a. 6	2 B	ad 1	Eph 3,19 *supereminentem scientiae caritatem Christi*

Aquinas, talking about the equality of virtues, refers to the allegorical reading of Rev 21,16 (no. 60) He summarises its meaning: „latera civitatis Ierusalem sunt aequalia".[22] This quotation has a double- role here: it has its spiritual meaning (2 C), and in the next premise it becomes a point of reference to the Gloss (3 B).

Another way of using Scripture can be found in the q. 66, a. 2, arg. 2 (no. 66). Aquinas mentions here the biblical patriarchs and saints such as Abraham, Moses, and Job, with general remarks, that each of them is praised because of one special virtue (respectively: faith, gentleness, and patience). Aquinas is not quoting the Scriptures in a strict sense, but each of these examples is biblical, and can be illustrated by different quotations, given in most editions of the *Summa*. Each of these patronages I count as one biblical reference.

Once more we have in the *sed contra* 1 Cor 13,13 (no. 73): still a new aspect is introduced; here Aquinas wants to show the priority of charity.[23]

q. 67 De duratione virtutum post hanc vitam

In the last question (q. 67) Aquinas tries to establish what kind of virtues can be ascribed to human being after death or in the state of glory.

No.	*Location and the title of the article*	*Category*	*The role in the article*	*Biblical reference*
76.	q. 67, a. 1 Utrum virtutes morales maneant post hanc vitam	2 C	arg. 1	Conclusion-paraphrasis of Mt 22,30 *sicut angeli Dei in caelo*
77.	q. 67, a. 1	2 A	sc	Wis 1,15 *iustitia perpetua est et immortalis*
78.	q. 67, a. 2 Utrum virtutes intellectuales maneant post hanc vitam	2 C	arg. 1	1 Cor 13,8-9 *scientia destruetur*, because *ex parte cognoscimus*
79.	q. 67, a. 2	2 A	sc	Lk 16,25 *Recordare quia recepisti bona in vita tua, et Lazarus similter mala*.

[22] Rev. 21:16: „civitas in quadro posita est et longitudo eius tanta est quanta et latitudo et mensus est civitatem de harundine per stadia duodecim milia longitudo et latitudo et altitudo eius aequalia sunt"

[23] See no. 29 and 33 above.

No.	*Location and the title of the article*	*Category*	*The role in the article*	*Biblical reference*
80.	q. 67, a. 3 Utrum fides maneat post hanc vitam	2 C	arg. 2	1 Cor 3,11 *Fundamentum aliud nemo potest ponere, praeter id quod positum est, quod est Christus Iesus*
81.	q. 67, a. 3	2 A	sc	2 Cor 5,6-7 *Quandiu sumus in corpore, peregrinamur a Domino: per fidem enim ambulamus, et non per speciem*
82.	q. 67, a. 3	2 A	corpus	Heb 11,1 definition of faith as *substantia sperandarum rerum, argumentum non apparentium*
83.	q. 67, a. 4 Utrum spes maneat post mortem in statu gloriae	3 A	arg. 3	Sir 24,29 *Qui edunt me, adhuc esurient, et qui bibunt me, adhuc sitient*
84.	q. 67, a. 4	3 A	arg. 3	1 P 1,12 *In quem desiderant angeli prospicere*
85.	q. 67, a. 4	1 C	sc	Rm 8,24 *Quod videt quis, quid sperat?*
86.	q. 67, a. 4	2 B	ad 2	Prov 1,33 *Abundantia perfruetur, malorum timore sublato*
87.	q. 67, a. 5 Utrum aliquid fidei vel spei remaneat in gloria	2 C	arg. 2	Eph 1,17-18 *Illuminatos oculos cordis vestri in agnitionem Dei*
88.	q. 67, a. 5	2 C	arg. 2	Ps 35,10 *In lumine tuo videbimus lumen*
89.	q. 67, a. 6 Utrum remaneat caritas post hanc vitam in gloria	2 C	arg. 1	1 Cor 13,10 *cum venerit quod perfectum est, evacuabitur quod ex parte est*
90.	q. 67, a. 6	1 C	sc	1 Cor 13,8 *Caritas nunquam excidit*

In the *sed contra* of q. 67, a. 2 (no. 79) Aquinas uses the parable about Lazarus and the rich man as a source of information about the state of man in the future life. The rich man is called to remember his wealth on earth. If he is able to perform such an act, which refers to particulars, it is an argument in favour of other and easier intellectual acts, which refer to universal ideas.

In the treatise on the virtues Aquinas follows basically Aristotle, frequently quoting the Scripture, and the Fathers of the Church, as main sources for the new

questions and problems, sharpening sometimes the objections, and at the same time letting them to have a profound impact on solutions. This can be seen for example in the consideration of the theological virtues and their primordial role in the hierarchy of virtues.

3.3. *De alia virtutibus adiuncta (q. 68-70)*

The rest of the questions (68-70) can be treated as a commentary on the Scripture. It is striking that the consideration of the interior principles of action (from q. 49) begins with philosophical reflections, which are harmoniously completed by supernatural actualisation both by supernatural *habitus* as well as *actus*: by the gifts of the Holy Spirit, and the acts of beatitudes and fruits. It can be seen as the answer to the question about human happiness.

Q. 68 The Gifts of the Holy Spirit

Aquinas distinguishes the gifts of the Holy Spirit from the virtues (a. 1), with great care because both are classified as good dispositions (*habitus*). He refers in a special way to the Scriptures and its *way* of speaking about the gifts as spirits ("sub nomine spiritus") in Is 11:2-3, where Aquinas finds indication for the determination of their nature. [24]

The structure of the q. 68 corresponds to the problems considered in the treatise on the virtues. Aquinas considers the necessity of the gifts (a. 2), and then analyses their essence. He asks whether the gifts are dispositions (*habitus*), and whether they are properly enumerated (a. 3-4). Then Aquinas considers their connection (a. 5 which corresponds to the q. 65 on the *connexio virtutum*), their duration in heaven (a. 6 corresponding to the q. 67), their hierarchy (a. 7 corresponding to the q. 66), and in relation to virtues (a. 8).

The biblical references are as follows:

No.	*Location and the title of the article*	*Category*	*The role in the article*	*Biblical reference*
1.	q. 68, a. 1 Utrum dona differant a virtutibus	3 B to St. Gregory	arg. 1	Allegorical reading of Job 1,2 *Nati sunt ei septem filii*

[24] Q. 68, a. 1 Corpus.

No.	*Location and the title of the article*	*Category*	*The role in the article*	*Biblical reference*
2.	a. 1	2 C	arg. 1	Is 11,2-3 *Requiescet super eum spiritus intellectus*, etc.
3.	a. 1	3 B to St. Augustine	arg. 2	Mt 12,45 *Tunc vadit, et assumit septem alios spiritus*, etc.
4.	a. 1	2 A	sc	Allegorical reading of Job 1,2 *Nati sunt ei septem filii et tres filiae*, see no. 1 above (q. 68, a. 1)
5.	a. 1	2 A	sc	Allegorival reading of Job 1,18 *quatuor angulos* (symbol of the cardinal virtues)
6.	a. 1	2 A	corpus	Sg 8,7 *Aquae multae non potuerunt extinguere caritatem*.
7.	a. 1	2 A	corpus	Is 11,2-3
8.	a. 1	2 A	corpus	Mt 11,29 *Discite a me, quia mitis sum et humilis corde*.
9.	a. 1	2 A	corpus	Jn 15,12 *Diligatis invicem, sicut dilexi vos*.
10.	a. 1	1 A An important methodological remark about the meaning of Is 11,2-3	corpus	The way in which the Scripture says about the gifts (as *spiritus*) indicates how to distinguish them from the virtues Is 11,2-3 *Requiescet super eum spiritus sapientiae et intellectus*, etc.
11.	a. 1	2 A	corpus	Is 50,5 *Dominus aperuit mihi aurem; ego autem non contradico, retrorsum non abii*.
12.	a. 2 Utrum dona sint necessaria homini ad salutem	2 A	sc	Wis 7,28 *Neminem diligit Deus nisi eum qui cum sapientia inhabitat*.
13.	a. 2	2 A	sc	Sir 1,28 *Qui sine timore est, non poterit iustificari*.
14.	a. 2	2 A	corpus	Rm 8,14.17 *Qui Spiritu Dei aguntur, hi filii Dei sunt; et si filii et haeredes*.
15.	a. 2	2 A	corpus	Ps 142,10 *Spiritus tuus bonus deducet me in terram rectam*.

No.	*Location and the title of the article*	*Category*	*The role in the article*	*Biblical reference*
16.	a. 3 Utrum dona Spiritus Sancti sint *habitus*	2 C	arg. 1	Is 11,2-3
17.	a. 3	2 C and 3 B to St. Gregory	arg. 1	Jn 1,33 *Super quem videris Spiritum descendentem, et manentem super eum, hic est qui baptizat*.
18.	a. 3	2 A	sc	Jn 14,17 *Apud vos manebit, et in vobis erit*.
19.	a. 4 Utrum convenienter septem dona Spiritus Sancti enumerentur	1 C / 2 A	sc	Is 11,2-3 with Aquinas's argument from the "auctoritas Scripturae" as such
20.	a. 4	2 A	corpus	Prov 15,27 *Per timorem Domini declina omnis a malo*.
21.	a. 4	2 A	corpus	Ps 118,120 *Confige timore tuo carnes meas, a iudiciis enim tuis timui*. Jw.
22.	a. 5 Utrum dona Spiritus Sancti sint connexa	3 A	arg. 1	1 Cor 12,8 *Alii datur per Spiritum sermo sapientiae, alii sermo scientiae secundum eundem Spiritum*.
23.	a. 5	2 A / 3 B to St. Gregory	sc	Allegorical readinf of the Job 1,4: the feast of the sons of Job as an image of the cooperation of the gifts of the Holy Spirit
24.	a. 5	2 A	corpus	Rm 5,5 *Caritas Dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris per Spiritum Sanctum, qui datus est nobis*.
25.	a. 5	2 B	ad 1	Explanation of 1 Cor 12,8 *sermone sapientiae* et *scientiae* jako *gratiae gratis datae*.
26.	a. 6 Utrum dona Spiritus Sancti remaneant in patria	2 C	arg. 1	Is 11,9 *Non nocebunt et non occident in universo monte sancto meo*.
27.	a. 6	2 A	corpus	1 Cor 15,28 *omnia in omnibus*
28.	a. 6	2 B	ad 2	Jr 31,34 *non docebit vir fratrem suum*

No.	*Location and the title of the article*	*Category*	*The role in the article*	*Biblical reference*
29.	a. 7 Utrum dignitas donorum attendatur secundum enumerationem Isaiae 11	1 C	title	Is 11, 2-3
30.	a. 7	3 A	arg. 1	Dt 10,12 *Et nunc, Israel, quid Dominus Deus tuus petit a te, nisi ut timeas Dominum Deum tuum?*
31.	a.7	3 A	arg. 1	Mal 1,6 *Sir ego Dominus, ubi timor meus?*
32.	a. 7	3 A	arg. 2	1 Tm 4,8 *pietas ad omnia utilis est*
33.	a. 7	2 C quotation within a quotation	sc	St. Augustine quotes and comments on Mt 5,3 and Is 11, counted separately below
34.	a. 7	2 C	sc	Is 11
35.	a. 7	2 B	ad 1	Quotation without naming the source: *quia initium sapientiae timor Domini* (Ps 110,10).
36.	a. 7	2 B	ad 1	Two biblical reference to Prov: 16,6, without quotation (*in timore Domini declinatur a malo*) (16,6).
37.	a. 7	2 B	ad 1	As above: the second reference says 15,27, which seems to be erroneous, should be rather 14,27: *timor Domini fons vitae ut declinet a ruina mortis*, or even better 14, 16 *sapiens timet et declinat malum*.
38.	a. 7	2 B	ad 2	1 Tm 4,8 Paraphrasis, St. Paul The Apostle opposes the gift of fear and physical exercises (*corporalis exercitatio*), which *ad modicum utilis est*
39.	a. 8 Utrum virtutes sint praeferendae donis	2 B	ad 3	1 Cor 13,4 *non agit perperam*

In many places, and more than earlier, Aquinas refers to the allegorical meaning of different biblical quotations, especially alluding to St. Gregory and his *Moralia* (for example references no. 1, 4, 5, 23).

In the long corpus about the distinction between the virtues and the gifts (q. 68, a. 1), Aquinas quotes the Scripture four times for or against this or that position (no. 6-9) before his own explanation of the Is 11,2-3 (no. 10). St. Thomas gives here the analysis of the movement in relation to the way in which the scripture speaks about the gifts (*sub nomine spiritus*). The capacity for being moved divinely (*inspiratio*) requires that some abilities and perfections be moved in a certain way (*motio ab exteriori*), and it requires a proportion to the divine mover (*dispositio et proportio*), higher than virtues.[25] And these perfections are the gifts. Striking is the connection of the philosophical discourse about this motion and its characteristics (like in Aristotle) with the interpretation of the Scripture (no. 10-11). At the same time one can connect this intuition with the remark found at the end of the first book of the *Nicomachean Ethics* about the divine inspiration given to some people. Aristotle tries to explain what he knew about Socrates from Plato, especially in the *Apology*. Socrates was a man who followed closely and faithfully the *divinum instinctus*.

While explaining the necessity of the gifts for salvation (q. 68, a. 2), Aquinas notices that the the Scriptures underline the necessity both of wisdom (the first gift), and of the fear of the Lord (the last one). In both cases, he quotes the Scripture: Wis 7,28 (no. 12) and Sir 1,28 (no. 13). So the gifts enumerated between them (the first and the last), concludes Aquinas, have to be necessary, too. In the supernatural order of salvation man needs supernatural instinct and motion from the Holy Spirit, and Aquinas illustrates this by quoting Rom 8:14.17 and Ps 142,10 (no. 14-15 above).

Enumerating the gifts and their order, Aquinas refers to the Scriptures (no. 19), but at the same time he tries to reconstruct the reasons behind it. In this case, he follows his anthropological considerations by connecting the gifts with human powers, in some cases illustrating this with quotations. (cf. no. 20-21). In a. 7 he asks about the theological and exegetical justification of this order. It can be seen as a continuation of the consideration in a. 4.

The last quotation in this question is from 1 Cor 13:4-5: "love is not jealous or boastful; it is not arrogant or rude. Love does not insist on its own way; it is not irritable or resentful". The gifts of wisdom and understanding (*sapientia* and *intellectus*) formed by charity does not harm men in any of these ways.

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[25] Aquinas constructs his reasoning in Latin as follows: *inspiratio › motio ab exteriori › proportio › dispositio ut perfectio altior quam virtutes = dona*.

Q. 69 Beatitudes

The next question concerns the beatitudes. This clearly biblical reference is taken from Mt 5,3-11 and Lc 6,20-23.

No.	*Location and the title of the article*	*Category*	*The role in the article*	*Biblical reference*
40.	Title and prologue to q. 69: De beatitudinis	1 A	title	The notion of the beatitudes Mt 5,3-11
41.	As above	1 A	title	Lk 6,20-23
42.	a. 1 Utrum beatitudines distinguantur a virtutibus et donis	3 B to St. Augustine	arg. 1	In general: *This text seems to have a smaller font.*
43.	a. 1	3 B to St. Ambrose	arg. 1	Lk 6,20
44.	a. 1	2 A	corpus	Rm 8,24 *Spe salvi facti sumus*
45.	a. 2 Utrum praemia quae attribuuntur beatitudinibus, ad hanc vitam pertineant	2 C	arg. 2	Lk 6,25 *Vae vobis qui saturati estis, quia esurietis. Vae vobis qui ridetis nunc, quia lugebitis et flebitis*
46.	a. 2	2 C	arg.2	Job 21,13 *Ducunt in bonis dies suos*
47.	a. 2	2 C	arg. 3	Ps 16,15 *Satiabor cum apparuerit gloria tua*
48.	a. 2	2 C	arg. 3	1 Jn 3,2 *Nunc filii Dei sumus, et nondum apparuit quid erimus. Scimus quoniam cum apparuerit, similes ei erimus : quoniam videbimus eum sicuti est.*
49.	a. 2	2 B	ad 1	Ps 27,7 *In Deo speravit cor meum, et adiutus sum.*
50.	a. 2	2 B	ad 2	*Centuplum accipietis etiam in hoc saeculo*. This is a combination of two quotations: Mt 19,29 and Mk 10,30.
51.	a. 2	2 B	ad 2	As above, Mk 10,30
52.	a. 2	2 B	ad 3	Jn 4,34 *Meus cibus est ut faciam voluntatem Patris mei.*

No.	*Location and the title of the article*	*Category*	*The role in the article*	*Biblical reference*
53.	a. 3 Utrum convenienter enumerentur beatitudines	2 C	arg. 4	Job 5,17 *Beatus homo qui corripitur a Domino*
54.	a. 3	2 C	arg. 4	Ps 1,1 *Beatus vir qui non abiit in consilio impiorum*.
55.	a. 3	2 C	arg. 4	Prov 3,13 *Beatus vir qui invenit sapientiam*. Jw.
56.	a. 3	2 C, sc 2 plays here the role of the objection	sc 2	Aquinas compares the number of beatitudes in Lk 6,20 and in Mt 5,3
57.	a. 3	2 C, as above	sc 2	Mt 5,3
58.	a. 3	2 A	corpus	Mt 5,3 *Beati pauperes spiritu*.
59.	a. 3	2 A	corpus	Mt 5,4 *Beati mites*.
60.	a. 3	2 A	corpus	Mt 5,5 *Beati qui lugent*.
61.	a. 3	2 A	corpus	Mt 5,6 *Beati qui esuriunt et sitiunt iustitiam*.
62.	a. 3	2 A	corpus	Lk 14,12-13: *Cum facis prandium aut coenam, noli vocare amicos neque fratres tuos*, etc.*, sed voca pauperes et debiles*
63.	a. 3	2 A	corpus	Mt 5,7 *Beati misericordes*.
64.	a. 3	2 A	corpus	Mt 5,8 *Beati mundo corde*.
65.	a. 3	2 A	corpus	Is 32,17 *Opus iustitiae pax*.
66.	a. 3	2 A	corpus	Mt 5,9 *Beati pacifici*.
67.	a. 3	2 B	ad 3	Koh 1,18 *Qui addit scientiam, addit et dolorem*.
68.	a. 3	2 B	ad 3	Dn 4,24 *Consilium meum regi placeat: peccata tua eleemosynis redime, et iniqitates tuas misericordiis pauperum*.
69.	a. 3	2 B	ad 4	Job 5,17 *Beatus vir qui corripitur a Domino:* belongs to the beatitude of those who mourn

No.	*Location and the title of the article*	*Category*	*The role in the article*	*Biblical reference*
70.	a. 3	2 B	ad 4	As above, Ps 1,1 *Beatus vir qui non abiit in consilio impiorum* (n. 42) belongs to the beatitude of the clean of hearts
71.	a. 3	2 B	ad 4	As above, Prov 3,13 *Beatus vir qui invenit sapientiam* (n. 43) belongs to the beatitude of peacemakers (*pacifici*).
72.	a. 3	2 A, in his case the answer to the objection has a character of commentary to the beatitudes in Lk	ad sc 2 (ad 6)	Lk 6,20 *Beati pauperes*
73.	a. 3	2 A	ad sc 2 (ad 6)	Lk 6,21 *Beati qui esuritis*
74.	a. 3	2 A	ad sc 2 (ad 6)	Lk 6,21 *Beati qui nunc fletis*
75.	a. 3	2 A	ad sc 2 (ad 6)	Lk 6, 22 *Beati eritis cum vos oderint homines*
76.	a. 4 Utrum praemia beatitudinum convenienter enumerentur	2 A, paraphrasis of the rewards connected with the beatitudes	arg. 1, 2, 3, corpus, ad 2	Mt 5,3 *regnum caelorum*
77.	a. 4	2 A as above	arg. 3, corpus, ad 3	*possessio terrae*, related to Mt 5, 4 *ipsi possidebunt terram*
78.	a. 4	1 A / 2 A as above	sc	Aquinas refers to the authority of the words of Christ (*auctoritas ipsius Domini*), written in the Scripture in Mt 5,3nn and Lk 6,20nn.
79.	a. 4	2 A / B	corpus, ad 3	*consolatio*: Mt 5,5 *ipsi consolabuntur*
80.	a. 4	2 A / B	corpus, ad 3	*saturitas*: Mt 5,6 *ipsi saturabuntur*
81.	a. 4	2 A / B	corpus, ad 3	*misericordia*: Mt 5,7 *misericordiam consequentur*

No.	*Location and the title of the article*	*Category*	*The role in the article*	*Biblical reference*
82.	a. 4	2 A / B	corpus, ad 3	*visio Dei*: Mt 5,8 *ipsi Deum videbunt*
83.	a. 4	2 A	corpus	*gloria divinae filiationis:* Mt 5,9 *filii Dei vocabuntur*
84.	a. 4	2 B	ad 2	*pauperibus spiritu:* Mt 5,3

Aquinas in the corpus of article 3 explains in a systematic way the order of the beatitudes as it is given by Matthew. As earlier, it is interesting to observe the synthesis of the Bible and Aristotle. Aquinas orders the beatitudes according to different states of life: from the life of pleasures, through the active life, to contemplation. Aquinas shows the ascending way to happiness according to the grades of beatitudes. We can find this idea, at least partially, also in Aristotle: the highest and most beatific activity consists in the act of contemplation of the truth. The Stagirite underlined the fact that happiness consists in an act, not in a state. Aquinas follows him and integrates this vision with the supernatural life of grace known from revelation.

Aquinas explains the different version of beatitudes in Luke by showing that they were directed by Jesus to a different audience: the crowd. That is why they stop only at the first stage of the life of pleasure (cf. a. 3, ad 6). Aquinas connects other biblical passages about the beatitudes with those enumerated by Matthew.

This explanation from Aquinas is a type of theological and anthropological exegesis. Each beatitude is counted here as a separate biblical reference. The same is true about the rewards connected with them (q. 69, a. 4). Although they do not form, strictly speaking, quotations, and are rather the paraphrases like *regnum caelorum* (arg. 1 and 3), *possessio terrae* (arg. 3), etc., they do come directly from the Scripture, and they form together another exegetical explanation of Aquinas. I count each one of them as one biblical reference.

Q. 70 The Fruits of the Holy Spirit

The next question is a theological commentary to expressions found in Gal 5:22-23. Already the order of the articles shows the usual method of Aquinas: he tries to establish what they are by referring them to his anthropological schema, asking whether they are acts (a. 1).

No.	*Location and the title of the article*	*Category*	*The role in the article*	*Biblical reference*
85.	Title and prologue to the q. 70 on the notion of *fructus*	1 A / B	title	Aquinas gives reference to Gal 5,22-23 without quoting it (*fructus autem Spiritus est caritas gaudium pax longanimitas bonitas benignitas fides modestia continentia*.)
86.	a. 1 Utrum fructus Spiritus Sancti quos Apostolus nominat "ad Galatas" 5, sint actus	2 C	arg. 1	Wis 3,15 *Bonorum laborum gloriosus est fructus*
87.	a. 1	2 C	arg. 1	Job 4,36 *Qui metit, mercedem accipit, et fructum congregat in vitam aeternam*
88.	a. 1	2 A	sc	Mt 12,33 *Ex fructu arbor cognoscitur*
89.	a. 1	2 A	corpus	1 Jn 3,9 *Omnis qui natus est ex Deo, peccatum non facit, quoniam semen ipsius in eo manet*.
90.	a. 1	2 B	ad 1	Koh 24,23 *Flores mei fructus honoris et honestatis*.
91.	a. 3 Utrum fructus convenienter enumerentur ab Apostolo	3 A	arg. 1	Rm 6,22 *Habeti fructum vestrum in sanctificatione*
92.	a. 3	3 A		Is 27,9 *Hic est omnis fructus, ut auferatur peccatum*
93.	a. 3	2 C	arg. 2	Mt 13,23: *centesimum*, et *sexagesimum*, et *trigesimum*, see the parable about the sower in Mt 13:8 (*dabant fructum aliud centesimum aliud sexagesimum aliud tricesimum*) and its explanation in Mt 13,23.
94.	a. 3	2 B	corpus	Rev 21,2 *Ex utraque parte fluminis lignum vitae, afferens fructus duodecim*
95.	a. 3	2 B	corpus	Rm 5,5 *Caritas Dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris per Spiritum Sanctum, qui datus est nobis*

No.	*Location and the title of the article*	*Category*	*The role in the article*	*Biblical reference*
96.	a. 3	2 B	corpus	1 Jn 4,16 *Qui manet in caritate, in Deo manet, et Deus in eo*
97.	a. 3	2 B	corpus	Ps 118,165 *Pax mult diligentibus legem tuam, et non est illis scandalum*
98.	a. 4 Utrum fructus Spiritus Sancti contrarientur operibus carnis	1 C	title	Paraphrasis of Gal 5,19 *opera carnis*
99.	a. 4	2 A	sc	Gal 5,17 *caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, et spiritus adversus carnem*
100.	a. 4	2 A	corpus	paraphrasis and interpretaion of Gal 5,19.22-23: *fornicatio, inmunditia, idolorum servitus, veneficia, inimicitia, contentiones et aemulationes, invidiae, ebrietas, comessationes*

In the corpus of the first article, St. Thomas explains that if something coming from man can be called his fruit, then what comes from a higher power, for example the Holy Spirit, can also be called his fruit. This can be compared: according to quotation from 1 Jn 3:9 (no. 89): to a divine seed: *Omnis qui natus est ex Deo, peccatum non facit, quoniam semen ipsius in eo manet*.

The first objection to this fruit image is constructed as an argument *in infinitum*: because there is a fruit, which is at the same time a cause for a fruit. This objection comes from placing together the following quotations: Wis 3,15 *Bonorum laborum gloriosus est fructus* (no. 86) and Job 4,36 *Qui metit, mercedem accipit, et fructum congregat in vitam aeternam* (no. 87). If then human acts lead to some fruit, they themselves cannot be described as fruits.

Aquinas responds to this objection by connecting a philosophical approach with a further biblical image: an end can simultaneously be a mean to something else. Thus the same action, guided by the Holy Spirit, can be compared to the fruit in relation to our life here, and to the flower as a fruit of bonding in relation to eternal life (no. 90).

In a. 3 St. Thomas comments on the number of the fruits. A letter to Galatians, according to the Vulgate, enumerates 12 fruits, although in some editions there are

only 9. The first objection is biblical: quoting Rom 6:22 and Is 27,9 (no. 91-92) it argues that there is but one fruit of human life.

As usual, Aquinas tries to find the reason for the order of the fruits, and again refers to his anthropological structure. Here the point of departure consists in the relation of reason to itself (*in seipsa*), then to what is beside it (*ad ea quae sunt iuxta*), and to what is below it (*ad ea quae sunt infra*). In this way, Aquinas enumerates the fruits through illustrating them by further biblical references.

In the corpus of a. 4 Aquinas gives a long citation from St. Augustine, which clearly refers to the *opera carnalia* of Gal 5:19-21. We can find there an enumeration of corporal sins: *fornicatio, inmunditia, idolorum servitus, veneficia, inimicitia, contentiones et aemulationes, invidiae, ebrietas, comessationes*. This is the last and the hundredth biblical reference in q. 68-70, and according to our counting one hundred ninety-third reference within q. 49-70 of the *Prima Secundae*.

4. Conclusions

In the following table one can observe the sum of the categories of citations we have identified. Some of the quotations play a double role, and for this reason, some of the citations belong to two categories at the same time.

	1A	*1B*	*1C*	*2A*	*2B*	*2C*	*3A*	*3B*	*3C*
q. 49-54	-	-	2 (2-3)	1 (1)	-	-	-	-	-
q. 55-67	1 (28[1])	2 (24, 29)[2]	6 (15, 22, 41, 73, 85, 90)	29 (8, 16-17, 23, 25-27, 30-31, 33, 39, 44-46, 50-51, 53, 56-59, 61-63, 74, 77, 79, 81-82)	7 (6, 12, 18, 64, 71, 75, 86)	22 (7, 13-14, 36-38, 42-43, 48-49, 55, 60, 65-68, 70, 76, 78, 80, 87-89)	11 (1, 3, 5, 19, 21, 32, 35, 52, 69, 83-84)	10 (4, 20, 34, 36, 40, 47, 51, 54, 60, 72)	5 (2, 9-11, 19)
q. 68	1 (10)[3]	-	2 (19, 29)	18 (4-9, 11-15, 18-21, 23, 24, 27)	7 (25, 28, 35-39)	6 (2, 16, 17, 26, 33-34)	4 (22, 30-32)	4 (1, 3, 17, 23)	-
q. 69	3 (40-41[4], 78[5])	-	-	22 (44, 58-66, 72-83)	14 (49-52, 67-71, 79-82, 84)	9 (45-48, 53-57)	-	2 (42-43)	-
q. 70	1 (85[6])	1 (85)[7]	1 (98)	4 (88-89, 99-100)	5 (90, 94-97)	3 (86-87, 93)	2 (91-92)	-	-
sum	6	3	9	74	33	40	17	16	5

1. Numbers in the brackets refer to the lists of citations above. Please note that in each of the three main sections (1. q. 49-54; 2. q. 55-67 and 3. q. 68-70) citations are counted from the beginning.
2. Theological virtues: faith, hope and love, known exclusively from the Scripture.
3. Q. 62, a. 1: „Tum quia sola divina revelatione, in sacra Scriptura, huiusmodi [theologicae] virtutes traduntur".
4. "Beatitudes" comes directly from Scripture.
5. This is a reference to Christ's authority and the order of beatitudes enumerated in the Gospel.
6. Fruit (*frucus*) is mentioned directly in Ga 5,22, as well as in 8 places quoted by Aquinas in q. 70 (no. 86-88, 90-94).
7. The *fruit* has double function in the prologue to q. 70 (1A and 1B).

Most importantly, we have recognized the methodological remarks of Aquinas, which show the influence of the Holy Scriptures on the structure of the *Summa of Theology* (macro-level). Aquinas shows that we know the theological virtues from the Scriptures (see q. 62, a. 1, corpus, no. 28), and he quotes 1 Cor 13,13 as a basic point of reference (see q. 62, a. 3, sc, no. 29). In q. 68, Aquinas explains the difference between the gifts and the virtues by referring to Is 11,2-3 and its way of expression. The beatitudes and the fruits of the Holy Spirit are taken directly from the Scriptures as are the theological virtues (q. 62). These elements modify the account of the cause of dispositions as well as of virtues (infused dispositions and virtues).

Needless to say, Aquinas does not hesitate to quote Scripture in many ways, including instrumental uses. Quite interesting is his misuse of the passages of the Scripture (17 times, signalled above as 3A). Quite frequently the Scriptures serve only as a point of identification of the sources: 5 times to Gloss (all in q. 55-67), 5 times to St. Augustine,[26] 3 times to St. Ambrose[27] and 3 times to St. Gregory.[28] Finally, in 5 places, Aquinas refers to the Scriptures for linguistic reasons.

Looking at the structure of this section of the *Summa* (q. 49-70), we need to admit a deep kind of *perichoresis* between philosophy (especially that of Aristotle) and biblical theology, especially concerning the beatitudes and fruits. The Holy Scriptures at the beginning, in q. 49-54, play a secondary role, which becomes paramount at the end, in q. 68-70. Aquinas constructs as the basis for his systematisation the anthropological structure of human powers and their acts, with the mediation of dispositions, which bear the clear marks of Aristotle. But even in the very dense philosophical considerations of *habitus*, Aquinas pays careful attention to further theological uses of this notion: the gifts of the Holy Spirit, the role of grace, the natural law and the new law, and the consequences of the original sin.[29] At the same time, this anthropological structure provides and leads to an analysis of human acts topped with the gifts, the beatitudes and the fruits.

Thus, we can observe the mutual impact of the Bible and Aristotle in Aquinas's synthesis. The Scriptures allows Aquinas to reread Aristotle and refine for theological use his philosophical considerations. At the same time, Aquinas reads and explains the Scriptures, as well as the theological Tradition of the Church, through

[26] Q. 55, a. 4, q. 63, a. 2; q. 65, a. 2; once in q. 68, a. 1, and once in q. 69, 1.

[27] Q. 61, q. 65, and q. 69, always in the first article.

[28] Only in q. 68: a. 1, 3, and 5.

[29] Lafont, *Structures et méthode*, 219-220.

refined philosophical (mainly Aristotelian) categories.[30] This is not the vicious circle. The synthesis evinces a real and deep reciprocal influence.[31]

The same conclusion can be drawn from the way in which Aquinas explains the order of the gifts, the beatitudes, their rewards, and the order of the fruits. Aquinas describes these reasons by referring to his anthropological synthesis, i.e., to human powers, their distinction, their dispositions, and their acts. This anthropological structure is also the key-element which structures and unifies his anthropological and moral synthesis. Needless to say, these come more from Aristotle than from the Scriptures.

St. Thomas uses tools from Aristotle in order to describe the data revealed by the Holy Scriptures. The following conclusion by Vijgen: "Aristotle is Aquinas's primordial intellectual collocutor whenever he, as a theologian, is seeking an understanding of the difficulties of the biblical text"[32] can be applied also to the systematic works of Aquinas, and especially to the moral part of the *Summa*. This perichoresis: biblical and philosophical: seems to be something unique to St. Thomas Aquinas.

The entire synthesis is corrected and fortified by hundreds of biblical references. This can be seen especially in Aquinas's explanation of the supernatural dimension of human acts. Revelation enables Aquinas to correct the basic metaphysical and anthropological data. Aquinas overtly mentions this in q. 66, a. 5, ad 4. Aquinas explains here (in the context of the hierarchy among the virtues) that the virtue of wisdom is higher than the virtue of the *intellectus* (the understanding of the first rules). Wisdom, according to the Angelic Doctor, not only uses the fundamental rules of thinking and philosophising, but it is also their judge (sic!). Although in this place Aquinas does not quote the Scriptures, one can use this remark as support for a very important methodological rule, which requires interpretation. It shows that the infused gift of wisdom, which comes from revelation, has the function of a judge, who may in some cases correct and change what is found in metaphysical considerations which are found at the edge of our capacity for knowing. This is the case even more for supernatural realities known by revelation. Insofar as science (*scientia*) should be guided by a proper understanding of the principles (*intellectus*),

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[30] "The main principle of Thomas's exegesis is the conviction about the unity of truth and the holistic understanding of the history of salvation", Roszak, "The Place and Function of Biblical Citations in Thomas Aquinas's Exegesis", 119.

[31] "Nous avons dans ce cas encore un exemple conret de la signification de l'adage *philosophia ancilla theologiae* : la philosophie est servante, non seulment en ce sens qu'elle met ses notions au service de la théologie, de la problématique définie par la Révélation, mais encore parce que ces notions reçoivent un affinement dermier, voire une transposition, de l'usage même que le théologien en fait." Lafont, *Structures et méthode*, 222.

[32] Vijgen, "The Use and Function of Aristotle", 338.

so both should be guided by wisdom (*sapientia*).[33] This aspect was not enumerated as a biblical reference, since it is very generic. It seems, however, to be crucial and requires further elaboration.

There are two ways in which one may impoverish the reading of Aquinas. On the one side there is the neo-scholastic and philosophical approach to Aquinas, which loses the integral theological dimensions. On the other side, however, one needs to admit the negative effects of a certain reluctance to embrace a proper understanding of the philosophical categories taken mainly from Aristotle, and deeply reworked and woven in the structure of the *Summa of Theology*. This leads to deplorable results: to instrumental use of precise notions and tools in favour of theories like proportionalism[34] or misinterpreting various topics (like Aquinas's understanding of love).[35] Aquinas is misused then in a way completely opposed to his basic principles and goals.

Aquinas makes an incredibly deep synthesis of divine revelation explained in the theological Tradition of the Church with the best results of philosophical traditions, both Aristotelian and Neoplatonic. The main lines of his moral thought can be seen as an answer to the philosophical *quaestio* about the meaning of life and happiness. At the same time, it is in accord with biblical Tradition. The prologue to the *Secunda Pars* in q. 6 can be seen as a commentary on the following words of the Scripture: "I call heaven and earth to witness against you this day, that I have set before you life and death, blessing and curse; therefore choose life, that you and your descendants may live, loving the LORD your God, obeying his voice, and cleaving to him; for that means life to you and length of days, that you may dwell in the land which the LORD swore to your fathers, to Abraham, to Isaac, and to Jacob, to give them."[36] God invites man to life and happiness and warns him about the possibility of death and unhappiness. We have considered the part of the *Summa of Theology* where one can find the answer. The highest actualisation of the human person comes through the divine integration of human acts through charity and the gifts of the Holy Spirit, leading man to the bliss of the beatitudes and the fruits, which are just a foretaste of what is called as eternal life.

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[33] *ST* I-II, q. 57, a. 2, ad 2.

[34] *Readings in Moral Theology. No. 1: Moral Norms and Catholic Tradition*, ed. Charles E. Curran and Richard A. McCormick, S.J. (New York: Paulist Press, 1979), especially the contributions of Peter Knauer, S.J. "The Hermeneutic Function of the Principle of Double Effect", Louis Janssens, "Ontic Evil and Moral Evil" and Joseph Fuchs, "The Absoluteness of Moral Terms".

[35] For example Adriano Oliva, *Amours*, *L'Église, les divorcés remariés, les couples homosexuels* (Paris : Éditions du Cerf, 2015)

[36] Dt 30:19-20.

Part 2
Christ

Towards A Biblical Thomism
Thomas Aquinas and the Renewal of Biblical Theology
Edited by Piotr Roszak and Jörgen Vijgen

Piotr Roszak

The Judge of the Living and of the Dead. Aquinas on Christ's Power to Judge in his Biblical Commentaries

One of the eschatological themes present in St. Thomas' biblical commentaries is that of the Last Judgment. This Judgement is, on the one hand, to come in the future but, on the other, is already happening now (cf. Jn 5:24-25). This specific "delay" requires an understanding of the Last Judgment in a wider Christological context, namely within the framework of the vision of history which directs us towards making all things subject to Christ (cf. Phil 3:21) because He is the *exemplar* and the *principium omnis creationis.* For Thomas, this kerygmatic truth about Christ, who will come to judge the living and the dead (cf. Acts 10:42), carries an important moral message. Biblical morality is permeated with this "finality" of the judgment, but Thomas does not imply here a "fear of judgment," although he analyzes thoroughly the theme of fear in his works. Jesus' judgment over the world is an injection of truth and a call for faithfulness which is being realized "now."

This chapter will thus be devoted to the general characteristics of Aquinas' eschatology which emerges from the terminological analysis of "the end of the world" (*finis mundi*). Next, the question of the essence of Jesus' judgment, the sources of His power of judging the creation and the criteria of His judgment in the biblical commentaries will be presented. The final part will focus on the moral consequences of the Christian expectation of the *parousia*.

1. Regarding the terminology for "the end of the world" (*finis mundi*)

Aquinas does not resort to contrasting a "scientific" eschatology (namely the idea that the world will end naturally) with the light of the Revelation in trying to understand their mutual association.[1] Although this is worth pursuing, he is mostly interested in the theological meaning of Christ's judgment. It is inscribed in a broader context of teaching on the "new creation," which is, in a sense, creation *ex vetere*, as it assumes not only creation *ex nihilo*, but also the fundamental *consummatio*. Against this background, the question of judgment refers to what is old. It does not appear as the threshold of the new creation because it is initiated now as the seed or the leaven. Judgment plays its role in the context of crossing over into eternity when the possibility of change is exhausted. The Fathers of the Church expressed it using the metaphor of the oven in which the dough for bread is placed.[2] For Thomas, it signifies that Christian life is directed towards an eschatological communion which is marked as the *inchoatio* here on earth and progresses towards its *consummatio* in glory.

1.1. *Finis temporis*

The term "the end of time" for Thomas is, generally, an indication of the period until a human soul may change because its possibilities of action are associated with its connection with the body, which is itself the first act of the soul.[3] At the moment of death, when the soul experiences the separation from the body, it loses the ability of describing and taking action. That is why Thomas distinguishes two types of judgment:[4] one, traditionally known as a particular judgment, which Thomas

[1] *In IV Sent*., d. 48 q. 2 a. 2 ad 8:. "Sed ista ratio videtur inconveniens: quia cum aliqua revolutio sit in caelo quae non finitur nisi in triginta sex millibus annorum, sequeretur quod tamdiu mundus deberet durare; quod non videtur probabile. Et praeterea secundum hoc posset sciri quando mundus finiri deberet. Probabiliter enim colligitur ab astrologis in quo situ corpora caelestia sunt facta, considerato numero annorum qui computatur ab initio mundi; et eodem modo posset sciri certus annorum numerus in quo ad dispositionem similem reverteretur".

[2] In his commentary on Ps 2, Thomas develops a metaphor where human life is compared to the work of a potter who helps it to acquire its proper shape.

[3] *ST* III, q.59, a.5, ad 3.

[4] In *In 1 Cor.,* cap. III, lect.2 Thomas distinguishes the *triplex Dei iudicium*, which consists of a general judgment (*iudicium generale*) at the end of time and a particular judgment at the

describes as *quod animam* and which a departed person undergoes at the moment of death; and a second at the end of the world during the Resurrection which entails a reward or punishment associated with the body.[5] For Thomas, this distinction is important because of the sense of the "end of time" which somehow "accumulates" the consequences of human acts which are not finished or erased by death.[6] The first of these judgments is reserved for Christ due to His divinity and the other from the mystery of the humanity of the Son of God. Christ will judge *quantum ad Corpus* because He is the Son of God and had the experience of the body. Aquinas reflects on this situation in the fundamental question as to why Christ, as one of the persons of the Holy Trinity, has the power of judging and whether it is associated with the Incarnation.

In his commentary on the Gospel of St. Mathew, explaining the parable of the weeds (Mt 13:24), Aquinas associates the end of time with the biblical vision of the "harvest" (*tempus messis*), which is presented by Christ Himself. The judgment will not be a court verdict but rather the reaping of what man has sown. However, the difference between the wheat and the weeds will be clear. Thomas does not reflect upon the criteria because the parable narrative indicates that it will be a revelation with an obvious truth. Waiting to pull up the weeds (the vision of history where the good and evil coexist) serves the purpose of growing until harvest when the seed is gathered on the day of judgment.[7] If it had been gathered too early, the Church would have lost St. Paul and therefore the judgment day is the "appropriate time"[8] to judge with justice.[9] What is significant for Aquinas is the ecclesiological context because the "harvest" is the time for gathering fruit which is happening in the Church now (to support this point, Thomas quotes Jn 4:35) and the Church Triumphant when the *consummatio saeculi* is fulfilled.[10] The purpose of the Church is to "gather" and

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moment of death (*particulare iudicium*). He also describes a third type of judgment, namely a "judgment that takes place in this life (*iudicium in hac vita*), inasmuch as God sometimes proves a man by the tribulations of this life". It is the time when man's affections are tested. For more on the importance of philological analysis in the biblical commentaries of Aquinas with respect to eschatological matters see Gilbert Dahan, "L' eschatologie dans les commentaires thomasiens des épîtres pauliniennes," *Revue Thomiste* 116 (2016), 20.

[5] *Quodlibet* X, q. 1 a. 2c.

[6] *ST* III, q.59, a.5 ad 1.

[7] *In Matt.,* cap. XIII, lect. 2. Aquinas' arguments supporting the point why the owner does not want to remove the weeds (it always refers to the good) are important. Following the Eastern and Western Fathers, Thomas interprets the weeds as heretics who were not so from the beginning (like the weeds of the field.)

[8] *In I Tim*., cap. VI, lect. 3.

[9] *Ad Rom*., cap. II, lect. 2.

[10] *In Matt*., cap. XIII, lect. 2.

the idea of the Church as the *congregatio* is present here.[11] Thomas pays attention to the details from the parable that evil will be "pulled up" and not "gathered." The first harvest took place during the lifetime of the Apostles, whereas the next harvesters will be angels.

The angels also appear in the parable of the dragnet where Thomas notices a clear reference to Jesus' judgment. The caught fish which are brought ashore (the sign of the end of time) are separated: the bad ones from the good ones, namely those which are edible and those which have distorted their nature. This activity must be done in the sitting position, which refers to the power of judging,[12] whereas the act of judgment will consist in a separation, [13] to be more precise, an exclusion - *excummunicatio*. In contrast with the parable of the weeds, Thomas observes that this situation concerns not so much people from "outside" the Church (the heretics who have left the Church) but those who were caught in the net of the Church but turned out to be unworthy of the Kingdom. The criteria of judgment are not provided apart from the indication that these people were "wicked." Nevertheless, the expression which refers to excommunication might suggest that the evil will be associated with a rejection of grace during life and with the belonging which does not signify an active inclusion, participation in the fruit of the passion, but a certain sinful sterility with regard to God's action.

Thus the perspective of the "end of time"[14] carries a message of withholding judgment until the day of the Last Judgment.[15] Commenting on 1 Cor 4:5, Thomas indicates that Jesus' judgment will be based on enlightenment. The perfection of this judgment will bring to light the things now hidden in darkness and will disclose the purposes of the heart, both good and evil, which have not been purified by penance.[16]

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[11] In *In II Thess*., prol. Thomas interprets St. Paul's vision of the time which will pass until the judgment as a time of gathering, namely harmonizing the will of the faithful around the most important aspect, that is, eternal reward. It refers to the harmony of the thoughts of the faithful around the stable truth.

[12] *In Matt*., cap. XIII, lect. 4: "Per littus finis mundi significatur, quia non erit apud sanctos turbulentia, sed erunt in quiete bona. Et dicit *sedentes*, quod pertinet ad iudiciariam potestatem."

[13] It is worth emphasizing the analogy to the mystery of salvation, which Thomas also discusses as the *opus distinctionis*.

[14] See Bryan Kromholtz, *On the Last Day: The Time of the Resurrection of the Dead according to Thomas Aquinas* (Fribourg: Academic Press, 2010), 148, where the author emphasizes that the 'last day' for Aquinas means that "motion of the heavenly bodies: and the time and change resulting form that motion: will cease at that moment".

[15] Thomas perfectly summarizes the climate of moral attitudes while awaiting *parousia* in his commentary on the Letters to the Thessalonians, expressing numerous ideas in the prologue.

[16] *In II Cor*., cap. IV, lect. 1.

1.2. *Dies iudicii / in finali iudicio*

Another expression to describe the moment of judging by Christ is the term *dies iudicii*, which opens the question of the nature of judgment by Jesus at the end of the ages. The time of the day of judgment is unknown[17] and its sense points to "fulfillment."[18] When the day of judgment comes, the rule of the earthly powers, including Satan,[19] will come to an end. In the commentaries, this term is a synonym for the "renewal of the world" [20] which occurs as the consequence of the judgment by the Lord. In the context of the text of Ps 29 (28), Thomas quotes the eschatological interpretation of St. Basil: "The voice of the Lord dividing the flame." This is an announcement that "on the day of judgment, by divine power, the fire will be divided, for burning without light will be in the fire surrounding the condemned, and a fire bright without burning will be for the glory of the elect."[21] The presence of "fire" on the day of judgment will be preceded by the judgment of Christ; for the righteous it will be a fire which purifies all of the elements which require purification, whereas for the condemned it will be an all-consuming fire.[22] What characterizes the godless on the day of judgment is "shame for their sins" which will lead to disorder and chaos, whereas the righteous will be rewarded.[23]

The day of judgment is the time to reveal the testimony of faith as Thomas understands the expression of St. Paul that Jesus will be glorified in the life of the believers (*glorificabitur Christus in vobis.*)[24] The judgment will be the event which will help the testimony of the faithful to become *certum et creditum.* The moment of "disclosure" is emphasized because "on the day of judgment the differences among men's merits will be disclosed"[25] and the saints will reveal the evil of the deeds of wrong-doers.[26] However, there will be no waiting to enter heaven until the day of judgment which, according to Thomas, was suggested by Greek theology, but the meeting with Christ will occur at the moment of death.[27]

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[17] *De Potentia*, q. 5 a. 6.

[18] *In Iob*, cap. 19, where there is a connection between the end of time and the fulfillment (*implendum*).

[19] *In Matt.* cap. XII, lect. 2.

[20] *In Isaiam*, cap. 65: "…quando mundus ad gloriam sanctorum innovabitur".

[21] *In Ps.* 28, n. 7.

[22] *In I Cor.*, cap. III, lect. 2.

[23] *In Ps.*, 36, n.15.

[24] *In II Thess.*, cap. I, lect. 2.

[25] *In I Cor.*, cap. III, lect. 2.

[26] *In Iob*, cap. XX.

[27] *In Ioan.*, cap. XIV lect. 1. "Graecorum opinio est, quod sancti non vadunt ad Paradisum usque ad diem iudicii. Sed si hoc esset, tunc apostolus frustra haberet desiderium esse cum

Explaining the moment of the last judgment in his commentary on the Gospel of St. Mathew (chapter 25), Thomas pays attention to the "gathering" of all nations (*qui nati sunt ab Adam usque ad finem mundi*). Among them there are also *parvuli nati,* those who, although they do not have their own merits, may possess grace *ex sacramento Christi* as well as those who possess the guilt of original sin. This "gathering" may be "localized", so that the judgment is performed where the Passion of Christ took place. But Thomas quotes the view of Origen that the judgment may also be of a "spiritual" nature despite its geographical dispersal. The judgment will happen where they are but they will be united by the fact of judgment.

1.3. *In fine mundi*

For Thomas, the end of the world is synonymous with the *consummatio* but it will not happen before the spreading of the Gospel around the world is fulfilled.[28] Perhaps this growing power of the Gospel encouraged Aquinas to discreetly interpret the detail from the description of the Queen in Ps 44, whose robes are embroidered with gold although not all of the clothing is made of gold. An allegorical interpretation views this description as reflecting human progress. Man will become luminous at the end of the way of perfection, something which is confirmed by the gloss quoted by Thomas: "those who see the end of the world will be perfect and holy."[29]

The end of the world is also marked by a progressive wrath which will lead to destruction, the image of which is the Temple in Jerusalem of which there "will not be left one stone upon another, that will not be thrown down."[30] Does it mean that some people who experience the end of the world will not die? According to Thomas, death is a necessary gate through which everyone will pass through, including those who will be alive when Christ comes in judgment. In that moment, however, they shall die and immediately afterwards they will rise. Because of the minimal time involved, they are regarded as living[31] and thus all will experience two judgments: the particular and the final judgment.

Christo, Phil. c. I, 23." It is worth paying attention to the character of Thomas' argumentation: *ad frustrandum*.

[28] *In Matt*., cap. XXIV, lect.1. For more see Carlo Leget, *Living with God. Thomas Aquinas on the Relation between Life on Earth and 'Life' after Death* (Leuven: Peeters, 1997), 244-246.

[29] *In Ps*. 44, n.9.

[30] *In I Thess*., cap. II, lect. 2.

[31] *In 1 Thess*., cap. IV, lect. 2: "aliqui invenientur vivi in tempore illo, quo Christus veniet ad iudicium; sed in illo momento temporis morientur et statim resurgent. Et ideo propter modicam interpolationem reputantur viventes."

1.4. *Tribunal Christi*

The day of the Last Judgment is also called Christ's day, because he will then accomplish His will by punishing those who did their own will in this world by sinning against the will of Christ the Lord.[32] The day of a thing is said to be present when it exists in its best state and in the fullness of its power.[33]

For Thomas, facing the Tribunal of Christ is the chance to highlight five fundamental features of the future judgment. The first one is its *universality* because it concerns all people who will stand before the "judgment seat of God" (cf. Rom 14:10). Contrary to fallible human courts, which sometimes call good what is evil, the other feature of the tribunal of Christ is *certainty of the judgment*. It is associated with the fact that before Christ's tribunal the purposes of the heart are manifested (*manifestari*). Next is the *necessity of judgment* since it cannot be avoided. This will be revealed by the fact that Christ will judge *in the same way he was judged by people*. Thomas emphasizes here why St. Paul uses the term "tribunal;" it is a reference to the old Roman tradition of three tribunals elected by people to control the malpractice of consuls and senators. They wielded their power in a "tribunal," a synonym for punishing offences. Finally, the fifth characteristic of the court, originating from the term "the Tribunal of Christ", is its *equity* because reward or punishment will be proclaimed based on merit.

2. Christ as the judge to whom "everything" has been subjected

The analyzed terms reveal not only the manner of understanding history with its own *finis* but also indicates Christ's dignity as the judge of this history who will "fulfill" it on the day of judgment. Thus, Salvation is not an escape or rejection of history but its acceptance and inclusion into eternal life.[34] Thomas observes that it is not accidental that Jesus' parables concerning the Kingdom of God frequently refer to the king whose prerogative is passing judgment. Aquinas ascribes a similar meaning to "sitting at the right hand of the Father" from where he will come again in glory to judge the living and the dead as it is said in the *Credo*. Thomas emphasizes that

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[32] *In II Cor*., cap. I, lect. 4.

[33] *In I Cor*., cap. III, lect. 2.

[34] Max Seckler, *Das Heil in der Geschichte. Geschichtstheologisches Denken bei Thomas von Aquin* (München: Kösel Verlag, 1964).

Christ is the judge because of His divinity but also because of his human nature. Let us analyze the explanation that Thomas provides of the judiciary dignity of Christ as the Son of Man.

2.1. *Christ as the iudex omnium hominum*

The universality of the judiciary power of Christ expressed by the formula "he will come again in glory to judge the living and the dead" is associated with the fact that all things have been subjected to the Son (*ei subiecta sunt omnia*). This indispensability of Christ is explained by Thomas by relying both on metaphysics and theology.

If the world is created in the Word (in Christ all things have been created), He is *ars Patris* or, as Thomas says, the *exemplar creationis.* The Father created everything through the Word and judges everything through the Word. Aquinas explains this in the context of the Letter to the Colossians, where he says that these are not Platonic ideas but one idea of Christ which illuminates the sense of the world.[35] Therefore he can state: "Now to Christ and to His dignity all things to some extent belong, inasmuch as all things are subject to Him. Moreover, He has been appointed Judge of all by God, 'because He is the Son of Man.' "[36] Therefore the soul of Christ "knows in the Word all things existing in whatever time, and the thoughts of men, of which He is the Judge."[37] This can be understood not merely of the Divine knowledge of Jesus, but also of His soul's knowledge, which it had in the Word. The judge should know the subject of his judgment and Christ has precisely such a competence because the creation of the world happened "through" Him. Subjecting everything to Christ is associated with His being the *principium creationis*. On the one hand, Christ as God Himself subjected all things to Himself (1 Cor 15:28) and, on the other, the Father has subjected all things to Jesus.[38] As Thomas remarks: Christ "exercises the judiciary power over all things by the merits of His Passion and Resurrection".[39]

Due to the course of history, Thomas specifies that subjecting everything to Christ does not refer only to His power (*quantum ad potestatem*; and in another

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[35] *In Col*., cap. I, lect. 4.

[36] S*T* III, q.10c.: "Ad Christum autem, et ad eius dignitatem, spectant quodammodo omnia, inquantum ei subiecta sunt omnia. Ipse est etiam omnium iudex constitutus a Deo, quia filius hominis est, ut dicitur Ioan. V".

[37] Ibid.

[38] *In Hebr*., cap. II, lect. 2 (n. 119).

[39] *ST* III, q.59, a.4c.

passage this argument is described as *ad auctoritatem,*)[40] but also to the fact that the realization of this power will happen "in the future, when He shall fulfill His will regarding all things."[41] History is "the time of our warfare and of merit,"[42] the time when our subjection to Christ is fulfilled: "this has not yet been fulfilled, because unbelievers, sinners and devils are not yet subject to him […] Sinners are not subject to Christ by reason of their rebellious wills; but in regard to his power all are subjected to him: now in regard to its authority, but later, in regard to obedience."[43] The image that Thomas evokes in this context is Ps 8, which literally refers to man and his position in the world created by God. Verse 8, in which the author mentions "putting all things under His feet" acquires a Christological interpretation by Thomas as it refers to Christ as the true man.[44]

The process of subjecting everything to Christ (for Aquinas, the synonym of salvation) which lasts until the day of the last judgment, is not directed towards evil but towards good: it "does not imply any anxiety in Christ, as it does in man […], but it designates his will to have mercy: *the Lord waits that he may have mercy only* (Isa 30:18)."[45] Thus subjecting everything to Him will be realized not only in the saved who fulfilled His will but also in those who did not want to be subjected to Him. Even if they did not fulfill the will of Christ *per se*, as Thomas observes, this will is fulfilled in the order of objective justice. The Last Judgment is thus synonymous with subjecting everything to Christ. Therefore, the last enemy to be destroyed is death and all the nations will come to Him.[46]

2.2. *Potestas (auctoritas) iudicandi*

Thomas associates the power of judging with another biblical image of "sitting on the throne in His glory" (Mt 25) and "sitting at the right hand of the Father" because 'sitting' is the sign of the dignity of judging, and the right hand symbolizes

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[40] *In Hebr*., cap. I, lect. 6.

[41] *ST* III, q.59, a.4, ad 2.

[42] *In Eph*., cap. II, lect. 1: "usque ad diem iudicii est nobis tempus belli et merendi."

[43] *In Hebr*., cap. II, lect. 2.

[44] Much is revealed in Aquinas' analysis of 1 Cor 15 where he develops a Christ-Adam typology, see L. Mauel Cruz Ortiz de Landázuri, *"'Christus, novissimus Adam.' La relación Cristo-Adán en los Comentarios de santo Tomás de Aquino a las epístolas paulinas",* Revista Española de Teología 76/1 (2016), 25–107.

[45] *In Hebr*., cap. X, lect. 1 (n. 498).

[46] *In Matt*. cap. XII, lect. 1.

spiritual goods.[47] The "throne" on which he will sit is not a material reality but refers to the saints and angels because through them judging will be fulfilled.[48] Sitting is a sign of judiciary power with authority, in contrast to defendants and prosecutors, who pass sentences in a standing position.[49]

For Thomas, a theological prerogative of Christ to judge is related with His being a mediator and that is why His judiciary power of Christ is associated with the highest priesthood.[50] Therefore, it is possible to interpret 'sitting at the right hand of the Father' as referring to the divinity and the shared power which is equal for the Father and the Son. Nevertheless, it refers more to the humanity of the Word. The "right hand" signifies here the unity of natures in Christ, thanks to which he can also judge as a man.

2.3. *Christ as the optimus iudex*

Thomas frequently reflects on the prerogatives of a judge. In question 59 of *Tertia Pars* in the *Summa Theologica* he mentions three conditions which are necessary for someone who judges. First of all, the power to coerce subjects and this power is given to Christ who has all power in heaven and on earth. The second condition is an upright zeal so that the verdicts are not be passed out of hatred or spite but from a love of justice. The final condition is the wisdom that is needed and which corresponds to Christ, because He is the eternal wisdom and *ars Patris.* While the first two are conditions for judging, the third condition is the rule of judgment itself because wisdom is the form (*forma*) or ratio itself of any judgment.

In the biblical commentaries there is an extensive argumentation concerning Christ as the Son of Man who will judge at the end of ages. Aquinas frequently emphasizes that the biblical texts do not refer to the Son of God, but rather to the Son of Man thus underlining that Christ will judge as a man. This power is given to Christ as man because he is the Head of the Church (*gratia capitis*) and the fullness of His sanctifying grace (the connection of Jesus' soul with the Word by which he possesses the fullness of the truth of the Word of God).[51] The exceptional nature of Christ's humanity is associated with the fact that "he excels all creatures in the possession of

[47] *In Hebr*., cap. VIII, lect. 1.

[48] *In Matt*., cap. XXIII, lect. 3.

[49] *In Matt*., cap. XIX, where Aquinas quotes St. John Chrysostom ; *In Matt*., cap. XIII: "*sedentes*, quod pertinet ad iudiciariam potestatem."

[50] *In Hebr*., cap. II, lect. IV.

[51] *In Hebr*., cap. IV, lect.2.

Divine gifts",[52] and therefore the Son as man will be the judge at the end of time. It does not mean, however, that Christ became the judge at the moment of Incarnation as "judgments of this kind were exercised by Christ before His Incarnation, inasmuch as He is the Word of God: and the soul united with Him personally became a partaker of this power by the Incarnation."[53]

Explaining the image of judgment in Mt 25, Aquinas enumerates several reasons why the Son of Man will judge. Firstly, he became man *to be visible by everybody.* Secondly, due to Christ's merits, according to the logic of Phil 2:8, His Passion was an opportunity to exult Him, and this *exaltavit* is interpreted by Thomas as an ability to judge. Therefore, He will appear on the day of judgment in such a form in which he was judged on earth. Thirdly, he will appear because of his generosity, as people will be judged by man. The confirmation of this is a citation from Heb 4:15 about a high priest who is able to sympathize with our weaknesses. It refers to an eagerness for sympathy, which results from the fact that he knows the human fate *per experientiam*, but as God he knows it *per simplicem notitiam*.

In the Commentary on the Letter to the Hebrews we find the same affirmation but with different interpretations. Here the *connaturalitas* and *affinitas* of Christ with human nature are mentioned in the first place.[54] This argument finds its justification in the way God acts in the world, namely in accordance with His nature. For just as God works through secondary causes, as being closer to their effects, so also, following this logic, is it most appropriate that Jesus will judge. The second reason concerns Christ as the cause of our resurrection, which is emphasized by the role of Jesus as an intermediary in two kinds of resurrection (a resurrection of the body, a new unity with the body and a spiritual resurrection, namely, a renewed union with God) and analogous to two types of life (the life of nature and the life of grace). Thirdly, it was proper that those to be judged should see their judge but both the good and the wicked are to be judged. Therefore, the form of the man will be visible to the good and the wicked in the judgment, the form of God being reserved for the good. Thomas identifies these two final arguments with the view of St. Augustine.[55]

The emphasis that the Son of Man will be the one to judge carries a message of hope for man and also the conviction that the judge will be the *optimus iudex*, an expression which appears in one of the commentaries. In order to judge well, the judge must know the things which pertain to the one being judged, which Thomas

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[52] *ST* III, q.58, a.4c.

[53] *ST* III, q.59, a.4, ad 3.

[54] Dominic Legge, *The Trinitarian Christology of St. Thomas Aquinas* (Oxford: OUP, 2017), 68.

[55] *In Hebr.*, cap. IV, lect. 2.

emphasizes by citing Aristotle's *Ethics,* and being superior in relation to the one who is judged.[56] The chosen ones will see Him in His divinity, while all people will see Him in His humanity.

2.4. *Judging together with Christ*

Aquinas frequently reflects on Christ's power to judge in the context of Jesus' announcement that the Apostles will also sit on twelve thrones, judging the twelve tribes of Israel (cf. Mt 19). Thomas, commenting on this passage, provides several reasons why the role of the judge will be given to the Apostles, applying the philosophical insight of Aristotle. Thus, the power to judge is for the Apostles a "participation" in Jesus' power of judging. They will be like *iudicis assessores* because they adhered to Him more than others.[57] This apostolic privilege of co-judging with Jesus is also extended to those who follow in the footsteps of the Apostles and imitate Christ. Thus Thomas interprets St. Paul's statement (1 Cor 6:2; Rom 14:10) that the saints will judge the world.[58]

In the same passage of the Gospel of St. Matthew, Thomas provides a review of various activities associated with judging to verify which is appropriate in this situation. He asks how we are to understand the Apostles' judgment, if it will be like that of the Queen of Sheba who was a "blow of conscience" for those who did not believe according to Mt 12:42, or should it be interpreted as the participation in the joy of Jesus' judgment or as Christ's assessors or "they will judge just as a book judges: "for it [a book] judges, because there are written therein the laws which judge him; so likewise, the hearts of the Apostles and of the just, who kept God's Commandments, will be the book judging them."[59] However, all these ways, according to Aquinas, do not express everything about the power of judging by the Apostles and, through them, by Jesus. There is something more, namely, a mental judgment which accumulates memory about the sins linked with the light which is given to the judged.

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[56] *In 1 Cor*., cap. II, lect. 3.

[57] *Contra Gentiles*, lib. 4 cap. 96 n. 4: "Licet autem Christus in illo finali iudicio auctoritatem habeat iudicandi, iudicabunt tamen simul cum illo, velut iudicis assessores, qui ei prae ceteris adhaeserunt, scilicet apostoli, quibus dictum est, Matth. 19-28: vos qui secuti estis me, sedebitis super sedes iudicantes duodecim tribus Israel; quae promissio etiam ad illos extenditur, qui apostolorum vestigia imitantur."

[58] It is characteristic that the motif of participation in the power of judging by God was undertaken by Thomas in the case of "the wise" when interpreting the psalms. *In Ps*., 48, n.8.

[59] *In Matt*., cap. XIX, lect. 2.

The Apostles will not judge by relying on their own power but on the power of Jesus and their judgment will enlighten other people (in the same way as the angels receive light from God). The indication that they will judge signifies that they receive a sort of light which is given by God who endows everything with goodness. Being a judge is not based on capricious decisions, but on serving and introducing a good which originates in an absolute sense from God Himself "filling all things with His goodness."[60] Thus, it is not surprising that Thomas describes the role of the saints as assisting a judge. This is done in two ways: combining human things with God through prayer and bringing things from God to men in prophecy.[61]

Thomas provides two reasons why the Apostles will participate in the power of judging. On the one hand, a judge must be "outside" the subject of judgment, and, if the subject of judgment is the sin of the world, then a judge should be someone from outside the world. The Apostles are such people because they have been chosen out of "the world" to follow Jesus, in the manner which Thomas describes as *ferventes*. The Apostles grew fervent from the contemplation which is kindled in man and, as Aquinas observes, if people are more accustomed to contemplation, they are more fervent (*ferventes.*)

On the other hand, Thomas quotes the view of Aristotle that a virtuous man is the judge of all men. Similarly, the sense of taste is the judge of all things having taste. If one wishes to know the taste of something, he gives it to someone who has a "correct sense of taste," says Thomas in his metaphor. This is the feature of virtuous people who have a "refined taste" in the good, and can therefore judge others.[62]

3. *Divino iudicio*: what does God's judgment consist of?

In his Commentary on the Gospel of St. Matthew, analyzing the parable of the talents, Thomas focuses on the idea of reckoning, which is emphasized by the term *reddere rationem*.[63] According to his exegetical procedures, Aquinas pays attention to the other uses of this term in the same Gospel (Mt 12:36 or 18:23). These cases indicate that we have to give an account for our acts and received gifts, which will happen at the moment of death or on the day of judgment, when we stand before

[60] *In I Cor.,* cap. III, lect. 3: "…implans omnia bonitatitubus suis."

[61] *In I Cor.*, cap. XI, lect. 2.

[62] *In Matt*., cap. XIX, lect. 2: "Sicut ergo qui vult aliquid gustare, dat ad gustandum ei qui habet gustum sanum: sic cum virtuosus habeat gustum sanum, ideo ipse regula est omnium actuum; ideo perfecti viri ut regula iudicabunt."

[63] *In Matt*., cap. XXV, lect.2.

the Tribunal of Christ. In the parable, the Lord appeared after a long time, and these words may refer to both death (namely, old age) and to the Last Judgment. What interests Thomas is the time of a longer delay of the Lord who does not rush and can wait. The reason for such conduct is that the Lord gives *longum spatium ad bene agendum* so the judgment reveals that His grace has not been in vain (cf. 1 Cor 15:10). According to Thomas, the image of sheaves carrying their burden in Ps 126 (125): 6 refers to the subject of judgment in "the measure of His own grace."[64]

This view is perfectly inscribed in Aquinas' understanding of the nature of judgment, to which he devotes a separate question in *Secunda Secundae* of his *Summa*, reflecting on the virtue of justice. The original meaning of the word "judgment" is a statement or decision of the just or right. It is attributed to just people, and on this depends their aptness for judging aright. Similarly, deciding in matters of fortitude is ascribed to brave people. There exists a special virtue: *synesis*: which belongs to prudence and is the power to judge rightly.[65]

In his Commentary on the Letter to the Hebrews and on the Gospel of St. Matthew, Thomas distinguishes, following St. Gregory the Great, two types of judgment on Judgment Day, depending on whether or not it is associated with a examination of merits. Condemnation refers to the unfaithful who will not be judged by a verbal judgment or trial (*iudicio discussionis*). Thus, judgment means either passing a court sentence (about the reward or punishment that all people will receive) or giving an account by the examination of merits (*per discussionem meritorum*).[66] This will not be necessary in all cases. For example, there are the Apostles and those who "renounced the world as they left everything behind because of Christ and therefore they will be judges", as well as the unfaithful, who are "completely separated from Christ." The situation will be clear for those who are in a state of war with someone and similarly, there will be no discussion over the "merits" of those who "have clung to Christ in all things because they are gods already (*iam dii sunt*).[67] But judgment with an examination will concern all those who:

> "have something with Christ, namely faith, and in something have withdrawn from him, namely by evil works and wicked desires, will be discussed as to the things they committed against Christ. Hence, as to this, only sinful Christians will be manifested before the judgment seat of Christ."[68]

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[64] *In Gal.*, cap. VI, lect. 1.
[65] *ST* II-II, q.60, a.1, ad 1.
[66] *In Matt.*, cap. XXV, lect. 3.
[67] *In II Cor.*, cap. V, lect. 2 (n. 171).
[68] *Ibid.*

The nature of God's judgment comes to light in his Commentary on the Letter to the Romans, where he describes God as the *inspector cordis* who "directs his special attention to the will of the sinner." The reward that God gives to man is not a simple responsibility: a settling of accounts with God (*reddere rationem*), but something which will happen proportionally (*secundum proportionem*), because the reward exceeds the merit. God "will render good to the good, and better to the better. The same applies to evil."[69] What is interesting is the manner in which God will judge on the day of judgment, a manner which Thomas sees reflected in the words of St. Paul in Rom 2:16 ("In the day when God will judge the secrets of men by Jesus Christ."). The testimony of conscience and the "accusing or defending thoughts", will be represented on the day of judgment by divine power, so that "one's salvation or damnation will be clear to him […] the recognition of those thoughts that remain in the soul seems to be nothing less, as a Gloss says, than the debt of punishment or the reward, which follows them."[70] God's judgment will be the revelation and confirmation of the judgment of conscience which man has passed in his life.

4. The criteria of judgment: mercy or justice?

Having determined the nature and reason of the power of Christ's judgment, St. Thomas does not avoid answering the question of the criteria which will be decisive on Judgment Day.

4.1. *The primacy of the good*

Thomistic exegesis of biblical texts concerning the Last Judgment reveals Thomas' fundamental conviction that the main purpose of judging is the good. This is how Aquinas understands the sense of questions directed in Mt 25 to those who are cast into the everlasting fire. Christ the judge does not ask them about the evil that they did, but rather about the good they omitted (when He was hungry, thirsty or in prison, etc.). Thus, the subject of judgment is the neglected good which should have been done but was ignored and postponed. The judgment of Jesus is performed *propter bonum;* it is focused on the judgment of the fruits which human life brings: how much they used the good for the benefit of others. Therefore, the verdict given

[69] *Ad Rom*, cap. II, lect. 2.
[70] *Ad Rom.*, cap. II, lect.3.

by Christ described man as an "unprofitable servant."[71] Does it mean that works of mercy are sufficient? Thomas himself asks this question within the framework of his exegetical *quaestio* and responds, following St. Gregory the Great, that if the condemned did not do the acts prompted by nature they also did not do acts which originated from grace. "Now is the time to escape from the wrath of God to the mercy of God, for the end of the world will not be a time of mercy but of justice."[72]

Undoubtedly, this agathological character of Jesus' judgment should be read from the perspective of God's nature, who not only does not will evil but knows each evil from the perspective of the good. Thus the final criterion of judgment is mercy, which in Thomas' reflection is not a suspension of justice but its deepest fulfillment because mercy is the primacy of the possibility of the good. Mercy is a constant enabling of the good in human life. The judgment is full of mercy as it refers to the good which man realized while imitating God Himself. Thomas observes that even the pulling up of the weeds in the parable from Mt 13 is intended so that those who are good will shine. Thus they are in the center of the attention and again it stems from the understanding of the mystery of God who does not possess an idea of evil as such. In this manner, Thomas reflects on the details from Mt 25, indicating that the praise of the just is longer than the act of the condemnation of the wicked.

Analogously to the description from Mt 25, in which the Judge calls the righteous (the sheep in contrast to the goats) pure, patient, obedient and fruitful (*affluentia fructuum*), in the case of the parable of the weeds among the wheat, he mentions the threefold reward: the results of the judgment: purity, unity and peace. The good acts they performed surprise us with their insignificance in comparison to the fact that they were noticed by God.

4.2. *Cooperation with grace (pondus)*

If the judgment refers mostly to the good which man did, evil deeds will be judged from this perspective. Theologically, giving an account of one's life on Judgment Day concerns the manner in which man used God's grace. Thomas explains

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[71] *In Matt*., cap. XXV, lect. 2: "Et notate quod non punitur propter malum quod fecerit, sed propter bonum quod omisit; unde supra VII, 19: *omnis arbor quae non facit fructum bonum, excidetur*. Et alibi, Io. XV, 2: *omnem palmitem in me non ferentem fructum tollet eum*. Et dicitur servus inutilis, quia bonum quod habet, non expendit in utilitatem aliorum: ut si intellectum habuit et non expendit in usum bonum, alios docendo; si pecuniam, et non exercuit opus misericordiae".

[72] *In 1 Thess*., cap. V, lect. 1: "Ab ira Dei nunc est effugere ad eius misericordiam, ibi vero non est tempus misericordiae, sed iustitiae."

this in his reading of Mt 25, where he defines grace as *pondus,* a weight or spiritual gravity[73] This is how Thomas understands the idea of "merit" which originates from grace: "God ordained human nature to attain the end of eternal life, not by its own strength, but by the help of grace; and in this way its act can be meritorious of eternal life."[74]

4.3. *Care of superiors for their herds*

Superiors will not be punished for their misdemeanors towards their inferiors but for their neglect of responsibility towards others, namely, how they "carried their own burden."[75] Thomas reflects on this motif of judgment in his Commentary on the Letter to the Hebrews where he states that the question from the Book of Jeremiah concerning the entrusted people (Jer 13:20) will have to be answered at the end of the ages by their superiors.[76] After an indication from Pr 6:1 and the warnings by St. Gregory the Great and St. Bernard, Aquinas wonders whether a person must render an account of only himself (as suggested in 2 Cor 5:10). His answer reveals the association between the acts of man and those of other people: "everyone will give an account mainly for his own deeds, but he will give an account for others to the extent that his acts pertain to others."[77]

5. Conclusion: morality and the Last Judgment

In a time in which eschatological narratives are being devalued and we are witnessing their transformation towards individual eschatologies, the teaching of St. Thomas Aquinas on the Last Judgment retains a significant balance between an individual judgment and the culmination of the whole of history. The reality of the judgment which Christ will perform at the end of time does not contradict the ethical reflections of Aquinas,[78] introducing unnecessary fear. The morality presented in the Bible in the context of the Last Judgment is not an apotheosis of fear before the

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[73] *In Matt*., cap. XXV, lect. 2: "gratia pondus est quod inclinat ipsam animam."

[74] *ST* I-II, q. 114, a. 2, ad 1.

[75] *In Gal.*, cap. VI, lect. 1.

[76] *In Hebr*., cap. XIII, lect. 3.

[77] *In Hebr*., cap. XIII, lect. 3.

[78] Anthony Celano, *Aristotle's Ethics and Medieval Philosophy: Moral Goodness and Practical Wisdom* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 170-202.

verdict of an unknown judge but trust in the power of the good which man has realized in his life. "Not growing weary in what is right" (cf. Gal 6:9) would be impossible without Christ who serves as an *exemplar* for every kind of good. Fear and its moral consequences is not a theme that Thomas associates with the Last Judgment but rather the attitude of *redimentes tempus* proposed by St. Paul in Eph 5.

In his reflection on 1 Thes 5:1-13, Thomas pays attention to the program of preparing the Thessalonians for the day of judgment, that is the time of the "realization of divine will" in all people. This is the main reason why this day is called *dies Domini*. It will happen "like a thief in the night", that is, unannounced and uncertain. But it will also be the day that will lead to the uncovering of our hearts. The approaching day of judgment will surprise some who are asleep by earthly goods, whereas the righteous (according to Lk 21, 26: "men fainting with fear and with foreboding of what is coming on the world") will experience the multiplicity of evils and absence of pleasures. Thanks to faith in Christ, Christians are instructed about this day and should not be surprised. They should adopt an attitude of vigilance, instead of "sleeping the sleep of sin" or being idle, so that they can choose solicitude and overcome pusillanimity.

Thus, Aquinas' eschatology is quite specific: it does not frighten us with the Last Judgment but reminds us, following St. Paul, that "it is sown in dishonor, it is raised in glory. It is sown in weakness, it is raised in power" (1 Cor 15:43). He observes that "the Lord gave much space to do well,"[79] and the delay of the *parousia* is caused by the nature of the spiritual life as always being mediated by salvation history. The fact that the resurrected Jesus is shown with his wounds indicates that the new creation, initiated by Christ as the principle of renovation, always remains *ex vetere*.[80] This balanced view sees the meaning of human merits in subjecting the soul to the specific spiritual gravity (*pondus*) introduced by grace. Breaking this gravitational power of grace is a motive which decides the nature of the judgment. For Thomas, Jesus' judgment will be the assessment of the good which has been wasted and the tribunal, in the Roman understanding of this term, rejects the abuse of freedom.

In his commentaries, Thomas relies on scriptural images but goes beyond simple description to draw theological consequences. He remains consistent in his distinctions which, as the analysis of texts indicates, are based on the same scriptural foundation. As in the case of other Christological themes, Thomas applies *per convenientiam* reasoning to the question of Jesus' judgment. The appropriateness of the

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[79] *In Matt*., cap. XXV, lect. 2: "… dat Dominus longum spatium ad bene agendum."

[80] Matthew Levering, *Jesus and the Demise of Death: Resurrection, Afterlife, and the Fate of the Christian* (Waco TX: Baylor University Press, 2012).

fact that the Son of Man will judge is not based on the exigent syllogism but corresponds to the character of God's action.

It appears that the biblical commentaries frequently help to understand the *Summa Theologica* but, in the case of the topic under review, a reverse conclusion might be drawn. The question of Christ the Judge from the *Tertia Pars* relies on the exegetical study of biblical images concerning the Last Judgment, which can be supported by references to the same passages of Scripture. The *Summa* in its ordered style can serve as the perfect key to study the commentaries as it presents the questions in a coherent order.

Towards A Biblical Thomism
Thomas Aquinas and the Renewal of Biblical Theology
Edited by Piotr Roszak and Jörgen Vijgen

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Formam servi accipiens (Phil 2:7) or Plenus gratiae et veritatis (Jn 1:14)? The apparent dilemma in Aquinas' exegesis

In his *Super Epistolam ad Philippenses lectura*, St. Thomas Aquinas presents a truly illuminating and profound understanding of the expression *forma servi accipiens* (Phil 2:7). Among others, in his analysis of human nature assumed by the Son of God, Aquinas includes a characterization taken from John's Prologue, where the incarnate Logos is described as *plenus gratiae et veritatis* (Jn 1:14).[1] How does Thomas manage to unite these two Christological traditions? After all, Phil 2:6–11 first discusses Christ's humiliation (*humiliatio*) and only later moves on to His exaltation (*exaltatio*), while in John's Prologue, though the concept of Logos' humiliation is clearly visible (Jn 1:11), the incarnate Word from the beginning partakes in the glory of the Father and is "full of grace and truth":

> "And the Word became flesh and dwelt among us, full of grace and truth; we have beheld his glory, glory as of the only Son from the Father" (Jn 1:14).

In John's Gospel this depiction of the incarnate Word as the one who is *plenus gratiae et veritatis* refers to His existence already before Resurrection and Ascension. Meanwhile, in Phil 2:6–11 Christ, existing in the "form of a servant/slave" (Phil 2:7), experiences *exalatio* because He "became obedient unto death, even death on a cross" (Phil 2:8). Do not we face a dilemma here: either a kenotic vision of Christ, as expressed by Paul in Phil 2:7, or John's vision, as taken from Jn 1:14? In this paper I

[1] These two passages are also juxtaposed in Daniel A. Keating, "Exegesis and Christology in Thomas Aquinas," in *Reading Sacred Scripture with Thomas Aquinas. Hermeneutical Tools, Theological Questions and New Perspectives*, ed. Piotr Roszak and Jörgen Vijgen (Turnhout: Brepols 2015), 520-527.

would like to show that this dilemma for Aquinas is only apparent, which he proves by using his principles of Biblical exegesis. Certainly, the issue of relationship between Pauline and Johannine Christology, as presented in the works of St. Thomas, deserves a separate monograph. Here I do not have such lofty ambitions and only intend to pay attention to one, very specific question.

1. Three aspects of *forma servi*

Aquinas divides Phil 2:6–11 into three parts: *maiestas* (2:6); *humiliatio* (2:7–8); *exaltatio* (2:9–11). The expression *forma servi* is located in the part concerning Christ's salvific humiliation (*humilitas*). According to St. Thomas, this humiliation occurred in two stages. Firstly, when the Son of God, existing *in forma Dei*, assumed his human nature: this was *mysterium incarnationis* (2:7). Secondly, when He obediently died on the Cross: this was *mysterium passionis* (2:8)[2]. Thus Aquinas considers the notion of *forma servi,* analysed here, as located in the section dedicated to Christ's humiliation in the mystery of incarnation. Taking on "the form of a servant" by the One who exists *in forma Dei* is therefore a key to understanding the *kenōsis* of incarnation, while His salvific obedience allows us to discover the meaning of His passion and death. Hence, on the basis of Aquinas' commentary on *Letter to Philippians*, the section on Christ's *humiliatio* may be presented in a simplified manner as follows:



[2] *In Phil.,* c. 2, 1. 2 (56).

Clearly, humiliation (*humiliatio*) is the broadest category here. It has two phases and the first one (1) is a prerequisite for the second (2). The Mystery of Incarnation (3) and the Mystery of Passion (4) form one reality: the Mystery of Humiliation.

Points (7): (10) are discussed in a specific order which is presented by Aquinas as follows:

I. "First, he touches on the **assumption** of human nature when he says, **taking the form of a servant**".[3]
II. "Secondly, he touches on the **conformity** of His nature to ours when he says, **being born in the likeness of men**".[4]
III. "Thirdly, he mentions the conditions of His human nature when he says, **and being found in human form**".[5]

What is crucial here is the statement that the expression *formam servi accipiens* denotes the ***assumptio*** (assumption) of human nature, which most broadly can be understood as created nature.

> "For it is through its form that a thing is said to be in a specific or generic nature; hence the form is called the nature of a thing"[6].

The view that in this text *forma* equals *natura* is consistent with the conclusions drawn from anti-Arian patristic exegesis, for example from the works by Hilary of Poitiers and Basil of Caesarea,[7] and identical to the stance of the medieval predecessors of Aquinas, who preferably translated the notion of *forma* as *essentia*.[8]

Then Aquinas discusses the issue of the ***conformitas*** (conformity) of this nature: according to him, it belongs to the same *species* (species). Finally, he examines its ***conditiones*** (conditions), which he describes in this manner:

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[3] *In Phil.,* c. 2, l. 2 (58): "Tangit ergo, primo, naturae humanae assumptionem, dicens formam servi accipiens".

[4] *In Phil.,* c. 2, l. 2 (59): "Secundo tangit naturae conformitatem, dicens in similitudinem hominum factus".

[5] *In Phil.,* c. 2, l. 2 (60): "Tertio naturae humanae conditiones ponit, dicens et habitu inventus ut homo".

[6] *In Phil.,* c. 2, l. 2 (54): "Unumquodque enim dicitur in natura generis vel speciei per suam formam, unde forma dicitur natura rei".

[7] Giles Emery, *Trinitarian Theology of Saint Thomas Aquinas* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2007), 135; J. Holmes, "St. Thomas's Commentary on Philippians 2:5-11: A New Translation with Introduction and Notes," in *Wisdom and Holiness, Science and Scholarship. Essays in Honor of Matthew L. Lamb*, ed. Michael Dauphinais and Matthew Levering (Naples: Sapientia Press 2007), 123-125.

[8] Gilbert Dahan, "Introduction," in Thomas d'Aquin, *Commentaire de l'épître aux Philippiens suivi de Commentaire de l'épître aux Colossiens* (Paris : Les Éditions du Cerf 2015), 33.

> "[…] He assumed all the defects and properties associated with the human species, except sin; therefore, he says, *and being found in human form,* namely, in His external life, because He became hungry as a man and tired and so on".[9]

Thomas also mentions another possible way of understanding *habitus*, which will be discussed in the latter part of this paper. Overall, Aquinas proceeds in accordance with Pauline logic, which he describes as the "*assumptio: conformitas: conditiones*" sequence, and more and more precisely defines the meaning of the basic notion of *forma servi.*

Meanwhile, the Mystery of Passion (4) consists of obedience (6), which was revealed especially in death (11) and ignominy (12). Therefore, the *mysterium passionis* is inherently connected with the *mysterium incarnationis*: Christ can suffer death (11) because through the Mystery of Incarnation (3) he exists precisely in the shape of *forma servi* (5). Hence, bringing this all together we can say that according to Aquinas this "taking the form of a servant/slave" consists of three aspects:

A. It is the assumption of something created, namely of human nature, which is united with the Person of the Godhead: (7) and (8);
B. It is the assumption of human nature in its specific form, having some defects: (7) and (9);
C. It is the assumption of human nature which has some defects, but is also full of grace and truth: (7) and (10). This approach to the notion of *forma servi* can be called an "integral" one.

So, in these three points (A, B, C) I have briefly characterised three aspects of the notion of *forma servi,* which can be identified not only in the *Commentary on the Letter to Philippians*, but also in other works by Aquinas. Now I will examine each of these points more closely.

Ad A. "Taking form of a servant/slave" denotes assumption of created human nature (body and soul) together with all the proprieties belonging to its species.[10] In this case, Aquinas discusses human nature without further qualification, stating only that this nature is created and that it serves God, just like all creation.[11] In other words, this broadest meaning of *forma servi* consists of analyzing this notion from the point of view that assumed human nature is created.

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[9] *In Phil.,* c. 2, l. 2 (60): "[…] defectus omnes et proprietates continentes speciem, praeter peccatum, suscepit. Et ideo habitu inventus ut homo, scilicet in exteriori conversatione, quia esuriit ut homo, fatigatus fuit, et huiusmodi".

[10] *In III Sent*., d. 5, q. 1, s.c. 3; *ScG*, IV, c. 7 (3413).

[11] *ST* III, q. 20, a. 1, corp.

> "For by reason of his creation man is a servant, and human nature is the form of a servant"[12].

It is worth noting that the recognition of this aspect of *forma servi* allows Aquinas to identify one of the meanings of God's *kenōsis*. Son of God, with the act of *exinanitio,* assuming the created nature into hypostatic union.[13] By means of this assumption of human nature he obtained a new mode of existence[14] and thus incarnation understood as *kenōsis* did not mean the resignation of some attributes of divine nature, but rather the assumption of human nature. Hence, it is *assumptio*, not deprivation of some kind, that constitutes the essence of the incarnation's kenosis:

> "For just as He descended from heaven, not that He ceased to exist in heaven, but because He began to exist in a new way on earth, so He also emptied Himself, not by putting off His divine nature, but by assuming a human nature".[15]

For Aquinas, who put so much stress on the existence of "fundamental difference" between the Creator and his creation, the fact that the Word assumed a created nature in hypostatic union shows the inconceivably deep *kenōsis* of God. By assuming this human nature, the Word, which is Fullness itself, assumed what is empty (*inanis*) and what: as creation: is submitted to Him.[16]

Ad B. *Forma servi* refers to human nature in its specific form, namely the one that enables the Word of God to bring salvation by obedience, passion and death.[17] This approach to the "form of a servant/slave" focuses on the defects (*defectus*) inherent to this nature.[18] The Son of God assumed *forma servi* in order to be able to suffer for our salvation.[19] Therefore, in this narrower sense of this notion, Aquinas emphasizes Christ's conformity with everything belonging to the weak human nature, of course with the exception of sin.[20] Here we encounter a second way of un-

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[12] *In Phil.*, c. 2, l. 2 (58): "Homo enim ex sua creatione est servus Dei, et natura humana est forma servi".

[13] *In Phil.,* c. 2, l. 2 (57).

[14] *In Phil.*, c. 2, l. 2 (57).

[15] *In Phil.,* c. 2, l. 2 (57): "Sicut enim descendit de caelo, non quod desineret esse in caelo, sed quia incepit esse novo modo in terris, sic etiam se exinanivit, non deponendo divinam naturam, sed assumendo naturam humanam".

[16] *In Phil.*, c. 2, l. 2 (57): „Natura autem humana, et anima non est plena, sed in potentia ad plenitudinem; quia est facta quasi tabula rasa. Est ergo natura humana inanis. Dicit ergo exinanivit, quia naturam humanam assumpsit".

[17] *ScG*, IV, c. 29 (3652); *ST* III, q. 14, a. 1, corp.

[18] *Contra impug.*, II, c. 6, corp.

[19] *In Ioh*., c. 5, l. 4 (765).

[20] *In Phil.*, c. 2, l. 2 (59,60.62).

derstanding kenosis according to Aquinas. The first aspect of *exinantitio* consists of assuming a created human nature; the second refers to assuming its specific form, namely with some defects (*defectus*). In his commentary on the *Letter to Philippians,* Aquinas does not specify which defects he is referring to. They are most exhaustively discussed in *Summa theologiae*.[21]

Ad C. The notion of *forma servi* refers also to human nature which: though defected: has all the perfections of grace and knowledge (*veritas*) that are needed to complete the salvific plan. This is precisely the "integral" approach to the "form of a servant", consisting of seeing Christ's human nature as full of grace and truth, without which *forma servi* cannot be understood as a means of salvation.[22]

The Pauline text specifies that Christ was *habitu inventus ut homo:* "being found in human form" (Phil 2:8). Aquinas treats the word *habitus* ("appearance", "demeanor", "garment", "propriety") as a hint allowing him to understand the relationship between human and divine nature in Christ. St. Thomas states that "ipsam humanitatem accepit quasi habitum".[23] It is impossible to translate the Latin *habitus* with just one word, as this would inevitably cause a narrowing of this notion's meaning.[24] The difficulties associated with the attempts to translate this word can be clearly seen while analyzing its four meanings related to the "changeable: changeless" opposition. According to Aquinas, when a subject assumes something as its *habitus*, the consequences may be as follows:[25]

1. What is assumed remains unchanged, but it brings change to the one who assumes (*mutat habentem, et ipse non mutatur*). Such is the case of a fool becoming a wise man.
2. What is assumed brings changes both to the one who assumes and to itself (*mutatur et mutat*). Here Aquinas refers to the example of food which nurtures the person eating it (and so this person changes) and undergoes change itself.
3. What is assumed brings changes neither to the one who assumes, nor to itself (*nec mutat, nec mutatur*). Here the ring is given as an example. Seemingly, what Aquinas has in mind is the fact that the ring, when put on a

[21] *ST* III, q. 14 and q. 15.

[22] *ST* III, q. 14, a. 1, ad 1; *In Ioh.*, c. 7, l. 2 (1037).

[23] *In Phil.*, c. 2, l. 2 (61).

[24] Leo Elders, "The "Lectura" of St. Thomas Aquinas of the Letters of the Apostle Paul to the Philippians and Colossians," in *Doctor Communis* (Vatican City: Pontificia Academia Sancti Thomae Aquinatis 2009), 135.

[25] *In Phil.*, c. 2, l. 2 (61). Thomas drew this enumeration from St. Augustine (*De diversis quaestionibus* 83, q. 79).

finger, does not bring any substantial change to the person's appearance; also, it does not undergo any change itself.

4. What is assumed does not bring change to the one who assumes, but it undergoes change itself (*mutatur et non mutat*). Here the garment is given as an example. For, as St. Thomas notes, the garment changes its appearance when it is put on by a person, but it does not bring any change to the "form" of human nature. This is precisely the way in which: according to Aquinas: human nature became *habitus* for Son of God.

St. Thomas' intent is clear. God's assumption of human nature into the hypostatic union did not bring any change in divine nature, but it changed human nature, and it was a change for the better: *mutata est in melius, quia impleta est gloria et veritate:* for this nature was filled with "grace and truth" (Jn 1:14).[26] Aquinas quotes the whole verse:

> "We have beheld his glory, glory as of the only Son from the Father, full of grace and truth" (Jn 1:14).

The inclusion of Jn 1:14 into this explanation of *forma servi* is a very significant clarification. Firstly, it gives a fuller picture of the "form of a servant/slave". Existence in this form denotes not only the assumption of human nature with its defects, but also being filled with grace and, consequently, "changing this nature for better". Secondly, it clarifies the logic of kenosis. God assumes human nature to transform it, rather than to transform his own, divine nature.

I shall remain for a moment by this Johannine notion of *plenus gratiae et veritatis* (Jn 1:14). What does it mean that Christ is "full of grace"? To understand this expression properly it is crucial to recognize the consequences for Christ's human nature of its union with the One of the persons of the Trinity. Such recognition is followed by another, based on a specific understanding of the word "full". To be "full" of something, Aquinas states, means having something in perfect abundance not only for oneself, but also for others.[27] Hence, St. Thomas understands fullness as some excess that can overflow to others.

Christ is also *plenus veritatis.* The Son of God came into this world to reveal the truth about God, to enlighten people shrouded in darkness. Therefore, the rev-

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[26] *In Phil.*, c. 2, l. 2 (61). Francesca Aran Murphy, "Thomas' commentaries on Philemon, 1 and 2 Thessalonians and Philippians," in *Aquinas on Scripture. An Introduction to his Biblical Commentaries*, ed. Thomas Gerard Weinandy *et alii* (London-New York: T & T Clark International 2005), 177. Murphy interprets the whole Aquinas' commentary on the second chapter of the *Letter to Philippians* as a lecture on the sanctifying deeds of Christ.

[27] *Comp. th.,* I, c. 214.

elation of truth and inclusion into God's life through grace constitute indispensable parts of the work of salvation as well. For the Son of God saves also by revealing the Truth which he was given by the Father. Thus, Aquinas sees Christ's knowledge not only as some good belonging only to himself, but also as a perfection which is to be transferred to those who unite with him.

2. Isa 42,1 as a bridge between Phil 2:7 and Jn 1:14

It seems that in Aquinas' interpretation of the meaning of *forma servi* the issue which raises the most serious doubts is the "integral" understanding of this notion, namely the one linking it to the phrase *plenus gratiae et veritatis* (Jn 1:14). Should not the notion of *forma servi* be associated with the kenotic aspect of the Incarnation? Is not such an attempt to join the theology of Phil 2:6–11 with the tradition of Johannine Christology too hasty and farfetched: therefore distorting the original meaning of this passage? However, St. Thomas seems to be convinced that putting the expression *forma servi* in its proper context, namely finding its source in the Old Testament, fully justifies the integral approach to this notion. In his commentary on the *Letter to Philippians* Aquinas uses Isa 42:1 to join Phil 2,7 with Jn 1:14:

> "Behold my servant, whom I uphold, my chosen, in whom my soul delights; I have put my Spirit upon him, he will bring forth justice to the nations".

Apart from this text, in his "accumulation of citations", which exemplifies the rule of "explaining the Bible by the Bible", St. Thomas cites two other passages:[28]

> "Know that the Lord is God! It is he that made us, and we are his; we are his people, and the sheep of his pasture" (Ps 99[100]:3).
>
> "But thou, o Lord, art a shield about me, my glory, and the lifter of my head" (Ps 3:4[3]).

The first of these citations is meant to show the natural servitude of human nature towards God, while the second one is more significant for the issue discussed

[28] On the accumulation of citations see: Piotr Roszak, "The Place and Function of Biblical Citations in Thomas Aquinas's Exegesis," in: *Reading Sacred Scripture with Thomas Aquinas. Hermeneutical Tools, Theological Questions and New Perspectives*, ed. Piotr Roszak and Jörgen Vijgen (Turnhout: Brepols 2015), 125–127; on "explaining the Bible by the Bible" rule see: Elisabeth Reinhard, "Thomas Aquinas as Interpreter of Scripture in Light of his Inauguration Lectures," in: *Reading Sacred Scripture with Thomas Aquinas. Hermeneutical Tools, Theological Questions and New Perspectives*, ed. Piotr Roszak and Jörgen Vijgen (Turnhout: Brepols 2015), 84.

in this paper, as Aquinas sometimes interprets this passage as related to the mystery of Incarnation.[29] In this approach, the word *susceptor* refers to God who assumes human nature, uniting it with Himself. However, I will not analyze these two citations further.

Now I shall return to Isa 42:1. It is the beginning of the first *Servant Song* (Isa 42:1–9), where Isaiah depicts the identity of the Servant and His calling. According to Wanda Cizewski, although Aquinas does not discuss the connection between Phil 2:6–11 and the figure of the Servant of the Lord extensively, nevertheless this connection is still more clearly outlined in his works than in the works of his predecessors, whose Biblical commentaries he referred to.[30] For instance, St. Thomas notes this parallel in his juvenile *Expositio super Isaiam,*[31] where he recognizes the connection between Phil 2:9 (*factus obediens usque and mortem*) and Isa 53:10; similarly, he points it out also in his late *Super Evangelium S. Matthaei lectura,*[32] where he refers to Isa 42:1. Therefore it is worth examining especially Aquinas' commentaries on Isa 42:1, which prove most clearly his recognition of connection between Phil 2:7 and the figure of the Servant of the Lord.

Firstly, I shall briefly analyze *Expositio super Isaiam*. The crucial passage is as follows:[33]

> "Primo ostendit gratie plenitudinem quantum ad gratiam unionis : *suscipiam eum* ; *servus* secundum humanam naturam, Luce primo «Suscepit Israel» etc. ; quantum ad gratiam capitis: *electus* ut sit caput Ecclesie, «ex milibus», Cant. v, Ps. «Beatus

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[29] *In Ps.*, 29, 1, p. 247: "Sed Christum hominem univit sibi suscipiendo in unitatem perfectam: Ps. 3: «Tu autem Domine susceptor meus es etc.»"; *In Ps.*, 41, 6, p. 312: "Et ideo susceptor dicitur ad defendendum. Psal. 3: «Tu autem Domine susceptor meus es etc.» Vel *susceptor meus es*, idest naturae meae. Isa. 42: «Ecce servus meus, suscipiam illum»".

[30] Wanda Cizewski, "Forma Dei: Forma Servi. A Study of Thomas Aquinas' Use of Philippians 2: 6-7," in *Divus Thomas* (Piacenza) 92/1–2 (1989), 16: "Although Thomas does not actually say much about the link between Philippians 2: 7 and the 'suffering servant' passages in Isaiah, he does bring out more clearly than did any of his predecessors that textual parallel, which may have been part of the original author's intention".

[31] "Secundo ponit meritum quantum ad uite innocentiam : *eo quod iniquitatem non fecit*, quantum ad peccatum operis, *in ore*, quantum ad peccatum oris, I Petri II «Qui peccatum non fecit, nec inuentus est dolus in ore eius». Et quantum ad mortis obedientiam : *et Dominus*, Pater, *uoluit*, et ipse obediens fuit Patri usque ad mortem, Phil. II «Factus obediens usque ad mortem», I Cor. I «Quod infirmum est Dei, fortius est hominibus»". *In Is.*, c. 53, ver. 198–207, p. 216.

[32] "„[…] unde Ecce puer, servus per servilem formam; Phil. II, 7: *Exinanivit semetipsum, formam servi accipiens*". *In Matt.*, c. 12, l. 1 (996).

[33] Another passage worth noting in this context: "*Ecce seruus meus* etc. Hic ostendit diuinam dilectionem ex filio quem promisit, I. iij «Sic Deus dilexit mundum» etc.". *Super Is.*, c. 42, ver. 1–3, p. 177.

quem elegisti et assumpsisti» etc., *complacuit*, Mt. iij «Hic est Filius meus» etc. ; quantum ad gratiam habitualem que fuit in ipso singularis: *dedi spiritum meum*, supra xj «Requiescet super eum spiritus Domini» etc.".[34]

St. Thomas interprets this whole passage in light of his teaching on the threefold grace in Christ, which finds its fullness in Him.[35] This interpretation may be summarized in the following way:

"Ecce seruus meus,"	*natura humana*
"suscipiam eum;"	*gratia unionis*
"electus meus, complacuit sibi in illo anima mea;"	*gratia capitis*
"dedi spiritum meum super eum".	*gratia habitualis*

Hence, according to Aquinas, if you read Isa 42:1 as a prophecy concerning the coming of the Messiah/Servant of the Lord, then you may recognize that it heralds His specific identity: and the essence of this identity is being bestowed in such an extraordinary way and in such an abundance that one may speak of *plenitudo gratiae*. This exegesis of Isa 42:1 endures in Aquinas' oeuvre, since it is repeated in his late work, namely *Summa theologiae*.[36] Also, the interpretation of the phrase *suscipiam eum* as referring to the Incarnation, that is to the assumption (*susceptio*) of human

[34] *In Is*., c. 42, ver. 14–24, p. 177.

[35] *In Ioh*, c. 1, l. 8 (188–190). In accordance with such a concept of fullness, St. Thomas considers the grace permeating Christ's human nature to be threefold: 1. Grace of union (*gratia unionis*). The incarnation was a perfectly selfless act of God's love, thus being grace in the strongest meaning of this word (*ST* III, q. 2, a. 11, corp.). Christ's human nature received the gift of being united with the Word of God without any precedent merits (*Comp. th.,* I, c. 214); 2. Habitual grace (*gratia habitualis*). The special grace which filled Christ's soul and which surpassed all graces whenever bestowed on other people (*ST* III, q. 7). 3. The grace of Christ as Head (*gratia capitis*). This grace sort of "overflows" on others, making Christ Head of the Church (*Comp. th.,* I, c. 214; *ST* III, q. 8). Aquinas believes that Johannine *Prologue* refers to this threefold grace bestowed on Christ, even discussing it in proper order. According to St. Thomas, when John writes "And the Word became flesh" (Jn 1:14), he has the grace of union in mind; when he states that the Word was "full of grace and truth" (Jn 1:14), he describes the special personal grace bestowed on Christ; finally, when he mentions that "from his fullness we have all received" (Jn 1:16), he refers to the grace of Christ as Head (*Comp., th.,* I, c. 214).

[36] *ST* III, q. 7, a. 13, s.c.: „Dicitur Isaiae 42, [1], *Ecce servus meus, suscipiam eum* : et postea sequitur, *Dedi Spiritum meum super eum*, quod quidem ad donum gratiae habitualis pertinet. Unde reliquitur quod susceptio naturae humanae in unione personae praecedat gratiam habitualem in Christo".

nature, can be found in the work from the last period of St. Thomas' life, namely in *Postilla super Psalmos.*[37]

The passage from the commentary on Mt 12:18–21, where Isa 42:1–4 is cited by the Evangelist, contains a similar theology: however, there are some new features introduced by St. Thomas here. It is worth noting that in this Gospel, Isa 42:1–4 is the longest citation from the Old Testament, of tremendous significance, as it identifies Jesus as the Servant of the Lord.

The wording of verse 1, crucial from our point of view, is here as follows:

> "Behold, my servant [boy] whom I have chosen, my beloved with whom my soul is well pleased. I will put my Spirit upon him, and he shall proclaim justice to the Gentiles" (Mt 12:18).[38]

Aquinas maintains that *puer* is the same as *servus*, and he connects this phrase with Phil 2:7:

> "[…] hence «Behold the boy», a servant in a servant's form: «He emptied himself, taking the form of a servant» (Phil 2:7)".[39]

St. Thomas interprets the next part of this citation as referring to the revelation of God's *electio, dilectio* and *gratia* in the Servant of the Lord. God, firstly, elects (*electio*); secondly, He loves (*dilectio*); finally, He bestows grace (*gratia*).[40]

"Ecce puer meus, quem elegi:"	*Electio*	The election of Christ is twofold: as the Son of God and as the Redeemer.[1]

[37] "Haec possunt referri ad Christum, qui conceptus fuit secundum humanam naturam in incarnatione, quoniam «Verbum caro factum est» Joan. 1. Isa. 42: «Ecce servus meus, suscipiam eum; electus meus, complacuit sibi in illo anima mea» […]". *In Ps.*, 3, nr 2, p. 156; „*Susceptor meus es*, idest naturae meae. Isa. 42: «Ecce servus meus, suscipiam illum»". *In Ps.*, 41, nr 6, p. 312.

[38] The whole text reads as follows: "'Ecce puer meus quem elegi: dilectus meus in quo bene complacuit animae meae. Ponam spiritum meum super eum, et iudicium gentibus nuntiabit. Non contendet, neque clamabit, neque audiet aliquis in plateis vocem eius. Arundinem quassatam non confringet, et linum fumigans non extinguet, donec eiiciat ad victoriam iudicium, et in nomine eius gentes sperabunt'" (Mt 12:18–21). This is how St. Thomas explains the textual discrepancy with Isa 42:1–4: „Et sciendum quod alii Apostoli dicunt auctoritates secundum hebraicam veritatem, alii secundum expositionem Septuaginta, alii sensum solum verbis exprimebant". *In Matt*, c. 12, l. 1 (996).

[39] *In Matt*., c. 12, l. 1 (996): "[…] unde Ecce puer, servus per servilem formam; Phil. II, 7: *Exinanivit semetipsum, formam servi accipiens*".

[40] *In Matt*., c. 12, l. 1 (997).

"dilectus meus in quo bene complacuit animae meae".	*Dilectio*	Christ, as the Only Begotten Son, is cherished in a special way. St. Thomas states: "Nihil autem placet, nisi per gratiam, et nihil gratum defuit Christo".[2] Therefore, in Christ there was no shortage of any grace.
"Ponam spiritum meum super eum […]"	*Gratia*	The Spirit was fully poured out on Christ (Jn 3:34; Isa 11:2).[3]

1. *In Matt.*, c. 12, l. 1 (998).
2. *In Matt.*, c. 12, l. 1 (999).
3. *In Matt.*, c. 12, l. 1 (1000).

In the end of his exegesis of Mt 12:18, Aquinas wrote down a very significant sentence: "And this, in as much as he has the form of a servant"[41]. Hence, everything he stated about Christ while analyzing the phrase "ponam spiritum meum super eum" should be understood as referring to Christ's *forma servi.* So, it is an integral approach to the notion *forma servi* that we encounter here: the approach which sees Christ's human nature as inextricably linked to the fullness of grace and truth.

To conclude:

1. The notion *forma servi* from Phil 2:7 should be associated with the figure of the Servant of Yahweh from the prophecy of Isaiah.
2. Since this notion was used by St. Paul in this part of Phil 2:6–11 which concerns *mysterium incarnationis*, its best parallel may be found in Isa 42:1, where the identity of the Servant is specified, rather than Isa 52:13–53,12, which depicts the Servant's passion. So, the parallel to this latter passage can be found in Phil 2,8, where *mysterium passionis* is discussed.
3. Isa 42:1–4 is cited also in Mt 12:18–21, what gives this text special significance in discovering the identity of Christ.
4. According to Aquinas, in Isa 42:1 the Servant is presented as having the fullness of grace.
5. Therefore the notion *forma servi* in Phil 2:7 should be understood "integrally" as well, namely as a created human nature having all the weaknesses and defects needed to fulfill the work of salvation, but also "full of grace and truth" (Jn 1:14). Thus, a careful reading of Isa 42:1 provides a bridge

[41] *In Matt.*, c. 12, l. 1 (1000): "Et hoc inquantum habet formam servi".

between the notion of *forma servi* in Phil 2:7 and the Johannine approach from Jn 1:14.

3. Significance of the association *per ideam*

The analysis of this approach to Isa 42:1 allows us to recognize some general characteristics of Aquinas' manner of citing Holy Scripture. While discussing the criteria of selection of citations meant to explain a given passage, Piotr Roszak observed that overall two such criteria may be distinguished: the terminological (*per verbum*) and the thematic (*per ideam*).[42]

1. *Per verbum*. A quotation is selected on the basis of verbal associations.[43] Such an association of various passages is not purely mechanical, but takes advantage of the fact that using the identical form of a given word allows one to grasp some deeper affinity of ideas behind these quotations.
2. *Per ideam.* A quotation is selected in such a way that reveals the broader context of other events of the salvific plan. Therefore, external association *per verbum* is unnecessary, because it is one and coherent reality, hidden behind different wording, which links together various passages of the Scripture. Hence, the citation is meant to reveal some reality, hidden behind the excerpt which is being interpreted: the reality that can be denoted by various words.[44]

Roszak also puts forward a classification of models of applying citations He distinguishes five of them:[45]

1. *Quotation which transforms interpretation*. As Roszak states, in this model "quotations act as a «railroad switch» which changes the direction of text interpretation introducing a new train of thought".[46]
2. *Quotation which extends interpretation*. This model consists of the introduction of a citation which provides a new, supplementary level of interpretation.

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[42] Roszak, "The Place and Function of Biblical Citations in Thomas Aquinas's Exegesis," 127.

[43] *Ibid.*, p. 127.

[44] "It signifies that when reading citations it is not sufficient to rely on the verbal associations only but it is necessary to investigate *res* and their message in the same way as it is with faith which does not concentrate solely on the word (it is not the faith in words) but goes further towards the reality which is represented in the faith formulas from the *credo*". *Ibid.*, p. 128.

[45] *Ibid.*, pp. 131–138.

[46] *Ibid.*, p. 131.

3. *Quotation which exemplifies interpretation*. In this model, the quotation confirms the adopted interpretation.
4. *Quotation which introduces the spiritual sense.*
5. *Citations in "sed contra".*

Now, how can this classification be helpful in understanding the way in which Aquinas uses Isa 42,1 to explain Phil 2,7? This case is noteworthy, as St. Thomas begins with capturing the association *per verbum* (*forma servi: ecce servus meus*), which later allows him to grasp the association *per ideam*. The idea that links both citations is the figure of the Servant of the Lord. Once Aquinas captures this association, he is able to broaden his interpretation of Phil 2:6-11 with passages referring to the Servant of the Lord, especially with Isa 42:1. The figure of the Servant begins to shed some light on Phil 2:6–11, not only in one specific aspect (relating to Christ's passion and death), but also in a general way, showing Christ as *electus, dilectus* and *plenus gratiae et veritatis.* Hence, the association *per verbum* is a starting point for capturing the idea which broadens and deepens the meaning of the notion *forma servi.* Thus, it is certainly an example of a *quotation which extends interpretation*. For Aquinas believes that capturing the association between Phil 2:7 and Isa 42:1 allows him to introduce a whole new level of interpretation.

Before I conclude, I would like to juxtapose briefly this exegesis of Aquinas's with some approaches found in contemporary biblical studies. The whole passage Phil 2:6–11, and especially Phil 2:7, is among those texts from the New Testament that are the most difficult to interpret, so there is a great number of concepts trying to explain its theological meaning. Of course, I shall not discuss all of them here, but rather recall just one, which is the closest to Aquinas' approach. The similarity consists in the recognition of a parallel with the figure of the Servant of Yahweh.[47] Though the proponents of this concept differ with regard to the details of solving this issue, what they have in common is the fact that in Phil 2:6–11 they identify above all the reference to Isa 52:13–53:12, and especially to Isa 53:12[48] (sometimes also to Isa 53:11 LXX or Isa 49:7):[49]

> "Therefore I will divide him a portion with the great, and he shall divide the spoil with the strong; because he poured out his soul to death, and was numbered with the transgressors" (Isa 53:12).

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[47] Ralph P. Martin, *A Hymn of Christ. Philippians 2, 5-11 in Recent Interpretation and in the Setting of Early Christian Worship* (Downers Grove: Inter Varsity Press 1997), p. 182–194; John Reumann, *Philippians* (New Haven: London, Yale University Press 2008), 336.

[48] Joseph Coppens, "Phil. 2:7 et Is. 53:12," in *Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses* 41 (1965), 147–150.

[49] Reumann, *Philippians*, p. 349.

Generally speaking, according to the proponents of this interpretation of Phil 2:6-11, this passage refers mainly to Christ's passion and His death on the Cross, rather than to the mystery of Incarnation. Therefore, the notion of *kenōsis* should be applied to Jesus' death, not to His incarnation.[50] Although this association of Phil 2:6–11 with the Servant Songs is often criticized as overlooking differences between the content of these passages,[51] I am nevertheless convinced that it is truly hard not to see the deep affinity between the Servant Songs (especially Isa 49:7; Isa 53,11 LXX and Isa 53:12) and Phil 2:6–11, all the more so because the citation from Isa 45:23 is an integral part of Phil 2:10–11. Certainly, the degree of such correspondence may be discussed, but it is hardly possible to deny its existence. But Aquinas puts this affinity in a broader perspective, linking Phil 2:6–11 not only with the passages on passion and death derived from the Servant Songs, but also with the whole "idea": so to speak: of the Servant of Yahweh. This idea includes also His identity depicted in Isa 42:1 and Mt 12:18–21. In other words, by citing Isa 42:1 Aquinas gave us a hint that the whole passage from Phil 2:6–11 should be regarded as referring to the identity and the whole history of the Servant of the Lord, not only to some of its chosen aspects. This is the main difference between Aquinas and contemporary commentators analyzing Phil 2:6–11. For it seems that St. Thomas was far more sensitive to associations *per ideam* than many present-day exegetes.

[50] Jan Flis, *List do Filipian. Wstęp, przekład z oryginału, komentarz* (Częstochowa: Edycja Świętego Pawła 2011), 245.

[51] *Ibid.*, 247.

Part 3
The Moral Life

Towards A Biblical Thomism
Thomas Aquinas and the Renewal of Biblical Theology
Edited by Piotr Roszak and Jörgen Vijgen

Michael S. Sherwin, O.P.

Love in Thomas Aquinas' Biblical Commentaries: A Sketch

The Question of Love

What is love? Thomas Aquinas discerns early in his career that there are both passive and active aspects of love. On one level, love is something we undergo. It is a change occurring in our appetites in response to some object (a person or a thing) that we perceive as good. This is the passive aspect of love. Aquinas portrays this passive aspect as existing both in the passions properly so called and in the will.[1] The objects of our love change us. In his *Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard*, Thomas describes this change primarily as a *transformatio*, while in the *Summa theologiae* he principally portrays it as a *complacentia*.[2] This passive element of love becomes the principle or source of love's active element. Love causes desire, or an act of the will.[3] Love leads us to action. Thomas further holds that love in the will has a special character. It entails a choice. This is why the proper Latin term for the will's love is "*dilectio*," a word that implies choice (*electio*).[4] Moreover, while love in the passions produces desire, love in the will produces something more than mere desire. Specifically, the will's desire for a good presupposes a certain spiritual affirmation of the beloved for whom we desire that good. Spiritual love thus has a twofold character. There is love for the beloved and for the good we desire for the beloved.[5]

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[1] *In III Sent*. d. 27, q. 1, a. 3; *ST* I-II, q. 26, a. 2.

[2] *In III Sent*. d. 27, q.1, a. 1: "amor nihil aliud est quam quaedam transformatio affectus in rem amatam." *ST* I-II, q. 26, a. 2: "Prima ergo immutatio appetitus ab appetibili vocatur amor, qui nihil est aliud quam complacentia appetibilis."

[3] *In III Sent*. d. 27, q. 1, a. 3, ad 1; *ST* I-II, q. 26, a. 2.

[4] *In III Sent*. d. 27, q. 2, a. 1; *ST* I-II, q. 26, a. 3.

[5] *In III Sent.* d. 29, a. 3; *ST* I-II, q. 26, a. 4.

This at least is how Thomas Aquinas portrays love in his great systematic works of theology. It is already present embryonically in his *Commentary on the Sentences* and reappears more fully developed in his *Summa theologiae*. To what extent is this conception of love present in his biblical commentaries? This question guides the brief analysis that follows. The study contains two parts. It begins by considering love as an affective principle of action, and then studies love as an act proper to the will.

Love As an Affective Principle of Action

Perhaps the most striking feature of St. Thomas' portrayal of love as a principle of action in his biblical commentaries is that Thomas nowhere employs the technical terminology he develops in his systematic works. The word "*transformatio*" appears not at all in his biblical commentaries, while *complacentia,* although present, nowhere refers to love. Even without the technical terminology, however, Thomas does portray love as a principle of movement. In both his early and later commentaries he underlines love's emotional power to move and unite. He refers to charity's zeal and to its fervor.[6] He speaks of love as "*incentivus*," as setting the tone or as inciting to action.[7] When the Scriptures refer to fire, he explains, this often is a reference to charity that enflames us to advance upward.[8] Thus, Hosea rightly refers to the cords of charity (*vinculis caritatis*) that draw the people Israel to God.[9] Charity also

[6] *In Is.*, ch. 9, lectio 1: "Ultimo ponit motivum ad dandum: zelus, idest amor dei patris. Joan. 3: sic deus dilexit mundum ut filium suum unigenitum daret." *In Ioh.*, ch. 2, lectio 2 [392]: "Ubi sciendum, quod zelus proprie dicit quamdam intensionem amoris, qua intense diligens, nihil sustinet quod amori suo repugnet." *In Ioh.*, ch. 4, lectio 2 [614]: "deus autem tales quaerit qui scilicet eum adorent in spiritu et veritate, et in fervore caritatis, et veritate fidei." *In Ioh.*, ch. 6, lectio 5 [946]: "verbum autem dei patris est spirans amorem: qui ergo capit illud cum fervore amoris, discit."

[7] *In Is.*, ch. 28: "incentivo amoris: Cant. 4: comedite amici, et inebriamini."

[8] *In Job*, ch. 18, lectio 1: "per ignem enim ardor amoris significari solet, secundum illud Cant. VIII 6 lampades eius, lampades ignis atque flammarum." *Super Evangelium Johannis*, ch. 5, lectio 6 [812]: "Nam ignis duo habet: scilicet quod ardet et splendet. Ardor autem ignis significat dilectionem propter tria. Primo quidem, quia ignis inter omnia corpora est magis activus: sic et ardor caritatis, intantum quod nihil eius impetum ferre potest, secundum illud II Cor. V, V. 14: caritas christi urget nos. Secundo, quia sicut ignis per hoc quod est maxime sensitivus, facit multum aestuare, ita et caritas aestum causat quousque homo consequatur intentum; Cant. Ult., 6: lampades eius lampades ignis atque flammarum. Tertio sicut ignis est sursum ductivus, ita et caritas, intantum quod coniungit nos deo; I Io. IV, 16: qui manet in caritate, in deo manet, et deus in eo."

[9] *In Ier.*, ch. 13, lectio 1: "Lumbare, quod lumbis adhaeret, in quibus concupiscentia amoris: sic est populus in amorem divinum assumptus. Oseae 11: in funiculis Adam traham eos, in vin-

functions as a cord by uniting the virtues together and uniting them to their end.[10] Charity is the root and beginning of all the virtues. Charity plays this role, Aquinas explains, by uniting us to God in our affections: "Charity is called the root of all the virtues because it unites one to God, who is the ultimate end. Hence, just as the end is the principle of every action, so too charity is the principle of every virtue."[11] The love of charity, therefore, is the source from which all right desire flows.[12]

These themes remain present throughout St. Thomas' Biblical commentaries. In his last work, the unfinished *Commentary on the Psalms*, Thomas speaks of love as "a spur and a fire" (*stimulus et ignis*), paraphrasing Paul by asserting that "the Charity of God compels us" (2 Co 5.14).[13] The Psalmist, we learn, not only refers to love as a fire, but as wings that make us soar the heights of contemplation.[14] Aquinas also employs Augustine's analogy of weight: divine love is like a weight that "moves the whole man unwaveringly to God."[15] Aquinas further explains, in his *Commentary*

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culis caritatis. Lineum, quod rude de terra tollitur, sed cultu humano decoratur: sic ille populus cultu divino" *In Ier.*, ch. 31, lectio 1: "Et ostendens revocantis affectum: in caritate perpetua dilexi te, quasi dicat: non ad tempus, sed in perpetuum tibi bona largitus est, attraxit, ad locum tuum, miserans, misericordiam exterius beneficio complens. Oseae 11: in funiculis Adam traham eos, in vinculis caritatis. Supra 2: recordatus sum tui, miserans adolescentiam tuam, et caritatem desponsationis tuae."

[10] *In Col.*, ch. 3, lectio 3 [163]: "Secundum Glossam per omnes virtutes homo perficitur, sed caritas connectit eas ad invicem, et facit eas perseverantes, et ideo dicitur vinculum. Vel ex natura sua est vinculum, quia est amor, qui est uniens amatum amanti. Os. C. XI, 4: in funiculis Adam traham eos, in vinculis caritatis, etc." *In Ioh.*, ch. 6, lectio 5 [935]: "Sed quia non solum revelatio exterior, vel obiectum, virtutem attrahendi habet, sed etiam interior instinctus impellens et movens ad credendum, ideo trahit multos pater ad filium per instinctum divinae operationis moventis interius cor hominis ad credendum; Phil. II, 13: deus est qui operatur in nobis velle et perficere; Oseae XI, 4: in funiculis Adam traham eos in vinculis caritatis."

[11] *In II Cor.*, ch. 12, lectio 3 [472]: "caritas enim ideo dicitur radix omnium virtutum, quia coniungit Deo, qui est ultimus finis. Unde sicut finis est principium omnium operabilium, ita charitas est principium omnium virtutum."

[12] *Ad Rom.*, ch. 8, lectio 5 [693]: "Desideria autem recta ex amore caritatis proveniunt, quam in nobis scilicet facit. Supra V, 5: caritas dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris per spiritum sanctum, qui datus est nobis.

[13] *In Psalmos*, pars 25, n. 7: "Secundo solicitat, cum sit sicut stimulus et ignis, amor: Cant. 8: lampades ejus lampades ignis: 2 Cor. 9: caritas dei urget nos."

[14] *In Psalmos*, pars 54, n. 5: "Alia penna est caritas, quae maxime facit volare in contemplationem." *In Psalmos*, pars 16, n. 3: "sic et deus suis alis, quae sunt charitas et misericordia, justos defendit a rapacitate Daemonum. Matth. 23: quoties volui congregare vos, quemadmodum gallina congregat pullos sub alas, et noluistis? his ergo alis deus nos elevat ad superna: Ps. 88: misericordia et veritas praecedent faciem tuam, beatus populus etc.. Hier. 31: in charitate perpetua dilexi te, ideo attraxi te miserans."

[15] *In Psalmos*, pars 25, n. 7: "divinus amor facit totum hominem in deum tendere sine vacillatione."

on Job, that whether the love be good or bad, love is the principle of all our affections.[16] Returning to the Psalms, Aquinas says the same thing about the will: "The first movement in things that pertain to the will is the movement of love."[17] This movement is nothing other than a change occurring in the will that orients it toward the beloved. Stated another way, "every inclination of the appetitive power is located in love," which is why the love of God is both the first commandment and the fulfillment of the law.[18] In his *Commentary on Galatians*, when explaining charity's place among the fruits of the Spirit, Aquinas offers an analogy with natural inclinations.

> As with natural motions, where the first is the inclination of natural appetite toward its end, since the first interior motion is the inclination to the good, which is called love, so too the first fruit [of the Spirit] is charity—which has been poured into our hearts by the Holy Spirit (Rm 5.5)—and from charity these others are perfected: thus the Apostle says, 'above all these have charity which is the bond of perfection' (Col. 3.14).[19]

Inclination here signifies the appetitive equivalent of an inclined plane, whose slant orients the rolling of all spheres placed upon it.[20] The will's subsequent actions roll toward the beloved according to its initial appetitive slope. This conception of love as an inclination encourages Aquinas to describe charity as drawing us out of ourselves in ecstasy and as impelling us to serve God freely.[21] When, however, the will loves from charity, what exactly is the will's act?

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[16] *In Job*, ch. 1, lectio 2: "nam et amor terrenus ab amore dei deficit, et per consequens omnis affectio, nam cuiuslibet affectionis est amor principium."

[17] *In Psalmos*, pars 32, n. 5: "Primus motus in rebus quae sunt per voluntatem est motus amoris."

[18] *In Matt.*, ch. 22, lectio 4: "omnis inclinatio appetitivae virtutis est in amore: ideo habemus mandatum quod colamus deum in dilectione; ad Rom. XIII, 10: plenitudo legis dilectio est; ad Eph. III, 17: in caritate radicati et fundati."

[19] *In Gal.*, ch. 5, lectio 6 [330]: "Nam sicut inter motus naturales primus est inclinatio appetitus naturae ad finem suum, ita primus motuum interiorum est inclinatio ad bonum, qui dicitur amor, et ideo primus fructus est charitas, Rom. V, 5: *caritas Dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris*, et cetera. Et ex caritate perficiuntur aliae, et ideo dicit apostolus, Col. III, v. 14: *super omnia charitatem habentes*."

[20] The description of "*inclinatio*" as the appetitive equivalent of an inclined plane is not explicitly in Aquinas, but was suggested by Lawrence Dewan, o.p. in conversation with the author during a meeting of the American Catholic Philosophical Association.

[21] *In II Cor.*, ch. 5, lectio 3; *ibid*. ch. 7, lectio 3.

The Will's Twofold Act of Love

When the young Thomas Aquinas as a bachelor began his cursory exposition of the Book of the Prophet Isaiah, one of the first things he did was confront the apparently conflicting views in Isaiah concerning God's attitude toward sacrifice. St. Thomas affirms that "from the point of view of the thing sacrificed, our sacrifices please God in themselves (*per se*), but the sacrifices of the ancients did not."[22] Aquinas justifies this assertion by offering the following distinction with regard to love.

> Something is said to be pleasing or loved in itself (*per se*) when it has within its very self (*in se ipso*) what causes it to be loved, such as a noble good; when, however, something is loved only in relation to something else, we do not say that it is loved for itself (*per se*), such as when we describe cutting or burning as loved, because of their relation to the goal of health.[23]

Aquinas then explains that God loves our sacrifices for themselves because they contain the noble good of sanctifying grace, while he loved the sacrifices of the Old Law only as signs of this future grace. Thus, he did not love them for themselves, but only in relation to what would come later.[24] In the context of his psychology of love, this distinction is significant because it marks the first time that the young Aquinas distinguishes between loving something for itself (*per se*) and loving something in relation to another (either oneself or someone else). Although he does not explicitly state what "to love" means, his description of God's loving acceptance of our sacrifices implies that to love something *per se* is to accept, to affirm or to be pleased with it.

This is how things stand until Thomas undertakes his first systematic study of theology in his *Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard*. In his treatment of charity, although he still retains the distinction between loving something for itself and loving something in relation to another, he now introduces a distinction that enables him to express more clearly the will's twofold act of love. It is the distinction between the love of concupiscence and the love of benevolence or friendship — which

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[22] *In Is.*, ch. 1, lectio 3: "Ex parte rei oblatae, sacrificia nostra placent deo per se, non autem antiquorum sacrificia."

[23] *In Is.*, ch. 1, lectio 3: "placitum sive amatum dicitur per se quod in se ipso habet unde ametur, sicut bonum honestum; quod autem amatur tantum per relationem illius tantum ad alterum, non dicitur per se amatum, sicut dicitur secari vel uri amatum, secundum quod est ad finem sanitatis relatum."

[24] *In Is.*, ch. 1, lectio 3: "Nostra autem sacrificia in seipsis continent gratiam sanctificationis, secundum quam sunt deo accepta; sed illa antiquorum sacramenta vel sacrificia erant tantum signa istorum; et ideo non erant per se amata."

perhaps we can better translate as the love proper to friendship.[25] Aquinas affirms that if we consider the matter with care, we see that this distinction corresponds to two acts of the will: namely, to desire (*appetere*) which we have toward absent goods, and to love (*amare*), which we have for things that are somehow present.[26] In the love of concupiscence we desire a good not for itself, but in relation to something else. Aquinas offers the example of wine: which we love not for itself, but for the enjoyment it causes when we drink it.[27] In the love proper to friendship, however, we love the other as one with whom we share a likeness and for whom we will good. Already in the *Sentences*, Aquinas affirms that the love proper to friendship (*amor amicitiae*) wills the other's good (*volens bonum ejus*).[28] Specifically, it is a love that rests in the beloved, "either being pleased with the good he has or wishing for him the good he lacks."[29] Aquinas does not yet affirm explicitly that "to love is to will the good of another," but he is moving in that direction. The phrase is from Aristotle, and comes from Aristotle's definition of the act proper to friendship love (*philein*).[30] Aquinas seems to have discovered this definition sometime in the late 1260s, and only explicitly attributes it to Aristotle in his treatment of love in the *Summa theologiae*,

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[25] *In II Sent.* d. 3, q. 4; *In III Sent.* d. 29, a. 3; *In IV Sent.* d. 49, q. 1, a. 2, qa. 1, ad 3; *ST* I-II, q. 26, a. 4.

[26] *In II Sent.* d. 3, q. 4, a. 1: "Quidam enim distinguunt dilectionem concupiscentiae et amicitiae: quae duo si diligenter consideremus, differunt secundum duos actus voluntatis, scilicet appetere, quod est rei non habitae, et amare, quod est rei habitae."

[27] *In III Sent.* d. 29, a. 3: "cum objectum amoris sit bonum, dupliciter aliquis tendere potest in bonum alicujus rei. Uno modo ita quod bonum illius rei ad alterum referat, sicut quod bonum unius rei optet alteri, si non habet; vel complaceat sibi, si habet: sicut amat quis vinum, in quantum dulcedinem vini peroptat, et in hoc gaudet quod ea fruitur, non quod vinum ipsam habet; et hic amor vocatur a quibusdam amor concupiscentiae. Amor autem iste non terminatur ad rem quae dicitur amari, sed reflectitur ad rem illam cui optatur bonum illius rei. Alio modo amor fertur in bonum alicujus rei ita quod ad rem ipsam terminatur, inquantum bonum quod habet, complacet quod habeat, et bonum quod non habet optatur ei; et hic est amor benevolentiae, qui est principium amicitiae, ut dicit philosophus."

[28] *In II Sent.* d. 3, q. 4, a. 1: "Dilectio autem amicitiae est qua aliquis aliquid, vel similitudinem ejus quod in se habet, amat in altero volens bonum ejus ad quem similitudinem habet: et propter hoc philosophus dicit quod est similis a simili amari, sicut unus virtuosus alium diligit; in quibus tamen est vera amicitia."

[29] *In III Sent.* d. 29, a. 3: "ad rem ipsam terminatur, inquantum bonum quod habet, complacet quod habeat, et bonum quod non habet optatur ei."

[30] Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 2.4 (1380b35-1381a1): "To love (filein) signifies to will to another all that you hold to be good, and to do so for the other and not for yourself." The Medieval Latin version that was in circulation at the time renders this as follows: "Sit itaque amare velle alicui que putat bona, illius gratia, sed non sui" (*Aristoteles latinus: Rhetorica. Translatio Anonyma sive Vetus et Translatio Guillelmi de Moerbeka*, edited by Bernhard Schneider [Leiden: Brill, 1978], vol. 31.1-2, p. 228).

written in 1271.[31] To see how these insights influence Aquinas' analysis of love in the Scriptures, we shall consider his treatment of several biblical passages that consider the love of God, of neighbor, and of self, as well as God's love for us.

In his *Commentary on Galatians*, Thomas interprets the command to love one's neighbor as oneself (Ga 5.14) as primarily commanding that one's love of neighbor be true. He explains what he means by true love (*veritas dilectionis*) by appealing to Aristotle's definition of love's act. His analysis of the components of Aristotle's definition enables Thomas to explain that the call to love our neighbor as ourselves means that we should love him for his own good and not for our own utility or pleasure.

> Since 'to love is to will good to someone,' we are said to love both the one to whom we will a good and the good we will to him, but not in the same way. For when I will a good to myself, I love myself absolutely for myself, but the good which I will to myself, I do not love for itself but for myself. Accordingly, I love my neighbor as myself (in other words, in the same way that I love myself), when I will him a good for his sake, and not because it is useful or pleasurable to me.[32]

The challenge that this biblical love commandment poses stems principally from the difficulty of interpreting the meaning of the "as" in the phrase "as yourself." St. Thomas interprets it primarily to mean "in the same way" that one loves oneself. Just as we desire certain goods for ourselves, we should desire these goods for our neighbor and do so for his own good. To understand the innovation concerning self-love that Thomas introduces here, it suffices to compare it with the one advanced by Augustine, who in the *De Trinitate* affirms: "what is it to love oneself, but to will to be present to oneself, in order to enjoy oneself?"[33] Augustine's definition of self-love renders the commandment to love one's neighbor as oneself virtually incomprehensible. It would seem to imply that the love commandment is either enjoining us to enjoy our neighbor, or to promote our neighbor's enjoyment of himself. Aristotle's

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[31] *ST* I-II, q. 26. a. 4: "sicut philosophus dicit in II Rhetoric., amare est velle alicui bonum." St. Thomas adds, however, that charity has a further feature: charity wills the good of the other from a union of affection: *ST* II-II, q. 27, a. 2: "benevolentia est simplex actus voluntatis quo volumus alicui bonum, etiam non praesupposita praedicta unione affectus ad ipsum. Sic igitur in dilectione, secundum quod est actus caritatis, includitur quidem benevolentia, sed dilectio sive amor addit unionem affectus."

[32] *In Gal.*, ch. 5, lectio 3 [305]: "Amare enim est velle bonum alicui. Et ideo dicimur amare aliquem cui volumus bonum, et etiam bonum illud amamus, quod ei volumus; sed diversimode, quia cum volo bonum mihi, me diligo simpliciter propter me, bonum autem illud quod mihi volo, diligo non propter se, sed propter me. Tunc ergo diligo proximum sicut meipsum, id est eodem modo quo meipsum, quando volo ei bonum propter se, non quia est mihi utilis, vel delectabilis."

[33] *De trinitate* 9.2.2: "Quid est autem amare se, nisi praesto sibi esse velle ad fruendum se?"

definition offers Aquinas the tools for a more satisfying interpretation of this biblical injunction. We love our neighbor as ourselves when we will our neighbor's good for his sake and not for our utility or enjoyment.

But what are the goods we should will for our neighbor? Thomas discerns that the "as yourself" of the love commandment also refers to this, which Thomas portrays as the requirement that our love of neighbor be just. Thomas explains that we love ourselves rightly (justly) when we want for ourselves those goods that pertain to what is highest in us, namely our intellect and reason. Likewise, we rightly love our neighbor when we primarily will for him intellectual or rational goods.[34] St. Thomas develops this insight further in his *Commentary on the Gospel of John*, when he interprets the Lord's affirmation that "He who loves his life loses it, and he who hates his life in this world will keep it for eternal life" (Jn 12.25). Thomas once again appeals to Aristotle's definition of love to explain what it means to love oneself (or more specifically, to love one's own life): "to love someone is to will good to that person; so, to love one's own life is to will good to it."[35] Thomas notes, however, that there are two ways we can love our lives: absolutely (*simpliciter*) or partially and only in a certain sense (*secundum quid*). Thomas explains that the difference stems from the character of the good we will for our lives. We love ourselves without qualification when we will for ourselves the absolute good (*bonum simpliciter*), which is nothing other than the highest good (*summum bonum*), God himself. We loves ourselves only in a qualified way if we love only lesser things.[36] Thus, "one who wills the divine and spiritual good for his life, loves it unqualifiedly; while one who wills for it earthly goods, such as riches, honors, pleasures, and the like, loves it in a qualified way."[37] Armed with these distinctions, St. Thomas can now offer a convincing interpretation of the Lord's words: "the passage means, therefore, that *he who loves his life*, in a qualified way, that is, in regard to temporal goods, *loses it*, unqualifiedly," while "*he*

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[34] *In Gal.*, ch. 5, lectio 3 [305]: "Secundo modo, ut referatur ad iustitiam dilectionis. Unaquaeque enim res est inclinata velle sibi illud, quod potissimum est in ea; potissimum autem in homine est intellectus, et ratio; ille ergo diligit se, qui vult sibi bonum intellectus et rationis. Tunc ergo diligis proximum sicut teipsum, quando vis ei bonum intellectus et rationis."

[35] *In Ioh.*, ch. 12, lectio 4 [1643]: "Amare enim aliquem est velle ei bonum; ille ergo animam suam amat, qui vult ei bonum."

[36] *In Ioh.*, ch. 12, lectio 4 [1643]: "Qui ergo vult animae suae id quod est bonum simpliciter, simpliciter amat eam; qui autem vult ei aliquod particulare bonum, amat eam secundum quid. Bona autem animae simpliciter sunt illa quibus anima fit bona, scilicet summum bonum, quod est Deus."

[37] *In Ioh.*, ch. 12, lectio 4 [1643]: "Qui ergo vult animae suae bonum divinum et spirituale, simpliciter amat eam; qui autem vult ei bona terrena, puta divitias et honores, voluptates et huiusmodi, amat eam secundum quid."

who hates his life in this world will keep it for eternal life."[38] Once again, this nuanced account of the Lord's words becomes possible because of the definition of love's act that Aquinas takes from Aristotle's *Rhetoric*.

In his *Commentary on Galatians*, St. Thomas discerns one further meaning in the biblical commandment to love our neighbors as ourselves. In addition to signifying that our love for our neighbor should be true and just, the "as yourself" also conveys that we should order our love of neighbor to the proper end: "just as you love yourself for God, so you should love your neighbor for him, namely, that he attain God."[39] The importance of this last element becomes clear once we remember that Augustine influentially defines charity as "the spirit's motion toward enjoying God for himself, and enjoying oneself and one's neighbor for God."[40] The challenge for those reading Augustine was how to interpret the phrase "for God" (*propter Deum*). Aquinas helps the reader by interpreting it to mean "that he attain God." To love our neighbors "for God" is to love them in a way that helps them attain God. St. Thomas, therefore, interprets the "as yourself" of the love commandment to mean that our love of neighbor should be true, just and ordered to God. It is Thomas' discovery of Aristotle's definition of the love proper to friendship that enables him to offer this nuanced account.

Thomas further develops his understanding of charity's act when, in his *Commentary on Philippians*, he analyses St. Paul's affirmation that although he desires to "depart and be with Christ," it is more necessary for him to "remain in the flesh" for the sake of his ministry to the Church in Philippi (Phil 1.21-24). Thomas objects that St. Paul seems to choose the lesser good. The objection unfolds as follows: "The love of God rouses the first desire in us, while the love of neighbor the second. But the first is a greater and better desire. Therefore, [Paul has chosen the less perfect desire]."[41] Thomas responds to this objection by first describing charity's love for God.

> The love of God is twofold, namely, the love of concupiscence, by which a man wills to enjoy God and to delight in Him; and this is man's good. The other is the love of

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[38] *In Ioh.*, ch. 12, lectio 4 [1644]: "Et ideo dicitur *qui amat animam suam*, secundum quid, scilicet ad bona temporalia, *perdet eam*, simpliciter scilicet. . . . . *qui odit animam suam in hoc mundo, in vitam aeternam custodit eam*."

[39] *In Gal.*, ch. 5, lectio 3 [305]: "ut sicut te diligis propter Deum, ita et proximum propter ipsum diligas, scilicet ut ad Deum perveniat."

[40] *De Doctrina Christiana* 3.10 [16]: "caritatem voco motum animi ad fruendum deo propter ipsum et se atque proximo propter deum."

[41] *In Phil.*, ch. 1, lectio 3 [36]: "Primum enim desiderium excitat in nobis dilectio Dei, secundum dilectio proximi: maius autem et melius est desiderium primum, igitur, et cetera."

> friendship, by which a man prefers the honor of God, even over this delight with which he enjoys God; and this is perfect charity.[42]

Thomas' goal is to show that St. Paul's love of neighbor is perfect, but he does so by first describing charity's perfect love for God. Drawing on the distinction between the love proper to concupiscence and the love proper to friendship, which, as we have seen, he had already introduced (using slightly different vocabulary) in his *Commentary on the Sentences*, Thomas describes what he regards as two legitimate ways of loving God. We love God by desiring to enjoy him, and we love God by willing his honor. Only this latter love is perfect.

Once again a comparison with Augustine's most influential definition of charity illustrates the importance of Thomas' innovation. As we have seen, Augustine places enjoyment at the heart of his definition of charity: "I call charity the spirit's motion toward enjoying God for himself" etc.[43] This definition well describes St. Paul's own desire: "My desire is to depart and be with Christ" (Phil 1.23). Aquinas, however, although he sees this love as legitimate, regards it as imperfect. It is a love of concupiscence, which he will later describe, in the *Summa theologiae*, as the love proper to hope: "Hope presupposes love of that which a man hopes to obtain; and such love is love of concupiscence, whereby he who desires good, loves himself rather than something else. On the other hand, charity implies love of friendship, to which we are led by hope"[44] Hope is an imperfect love in two ways: it loves God as an absent good we desire to attain, and it is essentially a form of self-love: we love God as *our* fulfillment. Like an infant's desire for his mother's milk, hope's desire is legitimate, but transitory and in the service of a greater love: the friendship love that wills God's glory and honor. This is why, in Aquinas' view, Paul ultimately sees his continued service on earth as more necessary. To show that charity's friendship love for God was more powerfully active in Paul's life than his desire to enjoy God in heaven, Aquinas quotes Paul's affirmation that "I could wish that I myself were accursed and cut off from Christ for the sake of my brethren" (Rm 9.3). Aquinas asserts that Paul's words show that "he possessed a more perfect charity, as though for the love of God and neighbor he was prepared to lose

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[42] *In Phil.*, ch. 1, lectio 3 [36]: "duplex est dilectio Dei, scilicet dilectio concupiscentiae, qua vult frui Deo et delectari in ipso, et hoc est bonum hominis. Item est dilectio amicitiae, qua homo praeponit honorem Dei etiam huic delectationi, qua fruitur Deo, et haec est perfecta caritas."

[43] *De Doctrina Christiana* 3.10 [16]: "caritatem voco motum animi ad fruendum deo propter ipsum et se atque proximo propter deum."

[44] *ST* I-II, q. 66, a. 6, ad 2: "spes praesupponit amorem eius quod quis adipisci se sperat, qui est amor concupiscentiae, quo quidem amore magis se amat qui concupiscit bonum, quam aliquid aliud. Caritas autem importat amorem amicitiae, ad quam pervenitur spe."

the delight of seeing God."[45] From this perspective, as has been argued elsewhere, Augustine's definition of charity is essentially a definition of Christian hope as animated by charity.[46]

St. Thomas' fullest account in his biblical commentaries of the distinction between the love of concupiscence and the love of friendship occurs in his *Commentary on the Gospel of John*, when he analyses the ways in which the world loves its own. He first notes that "world" can signify both something positive and something negative. Positively, world signifies "those who lead a good life in the world," as when Paul says, "God was in Christ reconciling the world to himself" (2Co 5.19).[47] In this sense, world signifies "the Church of the good that has grown strong throughout the whole world."[48] Negatively, however, world signifies those who love the passing things of this world to the exclusion of God, as when the Scriptures affirm that "the whole world is in the power of the evil one" (1Jn 5.19).[49] It is this negative sense of world that the Lord employs when he says to the disciples, "If you were of the world, the world would love its own; but because you are not of the world, since I chose you out of the world, therefore the world hates you" (Jn 15.19). Thomas objects that the Lord appears to be in error here, because experience shows that the wicked do not appear to love each other, but instead are full of strife among themselves. In what way, therefore, does the world (taken in its negative sense) love its own?[50] To answer this question, Thomas turns once again to his twofold understanding of love.

> I reply by saying that love is twofold, of friendship and of concupiscence, but they differ: since in the love of concupiscence we draw what is external to us toward ourselves, and we love these others insofar as they are useful or pleasurable to us. But in the love of friendship the opposite occurs, since we draw ourselves to what is external to

[45] *In Phil.*, ch. 1, lectio 3 [36]: "ut ostendat se esse perfectioris caritatis, quasi sit paratus propter amorem Dei et gloriam carere delectatione visionis Dei; et ideo hoc elegit, et bene, tamquam magis perfectum."

[46] See Michael Sherwin, "Augustine and Aquinas on Charity's Desire," in *Faith, Hope and Love: Thomas Aquinas on living by the theological virtues*, edited by Harm Goris, Lambert Hendriks and Henk Schoot (Leuven: Peeters, 2015), 185-186.

[47] *In Ioh.*, ch. 15, lectio 4 [2032]: "his qui bene vivunt in mundo; II Cor. V, 19: *Deus erat in Christo, mundum reconcilians sibi*."

[48] *In Ioh.*, ch. 15, lectio 4 [2032]: "Ecclesiam bonorum per totum mundum roboratam."

[49] *In Ioh.*, ch. 15, lectio 4 [2032]. This reflection elicits from St. Thomas one of the rare occasions where he permits himself a play on words, affirming that armed with these two senses of world we can say that "the whole world hates the whole world" (Sic ergo totus mundus totum odit mundum: quia amatores mundi, qui sunt per totum mundum diffusi, odiunt mundum totum, idest Ecclesiam.).

[50] *In Ioh.*, ch. 15, lectio 4 [2036].

> us, because those we love in this way we treat the same as ourselves, sharing ourselves with them in some way.[51]

Thomas once again observes that love of concupiscence is here a form of self-love.

> The love of concupiscence is not a love for the thing desired but a love for the one desiring: for in this kind of love, one loves another because the other is useful, as was said. Therefore, in this kind of love, one is more loving himself than the other. For example, a person who loves wine because it gives him pleasure loves himself rather than the wine.[52]

In contrast, "the love of friendship is concerned more with the thing loved than with the one loving, because here one loves another for the sake of the beloved, and not for the sake of the one loving."[53]

The distinction between these two loves only helps St Thomas understand how the world loves its own, when he considers these loves' contrasting relationship to likeness. On one level, it seems obvious that the world loves its own, because as the Scriptures say, "Every creature loves its like" (Sir 13.15). Thomas can thus affirm that, "the world, that is, those who love the world, love those who love the world."[54] Thomas notes, however, that this is only the case with regard to the love proper to friendship: "in the love of friendship, likeness is a cause of love, for we do not love someone in this way unless we are one with that person: and likeness is a certain type of oneness."[55] In the love of concupiscence, however, a shared likeness is a cause of strife, because the similarity between the lovers hinders them in their pursuit of the useful or pleasurable goods they each desire. This is why "among the proud there is

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[51] *In Ioh.*, ch. 15, lectio 4 [2036]: "Responsio. Dicendum, quod duplex est amor: amicitiae scilicet et concupiscentiae, sed differunt: quia in amore concupiscentiae, quae sunt nobis extrinseca, ad nos ipsos trahimus, cum ipso amore diligamus alia, inquantum sunt nobis utilia vel delectabilia; sed in amore amicitiae est e converso, quia nosmetipsos trahimus ad ea quae sunt extra nos; quia ad eos quos isto amore diligimus, habemus nos sicut ad nosmetipsos, communicantes eis quodammodo nosmetipsos."

[52] *In Ioh.*, ch. 15, lectio 4 [2036]: "amor concupiscentiae non est rei concupitae, sed concupiscentis: propter hoc enim quis hoc amore aliquem diligit, inquantum est sibi utilis, ut dictum est. Et ideo magis diligit in hoc se quam illum: sicut qui diligit vinum quia est sibi delectabile, se potius quam vinum diligit."

[53] *In Ioh.*, ch. 15, lectio 4 [2036]: "amor amicitiae est potius rei amatae quam amantis, quia diligit aliquem propter ipsum dilectum, non propter ipsum diligentem."

[54] *In Ioh.*, ch. 15, lectio 4 [2034]: "mundus, idest amatores mundi diligunt mundi amatores."

[55] *In Ioh.*, ch. 15, lectio 4 [2036]: "in amore amicitiae similitudo est causa amoris, non enim sic diligimus aliquem nisi inquantum sumus unum cum eo: similitudo autem est unitas quaedam."

always strife" (Pr 13.10) and, as Aristotle notes, there are quarrels among those of the same trade, such as among potters.[56] Thomas explains this as follows: "so it is that the proud feud among themselves, for one takes for himself the glory that another loves and in which he takes pleasure. As for the potters, they quarrel because one takes for himself some profit which another wants for himself."[57] These fine grained reflections enable St. Thomas to demonstrate both the wisdom of the Lord's words and the truth underlying the objection to them. They enable him to explain how the world both loves and hates its own. Those who belong to the world, hate each other on the level of concupiscible love, since they hinder each other in their common pursuit of pleasure or utility. On the level of the love proper to friendship, however, the shared likeness of their corrupt characters provokes a certain mutual affection. The just have no fellowship with the wicked on this level, and thus the world hates them.[58]

The sharp contrast that St. Thomas sketches here between these two loves tends to overshadow his earlier attempts to integrate them into a single dynamic. As we have seen, in his *Commentary on Galatians*, Thomas employs Aristotle's definition of love to assert love's twofold character. "Since 'to love is to will good to someone,' we are said to love both the one to whom we will a good and the good we will to him, but not in the same way."[59] In his systematic works, he indicates that this distinction corresponds to the distinction between love of concupiscence and love of friendship:

> As the Philosopher says (*Rhetoric II*), 'to love is to wish good to someone.' Hence the movement of love has a twofold tendency: towards the good which a person wishes to someone (to himself or to another) and towards that to which he wishes some good. A person, therefore, has love of concupiscence towards the good that he wishes to another, and love of friendship towards him to whom he wishes good.[60]

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[56] See Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 8.1 (1155a35). Aristotle is alluding to the proverb found in Hesiod: "Potter with potter contends, and joiner quarrels with joiner" (*Works and Days*, 25). See also Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 2.4 (1381b).

[57] *In Ioh.*, ch. 15, lectio 4 [2036]: "Et inde est quod superbi iurgantur adinvicem, inquantum unus usurpat sibi gloriam quam alius amat, et in qua delectatur; figuli etiam, inquantum unus trahit ad se lucrum, quod alius pro se volebat."

[58] *In Ioh.*, ch. 15, lectio 4 [2036]: "Sic ergo, quia in amore amicitiae similitudo causa est amoris, dissimilitudo causa odii, inde est quod mundus odio habet quod suum non est et sibi dissimile, et diligit, idest dilectione amicitiae, quod suum est. Sed de dilectione concupiscentiae est e converso. Et ideo dicit *si de mundo fuissetis, mundus quod suum erat diligeret*, scilicet amore amicitiae.

[59] *In Gal.*, ch. 5, lectio 3 [305]: "Amare enim est velle bonum alicui. Et ideo dicimur amare aliquem cui volumus bonum, et etiam bonum illud amamus, quod ei volumus; sed diversimode."

[60] *ST* I-II, q. 26, a. 4: "sicut philosophus dicit in II Rhetoric., amare est velle alicui bonum. Sic ergo motus amoris in duo tendit, scilicet in bonum quod quis vult alicui, vel sibi vel alii; et in

When, therefore, St. Thomas describes the love of concupiscence as a form of self-love, he is not rejecting his overall psychology of love that sees every act of friendship love as containing a movement of concupiscible love. Instead, he is being elliptic, describing the case where we ourselves are the object of our love of friendship, desiring our own good by means of the love of concupiscence. That this is Aquinas' view becomes clear once we consider the rest of the passage from his *Commentary on Galatians* cited. Thomas illustrates love's twofold character precisely by offering the example of self-love: "for when I will a good to myself, I love myself absolutely for myself, but the good which I will to myself, I do not love for itself but for myself."[61] In Aquinas' view, therefore, whether we are loving God, neighbor, or ourselves, the will's love is always the twofold act of willing a good for the beloved.

The foundational example of love's twofold dynamic is God's love for us. In his *Commentary on Romans*, St. Thomas portrays this on the level of grace, once again employing Aristotle's definition of love, in this case to explain Paul's insistence on the priority of God's action.

> The primary source of grace is mentioned, namely, God's love. . . . For God's love is not called forth by any goodness in a creature, as human love is; rather, he causes the creature's goodness, because to love is to will good to the beloved. But God's love is the cause of things."[62]

Thomas proclaims this even more fully in his analysis of the Lord's famous affirmation to Nicodemus, "For God so loved the world that he gave his only Son, that whoever believes in him should not perish but have eternal life" (Jn 3.16). St. Thomas explains that this love is the source of all we have, both on the level of nature and of grace, and especially concerning the gift of eternal glory.

> The cause of all our good is the Lord and divine love. For to love is, properly speaking, to will good to someone. Therefore, since the will of God is the cause of things, good comes to us because God loves us. Thus God's love is the cause of the good of nature: 'You love everything that exists' (Ws 11.25). It is also the cause of the good of

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illud cui vult bonum. Ad illud ergo bonum quod quis vult alteri, habetur amor concupiscentiae, ad illud autem cui aliquis vult bonum, habetur amor amicitiae." See also the earlier formulation.

[61] *In Gal.*, ch. 5, lectio 3 [305]: "quia cum volo bonum mihi, me diligo simpliciter propter me, bonum autem illud quod mihi volo, diligo non propter se, sed propter me."

[62] *Ad Rom.*, ch. 1, lectio 4 [67]: "ponitur gratiae origo, quod est dei dilectio. . . . Dei enim dilectio non provocatur ex bono creaturae, sicut dilectio humana, sed magis ipsum bonum creaturae causat, quia diligere est bonum velle dilecto: voluntas autem dei est causa rerum."

> grace: 'I have loved you with an everlasting love, and so I have drawn you,' namely, by grace (Jr 31.3). But that we also be given the good of glory flows from great charity.[63]

St. Thomas then argues that in this famous verse (Jn 3.16), Jesus reveals how God's charity is not just great, but is the greatest (maximam): because it is God who loves us, loving us while we were yet sinners, giving us the greatest gift, his son, which bears the fruit of eternal life. Once again, it is by employing Aristotle's simple definition of love's act that Thomas can help the reader better understand the biblical account of divine love.

Conclusion

We began this sketch by asking to what extent does Thomas Aquinas employ in his biblical commentaries the psychology of love he develops in his systematic works of theology. Specifically, to what extent does he portray love as an affective principle of action, and to what degree does he portray the will's love as a twofold love, whereby we will good to another? The initial evidence offered in these pages demonstrates that he does both. Although he avoids some of the technical vocabulary he employs in the *Sentences* and the *Summa*, he nonetheless applies his understanding of love as passive principle and of love as act to help the reader better understand the biblical message concerning love, both human and divine. A full account of St. Thomas' theology of love in his biblical commentaries would study a wider selections of texts and address the thorny question of the relative dates of composition of these works. This essay offers only a sketch, but perhaps it will encourage scholars to finish the portrait.

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[63] *In Ioh.*, ch. 3, lectio 3 [477]: "omnium bonorum nostrorum causa est dominus et divinus amor. Amare enim proprie est velle alicui bonum. Cum ergo voluntas Dei sit causa rerum, ex hoc provenit nobis bonum, quia Deus amat nos. Et quidem amor Dei est causa boni naturae; Sap. XI, 25: *diligis omnia quae sunt* et cetera. Item est causa boni gratiae; Ier. XXXI, 3: *in caritate perpetua dilexi te, ideo attraxi te*, scilicet per gratiam. Sed quod sit etiam dator boni gloriae, procedit ex magna caritate."

Towards A Biblical Thomism
Thomas Aquinas and the Renewal of Biblical Theology
Edited by Piotr Roszak and Jörgen Vijgen

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Aquinas Harmonization of Evangelical Morality and Philosophical Ethics

Christianity proposes a doctrine many of whose main points are mysteries. Therefore, relations between faith and reason require study and proper presentation by Christian thinkers, for they are not always evident. Usually, reflection and discussions have focused on theoretical aspects: the existence, nature and providence of God; the origin and destiny of man; his freedom, or his immortality; etc.

The transcendental importance of such speculative questions can hardly be overestimated, for, if we do not know the nature of reality, our conduct becomes blind and, ultimately, irrational. We cannot live as human beings without assuming, even implicitly, a certain answer to these great theoretical interrogations.

At the same time, because of our own nature of rational animals, the problems that affect us daily are often quite practical. We are more often concerned with behavioural problems than with divine attributes. Our thoughts are assiduous in the pursuit of practical goals and not so much in the resolution of theoretical questions. We dedicate more time to the urgent and immediate issues than to the important, lasting, ultimate matters. It is quite natural: even Aristotle, in his *Metaphysics,* admits that First Philosophy is more a divine activity than a human practice.[1]

Thus, paradoxes and apparent opposition between Christian doctrine and human wisdom usually occurs on a practical level, much more frequently than in the theoretical and purely intellectual order. It is mainly regarding actual behaviour that Christianity appears as a sign of contradiction for purely human prudence, for, indeed, Jesus advised to turn the other cheek; to give not only the robe but also the mantle; to seek the last place and not the first; to be meek and humble instead of righteous and proud. Not only in our time, but in all times, every Christian has expe-

[1] *Metaphysica* I, 1 (982b25 ff.).

rienced in his interior, again and again, every day, the struggle between very human tendencies and very Christian demands. For non-Christians, these same exigencies have seemed admirable to some, foolish to others, shocking to all.

The Beatitudes are, perhaps, the evangelical doctrine where this divergence between the teaching of Christ and the common sense of men is most clearly noticed. No one had ever called blessed the poor and humble, happy those who mourn, those who lack justice, those who are slandered and persecuted. And is it not natural? If we desire good to others we avoid humiliating, saddening, aggravating them. The charity demanded by Christ himself is, indeed, to feed those hungry or thirsty; to behave with justice, with truth, with generosity. How do sufferings and blessings combine? Are we happy denying ourselves? This is the Christian paradox that produces in us ordinary, average, everyday struggle.

Thomas Aquinas is an indisputable referent in the resolution of apparent conflicts between human evidences and Christian doctrine.[2] My purpose here is to approach his thought about the harmony between the philosophical, human ethics, and the evangelical morality of the Beatitudes.[3] In Aquinas's biography, they often appeared as antithetical. For instance, shortly after entering the Dominican Order, his family opposed him and locked him in a castle, considering unrighteous that Thomas, at the age of fourteen, disposed of his own life without asking permission to his mother, both head of the family and feudal *domina*. Subsequently, and until the end of his life, Thomas had to defend himself against those who criticized the mendicant orders, because a healthy and capable man is responsible for his own upkeep, and his begging for a life seems utterly immoral. We could add many other examples of the struggles Aquinas had to fight because of his Christian convictions and life; but it just suffices to say that Thomas was no stranger to what we see in the lives of those who give themselves fully to God, after Christ: by following the evangelical counsels radically, Thomas was misunderstood not only by the wicked, but also by the good and humanly judicious. It makes sense, then, to inquire for the answer that this great master gave regarding the harmony between natural ethics and the doctrine of the Beatitudes.

The first coincidence that Aquinas points out between both approaches lies in the same notion of blessedness or happiness, understood as the achievement of the

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[2] Cf. Francisco Canals Vidal, "Unidad según síntesis," *Espíritu* 63/147 (2014), 9-31.

[3] Regarding the importance of the beatitudes for Aquinas's moral doctrine, see Marie-Dominique Roland-Gosselin, "Le Sermon sur la Montagne et la théologie thomiste," *Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques* 17 (1928), 201-234; Servais-Théodore Pinckaers, *La quête du bonheur* (Téqui : Paris 1979); Serge-Thomas Bonino, "Les béatitudes au coeur de la théologie de saint Thomas d'Aquin," *Doctor Communis* (2015), 32-48.

best goal, the last completion of man. Achieving good is nothing but improving our lives. The greatest good, therefore, lies in the best life. Now, life is lived by acting, exercising operations. Therefore, the highest good, the best life, is achieved by the most perfect operation. Such perfection in action requires, in turn, a perfected ability, a permanent disposition of our soul faculties to act with full success, ease and delight. We call these dispositions virtues. Thus, St. Thomas writes, "blessedness or happiness, according to the Philosopher, is the operation according to perfect virtue" [4], a living not only culminating and delightful, but also perfect and excellent.[5]

Such perfection in exercise is the second point where the Thomistic doctrine of the Beatitudes fully agrees with Aristotle, the non-Christian philosopher who has best penetrated the nature of human virtues.[6]

Actions, says Thomas[7], are appropriate to human life for three reasons. First, because the prevailing faculty is reason or, at least, it obeys to reason. In fact, man is

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[4] *In III Sent.*, d. 34, q. 1, a. 4, s. c. 2.

[5] *ST* I-II, q. 70, a. 2 co.: "plus requiritur ad rationem beatitudinis, quam ad rationem fructus. Nam ad rationem fructus sufficit quod sit aliquid habens rationem ultimi et delectabilis, sed ad rationem beatitudinis, ulterius requiritur quod sit aliquid perfectum et excellens. Unde omnes beatitudines possunt dici fructus, sed non convertitur. Sunt enim fructus quaecumque virtuosa opera, in quibus homo delectatur. Sed beatitudines dicuntur solum perfecta opera, quae etiam, ratione suae perfectionis, magis attribuuntur donis quam virtutibus."

[6] Cf. Jörn Müller, "*Duplex beatitudo*: Aristotle's Legacy and Aquinas's Conception of Human Happiness," in *Aquinas and the Nicomachean Ethics*, eds. Tobias Hoffmann, Jörn Müller and Matthias Perkams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 52-71.

[7] *In III Sent.*, d. 34, q. 1, a. 1 co.: "alii dicunt, quod dona dantur ad altiores actus quam sint actus virtutum; et haec opinio inter omnes vera videtur. Unde ad hujus intellectum sciendum, quod cum virtus in omnibus rebus inveniri possit, secundum quod habent aliquas proprias operationes, in quibus ad bene operandum ex propria virtute perficiuntur; loquentes tamen in morali materia de virtute, intelligimus de virtute humana, quae quidem ad operationem humanam bene exequendam perficit. Operatio autem hominis potest dici tripliciter. Primo ex potentia eliciente vel imperante operationem; sicut operatio rationis vel alicujus potentiae quae obedit rationi, quia a ratione habet homo quod sit homo; nutriri autem et videre non sunt operationes hominis inquantum est homo, sed inquantum est vivum vel animal; et secundum hoc omnes habitus perficientes ad operationes aliquas in quibus non communicat homo cum brutis, possunt dici virtutes humanae. Secundo dicitur operatio humana ex materia, sive objecto, sicut illae quae habent pro materia passiones, sive operationes humanas: sic enim virtutes morales proprie virtutes humanae dicuntur. Unde dicit Philosophus X *Ethicorum*, quod opus speculativae virtutis est magis divinum quam humanum: quia habet necessaria et aeterna pro materia, non autem humana. Tertio dicitur humana ex modo, quia scilicet in operationibus humanis vel primo vel secundo modo, etiam modus humanus servatur. Si autem ea quae hominis sunt, supra humanum modum quis exequatur, erit operatio non humana simpliciter, sed quodammodo divina. Unde Philosophus, in VII *Ethicorum*, contra virtutem simpliciter dividit virtutem heroicam, quam divinam dicit, eo quod per excellentiam virtutis homo fit quasi Deus. Et secundum hoc dico, quod dona a virtutibus distinguuntur in hoc quod virtutes perficiunt ad actus modo humano, sed dona ultra humanum

man precisely because he is rational: a rational animal. Human faculties other than intelligence belong to vegetative or to animal life: they are not specifically ours, but we share them with plants and animals. Therefore, the properly human virtues and acts are those that we do not share with irrational beings. From here, Aristotle and Aquinas obtain an important corollary. There is a genuine human happiness that works fully according to reason. But whoever is guided by divine wisdom, by a wisdom superior to that of men, such person is capable of even more perfect actions, so that Aquinas writes: "also Aristotle says in the chapter *On Good Fortune* [of the *Eudemian Ethics]* that those who behave by a divine instinct should not decide or receive advice from human reason, but they must follow their inner instinct, because they are moved by a better principle than man's reason".[8] Precisely this divine instinct, free from the limitations of human intellect, specifies in the theology of Aquinas the gifts of the Holy Spirit, and distinguishes them from the virtues, whether human or infused.[9]

When man behaves under the divine inspiration, and not guided by human reason, his actions may certainly seem excessive, reckless, foolish: such is the case,

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modum: quod patet in fide et intellectu. Connaturalis enim modus humanae naturae est ut divina non nisi per speculum creaturarum et aenigmata similitudinum percipiat; et ad sic percipienda divina perficit fides, quae virtus dicitur. Sed intellectus donum, ut Gregorius dicit, de auditis mentem illustrat, ut homo etiam in hac vita praelibationem futurae manifestationis accipiat; et ad hoc etiam consonat nomen doni. Illud enim proprie donum dici debet quod ex sola liberalitate donantis competit ei in quo est, et non ex debito suae conditionis."

[8] *ST* I-II, q. 68, a. 1 co.: "in homine est duplex principium movens, unum quidem interius, quod est ratio; aliud autem exterius, quod est Deus, ut supra dictum est; et etiam Philosophus hoc dicit, in capitulo *De bona fortuna*. Manifestum est autem quod omne quod movetur, necesse est proportionatum esse motori, et haec est perfectio mobilis inquantum est mobile, dispositio qua disponitur ad hoc quod bene moveatur a suo motore. Quanto igitur movens est altior, tanto necesse est quod mobile perfectiori dispositione ei proportionetur, sicut videmus quod perfectius oportet esse discipulum dispositum, ad hoc quod altiorem doctrinam capiat a docente. Manifestum est autem quod virtutes humanae perficiunt hominem secundum quod homo natus est moveri per rationem in his quae interius vel exterius agit. Oportet igitur inesse homini altiores perfectiones, secundum quas sit dispositus ad hoc quod divinitus moveatur. Et istae perfectiones vocantur dona, non solum quia infunduntur a Deo; sed quia secundum ea homo disponitur ut efficiatur prompte mobilis ab inspiratione divina, sicut dicitur Isaiae L, *Dominus aperuit mihi aurem; ego autem non contradico, retrorsum non abii*. Et Philosophus etiam dicit, in capitulo *De bona fortuna*, quod his qui moventur per instinctum divinum, non expedit consiliari secundum rationem humanam, sed quod sequantur interiorem instinctum, quia moventur a meliori principio quam sit ratio humana. Et hoc est quod quidam dicunt, quod dona perficiunt hominem ad altiores actus quam sint actus virtutum."

[9] Cf. Andrew C. Pinsent, "The Gifts and Fruits of the Holy Spirit," in: *The Oxford Handbook of Aquinas*, eds. Brian Davies and Eleonor Stump (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 475-488.

precisely, of the eight beatitudes, which Thomas, following St. Augustine[10], ascribes to the gifts of the Holy Spirit[11]; so that poverty of spirit follows the gift of fear of God, which corrects injudicious desires; meekness is subsequent to the gift of piety, which perfects our wishes towards others; crying for misdemeanours follows the gift of science, which governs practical judgment; hunger and thirst for justice follow the gift of fortitude, which corrects the irascible appetite; mercy follows the gift of counsel, which improves the knowledge of practical reason; a pure heart follows the gift of intelligence[12], which perfects the contemplative knowledge; peace follows the gift of wisdom, which makes us know better the necessary; and, finally, resilience in persecutions follows the fullness of the life of the Spirit[13], where all the shared gifts are united.[14]

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[10] *ST* II-II, q. 83, a. 9, ad 3: "Augustinus, in libro *De sermone Domini in monte*, adaptat septem petitiones donis et beatitudinibus, dicens: 'si timor Dei est quo beati sunt pauperes spiritu, petamus ut sanctificetur in hominibus nomen Dei timore casto. Si pietas est qua beati sunt mites, petamus ut veniat regnum eius, ut mitescamus, nec ei resistamus. Si scientia est qua beati sunt qui lugent, oremus ut fiat voluntas eius, quia sic non lugebimus. Si fortitudo est qua beati sunt qui esuriunt, oremus ut panis noster quotidianus detur nobis. Si consilium est quo beati sunt misericordes, debita dimittamus, ut nobis nostra dimittantur. Si intellectus est quo beati sunt mundo corde, oremus ne habeamus duplex cor, temporalia sectando, de quibus tentationes fiunt in nobis. Si sapientia est qua beati sunt pacifici quoniam filii Dei vocabuntur, oremus ut liberemur a malo, ipsa enim liberatio liberos nos faciet filios Dei'." See also Servais-Théodore Pinckaers, "Le commentaire du Sermon sur la montagne par saint Augustin et la moral de saint Thomas," *Revue d'Éthique et de Theologie Morale* no. 253 (2009), 9-28.

[11] *ST* I-II, q. 68, a. 4 co.: "dona sunt quidam habitus perficientes hominem ad hoc quod prompte sequatur instinctum Spiritus Sancti, sicut virtutes morales perficiunt vires appetitivas ad obediendum rationi. Sicut autem vires appetitivae natae sunt moveri per imperium rationis, ita omnes vires humanae natae sunt moveri per instinctum Dei, sicut a quadam superiori potentia. Et ideo in omnibus viribus hominis quae possunt esse principia humanorum actuum, sicut sunt virtutes, ita etiam sunt dona, scilicet in ratione, et in vi appetitiva. Ratio autem est speculativa et practica, et in utraque consideratur apprehensio veritatis, quae pertinet ad inventionem; et iudicium de veritate. Ad apprehensionem igitur veritatis, perficitur speculativa ratio per intellectum; practica vero per consilium. Ad recte autem iudicandum, speculativa quidem per sapientiam, practica vero per scientiam perficitur. Appetitiva autem virtus, in his quidem quae sunt ad alterum, perficitur per pietatem. In his autem quae sunt ad seipsum, perficitur per fortitudinem contra terrorem periculorum, contra concupiscentiam vero inordinatam delectabilium, per timorem, secundum illud Proverb. XV, *per timorem Domini declinat omnis a malo*; et in Psalmo CXVIII, *confige timore tuo carnes meas, a iudiciis enim tuis timui*. Et sic patet quod haec dona extendunt se ad omnia ad quae se extendunt virtutes tam intellectuales quam morales."

[12] Cf. Joseph McGuinness, "The Distinctive Nature of the Gift of Understanding," *The Thomist* 3 (1941), 217-278.

[13] *In III Sent.*, d. 34, q. 1, a. 5 co.: "Secundum Philosophum autem, omnis operatio procedens ex habitu perficiente naturam, habet delectationem annexam; unde cum felicitas vel beatitudo sit operatio secundum virtutem perfectam, quoddam formale completivum beatitudinis

As we have seen, a way of life is human if it is governed by reason; but, according to Aristotle and Aquinas, there is another even more perfect and happy life, the one guided by God, which our intelligence alone cannot fully understand.

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est ipsa delectatio; et ideo fructus qui delectationem nominant, beatitudinibus respondent, sicut beatitudines donis. Inter fructus autem computantur quidam qui sunt essentialiter delectatio, ut gaudium quantum ad unionem et praesentiam bonorum; et pax quantum ad remotionem impedimentorum perturbantium delectationem; et ideo hi duo fructus respondent omnibus donis et beatitudinibus. Quidam vero ponuntur quasi ratio delectationis et causa. Est autem delectatio in operibus activae et contemplativae vitae. In operibus autem activae vitae ratio delectationis est duplex. Uno modo ex remotione impedientium veram delectationem spiritus: delectatio enim ex operatione non impedita causatur, secundum Philosophum. Alio modo ex praesentia bonorum spiritui convenientium. Impeditur autem spiritualis delectatio vitae activae dupliciter. Uno modo per delectationes contrarias, scilicet bonorum temporalium: sicut enim operationes contrariae sunt, ita et delectationes, ut dicit Philosophus in X *Ethicorum*. Temporalis autem delectatio vel est in bonis exterioribus, scilicet divitiis et honoribus; et hanc delectationem cohibet modestia, quae fructus ponitur, et respondet paupertati spiritus: vel etiam in delectationibus carnis; et sic reprimuntur vel abstinendo ab illicitis, quod facit castitas, vel etiam a licitis, quod facit continentia, secundum *Glossam*: et hi duo fructus respondent beatitudini luctus; et per consequens hi tres fructus respondent dono timoris quasi exequenti. Vel aliter secundum Philosophum in VII *Ethicorum*, potest distingui castitas a continentia, ut per continentiam sic reprimantur concupiscentiae ut non dominentur, per castitatem autem ut etiam subjiciantur. Alio modo impeditur delectatio spiritualis per exteriores difficultates: quae quidem consistunt vel in labore actionum, quem vincit longanimitas; unde hic fructus respondet quartae beatitudini, et dono fortitudinis: vel etiam in dolore passionum; et hic dupliciter vincitur. Uno modo ut per eas constantia animi non frangatur quantum ad seipsum; et hoc facit patientia; et hic fructus respondet octavae beatitudini: *beati qui persecutionem patiuntur*, et dono fortitudinis. Alio modo ut homo ab inferente non turbetur ad nocendum ei; et hoc facit mansuetudo; et hic fructus respondet mititati, quae est secunda beatitudo, et dono pietatis. Bonum autem conveniens secundum activam vitam, quod delectationem facit, est etiam in affectu, secundum quod homini omne bonum complacet et sui et alterius: hoc enim est hominem dulcem habere animum, et sic est bonitas -*Glossa*: 'dulcedo animi'- et in ordine ad effectum, secundum quod homo est bene communicativus suorum ad alios; et sic est benignitas; et hi duo fructus respondent beatitudini quintae, quae est de misericordia, et dono pietatis. Omnes autem praedicti fructus respondent donis consilii et scientiae quasi dirigentibus. In vita autem contemplativa non potest esse aliquid delectationem impediens, nisi ex parte activae vitae: quia secundum Philosophum delectationi quae est in considerando, non est contrarium. Unde non est ibi ratio delectationis nisi ex praesentia boni in quo mens quiescit; et hoc dupliciter. Uno modo per cognitionem spiritualium sine dubitatione, et sic est fides -*Glossa*: 'de invisibilibus certitudo'- et respondet sextae beatitudini, et dono intellectus. Alio modo per intimam unionem ad spiritualia, ex quo potest judicare de omnibus aliis, quia spiritualis omnia judicat, I Corinth. XI, et sic est caritas, et respondet septimae beatitudini, scilicet, *beati pacifici*, et dono sapientiae."

[14] *In Matt.*, cap. 5, l. 2: "omnia quae in inferioribus divisa sunt, in superioribus congregantur. Et quia in rebus humanis ista inveniuntur dispersa, et nos manuducimur per sensibilia, ideo Dominus per multa significavit illud praemium aeternum." Cf. Guy Boissard, "L'action de l'Esprit Saint. Un nouveau commencement," *Nova et Vetera* (Fribourg) 82 (2007), 265-282; idem, "Les dons du Saint-Esprit," *Nova et Vetera* (Fribourg) 87 (2012), 85-104, 225-243, 359-377.

Another improvement of human life corresponds to the second criterion according to which an action and a life are properly human. This second condition is the object of the activity.[15] We are rational animals and, for the same reason, it is very human that we care about our well-being, our security, our affections, our reputation, our freedom. All this is reasonable and human, precisely because it is the natural object of our actions. Now, a most perfect action, Aristotle points out, must have its most perfect object. If man were the highest being, politics, which pursues the common good in human matters, would be the main object of the best human life[16]. That is not the case, because the most perfect being is not man, but God. For this reason, the most perfect human life, according to Aristotle, is achieved when the highest faculty of man, his intelligence, has as his material object the most perfect object, which is God.[17] This, says the Stagirite, is more than a merely human life; it is divine, because it is assimilated in the fullest way to the living of God, which consists in His own intellectual knowledge.[18] Human being, with his reason, does not reach the plenitude of act of the perfect Intelligence that knows Itself, but, by the intellectual contemplation of God, man assimilates to this most perfect Being.

The Aristotelian doctrine on the material object of human happiness is assumed by Aquinas.[19] Christianity also teaches that blessedness, the full perfection of life, is accomplished by the intellectual vision of the divine Being. However, diverging from Aristotle, Christian doctrine maintains that such happiness is beyond even the most

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[15] *In III Sent.*, d. 34, q. 1, a. 1 co.: "Operatio autem hominis potest dici tripliciter. [...] Secundo dicitur operatio humana ex materia, sive objecto, sicut illae quae habent pro materia passiones, sive operationes humanas: sic enim virtutes morales proprie virtutes humanae dicuntur. Unde dicit Philosophus, X *Ethicorum*, quod opus speculativae virtutis est magis divinum quam humanum: quia habet necessaria et aeterna pro materia, non autem humana."

[16] *Ethica Nic.* VI, 7 (1141a20-22).

[17] *Ethica Nic.* X, 7; *Metaphysica* I, 2 (983a1 ff.). See also Antonio Donato, "Contemplation as the End of Human Nature in Aquinas's 'Sententia libri Ethicorum'," in *Virtue's End: God in the Moral Philosophy of Aristotle and Aquinas*, eds. Fulvio Di Blasi, Joshua P. Hochschild and John Langan, (South Bend IN: St. Augustine's Press, 2007), 27-43.

[18] *Ethica Nic.*, loc. cit.; *Metaphysica* XII, 9 (1074b19-20).

[19] *SLE*, lib. 10 l. 11 n. 9: "Et ideo manifestans quod dictum est, subdit quod homo sic vivens, scilicet vacando contemplationi, non vivit secundum quod homo, qui est compositus ex diversis, sed secundum quod aliquid divinum in ipso existit, prout scilicet secundum intellectum divinam similitudinem participat. Et ideo quantum intellectus in sua puritate consideratus differt a composito ex anima et corpore, tantum distat operatio speculativa ab operatione quae fit secundum virtutem moralem, quae proprie est circa humana. Sicut ergo intellectus per comparationem ad hominem est quiddam divinum, ita et vita speculativa, quae est secundum intellectum, comparatur ad vitam moralem, sicut divina ad humanam."

perfect natural human life[20], and it is only given by a supernatural participation in the very life of God.[21]

Developing this respect, Saint Thomas explains that the evangelical doctrine of the Beatitudes shows us the way of perfection according to two different specifications in the object of our actions.[22]

Regarding the first of these two specifications, human acts are more or less perfect according to their material object[23], which specifies our different faculties. In this regard, human conceptions of happiness are very different. Some place it in voluptuous life; others, in the active life; and, finally, some others in the contemplative life.[24]

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[20] Cf. Mary C. Sommers, "Contemplation and Action in Aristotle and Aquinas," in *Aristotle in Aquinas's Theology*, eds. Giles Emery and Matthew Levering (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 167-185.

[21] *ST* I-II, q. 62, a. 1 co.: "per virtutem perficitur homo ad actus quibus in beatitudinem ordinatur, ut ex supradictis patet. Est autem duplex hominis beatitudo sive felicitas, ut supra dictum est. Una quidem proportionata humanae naturae, ad quam scilicet homo pervenire potest per principia suae naturae. Alia autem est beatitudo naturam hominis excedens, ad quam homo sola divina virtute pervenire potest, secundum quandam divinitatis participationem; secundum quod dicitur II Petr. I, quod per Christum facti sumus *consortes divinae naturae*. Et quia huiusmodi beatitudo proportionem humanae naturae excedit, principia naturalia hominis, ex quibus procedit ad bene agendum secundum suam proportionem, non sufficiunt ad ordinandum hominem in beatitudinem praedictam. Unde oportet quod superaddantur homini divinitus aliqua principia, per quae ita ordinetur ad beatitudinem supernaturalem, sicut per principia naturalia ordinatur ad finem connaturalem, non tamen absque adiutorio divino. Et huiusmodi principia virtutes dicuntur theologicae, tum quia habent Deum pro obiecto, inquantum per eas recte ordinamur in Deum; tum quia a solo Deo nobis infunduntur; tum quia sola divina revelatione, in sacra Scriptura, huiusmodi virtutes traduntur."

[22] *ST* I-II, q. 63, a. 4 co.

[23] *ST* I-II, q. 63, a. 4 co.: "dupliciter habitus distinguuntur specie. Uno modo, sicut praedictum est, secundum speciales et formales rationes obiectorum. Obiectum autem virtutis cuiuslibet est bonum consideratum in materia propria, sicut temperantiae obiectum est bonum delectabilium in concupiscentiis tactus. Cuius quidem obiecti formalis ratio est a ratione, quae instituit modum in his concupiscentiis, materiale autem est id quod est ex parte concupiscentiarum. Manifestum est autem quod alterius rationis est modus qui imponitur in huiusmodi concupiscentiis secundum regulam rationis humanae, et secundum regulam divinam. Puta in sumptione ciborum, ratione humana modus statuitur ut non noceat valetudini corporis, nec impediat rationis actum, secundum autem regulam legis divinae, requiritur quod homo castiget corpus suum, et in servitutem redigat, per abstinentiam cibi et potus, et aliorum huiusmodi. Unde manifestum est quod temperantia infusa et acquisita differunt specie, et eadem ratio est de aliis virtutibus."

[24] *ST* I-II, q. 69, a. 3 co.: "beatitudines istae convenientissime enumerantur. Ad cuius evidentiam, est considerandum quod triplicem beatitudinem aliqui posuerunt, quidam enim posuerunt beatitudinem in vita voluptuosa; quidam in vita activa; quidam vero in vita contemplativa. Hae autem tres beatitudines diversimode se habent ad beatitudinem futuram, cuius spe dicimur hic

The happiness of the voluptuous life[25] is obtained with the satisfaction of desires, which provides pleasure. Now, if it is not accompanied by rationality as its

beati. Nam beatitudo voluptuosa, quia falsa est et rationi contraria, impedimentum est beatitudinis futurae. Beatitudo vero activae vitae dispositiva est ad beatitudinem futuram. Beatitudo autem contemplativa, si sit perfecta, est essentialiter ipsa futura beatitudo, si autem sit imperfecta, est quaedam inchoatio eius.» *Ibidem*, a. 4 co.: «praemia ista convenientissime assignantur, considerata conditione beatitudinum secundum tres beatitudines supra assignatas.» *In Matt.*, cap. 5 l. 2: «in istis verbis includitur omnis plena beatitudo: omnes enim homines appetunt beatitudinem, sed differunt in iudicando de beatitudine; et ideo quidam istud, quidam illud appetunt. Invenimus autem quadruplicem opinionem de beatitudine. Quidam enim credunt, quod in exterioribus tantum consistat, scilicet in affluentia istorum temporalium [...]. Alii quod perfecta beatitudo consistit in hoc quod homo satisfaciat voluntati suae [...]. Alii dicunt quod perfecta beatitudo consistit in virtutibus activae vitae. Alii quod in virtutibus contemplativae vitae, scilicet divinorum et intelligibilium, sicut Aristoteles. Omnes autem istae opiniones falsae sunt: quamvis non eodem modo. Unde Dominus omnes reprobat."

[25] *ST* I-II, q. 69, a. 3 co.: "Hae autem tres beatitudines diversimode se habent ad beatitudinem futuram, cuius spe dicimur hic beati. Nam beatitudo voluptuosa, quia falsa est et rationi contraria, impedimentum est beatitudinis futurae. [...] Et ideo Dominus primo quidem posuit quasdam beatitudines quasi removentes impedimentum voluptuosae beatitudinis. Consistit enim voluptuosa vita in duobus. Primo quidem, in affluentia exteriorum bonorum, sive sint divitiae, sive sint honores. A quibus quidem retrahitur homo per virtutem sic ut moderate eis utatur, per donum autem excellentiori modo, ut scilicet homo totaliter ea contemnat. Unde prima beatitudo ponitur, *beati pauperes spiritu*, quod potest referri vel ad contemptum divitiarum; vel ad contemptum honorum, quod fit per humilitatem. Secundo vero voluptuosa vita consistit in sequendo proprias passiones, sive irascibilis sive concupiscibilis. A sequela autem passionum irascibilis, retrahit virtus ne homo in eis superfluat, secundum regulam rationis, donum autem excellentiori modo, ut scilicet homo, secundum voluntatem divinam, totaliter ab eis tranquillus reddatur. Unde secunda beatitudo ponitur, *beati mites*. A sequela vero passionum concupiscibilis, retrahit virtus, moderate huiusmodi passionibus utendo, donum vero, eas, si necesse fuerit, totaliter abiiciendo; quinimmo, si necessarium fuerit, voluntarium luctum assumendo. Unde tertia beatitudo ponitur, *beati qui lugent*." *ST* I-II, q. 69, a. 4 co.: "Tres enim primae beatitudines accipiuntur per retractionem ab his in quibus voluptuosa beatitudo consistit, quam homo desiderat quaerens id quod naturaliter desideratur, non ubi quaerere debet, scilicet in Deo, sed in rebus temporalibus et caducis. Et ideo praemia trium primarum beatitudinum accipiuntur secundum ea quae in beatitudine terrena aliqui quaerunt. Quaerunt enim homines in rebus exterioribus, scilicet divitiis et honoribus, excellentiam quandam et abundantiam, quorum utrumque importat regnum caelorum, per quod homo consequitur excellentiam et abundantiam bonorum in Deo. Et ideo regnum caelorum Dominus pauperibus spiritu repromisit. Quaerunt autem homines feroces et immites per litigia et bella securitatem sibi acquirere, inimicos suos destruendo. Unde Dominus repromisit mitibus securam et quietam possessionem terrae viventium, per quam significatur soliditas aeternorum bonorum. Quaerunt autem homines in concupiscentiis et delectationibus mundi, habere consolationem contra praesentis vitae labores. Et ideo Dominus consolationem lugentibus repromittit." *In Matt.*, cap. 5 l. 2: "Opinionem illorum qui dixerunt quod [beatitudo] consistit in affluentia exteriorum, reprobat [Dominus]: unde dicit *beati pauperes*, scilicet quasi, non beati affluentes. Opinionem vero eorum qui ponebant beatitudinem in satisfactione appetitus, reprobat cum dic-

formal object, this life is not even human, but brutalized; so that, if everything is subordinated to such a material object, it impedes moral good and despises truth. Therefore, the first requirement for achieving the most perfect life is precisely to remove the obstacle of wrong desires: first of all, the disorderly desire for external goods, such as riches and honours. Human virtues achieve the human and moderate use of them, but the spiritual gifts go further, to the point of contempt of such external goods in comparison with divine goods. Therefore, explains Aquinas, the first beatitude calls the poor in spirit happy.[26]

Voluptuous life, along with the acquisition of the external goods, seeks also to satisfy irascible and concupiscible desires. Natural reason moderates them, but the gifts of the Spirit take us farther, to the stillness of the divine will, which makes us meek –second beatitude[27]– and rejects such pleasures, if necessary, even weeping for the evil they carry –third beatitude.[28]

Another conception of happiness, according to its material object, places it in active life[29], whose matter, in fact, is proper to human virtues. Virtues, indeed, temper

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it *beati misericordes*. Sed sciendum quod triplex est appetitus in homine: irascibilis, qui appetit vindictam de inimicis, et hoc reprobat, cum dicit *beati mites*. Concupiscibilis, cuius bonum est gaudere et delectari: hoc reprobat cum dicit *beati qui lugent*. Voluntatis, qui est duplex, secundum quod duo quaerit. Primo quod voluntas nulla superiori lege coerceatur; secundo quod possit restringere alios ut subditos: unde desiderat praeesse, et non subesse. Dominus autem contrarium ostendit quantum ad utrumque. Et quantum ad primum dicit *beati qui esuriunt et sitiunt iustitiam*. Quantum autem ad secundum dicit *beati misericordes*. Ergo et illi qui ponunt beatitudinem in exteriori affluentia, et qui in satisfactione appetitus, errant."

[26] Cf. Pedro Rodríguez, "Los pobres y el Reino de Dios," *Doctor Communis* (2015), 100-107.

[27] Cf. John P. Hittinger, "On Meekness, Piety and Reconciliation," *Doctor Communis* (2015), 108-120.

[28] Cf. Kurt Koch, "Beati gli afflitti perché saranno consolati," *Doctor Communis* (2015), 121-127.

[29] *ST* I-II, q. 69, a. 3 co.: "Beatitudo vero activae vitae dispositiva est ad beatitudinem futuram. [...] Activa vero vita in his consistit praecipue quae proximis exhibemus, vel sub ratione debiti, vel sub ratione spontanei beneficii. Et ad primum quidem nos virtus disponit, ut ea quae debemus proximis, non recusemus exhibere, quod pertinet ad iustitiam. Donum autem ad hoc ipsum abundantiori quodam affectu nos inducit, ut scilicet ferventi desiderio opera iustitiae impleamus, sicut ferventi desiderio esuriens et sitiens cupit cibum vel potum. Unde quarta beatitudo ponitur, *beati qui esuriunt et sitiunt iustitiam*. Circa spontanea vero dona nos perficit virtus ut illis donemus quibus ratio dictat esse donandum, puta amicis aut aliis nobis coniunctis, quod pertinet ad virtutem liberalitatis. Sed donum, propter Dei reverentiam, solam necessitatem considerat in his quibus gratuita beneficia praestat, unde dicitur Luc. XIV, *cum facis prandium aut coenam, noli vocare amicos neque fratres tuos* etc., *sed voca pauperes et debiles* etc., quod proprie est misereri. Et ideo quinta beatitudo ponitur, *beati misericordes*." *ST* I-II, q. 69, a. 4 co.: "Aliae vero duae beatitudines pertinent ad opera activae beatitudinis, quae sunt opera virtutum ordinantium hominem ad proximum, a quibus operibus aliqui retrahuntur propter inordinatum amorem proprii boni.

the desires, and thus dispose us for the most perfect life. And, besides, human virtues are like general justice, which fulfils what is due to oneself and to others. However, the supernatural gifts of the Holy Spirit go further, so that we fulfil that justice with even more abundant fervour. And it is in this outstanding way, teaches Aquinas, that the fourth beatitude calls happy those who hunger and thirst for justice.[30]

An even greater degree of perfection regards those goods not strictly due, but spontaneously bestowed. In respect to them, Thomas teaches that spiritual gifts go beyond the virtue of liberality for, out of reverence for God, they move to consider only the need of those who could not return the benefit, as the poor, the sick, the weak and the miserable. Therefore, the fifth beatitude places happiness in mercy.[31]

The third foremost doctrine of happiness according to its material object finds blessedness in the contemplative life.[32] Obtaining such happiness requires, above all,

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Et ideo Dominus attribuit illa praemia his beatitudinibus, propter quae homines ab eis discedunt. Discedunt enim aliqui ab operibus iustitiae, non reddentes debitum, sed potius aliena rapientes ut bonis temporalibus repleantur. Et ideo Dominus esurientibus iustitiam, saturitatem repromisit. Discedunt etiam aliqui ab operibus misericordiae, ne se immisceant miseriis alienis. Et ideo Dominus misericordibus repromittit misericordiam, per quam ab omni miseria liberentur." *In Matt.*, cap. 5 l. 2: "Illi autem qui ponunt beatitudinem in actibus activae vitae, scilicet moralibus, errant; sed minus, quia illud est via ad beatitudinem. Unde Dominus non reprobat tamquam malum, sed ostendit ordinatum ad beatitudinem: quia vel ordinantur ad seipsum, sicut temperantia et huiusmodi, et finis eorum est munditia cordis, quia faciunt vincere passiones; vel ordinantur ad alterum, et sic finis eorum est pax, et huiusmodi: *opus* enim *iustitiae est pax*. Et ideo istae virtutes sunt viae in beatitudinem, et non ipsa beatitudo; et hoc est *beati mundo corde quoniam ipsi Deum videbunt*. Non dicit *vident*, quia hoc esset ipsa beatitudo. Et iterum beati pacifici, non quia pacifici, sed quia in aliud tendunt, *quoniam filii Dei vocabuntur*."

[30] Cf. Savio Hon Tai-Fai, "Beati quelli che hanno fame e sete della giustizia perchè saranno saziati," *Doctor Communis* (2015), 128-130.

[31] Cf. Leo Elders, "St. Thomas Aquinas and the Beatitude of the Merciful," *Doctor Communis* (2015), 131-136.

[32] *ST* I-II, q. 69, a. 3 co.: «Ea vero quae ad contemplativam vitam pertinent, vel sunt ipsa beatitudo finalis, vel aliqua inchoatio eius, et ideo non ponuntur in beatitudinibus tanquam merita, sed tanquam praemia. Ponuntur autem tanquam merita effectus activae vitae, quibus homo disponitur ad contemplativam vitam. Effectus autem activae vitae, quantum ad virtutes et dona quibus homo perficitur in seipso, est munditia cordis, ut scilicet mens hominis passionibus non inquinetur. Unde sexta beatitudo ponitur, *beati mundo corde*. Quantum vero ad virtutes et dona quibus homo perficitur in comparatione ad proximum, effectus activae vitae est pax; secundum illud Isaiae XXXII, *opus iustitiae pax*. Et ideo septima beatitudo ponitur, *beati pacifici*." *ST* I-II, q. 69, a. 4 co.: "Aliae vero duae ultimae beatitudines pertinent ad contemplativam felicitatem seu beatitudinem, et ideo secundum convenientiam dispositionum quae ponuntur in merito, praemia redduntur. Nam munditia oculi disponit ad clare videndum, unde mundis corde divina visio repromittitur. Constituere vero pacem vel in seipso vel inter alios, manifestat hominem esse Dei imitatorem, qui est Deus unitatis et pacis. Et ideo pro praemio redditur ei gloria divinae filiationis, quae est in perfecta coniunctione ad Deum per sapientiam consummatam." *In Matt.*, cap. 5 l. 2:

the perfect fruit of a right active life, beginning by the correct treatment of man to himself. Therefore, the sixth beatitude places happiness in the purity of the heart.[33] It also requires perfection in the good treatment of others, whose fruit is peace. Therefore, the seventh beatitude calls peace makers happy.[34]

This journey, portrayed by Aquinas, illustrates a progressive gradation in the perfection of human existence. To be guided, not by reason, but by God himself, is already an improvement in human life, which enables us to participate in the divine life; but, moreover, it is a path that progressively brings us closer to the perfection of the various faculties of man, from our lowest and most animal capacities to the moral perfection, requisite and anteroom of divine contemplation.

For Aristotle, there are actions and virtues better than others because they achieve a higher end. The virtues and operations whose material objects are most perfect stand also better; and, for this reason, the contemplation of the divine is better than political virtue, for instance. Aquinas adds a dynamic in this hierarchy of lives, precisely in the order of the Beatitudes, for, in most cases, God improves man progressively.

Aquinas also adds that, in the dynamic order of the classification of acts by their matter, next to the material object, we must consider too the nature of the end. For instance, although both medicine and veterinary medicine have as their material object the health of the body, they are specifically diverse because human nature is different and better than that of an irrational animal, so that the physician must seek the benefit of the patient, while a veterinarian may legitimately put first the interest of the owner of the animal. From this point of view, human and supernatural virtues (including gifts) are specifically different.[35] Thomas writes: "In the third book of *Politics*, Aristotle states that civic virtues are different according to the diverse polit-

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"Illorum autem opinio qui dicunt quod beatitudo consistit in contemplatione divinorum, reprobat Dominus quantum ad tempus, quia alias vera est, quia ultima felicitas consistit in visione optimi intelligibilis, scilicet Dei: unde dicit *videbunt*. Et notandum quod, secundum Philosophum, ad hoc quod actus contemplativi faciant beatum, duo requiruntur: unum substantialiter, scilicet quod sit actus altissimi intelligibilis, quod est Deus; aliud formaliter, scilicet amor et delectatio: delectatio enim perficit felicitatem, sicut pulchritudo iuventutem. Et ideo Dominus duo ponit *Deum videbunt* et *filii Dei vocabuntur*: hoc enim pertinet ad unionem amoris; *I Io.* cap. III: *videte qualem caritatem dedit nobis pater, ut filii Dei nominemur et simus*."

[33] Cf. Georges Cottier, "Bienheureux les coeurs purs car ils verront Dieu," *Doctor Communis* (2015), 137-148.

[34] Cf. Luz García Alonso, "Blessed Are the Peacemakers -Those Who Sow Peace- for They Will Be Called Children of God," *Doctor Communis* (2015), 149-154.

[35] See also David A. Jones, "Sin, Suffering, and the Need for the Theological Virtues," *Christian Bioethics* 12 (2006), 187-198; Steven A. Long, *Natura pura. On the Recovery of Nature in the Doctrine of Grace* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2010).

ical systems. And it is in this manner that the infused moral virtues –by which men become the fellow-citizens of the saints and relatives of God– are different of those other [humanly] acquired virtues through which man is well adapted to human issues".[36] In this way, for example, human prudence[37] has a natural goal, whereas the spiritual gift of counsel is directed to a higher end. And while it is true that any vice is opposed to human virtue as well as to infused and spiritual gifts, it is also true that sometimes the supernatural end may be incompatible with sensible and legitimate human goals. Hence, the beatitudes are often "foolishness to the gentiles", and the behaviour of the saints may scandalize even the good, wise and sensible... in merely human ways.

Thus, the importance of the distinction between the natural and the supernatural end of man should not be undervalued, even if both Aristotle and Thomas agree that God is the material object of man's best life.[38] If we attend to human natural goal, happiness may be accessible to man by his own capacity, as Aristotle teaches.[39] However, supernatural purpose exceeds human perfection, and requires the supernatural virtues and gifts of the Holy Spirit[40], so that, in this respect, human

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[36] *ST* I-II, q. 63, a. 4 co.: "dupliciter habitus distinguuntur specie. Uno modo, sicut praedictum est, secundum speciales et formales rationes obiectorum. [...] Alio modo habitus distinguuntur specie secundum ea ad quae ordinantur, non enim est eadem specie sanitas hominis et equi, propter diversas naturas ad quas ordinantur. Et eodem modo dicit Philosophus, in III *Politicorum*, quod diversae sunt virtutes civium, secundum quod bene se habent ad diversas politias. Et per hunc etiam modum differunt specie virtutes morales infusae, per quas homines bene se habent in ordine ad hoc quod sint cives sanctorum et domestici Dei; et aliae virtutes acquisitae, secundum quas homo se bene habet in ordine ad res humanas."

[37] Cf. Kevin Flannery, "The Beatitudes, Prudence (Acquired and Infused), Aristotle, and Aquinas," *Doctor Communis* (2015), 74-99.

[38] Cf. Reinhard Hütter, "`Desiderium naturale visionis Dei - Est autem duplex hominis beatitude sive felicitas´: Some Observations about Lawrence Feingold's and John Milbank's Recent Interventions in the Debate over the Natural Desire to See God," *Nova et Vetera. English Edition* 5 (2007), 81-132.

[39] Cf. Anthony Celano, "The Concept of Worldly Beatitude in the Writings of Thomas Aquinas," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 25 (1987), 215-226.

[40] *ST* I-II, q. 62, a. 1 co.: "per virtutem perficitur homo ad actus quibus in beatitudinem ordinatur, ut ex supradictis patet. Est autem duplex hominis beatitudo sive felicitas, ut supra dictum est. Una quidem proportionata humanae naturae, ad quam scilicet homo pervenire potest per principia suae naturae. Alia autem est beatitudo naturam hominis excedens, ad quam homo sola divina virtute pervenire potest, secundum quandam divinitatis participationem; secundum quod dicitur II Petr. I, quod per Christum facti sumus *consortes divinae naturae*. Et quia huiusmodi beatitudo proportionem humanae naturae excedit, principia naturalia hominis, ex quibus procedit ad bene agendum secundum suam proportionem, non sufficiunt ad ordinandum hominem in beatitudinem praedictam. Unde oportet quod superaddantur homini divinitus aliqua principia, per quae ita ordinetur ad beatitudinem supernaturalem, sicut per principia naturalia ordinatur

virtues even cease to be properly virtues[41], because they no longer qualify for the perfect operation or for the better life of man, which is accomplished in the contemplation, not of truths about God, as in Metaphysics, but in the intellectual vision of God's actual being.[42]

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ad finem connaturalem, non tamen absque adiutorio divino. Et huiusmodi principia virtutes dicuntur theologicae, tum quia habent Deum pro obiecto, inquantum per eas recte ordinamur in Deum; tum quia a solo Deo nobis infunduntur; tum quia sola divina revelatione, in sacra Scriptura, huiusmodi virtutes traduntur." *ST* I-II, q. 62, a. 3 co.: "virtutes theologicae hoc modo ordinant hominem ad beatitudinem supernaturalem, sicut per naturalem inclinationem ordinatur homo in finem sibi connaturalem. Hoc autem contingit secundum duo. Primo quidem, secundum rationem vel intellectum, inquantum continet prima principia universalia cognita nobis per naturale lumen intellectus, ex quibus procedit ratio tam in speculandis quam in agendis. Secundo, per rectitudinem voluntatis naturaliter tendentis in bonum rationis. Sed haec duo deficiunt ab ordine beatitudinis supernaturalis; secundum illud I ad Cor. II, *oculus non vidit, et auris non audivit, et in cor hominis non ascendit, quae praeparavit Deus diligentibus se*. Unde oportuit quod quantum ad utrumque, aliquid homini supernaturaliter adderetur, ad ordinandum ipsum in finem supernaturalem. Et primo quidem, quantum ad intellectum, adduntur homini quaedam principia supernaturalia, quae divino lumine capiuntur, et haec sunt credibilia, de quibus est fides. Secundo vero, voluntas ordinatur in illum finem et quantum ad motum intentionis, in ipsum tendentem sicut in id quod est possibile consequi, quod pertinet ad spem, et quantum ad unionem quandam spiritualem, per quam quodammodo transformatur in illum finem, quod fit per caritatem. Appetitus enim uniuscuiusque rei naturaliter movetur et tendit in finem sibi connaturalem, et iste motus provenit ex quadam conformitate rei ad suum finem."

[41] *ST* I-II, q. 65, a. 2 co.: "virtutes morales prout sunt operativae boni in ordine ad finem qui non excedit facultatem naturalem hominis, possunt per opera humana acquiri. Et sic acquisitae sine caritate esse possunt, sicut fuerunt in multis gentilibus. Secundum autem quod sunt operativae boni in ordine ad ultimum finem supernaturalem, sic perfecte et vere habent rationem virtutis; et non possunt humanis actibus acquiri, sed infunduntur a Deo. Et huiusmodi virtutes morales sine caritate esse non possunt. Dictum est enim supra quod aliae virtutes morales non possunt esse sine prudentia; prudentia autem non potest esse sine virtutibus moralibus, inquantum virtutes morales faciunt bene se habere ad quosdam fines, ex quibus procedit ratio prudentiae. Ad rectam autem rationem prudentiae multo magis requiritur quod homo bene se habeat circa ultimum finem, quod fit per caritatem, quam circa alios fines, quod fit per virtutes morales, sicut ratio recta in speculativis maxime indiget primo principio indemonstrabili, quod est contradictoria non simul esse vera. Unde manifestum fit quod nec prudentia infusa potest esse sine caritate; nec aliae virtutes morales consequenter, quae sine prudentia esse non possunt. Patet igitur ex dictis quod solae virtutes infusae sunt perfectae, et simpliciter dicendae virtutes, quia bene ordinant hominem ad finem ultimum simpliciter. Aliae vero virtutes, scilicet acquisitae, sunt secundum quid virtutes, non autem simpliciter, ordinant enim hominem bene respectu finis ultimi in aliquo genere, non autem respectu finis ultimi simpliciter. Unde Rom. XIV super illud, *omne quod non est ex fide, peccatum est*, dicit Glossa Augustini, *ubi deest agnitio veritatis, falsa est virtus etiam in bonis moribus*."

[42] *ST* I, q. 3, a. 4, ad 2: "esse dupliciter dicitur, uno modo, significat actum essendi; alio modo, significat compositionem propositionis, quam anima adinvenit coniungens praedicatum subiec-

Besides of this, the difference between man's earthly supernatural life of grace and beatific vision is so important that, according to Aquinas, justifies the structure that is repeated in each of the Beatitudes.[43] All of them indicate a meritorious action in this life and the reward[44] that corresponds to it, which is always blessedness, the fullness of supernatural life through the vision of God. However, Thomas goes back to Aristotle to justify that merit is already, in a certain sense, happiness: "imperfect virtue", he writes, "only makes hope for future happiness by merit. Perfect virtue creates expectations by merit but also by assimilation to happiness. It is in this way that, as Aristotle states in the first book of *Ethics,* we call good–natured children happy, insofar as they show some traces of future happiness".[45]

Following this same analogy, Thomas teaches that the poor in spirit, who renounces riches and honours, is given the abundance of the Kingdom of Heaven which, according to St. Augustine, can be understood as the beginning of perfect

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to. Primo igitur modo accipiendo esse, non possumus scire esse Dei, sicut nec eius essentiam, sed solum secundo modo. Scimus enim quod haec propositio quam formamus de Deo, cum dicimus Deus est, vera est. Et hoc scimus ex eius effectibus." *In Matt.*, cap. 5 l. 2: "Illorum autem opinio qui dicunt quod beatitudo consistit in contemplatione divinorum, reprobat Dominus quantum ad tempus, quia alias vera est, quia ultima felicitas consistit in visione optimi intelligibilis, scilicet Dei: unde dicit *videbunt*." See also Oscar J. Brown, "Saint Thomas, the Philosophers and Felicity," *Laval Théologique et Philosophique* 37 (1981), 69-82.

[43] *ST* I-II, q. 69, a. 2 co.: «ea quae in beatitudinibus tanguntur tanquam merita, sunt quaedam praeparationes vel dispositiones ad beatitudinem, vel perfectam vel inchoatam. Ea vero quae ponuntur tanquam praemia, possunt esse vel ipsa beatitudo perfecta, et sic pertinent ad futuram vitam, vel aliqua inchoatio beatitudinis, sicut est in viris perfectis, et sic praemia pertinent ad praesentem vitam. Cum enim aliquis incipit proficere in actibus virtutum et donorum, potest sperari de eo quod perveniet et ad perfectionem viae, et ad perfectionem patriae.»

[44] Regarding divine reward in Aquinas, see Shawn Colberg, '*Be Glad and Rejoice for Your Reward Is Very Great in Heaven*': *`Reward´ in the Theology of Thomas and Bonaventure*, doctoral dissertation, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame 2008.

[45] *In III Sent.*, d. 34, q. 1, a. 4, ad 2: "virtus imperfecta facit sperare beatitudinem futuram solum merendo ipsam; sed virtus perfecta per meritum et assimilationem ad ipsam; sicut etiam pueros bonae indolis dicimus felices, secundum Philosophum in I *Ethicorum*, inquantum in eis quoddam indicium futurae felicitatis apparet." *ST* I-II, q. 69, a. 1 co.: "beatitudo est ultimus finis humanae vitae. Dicitur autem aliquis iam finem habere, propter spem finis obtinendi, unde et Philosophus dicit, in I *Ethicorum*, quod pueri dicuntur beati propter spem; et Apostolus dicit, Rom. VIII, *spe salvi facti sumus*. Spes autem de fine consequendo insurgit ex hoc quod aliquis convenienter movetur ad finem, et appropinquat ad ipsum, quod quidem fit per aliquam actionem. Ad finem autem beatitudinis movetur aliquis et appropinquat per operationes virtutum; et praecipue per operationes donorum, si loquamur de beatitudine aeterna, ad quam ratio non sufficit, sed in eam inducit Spiritus Sanctus, ad cuius obedientiam et sequelam per dona perficimur. Et ideo beatitudines distinguuntur quidem a virtutibus et donis, non sicut habitus ab eis distincti, sed sicut actus distinguuntur ab habitibus."

wisdom, since the Holy Spirit begins to reign in them. [46] Now, something can be had without firmness or peace. For this reason, says Thomas, the meek, who renounces to the security of victory by litigation, obtains a greater good than the poor, namely, the solid possession of the land. Possessions, however, may not be alien to pain. Hence, Aquinas continues, that those who weep, renouncing to the comfort that pleasures can provide, are promised consolation. Such relief, but with the abundance of satiety, is further promised to those who hunger and thirst for justice. And it is promised beyond what could be expected by merits or desires, namely, with mercy, to those who do not turn away from others' misery. Greater still, continues Thomas, is the reward of those who have a pure heart, for they are promised not only the abundance of God's banquet, but to contemplate God himself. And the greatest recompense is promised to those who imitate the God of unity and peace, because their reward is the divine filiation, which is given in the perfect union with God through the consummation of wisdom.[47]

In this way, the meritorious actions described in the Beatitudes bring with themselves the hope of happiness; but their corresponding prizes, teaches Aquinas, begin already in this life progressively, even if they have full consummation only in the future life. For, indeed, happiness, as explained before, is the operation according to the perfect virtue. Thomas agrees with Aristotle in that such is the intellectual contemplation of God. But, for Aquinas, it would be wrong to think that in this life

[46] *ST* I-II, q. 69, a. 2, ad 3: "omnia illa praemia perfecte quidem consummabuntur in vita futura, sed interim etiam in hac vita quodammodo inchoantur. Nam regnum caelorum, ut Augustinus dicit, potest intelligi perfectae sapientiae initium, secundum quod incipit in eis Spiritus regnare. Possessio etiam terrae significat affectum bonum animae requiescentis per desiderium in stabilitate haereditatis perpetuae, per terram significatae. Consolantur autem in hac vita, Spiritum Sanctum, qui Paracletus, idest consolator, dicitur, participando. Saturantur etiam in hac vita illo cibo de quo Dominus dicit, *meus cibus est ut faciam voluntatem Patris mei*. In hac etiam vita consequuntur homines misericordiam Dei. In hac etiam vita, purgato oculo per donum intellectus, Deus quodammodo videri potest. Similiter etiam in hac vita qui motus suos pacificant, ad similitudinem Dei accedentes, filii Dei nominantur. Tamen haec perfectius erunt in patria." *Ibidem*, a. 4, ad 3: "etiam praemia secundum additionem se habent ad invicem. Nam plus est possidere terram regni caelorum, quam simpliciter habere, multa enim habemus quae non firmiter et pacifice possidemus. Plus est etiam consolari in regno, quam habere et possidere, multa enim cum dolore possidemus. Plus est etiam saturari quam simpliciter consolari, nam saturitas abundantiam consolationis importat. Misericordia vero excedit saturitatem, ut plus scilicet homo accipiat quam meruerit, vel desiderare potuerit. Adhuc autem maius est Deum videre, sicut maior est qui in curia regis non solum prandet, sed etiam faciem regis videt. Summam autem dignitatem in domo regia filius regis habet." Cf. *ibidem*, a. 3 co.; a. 4 co.; *In Matt.*, cap. 5, l. 2.

[47] Cf. Cruz González Ayesta, *El don de sabiduría según Santo Tomás. Divinización, filiación y connaturalidad* (Pamplona : Eunsa, 1998).

we can know God as He really is, for we cannot perceive Him except through the mirror of creatures and the enigmas of similarities. The spiritual gift of intellect, however, illustrates the content of faith, so that man begins to taste the future manifestation of God already in this life.[48] And charity is even better, for by it the will unites in a certain way to God and shapes us in conformance with Him[49], so that we reach a connatural knowledge of the divine being.[50] Such wisdom grows always greater as love increases[51] even to the mysterious plenitude of future glory, where God will be all in all things.[52]

We have entered here an area unsuspected for the philosophy of Aristotle, but, as Aquinas explains, not contrary to it.

As we have seen, Thomas distinguishes three respects in which a virtue, and its actions, can be called human, according to Aristotle. The first regard is that virtues and actions are directed by reason. Nevertheless, Aristotle, as Thomas points out, also teaches that even more perfect and divine is to be guided higher by the divinity. And that is the case of the gifts of the Holy Spirit, which impel us to act according to the Beatitudes.

A second way in which, according to the philosopher, virtues and acts are human is by their specification, namely by their object. Here, too, Aristotle admits that the most perfect life of man consists in the contemplation of the divine.

Now, regarding God's contemplation, Christianity adds that the divine principle that directs man –mentioned by Aristotle as superior to human wisdom– leads man to participate in the divine life beyond human capacity, elevating him to a su-

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[48] *In III Sent.*, d. 34, q. 1, a. 1 co.: "Connaturalis enim modus humanae naturae est ut divina non nisi per speculum creaturarum et aenigmata similitudinum percipiat; et ad sic percipienda divina perficit fides, quae virtus dicitur. Sed intellectus donum, ut Gregorius dicit, de auditis mentem illustrat, ut homo etiam in hac vita praelibationem futurae manifestationis accipiat; et ad hoc etiam consonat nomen doni. Illud enim proprie donum dici debet quod ex sola liberalitate donantis competit ei in quo est, et non ex debito suae conditionis."

[49] Cf. Joseph Wawrykow, "Christ and the Gifts of the Holy Spirit according to Thomas Aquinas," in *Kirchenbild und Spiritualität*, eds. Thomas Prügl and Marianne Schlosser, (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2007), 43-62. Regarding divine friendship and similarity, Aquinas also refers to Aristotle, cf. Guy Mansini, "Aristotle and Aquinas's Theology of Charity in the `Summa theologiae´," in *Aristotle in Aquinas's Theology*, eds. Gilles Emery and Matthew W. Levering (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 121-138.

[50] Cf. Michael Sherwin, *By Knowledge and by Love: Charity and Knowledge in the Moral Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas* (Washington D.C.: CUA Press, 2005); Heather M. Erb, "`Pati divina´: Mystical Union in Aquinas," in *Faith, Scholarship, and Culture in the 21st Century*, eds. Alice Ramos and Marie George (Washington D.C.: CUA Press, 2002), 73-96.

[51] *ST* I-II, q. 62, a. 3 co.

[52] *ST* I-II, q. 68, a. 6 co.; *ST* II-II, q. 44, a. 6 co.

pernatural order.[53] Even if Aristotle could not know the life of grace, and even if he identifies God's contemplation with metaphysical speculation, Aquinas shows that proper beatific vision is not much beyond the teaching of the philosopher.

Indeed, Thomas points out a glimpse of the life of grace in Aristotle, for, according to him, an action can be either human or superhuman in a third sense. Aquinas writes in this regard: "thirdly, [a virtue] is called human by its measure, because in actions that are human in the two previous senses also the human measure is followed. On the other hand, if one carries out that which is proper to man in a superhuman way, the operation will not be merely human, but divine in a certain way. For Aristotle, in the seventh book of the *Ethics*, distinguishes between the mere virtue and the heroic virtue, which he calls divine, for, because of the excellence of virtue, man becomes like a god." [54] And, indeed, that intimate knowledge of the essence of God which the saints attain[55], prefiguring the beatific vision, leads them to direct their actions with the wisdom and the power that only belongs to God.

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[53] Cf. Daria Spezzano, *The Glory of God's Grace: Deification according to St. Thomas Aquinas* (Ave Maria: Sapientia Press, 2015).

[54] *In III Sent.*, d. 34, q. 1, a. 1 co.: "Operatio autem hominis potest dici tripliciter. [...] Tertio dicitur humana ex modo, quia scilicet in operationibus humanis vel primo vel secundo modo, etiam modus humanus servatur. Si autem ea quae hominis sunt, supra humanum modum quis exequatur, erit operatio non humana simpliciter, sed quodammodo divina. Unde Philosophus, in VII *Ethicorum*, contra virtutem simpliciter dividit virtutem heroicam, quam divinam dicit, eo quod per excellentiam virtutis homo fit quasi Deus. Et secundum hoc dico, quod dona a virtutibus distinguuntur in hoc quod virtutes perficiunt ad actus modo humano, sed dona ultra humanum modum: quod patet in fide et intellectu. Connaturalis enim modus humanae naturae est ut divina non nisi per speculum creaturarum et aenigmata similitudinum percipiat; et ad sic percipienda divina perficit fides, quae virtus dicitur. Sed intellectus donum, ut Gregorius dicit, de auditis mentem illustrat, ut homo etiam in hac vita praelibationem futurae manifestationis accipiat; et ad hoc etiam consonat nomen doni. Illud enim proprie donum dici debet quod ex sola liberalitate donantis competit ei in quo est, et non ex debito suae conditionis." See also William Desmond, "Exceeding Virtue: Aquinas and the Beatitudes," in *Thomas Aquinas: Teacher and Scholar: The Aquinas Lectures at Maynooth, vol. 2: 2002-2010*, eds. James G. McEvoy, Michael Dunne and Julia Hynes (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2012), 28-49.

[55] *In Heb.*, cap. 5, l. 2: "In aliis ergo scientiis sufficit quod homo sit perfectus secundum intellectum, in istis vero requiritur quod sit perfectus secundum intellectum et affectum. Loquenda sunt igitur alta mysteria perfectis. I Cor. II: *sapientiam loquimur inter perfectos*. Unusquisque enim secundum quod est dispositus, sic iudicat; sicut iratus aliter iudicat durante passione, et aliter ipsa cessante. Et similiter incontinens aliter iudicat aliquid esse bonum tempore passionis, aliter post. Et ideo dicit Philosophus, quod unusquisque qualis est, talis sibi finis videtur. Et quia quae in sacra Scriptura traduntur, pertinent ad affectum, et non tantum ad intellectum, ideo oportet esse perfectum in utroque."

We have not exhausted our subject, for the spiritual theology of Thomas Aquinas, rooted in his intimate knowledge of the Holy Scripture and of classic philosophy, is vast in its extent and depth. However, the foregoing explanation shows how the harmony of faith and reason, which Thomas illustrated on the basis of Aristotle's philosophy, also extends to the coherence between Aristotelian ethics and the evangelical morality of the Beatitudes, for both come from the same Divine Truth that governs all things.

Towards A Biblical Thomism
Thomas Aquinas and the Renewal of Biblical Theology
Edited by Piotr Roszak and Jörgen Vijgen

Cajetan Cuddy, O.P.

Thomas Aquinas on the Bible and Morality: The Sacred Scriptures, the Natural Law, and the Hermeneutic of Continuity

"Man has a natural inclination to know the truth about God, and to live in society… whatever pertains to this inclination belongs to the natural law." (Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 94, a. 2)

"For true knowledge of God, by its very nature, leads men to good." (Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on Romans*, no. 112)

1. The Natural Law, the Bible, and a Narrative of Theological Renewal

In 2005 the English version of the journal *Communio* published a lecture from Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger titled: "The Renewal of Moral Theology: Perspectives of Vatican II and *Veritatis Splendor*."[1] He makes the following observation in its opening pages:

[1] Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, "The Renewal of Moral Theology: Perspectives of Vatican II and *Veritatis Splendor*," *Communio: International Catholic Review* 32 (2005), 357-368. This essay was later republished in Benedict XVI, *The Unity of the Church*, vol. 1 of *Joseph Ratzinger in Communio* (Grand Rapids: MI: Eerdmans, 2010), 183-194. For an illuminating analysis of Ratzinger's work in moral theology and the natural law see: F. Russell Hittinger, "Natural Law and Public Discourse: The Legacies of Joseph Ratzinger," *Loyola Law Review* 60 (2014), 241-271. A later version of Hit-

> Generally speaking, the manualist tradition really was marked by a decided rationalism; because of this, Sacred Scripture retained only a very marginal function in the elaboration of moral theology. The latter [the manualist tradition] was constructed substantially on the foundation of natural law and therefore in the form of a philosophical reflection based on the ancient Stoic tradition.[2]

Subsequently, during the early and middle parts of the twentieth century, "the need for a profound renewal was felt" in which the Bible and Christ would receive more prominence in and give more direction to moral theology.[3]

Thus far Ratzinger does not recount anything that would surprise his readers. In fact, his succinct summary of moral theology before the period of theological renewal follows a broadly accepted narrative.[4] A rationalistic, natural law, "manualist"

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tinger's article appeared as: "Natural Law and Wisdom Traditions," *The Muslim World* 106, no. 2 (2016), 313-336.

[2] Ratzinger, "Renewal of Moral Theology," 358. He goes on to observe: "Hence, together with a certain naturalism reflecting a substantially philosophical reflection decorated here and there with biblical citations, the manuals strongly emphasized casuistry so that they could respond to the requirements of practice" (ibid.). This approach to the moral life operated within a negative matrix of "so many prohibitions, so many 'no's,'" and "no longer allowed people to see the great message of liberation and freedom given to us in the encounter with Christ" (ibid).

[3] "This [need for a profound renewal] was certainly the idea of the constitution *Gaudium et Spes*: to return to a substantially biblical and christological ethics, inspired by the encounter with Christ, an ethics conceived not as a series of precepts but as the event of an encounter, of a love that then also knows how to create corresponding actions" (ibid., 358-359). A moral theologian of note during this period concurs with Ratzinger's summary of the state of moral theology: "The Second Vatican Council was not meant to be the council of moral theology.… Undeniably, however, moral theological problems were not secondary. In fact, the Second Vatican Council inaugurated a new era in moral theology whose long period of preparation is still to be presented.… The degree on priestly formation, *Optatam Totius* (16, 1), sets the pace for the reflection of moral theology, bringing to an end a long, painful, and intricate history. According to this document, moral theology must find nourishment in the Sacred Scriptures. The necessity of a renewed theological agenda took shape through critical dialogue with the natural law tradition of the manuals. The moral life of the Christian should not be conceived any longer as the fulfillment of an impersonal order of natural law but as the response to a call coming from the historical person of Jesus Christ" (Klaus Demmer, *Shaping the Moral Life: An Approach to Moral Theology* [Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2000], 4–5).

[4] For example, see: Enda McDonagh, ed., *Moral Theology Renewed: Papers from the Maynooth Union Summer School 1964* (Dublin: Gill and Son, 1965); Josef Fuchs, *Human Values and Christian Morality* (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan Ltd., 1970); John Mahoney, *The Making of Moral Theology: A Study of the Roman Catholic Tradition* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987); James F. Keenan, *A History of Catholic Moral Theology in the Twentieth Century: From Confessing Sins to Liberating Consciences* (London: Continuum, 2010); Charles E. Curran, *The Development of Moral Theology: Five Strands* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013).

approach dominated the moral theological scene before the emergence of the scripturally-informed *ressourcement* theologies.[5] Indeed, some have characterized the use of and reliance upon the natural law within older approaches to moral theology as betraying a "naïve essentialism."[6] This biblically-informed renewal assured a new interval in moral theology: a rediscovery of the Beatitudes, the virtues, the life of grace, the Gifts of the Holy Spirit, and the personal encounter with Jesus Christ. It signaled a moment of new springtime. The Second Vatican Council even prescribed

[5] For further analyses of the *ressourcement* renewal consult: Gabriel Flynn and Paul D. Murray, ed., with the assistance of Patricia Kelly, *Ressourcement: A Movement for Renewal in Twentieth-Century Catholic Theology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).

[6] James F. Keenan, SJ, has argued that a "naïve essentialism" dominated much of natural law discourse from the eighteenth to the mid-twentieth century, to such a degree that moral theology became "a set of unalterable prescriptions and prohibitions: no abortion, no divorce, no masturbation, no birth control, etc." that were as universal (pertaining to "every human being and every local culture") as they were unalterable ("the teachings were unchanging throughout history") (*History of Catholic Moral Theology*, 174). He goes on to suggest that the renewal of moral theology effected a much-needed reformulation of natural law doctrine: "In order to overcome essentialism and to retrieve a truer understanding of the natural law, we need an interdisciplinary approach to understanding nature and its role in moral reasoning. Nature is no longer understood as the pure object that we engage and examine, as something distant and apart from the human being. Nature is not seen as an object as it was in essentialism; rather, nature is a complex and unfolding system whose finality, development, and ways of interacting are grasped only partially—though not arbitrarily—by human insight" (ibid., 174-75). Cautions against a "naïve essentialism" originating from a "naïve realist epistemology" appear with some regularity in Father Keenan's reflections. Cf. James F. Keenan, and Thomas R. Kopfensteiner, "Moral Theology Out of Western Europe," *Theological Studies* 59 (1998), 107-135. Another moral theologian cautions against a blind acceptance of magisterial pronouncements flowing from an "essentialist" understanding of human nature that neglects "what is essential for human salvation": "I think the Church has a right and a duty to speak authoritatively about natural law in all its aspects—pastoral and doctrinal—because its teaching has to do with what is essential for human salvation. However, this does not imply an uncritical acceptance of the concept of nature which is implied in every ecclesial teaching on the matter of natural law. The ecclesial formulators of such teachings must be careful to avoid identifying nature with the order of creation, especially in an essentialist manner" (Paulinus Ikechukwu Odozor, *Moral Theology in an Age of Renewal: A Study of the Catholic Tradition since Vatican II* [Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2003], 187-188). In other words, the renewal helped moral theology to shed its former "obsession with 'seeking eternal truths' and with searching for 'immutable essences' with little regard to the human subject as a historical being and the subject of moral deliberations. Moral theology had in fact become a type of moral philosophy with little relevance to Christians as human beings who were seeking to live an authentic existence in this world. By the Second Vatican Council, dissatisfaction with this kind of theology had become very noticeable. It is this climate of discontent that prompted the Second Vatican Council to issue the call for the renewal of all theological studies, especially moral theology" (ibid., 5-6).

the reintegration of the Scriptures and Christ back into theological science.[7] The prospect of a post-manualist period with its possibilities for "evangelical" revitalization appeared most desirable and assuredly efficacious.[8]

Ratzinger continues his narrative, however, with the observation that "something unexpected happened." The renewal that was ardently promised and widely anticipated did not come to fruition in the way one might have hoped:

> Something unexpected happened, perhaps not completely unforeseeable, but in any case unexpected. There were some initial attempts, which were certainly important and valid, to renew a moral theology under biblical inspiration…. These attempts quickly ceased, however, without attaining their goal, without arriving at the new springtime of a profoundly christological and biblical moral theology that had been so hoped for.[9]

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[7] "Special care should be given to the perfecting of moral theology. Its scientific presentation should draw more fully on the teaching of Holy Scripture and should throw light upon the exalted vocation of the faithful in Christ and their obligation to bring forth fruit in charity for the life of the world" (*Optatam Totius*, no. 16). For a very personal appropriation of *Optatam Totius*, no. 16, see: Bernard Häring, *Free and Faithful: My Life in the Catholic Church* (Liguori, MO: Liguori/Triumph, 1998), 102-103. For a consideration of the moral theological concerns at play before, during, and immediately after the Second Vatican Council, see: Pierre d'Ornellas, *Liberté, que dis-tu de toi-même? Vatican II 1959–1965* (Paris: Parole et Silence, 1999).

[8] For an examination of the "evangelical" aspects of the *ressourcement* renewal, see: Yves Congar, *True and False Reform in the Church*, trans. Paul Philibert (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 2011).

[9] Ratzinger, "Renewal of Moral Theology," 359. Of course, the writings of Servais Pinckaers, OP, constitute the most sustained effort of a moral theologian to follow the call for authentic renewal according to Catholic tradition: Servais Pinckaers, *Le renouveau de la morale: Études pour une morale fidèle à ses sources et à sa mission présente* (Paris: Téqui, 1964); Servais Pinckaers, *Sources of Christian Ethics*, trans. Sr. Mary Thomas Noble, OP (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1995). For summaries of Pinckaers's theological legacy, see: Michael S. Sherwin, "Four Challenges for Moral Theology in the New Century," *Logos* 6, no. 1 (2003): 13–26; Romanus Cessario, "Hommage au Père Servais-Théodore Pinckaers, OP: The Significance of His Work," *Nova et Vetera* 5 (2007), 1-16; Romanus Cessario, "On the Place of Servais Pinckaers (+ 7 April 2008) in the Renewal of Catholic Theology," *The Thomist* 73 (2007), 1-27; Craig Steven Titus, "Servais Pinckaers and the Renewal of Catholic Moral Theology," *Journal of Moral Theology* 1 (2012), 43-68; James McEvoy, "Parallel Projects: Alasdair MacIntyre's Virtue Ethics, Thirteenth-Century Pastoral Theology (Leonard Boyle, O.P.), and Thomistic Moral Theology (Servais Pinckaers, O.P.)," in *What Happened in and to Moral Philosophy in the Twentieth Century: Philosophical Essays in Honor of Alasdair MacIntyre*, ed. Fran O'Rourke (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2013), 244-266; Paul Morrissey, "Servais-Théodore Pinckaers, O.P., and the Renewal of Sapiential Thomistic Theology," *Nova et Vetera* 12 (2014), 163-191. Additionally, the biblical moral theological legacy of Benedict M. Ashley, OP, also merits recognition: Benedict M. Ashley, "Scriptural Grounds for Concrete Moral Norms," *The Thomist* 52, no. 1 (1988): 1–22;

The possibility of an approach to morals that engendered true freedom and a holistic doctrine of life rather than rationalistic, natural law "physicalism" was so appealing it was virtually enchanting.[10] Sadly, the renewal within moral theology failed to deliver the vibrant alternative to the arid manualism that it had promised. The new project changed course unexpectedly, and prospects of scriptural reinvigoration began to fade as projects of fundamental "revision" began to emerge.[11] "As we well know," Ratzinger remarks, "Scripture does not offer us a theological system, and still less a system of moral theology, with a systematic and orderly presentation of the main principles of action."[12] Hence, "while it was hoped that a renewed moral theology would go beyond the natural law system in order to recover a deeper biblical inspiration, it was precisely moral theology that ended by marginalizing Sacred

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Benedict M. Ashley, *Living the Truth in Love: A Biblical Introduction to Moral Theology* (Staten Island, NY: St. Pauls, 1996); Benedict M. Ashley, *The Ashley Reader: Redeeming Reason* (Naples, FL: Sapientia Press, 2006); Benedict M. Ashley, Jean deBlois, and Kevin D. O'Rourke, *Health Care Ethics: A Catholic Theological Analysis*, 5th ed. (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2006). For a study of Father Ashley's approach to moral theology, see: Mark S. Latkovic, *The Fundamental Moral Theology of Benedict Ashley, O.P.: A Critical Study. Toward a Response to the Second Vatican Council's Call for Renewal in Moral Theology* (Ann Arbor, MI: University Microfilms, 1998).

[10] For a history of "physicalism," see: Brian V. Johnstone, "From Physicalism to Personalism," *Studia Moralia* 30 (1992), 71-96.

[11] "What the [Second Vatican] council called for clearly included a serious consideration of formulating a scriptural basis for moral life. That basis, however, could not be introduced without affecting the whole of moral theology at its very foundation. The textbooks of moral theology before the council relied principally upon theories of natural law that were guided by a literal reading of the decalogue…. The renewal of scriptural studies which was itself promoted at Vatican II implied that even moral theology would have to adopt historical and hermeneutical tools to implement the use of scripture as part of its basis. This, in turn, implied substantial methodological changes within the discipline of moral theology itself. Before very long it became evident to at least some experts in the field that what was needed was not merely a *development* of moral theology but a thorough *revision* of the science" (Joseph A. Selling, "The Context and the Arguments of *Veritatis Splendor*, in *The Splendor of Accuracy: An Examination of the Assertions Made by* Veritatis Splendor, ed. Joseph A. Selling and Jan Jans [Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1994], 12). Emphasis original.

[12] Ratzinger, "Renewal of Moral Theology," 360. Other moral theologians of different persuasions have echoed this point: "As important as scripture is as a source for moral theology, the use of scripture in moral theology has significant limitations. A unified or a systematic biblical or scriptural ethic is not a reality" (Charles E. Curran, *Catholic Moral Theology in the United States: A History* [Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2008], 138). "As for moral theology, one must accept the limits that moral science imposes on theology, including biblical science…. One cannot expect the sacred Scriptures to solve every moral problem" (Romanus Cessario, "Scripture as the Soul of Moral Theology: Reflections on Vatican II and *Ressourcement* Thomism," *The Thomist* 76 (2012), 187).

Scripture *even more completely than the pre-conciliar manualist tradition*."[13] With a few exceptions, the theologians of renewal betrayed their discipline in ways far more drastic and far more extensive than the natural law approaches they had abrogated.[14] Although some of the manualists had failed "*de facto*" to integrate the Bible into moral theology, their successors largely marginalized the Scriptures "*de iure*."[15] A theological movement inspired by *ressourcement* renewal had morphed into a revisionist "revolution."[16] While "philosophical rationality in the pre-conciliar era was developed with reference to the fundamental category of natural law," now "discussion is occurring in a context that is not only post-metaphysical but a-metaphysical, in which it seems that the natural law is part of a past that is gone without recovery." Indeed, "the concept of nature has undergone radical change."[17]

The renewal had promised a biblical ethic as an alternative to the natural law tradition. What actually followed, however, was the abandonment of *both* the Bible

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[13] Ratzinger, "Renewal of Moral Theology," 361. Emphasis added. Elsewhere, Ratzinger reiterates this point: "At first, this so-called naturalism of the magisterial tradition was seen in opposition to the personalism of the Bible. The opposition of nature and person as a basic pattern for argumentation was at the same time seen as an opposition between philosophical and biblical tradition. Still, it has now long been recognized that there is no such thing as a pure 'biblicism,' and that even 'personalism' has its own philosophical aspects. Today we see almost the direct opposite: The Bible has to a great extent vanished from the modern works in moral theology. In its place, a tendency toward a particularly strong rational analysis has become dominant, together with the assertion of the autonomy of morals, which is based neither on nature nor on the person, but on historicity and future-oriented models of social behavior" (Joseph Ratzinger, "Bishops, Theologians, and Morality," in *On Conscience* [San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2007], 65).

[14] Hittinger explains that prominent currents within the project of moral theological renewal veered off course, "becoming ever more remote from either the order of creation or redemption. Rather than reforming a casuistical legalism operating on the margins of serious philosophy and theology, moral theology had become ethical theories detached from traditions" ("Natural Law and Wisdom Traditions," 316).

[15] "In the latter [i.e., the manualists], in fact, Sacred Scripture was absent *de facto*, although perhaps in theory it was supposed to inspire, though without success. Now, on the other hand, it is marginalized *de iure*: it is claimed that Sacred Scripture cannot offer moral principles that would suitably guide the construction of our actions. Scripture, according to this position, offers only a horizon of intentions and motivations, but it does not enter into the moral contents of action" (Ratzinger, "Renewal of Moral Theology," 361).

[16] Richard A. McCormick, SJ, offered the following observation in 1989: "I do not believe that 'revolution' is too strong a word for the developments that have occurred in moral theology in the last 30 years" ("Moral Theology 1940-1989: An Overview," *Theological Studies* 50 (1989), 6-7). Cf. John Langan, "Catholic Moral Rationalism and the Philosophical Bases of Moral Theology," *Theological Studies* 50 (1989), 25-43; John A. Gallagher, *Time Past, Time Future: An Historical Study of Catholic Moral Theology* (New York: Paulist Press); Brian V. Johnstone, "The Revisionist Project in Roman Catholic Moral Theology," *Studies in Christian Ethics* 5 (1992), 18-31.

[17] Ratzinger, "Renewal of Moral Theology," 363.

and the natural law. Ratzinger argues that new types of *human reason* began to exert the moral oversight that the natural law had once given and that the Bible was promised to provide.[18] A new "a-metaphysical and post-metaphysical reason" — "a reason closed in on itself, in which the divine light does not appear" — now shaped moral discourse.[19] Certain complications attended the rise of this new moral reason and the simultaneous demise of the natural law tradition:

> How could such a post-metaphysical reason construct a moral vision? Certainly no longer by recognizing moral principles inscribed in being, because nothing is inscribed if being is the product of evolution. And yet reason must nonetheless find reference points for making fitting decisions for the life of the person and of the community and for the future of humanity.[20]

Unsurprisingly, this new reason — "deaf and blind to the divine word in being" — engendered *consequentialism*: "a theory that contradicts the very foundations of the Christian vision" because it neglects "the language of the Creator."[21]

In other words, the renewal had promised a new springtime in moral theology. What came was a different kind of winter; far longer and far more bitter than previous winters. As the natural law fell from the theological constellation, the Bible also suffered eclipse. And with the demise of the natural law and the neglect of the

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[18] Ibid., 361.

[19] Ibid., 363.

[20] Ibid., 364.

[21] "In this way, consequentialist ethics was born, whether we call it teologism or proportionalism. This view presupposes a post-metaphysical reason, deaf and blind to the divine word in being. It seeks the best way of constructing the world through the calculation of consequences. It identifies what must be done by using this criterion. Thus, it obviously changes the relationship between intention and object. In fact, the object of action is in itself mutable and must be placed in a context in order to mean anything. With the denial of the existence of principles inscribed in being, the possibility of recognizing the *intrinsece bonum aut malum* naturally disappears. Nothing is *intrinsece bonum* or *intrinsece malum*, because everything depends on context and on the finalities that must be realized" (ibid.).

Father Pinckaers diagnosed the situation in a similar manner: "The reproach we might offer to 'consequentialism' is that it has narrowed moral theory by reducing judgment to a pre-moral level, to a kind of technical calculation of consequences in view of an end, and by limiting the moral plane to an option between good and bad intention. At the same time, this system has practically severed the bonds between moral theology and Scripture with its distinction between the transcendental and categorical levels. Morality or ethics being confined to the categorical level, the system was permitted to be developed with the aid of reason alone, having no further need of Scripture" (Servais Pinckaers, "Scripture and the Renewal of Moral Theology (1995)," in *The Pinckaers Reader: Renewing Thomistic Moral Theology*, eds. John Berkman and Craig Steven Titus, (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2005), 63).

Sacred Scriptures, a de-natured rationalism assumed governance and a consequentialist ethic stepped forward. Thus, Ratzinger's account of "The Renewal of Moral Theology."[22]

Two years before Ratzinger's lecture appeared in English, the then Cardinal Prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith asked the Pontifical Biblical Commission (PBC) to consider the relationship between the Bible and morality.[23] He would also ask the International Theological Commission to consider the question of the natural law.[24] The post-renewal condition of moral theology clearly concerned Ratzinger. The role of the Bible and the natural law in moral theology remained topics of great interest for the future pope.

The result of the PBC study was published in 2008: *The Bible and Morality: Biblical Roots of Christian Conduct*. The natural law received only three references within the PBC document in its Italian version, and the Pontifical Biblical Commission admitted that the natural law remained an "open problem": "Certain problems still remain open. To limit ourselves to one example, the concept of 'natural law', of which some traces may perhaps be found in Rom 1.18–32; 2.14–15, and which involves, at least in its traditional formulation, philosophical categories extraneous to

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[22] For a different interpretation of themes integral to Ratzinger's analysis, see: Richard A. McCormick, "Chapter 1: Moral Theology since Vatican II: Clarity or Chaos," in his book, *The Critical Calling: Reflections on Moral Dilemmas Since Vatican II* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2006), 3-24.

[23] William Cardinal Levada explains the genesis of *The Bible and Morality*: "Already in 2002 the Pontifical Biblical Commission, at the behest of the then President Card. Joseph Ratzinger, set about to examine the problem of the relationship between the bible and morality by posing itself the question: what is the value and the significance of the inspired text for today's morality, regarding which the above mentioned difficulties cannot be neglected?" ("Preface," in Pontifical Biblical Commission, *The Bible and Morality: Biblical Roots of Christian Conduct* [Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2008]). For other accounts of the relationship between the Bible and morality, see: Charles E. Curran and Richard A. McCormick, ed., *The Use of Scripture in Moral Theology* (New York: Paulist Press, 1984); Philippe Bordeyne, ed., *Bible et Morale* (Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 2003); Olivier Artus, "Bible et morale. Quels critères pour discerner?," *Revue d'éthique et de théologie morale* 260, no. 3 (2010), 51-68; François Gonon, *L'Écriture Sainte, âme de la théologie morale: Les chemins ouverts par Henri de Lubac, Paul Beauchamp et Jean-Marie Hennaux* (Paris: Parole et Silence, 2010).

[24] International Theological Commission, *In Search of a Universal Ethic: A New Look at the Natural Law* (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2009). See also: Luc-Thomas Somme, "À propos du document *À la recherche d'une éthique universelle, Nouveau regard sur la loi naturelle*," *Revue thomiste* 109 (2009), 639-646; Serge-Thomas Bonino, "Questions autour du document: À la recherche d'une éthique universelle. Nouveau regard sur la loi naturelle," *Transversalités* 117, no. 1 (2011), 9-25; John Berkman and William C. Mattison, III, ed., *Searching for a Universal Ethic: Multidisciplinary, Ecumenical, and Interfaith Responses to the Catholic Natural Law Tradition* (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2014).

Scripture."[25] However, *The Bible and Morality* also recognized that "the value of the natural law, or rather the capacity of the human conscience to distinguish between what should and should not be done, is acknowledged and appreciated in Rom 2.14–15."[26] The document emphasized the "concept of 'revealed morality,'" and the PBC cautioned against "certain common prejudices" that would reduce "morality to a code of individual or collective conduct, a sum of virtues to be practiced or to the requirements of an assumed universal [natural] law." Such prejudices, the Commission argued, obscure "the special character, the values and the permanent validity of biblical morality."[27] In sum, the PBC conceded that some "traces" of the natural law could "perhaps" be identified in Romans 1 and 2. Nonetheless, the Commission evidently considered the role of the natural law within a biblical morality to be far from self-evident, and it cautioned against a reductionistic use of the natural law to something akin to an ethical lowest-common-denominator.

It is my intent in the remainder of this essay to turn to Saint Thomas Aquinas for some direction with regard to the PBC's "open problem": the relationship between the Bible and the natural law in moral theology. Because *The Bible and Morality* adverts to Romans 1:18-32 and 2:14-15, I will begin my analysis with Aquinas's consideration of these Biblical passages in relation to his summary of natural law inclinations in *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 94, a. 2.[28] In the third and concluding section, I will return to Ratzinger's account of the renewal in moral theology and explore how Aquinas's natural law doctrine both serves and preserves the unity of the Bible and morality.

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[25] *Bible and Morality*, no. 159.

[26] Ibid., no. 109.

[27] Ibid., no. 4. The natural law only appears twice in the English translation (nos. 109 and 159). This is significant because it appears that only the English translation of *The Bible and Morality* lacks this third explicit reference (no. 4) to the natural law as found in the document's Italian original. I have supplied (in brackets) the missing word ("natural") in the above quotation from section no. 4.

[28] Here one recognizes the numerous and valuable contributions on this topic from the pen of Matthew Levering, particularly his book: *Biblical Natural Law: A Theocentric and Teleological Approach* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); and his essays: "God and Natural Law: Reflections on Genesis 22," *Modern Theology* 24 (2008), 151-177; "Knowing What is 'Natural': Thomas Aquinas and Luke Timothy Johnson on Romans 1–2, *Logos* 12 (2009): 117-142. Also of note is the book by Anver M. Emon, Matthew Levering, David Novak, *Natural Law: A Jewish, Christian, and Islamic Trialogue* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).

2. Thomas Aquinas on the Bible and the Natural Law

Explicit references to the "natural law" or to the "law of nature" appear twenty-three times in ten separate places within Aquinas's commentary on Saint Paul's Epistle to the Romans. Aquinas first invokes the natural law by name in his commentary on Romans 2:14 in reference to the "Gentiles who have not the law [but] do by nature what the law requires." He observes that the phrase "by nature" can refer to "the natural law showing them [the Gentiles] what should be done, as in a psalm: *there are many who say, 'who shows us good things?' The light of your countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us* (Ps 4:6), i.e., the light of natural reason, in which is God's image."[29] What immediately attracts attention is Aquinas's use of Psalm 4:6 in reference to the natural law. This is not the only context in which Aquinas links the natural law, Romans 2:14, and Psalm 4:6. In fact, Romans 2:14 and Psalm 4:6 are the only two Biblical texts Aquinas cites in the first distinct article about the natural law found in the *Summa theologiae* (I-II, q. 91, a. 2). He invokes Romans 2:14 in the article's *sed contra* to affirm the existence of the natural law: "Although they have no written law, yet they have the natural law, whereby each one knows, and is conscious of, what is good and what is evil."[30] He quotes Psalm 4:6 in the article's

[29] "But the expression *by nature* causes some difficulty. For it seems to favor the Pelagians, who taught that man could observe all the precepts of the law by his own natural powers. Hence, *by nature* should mean nature reformed by grace. For he is speaking of gentiles, converted to the faith, who began to obey the moral precepts of the law by the help of Christ's grace. Or *by nature* can mean by the natural law showing them what should be done, as in a psalm: *there are many who say, 'who shows us good things?' The light of your countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us* (Ps 4:6), i.e., the light of natural reason, in which is God's image. All this does not rule out the need of grace to move the affections any more than *the knowledge of sin through the law* (Rom 3:20) exempts from the need of grace to move the affections" ("Sed quod dicit *naturaliter*, dubitationem habet. Videtur enim patrocinari Pelagianis, qui dicebant quod homo per sua naturalia poterat omnia praecepta legis servare. Unde exponendum est *naturaliter*, id est per naturam gratia reformatam. Loquitur enim de gentilibus ad fidem conversis, qui auxilio gratiae Christi coeperant moralia legis servare. Vel potest dici *naturaliter*, id est per legem naturalem ostendentem eis quid sit agendum, secundum illud Ps. IV,7s.: *multi dicunt: quis ostendit nobis bona? Signatum*, etc., quod est lumen rationis naturalis, in qua est imago Dei. Et tamen non excluditur quin necessaria sit gratia ad movendum affectum, sicut etiam *per legem est cognitio peccati*, ut dicitur infra III, 20, et tamen ulterius requiritur gratia ad movendum affectum" [no. 216]). Unless otherwise noted, all English quotations from Aquinas's commentary on Romans are taken from: Saint Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on the Letter of Saint Paul to the Romans*, trans. Fabian R. Larcher, ed. John Mortensen and Enrique Alarcón (Lander, WY: The Aquinas Institute for the Study of Sacred Doctrine, 2012).

[30] "Sed contra est quod, Rom. II, super illud, cum gentes, quae legem non habent, naturaliter ea quae legis sunt faciunt, dicit Glossa, etsi non habent legem scriptam, habent tamen legem naturalem, qua quilibet intelligit et sibi conscius est quid sit bonum et quid malum" (*STh* I-II, q. 91, a.

body to explain how the natural law comprises the rational creature's participation in the eternal law. While every creature participates in the eternal law (at least to the degree that the creature exists), the rational creature uniquely "participates in eternal *ratio* itself, through which it has a natural inclination to due action and end."[31] Aquinas thus associates the "light" of the divine countenance with "the light of natural reason, whereby we discern what is good and what is evil, which is the function of the natural law, [and] is nothing else than an imprint on us of the Divine light."[32] Hence, one may legitimately suggest: 1) Aquinas regards the natural law as a constitutive element of Romans 2:14, and 2) he considers his exegetical analysis of the natural law in Romans 2:14 to stand in continuity with his systematic presentation of the natural law in the *Summa theologiae* (evidenced through his use of Romans 2:14 and Psalm 4:6).[33]

One may ask, however: *can the natural law claim a legitimate place in Aquinas's exegesis of Romans 1?* Because an explicit reference to the natural law does not appear in his consideration of this chapter, one could sympathize with any who might deny its relevance to this biblical text. However, two significant pieces of evidence to the contrary present themselves. First, Romans 1 serves as a key scriptural passage for Aquinas's consideration of the natural law in the *Summa theologiae*. Indeed, Matthew Levering has observed that "the sole citation of Romans 1:20 in the *prima-secundae pars* occurs in question ninety-three, article two, where Aquinas discusses the eternal law and the natural law."[34] "We cannot know the things that are of God, as they are in themselves; but they are made known to us in their effects, according to Rm. 1:20: 'The invisible things of God . . . are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made.'"[35] The precision with which Aquinas composed and structured his *Summa theologiae* supports identifying a link between Romans 1 and the natural

2, sc). Unless otherwise noted, all English quotations from the *Summa theologiae* are taken from the translation of the Fathers of the English Dominican Province (New York: Benziger Brothers, 1948; repr. Christian Classics, 1981).

[31] "Unde et in ipsa participatur ratio aeterna, per quam habet naturalem inclinationem ad debitum actum et finem" (*ST* I-II, q. 91, a. 2). Translation mine.

[32] "Signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui, domine, quasi lumen rationis naturalis, quo discernimus quid sit bonum et malum, quod pertinet ad naturalem legem, nihil aliud sit quam impressio divini luminis in nobis" (ibid.).

[33] Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Ad Rom.,* ch. 2, lectio 3, no. 215.

[34] Matthew Levering, *Paul in the* Summa Theologiae (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2014), 227-228.

[35] "Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ea quae sunt Dei, in seipsis quidem cognosci a nobis non possunt, sed tamen in effectibus suis nobis manifestantur, secundum illud Rom. I, invisibilia Dei per ea quae facta sunt, intellecta, conspiciuntur" (*ST* I-II, q. 93, a. 2, ad 1).

law.[36] Second, as we have already seen, Psalm 4:6 is also a verse which, for Aquinas, serves as a key reference to the natural law — both in Romans 2 and in the *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 91, a. 2.[37] The fact that Psalm 4:6 appears only twice in his Romans commentary — and only in reference to Romans 1 and to Romans 2 — also supports the claim that the natural law is relevant to Aquinas's commentary on Romans 1.

In his commentary on Romans 1:19, Aquinas states: "Men had such knowledge through the light of reason bestowed on them: *many say: O, that we might see some good! Lift up the light of your countenance upon us, O Lord* (Ps 4:6)."[38] A question immediately arises: *what knowledge?* The answer is evident from even a cursory reading of Aquinas's commentary on Romans 1: *the natural knowledge of God*.[39] Indeed, here, Aquinas quotes Psalm 4:6 at the end of his explanation of the three ways man is able to know God naturally: 1) by way of causality (which confirms God's existence), 2) by way of excellence (which confirms that God is above all things), and 3) by way of negation (which confirms God's immutability and infinity).[40] In other words, Aquinas invokes Psalm 4:6 (a key verse in reference to the natural law) within an extended consideration of *natural theology*.[41] For Aquinas, natural theology is pos-

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[36] For a concise examination of the background and structure of the *Summa theologiae* see: Jean-Pierre Torrell, *Aquinas's Summa: Background, Structure, and Reception*, trans. Benedict M. Guevin (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2005).

[37] See also Aquinas's commentaries on the Psalms (Ps. 4, n. 5), Book of Job (ch. 33, lect. 2), and the Gospel of John (ch. 1, lect. 5).

[38] "Huiusmodi autem cognitionem habuerunt per lumen rationis inditum. Ps. IV, 6: *multi dicunt quis ostendit nobis bona? Signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui domine*" (no. 115).

[39] For considerations of the natural knowledge of God in Romans 1 and related disputes see: David M. Coffey, "Natural Knowledge of God: Reflections on Romans 1:18–32," *Theological Studies* 31 (1970), 674-691; William Vandermarck, "Natural Knowledge of God in Romans: Patristic and Medieval Interpretation," *Theological Studies* 34 (1973), 36-52; Eugene F. Rogers, Jr., *Thomas Aquinas and Karl Barth: Sacred Doctrine and the Natural Knowledge of God* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995); Douglas A. Campbell, "Natural Theology in Paul? Reading Romans 1.19–20," *International Journal of Systematic Theology* 1 (1999), 231-252; Ruedi Imbach, "Prédicateur philosophe: Philosophe prédicateur. Observations sur le discours de Saint Paul à l'Aréopage et sa réception chez Augustin, Érasme et Thomas d'Aquin," *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 98, no. 3 (2014): 413-441; Serge-Thomas Bonino, *Dieu, «Celui qui est» (De Deo ut uno)* (Paris: Parole et Silence, 2016), 51-84.

[40] Thomas Aquinas, *Ad Rom.,* ch. 1, lectio 6, no. 115.

[41] "It seems that the Apostle [Paul] touches on the three theologies of the gentiles. First the civil, which was observed by their priests adoring idols in the temple; in regard to this he says: *they changed the glory of the incorruptible God*. Second, the theology of fables, which their poets presented in the theater. In regard to this he says: *who changed the truth of God into a lie*. Third, their natural theology, which the philosophers observed in the world, when they worshipped the parts of the world. In regard to this he says: *and worshipped and served the creature rather than the creator*" ("Videtur autem apostolus triplicem theologiam tangere gentilium. Primo quidem civilem, quae ob-

sible because "God's wisdom is shown by his creatures" "just as art is shown by an artist's works."[42] The "light" of the unique cognitional potency proper to the rational creature enables the human person to know God through created natural means: "man understands God through visible creatures."[43] Moreover, this rational capacity to know God is not without significance and consequence. Aquinas stands with Saint Paul in affirming that a "true knowledge of God" (*vera Dei cognitio*) is possible for the rational creature even without the light of faith.[44] "They [the Gentiles] did possess some true knowledge of God, because *what is known about God*, i.e., what can be known about God by men through reason, *is manifest in them*, i.e., is manifest to them from something in them, i.e. from an inner light."[45]

A lot depends on this natural, true knowledge of God. "True knowledge of God, by its very nature, leads men to good."[46] Here the connection between natural theology and natural law begins to emerge with more clarity. Indeed, this was the grave sin of the Gentiles who did possess true knowledge about God: "their basic guilt was not due to ignorance… although they possessed knowledge of God, they failed to use it unto good."[47] "The human mind is free of vanity only when it leans on God. But when God is rejected and the mind rests in creatures, it incurs vanity."[48] The results of this vanity are well-known: "those who sinned against knowing God either by refusing to acknowledge him or by thinking that they do not know him, should be given up to a perverse sense."[49] Aquinas explains that such sins against the

servabatur a pontificibus in adoratione idolorum in templo; et quantum ad hoc dicit: *et mutaverunt gloriam incorruptibilis Dei*. Secundo theologiam fabularem, quam poetae tradebant in theatris; et quantum ad hoc dicit: *qui commutaverunt veritatem Dei in mendacium*. Tertio theologiam naturalem, quam observaverunt philosophi in mundo, partes mundi colentes; et quantum ad hoc dicit: *et coluerunt et servierunt creaturae potius quam creatori*" [Aquinas, *Ad Rom.*, ch. 1, lectio 7, no. 145]).

[42] "Sicut enim ars manifestatur per artificis opera, ita et Dei sapientia manifestatur per creaturas" (id., ch. 1, lectio 6, no. 118).

[43] "Homo intelligit Deum per creaturas visibiles" (ibid., no. 120).

[44] Ibid. no. 112.

[45] "Dicit ergo primo: recte dico quod veritatem Dei detinuerunt, fuit enim in eis, quantum ad aliquid, vera Dei cognitio, quia *quod notum est Dei*, id est quod cognoscibile est de Deo ab homine per rationem, *manifestum est in illis*, id est manifestum est eis ex eo quod in illis est, id est ex lumine intrinseco" (ibid., no. 114).

[46] "Nam vera Dei cognitio quantum est de se inducit homines ad bonum" (ibid., no. 112).

[47] "Prima eorum culpa non fuerit ex ignorantia, ostenditur per hoc quod Dei cognitionem habentes ea non sunt usi ad bonum" (ibid., no. 127).

[48] "Solum mens humana est a vanitate libera quando Deo innititur. Cum autem, praetermisso Deo, innititur cuicumque creaturae, incurrit vanitatem" (id., ch. 1, lectio 7, no. 129).

[49] "Est autem conveniens ut qui contra Dei notitiam peccaverunt, vel eum cognoscere nolentes, vel eum cognoscere non arbitrantes, in perversitatem sensus traderentur" (id., ch. 1, lectio 8, no. 155).

true knowledge about God lead to "behavior not in accord with right reason [*recta ratio*]."[50] One cannot stand against the truth about God ("First Truth") through "perverse reasoning" or an idolatrous "lie" without fatal moral consequences.[51]

With these themes prominent in our minds, let us now review, briefly, Aquinas's natural law presentation in the *Summa theologiae*. I-II, q. 94, a. 2 is quite familiar to natural lawyers. In this article, Aquinas explains that the order of natural law precepts follows the order of natural inclinations.[52] The derivation of natural law precepts from natural inclinations arises from the teleological nature of the good: "good has the nature of an end… hence it is that all those things to which man has a natural inclination, are naturally apprehended by reason as being good, and consequently as objects of pursuit."[53] Aquinas outlines three types of inclinations to the good: the first inclination man shares with all creatures, the second inclination is "more special" (*inclinatio ad aliqua magis specialia*) and is something man shares with all animal creatures, and the third is more proper to man because of his rational nature. Few elements within Aquinas's *corpus* have elicited as much study and debate as his brief summary of natural law inclinations in *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 94, a. 2.[54] However, the final and highest natural law inclination Aquinas identifies occasionally eludes the theological categorization he specifies.[55] "Man has a natural inclination to know the truth about God [*homo habet naturalem inclinationem ad*

[50] Ibid., no. 155. Cf. no. 149.

[51] Ibid., no. 142. Cf. no. 137 and no. 147. For a more extended consideration of some of these themes within Aquinas's exegesis of Romans 1 and 2 see: Matthew Levering, "Knowing What is 'Natural': Thomas Aquinas and Luke Timothy Johnson on Romans 1–2," *Logos* 12 (2009), 117-142.

[52] "Secundum igitur ordinem inclinationum naturalium, est ordo praeceptorum legis naturae" (*ST* I-II, q. 94, a. 2).

[53] "Quia vero bonum habet rationem finis, malum autem rationem contrarii, inde est quod omnia illa ad quae homo habet naturalem inclinationem, ratio naturaliter apprehendit ut bona, et per consequens ut opere prosequenda, et contraria eorum ut mala et vitanda" (ibid.).

[54] Cf. Steven J. Jensen, *Knowing the Natural Law: From Precepts and Inclinations to Deriving Oughts* (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2015). For broader accounts of the inclination controversies within natural law doctrine see: Michael Bertram Crowe, *The Changing Profile of the Natural Law* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977); Pauline C. Westerman, *The Disintegration of Natural Law Theory: Aquinas to Finnis* (Leiden: Brill, 1998); Luis Cortest, *The Disfigured Face: Traditional Natural Law and Its Encounter with Modernity* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008).

[55] Significant exceptions would include: Yves Simon, *The Tradition of Natural Law: A Philosopher's Reflection* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1999); Fulvio Di Blasi, *God and the Natural Law: A Rereading of Thomas Aquinas*, trans. David Thunder (South Bend, IN: St. Augustine's Press, 2006); Lawrence Dewan, "St. Thomas, Our Natural Lights, and the Moral Order," in *Wisdom, Law, and Virtue: Essays in Thomistic Ethics* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2007), 199-212.

hoc quod veritatem cognoscat de Deo], and to live in society."[56] The highest, rational, inclination terminates in a knowledge of the truth *about God*. The truth-inclination Aquinas identifies is a specific inclination to a specific truth: man has a natural inclination to formally theological truth. Sometimes Aquinas's teaching on this highest inclination receives summary as an inclination "to the truth and to society." This account does not literally capture Aquinas's precise natural law teaching. Certainly, the truth in general stands in dispositive (and derivative) relation to the truth about God. All truth is from God. All truth leads to God.[57] However, according to Aquinas, the highest inclination of the natural law actually terminates in the truth about God himself.[58] The natural law is, therefore, properly theological.

At this point, another question emerges: *how can the natural law be theological?* Does not its very *naturalness* oppose a formally *theological* orientation? This question — and its answer — requires careful consideration. A temptation emerges at this point to underappreciate the different objective formalities possible among different acts of knowing.[59] The Thomist tradition frequently invokes the distinction between an object as an *entity* (*ut res*) and an object as an *objective* (*ut obiectum*). It is possible for the human intellect to know the same entity according to different formal objectives.[60] Although God is the simplest of all entities, he is the object of several formally distinct, objective cognitive *habitus*. For example, the single entity of God can be known through the light of glory in beatific contemplation, through the light of infused faith in the contemplation of the wayfarer, and through the light

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[56] "Homo habet naturalem inclinationem ad hoc quod veritatem cognoscat de Deo, et ad hoc quod in societate vivat" (*ST* I-II, q. 94, a. 2).

[57] Cf. *ST* I, q. 16, aa. 5-6; *De ver.* q. 1, a. 8.

[58] "Of course, Aristotle and Aquinas say that the natural end of human life is not just 'contemplation' but 'contemplation of the Divine.' For them all truth leads to Truth Itself, to God. Thus contemplation is satisfying to the degree that it is able to discover God, the First Cause, in all his effects; but since all human experiences are in various ways effects of the First Cause, that implies that all human experience finds its meaningfulness insofar as it enhances our contemplation of the Divine" (Benedict M. Ashley, "What is the End of the Human Person?: The Vision of God and integral Human Fulfilment," in *Moral Truth and Moral Tradition: Essays in Honour of Peter Geach and Elizabeth Anscombe*, ed. Luke Gormally [Dublin: Four Courts Press, 1994], 87). Cf. Ralph McInerny, *The Question of Christian Ethics* (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1993).

[59] Cf. *ST* I, q. 1, a. 3.

[60] T.C. O'Brien explains that "formal objective" refers not to "aim or goal," but rather to "the special value or interest or aspect in the object that is the reason or formal source of the act's engagement with it" ("Appendix I: Objects and Virtues," in Thomas Aquinas, *Faith*, ed. and trans. T.C. O'Brien, vol. 31 [2a2ae. 1–7] of *Summa Theologiae* [London: Blackfriars, 1974], 178). O'Brien's examination of formal objectivity in this appendix is truly masterful.

of natural reason in the contemplation of the natural theologian.[61] Moreover, the distinction between these three degrees of contemplation is not one merely of degree. The wayfarer attains knowledge of the truth about God that is both formally and materially far more profound than that of the natural theologian (e.g., God revealing that he is a Trinity of Divine Persons), but the natural theologian can actually attain real truth about the same entity (e.g., human reasoning to God's unity and simplicity). Analogously, the human person can stand as the same entitative object of various scientific disciplines (e.g., biology, psychology, metaphysics, and sacred theology).[62] This is why Aquinas's emphasis on the "light" of natural reason is so significant. Although the light of natural reason is fully natural — and stands essentially distinct from the supernatural light of faith given to the graced wayfarer (not to mention the light of glory proper to the blessed!) — it can reach out to God as entitative object, and it can arrive at true knowledge about God (i.e., truly "theological" knowledge). The significance of the distinctions present within formal objectivity is virtually impossible to overestimate. Moreover, imprecisions about formal objectivity result in complications within natural law doctrine.[63] The highest inclination of human nature actually terminates in formally theological truth. The natural theology integral to the natural law is really and truly theology. This very specific type of theological orientation proper to the natural law has led some to describe the natural law as *theonomic*.[64]

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[61] Cf. *ST* I, q. 12.

[62] Cf. Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, *The One God: A Commentary on the First Part of St. Thomas' Theological Summa* (St. Louis, MO: B. Herder Book Co., 1943), 47. See also Cajetan's commentary on *ST* I, a. 3, no. 9; and John of St. Thomas, *The Material Logic of John of St. Thomas*, trans. Yves Simon, John Glanville, G. Donald Hollenhorst (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955). For a succinct contemporary explanation of the distinctions within formal objectivity see: Philip Neri Reese, "Theology, Faith, Universities: From Specialization to Specification in Theology," *New Blackfriars* 92, no. 1042 (2011), 691-704.

[63] For example see: Paul A. McGavin, "Responding to the Moral Theology Inheritance of Benedict XVI in the Era of Francis I," *Pacifica* 27 (2014), 271-293; William C. Mattison, III, "The Changing Face of Natural Law: The Necessity of Belief for Natural Law Norm Specification," *Journal of the Society of Christian Ethics* 27 (2007), 251-277.

[64] "Others speak, and rightly so, of *theonomy,* or *participated theonomy,* since man's free obedience to God's law effectively implies that human reason and human will participate in God's wisdom and providence. By forbidding man to 'eat of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil,' God makes it clear that man does not originally possess such "knowledge" as something properly his own, but only participates in it by the light of natural reason and of Divine Revelation, which manifest to him the requirements and the promptings of eternal wisdom. Law must therefore be considered an expression of divine wisdom: by submitting to the law, freedom submits to the truth of creation. Consequently one must acknowledge in the freedom of the human person the image and the nearness of God, who is present in all (cf. *Eph* 4:6). But one must likewise acknowledge

There has been a noticeable renewal of interest in the question of man's natural desire for God.[65] The Thomist tradition has consistently maintained that man does not possess a natural desire for supernatural beatitude.[66] However, this denial of a natural desire for the Beatific Vision does not also imply that human persons lack any and all inclination to God. Indeed, they do have an ineradicable natural desire for God written into the very structures of their rational nature. Aquinas's authentic natural law doctrine invites theologians to recall that God *ut res* is not always known as God *ut obiectum revelatum*. The presence of God within a speculative discourse does not necessarily indicate that the discourse has moved into the domain of divine revelation. God's primacy in the causal order (as the First Mover) and finality in the order of ends (as the ultimate final cause) necessitates God's relevance to natural law doctrine.

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the majesty of the God of the universe and revere the holiness of the law of God, who is infinitely transcendent: *Deus semper maior*" (*Veritatis Splendor*, no. 41). For more on the theonomic nature of the natural law, see: Steven A. Long, "The Perfect Storm: On the Loss of Nature as a Normative Theonomic Principle in Moral Philosophy" in *What Happened in and to Moral Philosophy in the Twentieth Century: Philosophical Essays in Honor of Alasdair MacIntyre*, ed. Fran O'Rourke (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2013), 271-303.

[65] For a sampling of recent literature on this topic, see: Stephen J. Duffy, *The Graced Horizon: Nature and Grace in Modern Catholic Thought* (Collegeville, MN: The Liturgical Press, 1992); Denis J.M. Bradley, *Aquinas on the Twofold Human Good: Reason and Human Happiness in Aquinas's Moral Science* (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1997); Georges Cottier, *Le Désir de Dieu: Sur les traces de Saint Thomas* (Paris: Parole et Silence, 2002); Guy Mansini, "Henri de Lubac, the Natural Desire to See God, and Pure Nature," *Gregorianum* 83 (2002), 89-109; Tracey Rowland, *Culture and the Thomist Tradition after Vatican II* (London: Routledge, 2003); Romanus Cessario, "Cardinal Cajetan and His Critics," *Nova et Vetera* 3 (2005), 109-200; Harm Goris, "Steering Clear of Charybdis: Some Directions for Avoiding 'Grace Extrinsicism' in Aquinas," *Nova et Vetera* 5 (2007), 67-80; Reinhard Hütter, "*Desiderium Naturale Visionis Dei—Est autem duplex hominis beatitudo sive felicitas*: Some Observations about Lawrence Feingold's and John Milbank's Recent Interventions in the Debate over the Natural Desire to See God," *Nova et Vetera* 5 (2007), 81-132; Reinhard Hütter, "Aquinas on the Natural Desire for the Vision of God: A Relecture of *Summa Contra Gentiles* III, c. 25 *après* Henri De Lubac," *The Thomist* 73 (2009), 523-591; Christopher J. Malloy, "De Lubac on Natural Desire: Difficulties and Antitheses," *Nova et Vetera* 9 (2011), 567-624; John Milbank, *The Suspended Middle: Henri de Lubac and the Debate Concerning the Supernatural*, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2014); Steven A. Long, *Natura Pura: On the Recovery of Nature in the Doctrine of Grace* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2010); Bernard Mulcahy, OP, *Aquinas's Notion of Pure Nature and the Christian Integralism of Henri de Lubac: Not Everything is Grace* (New York: Peter Lang, 2011); Christopher M. Cullen, "The Natural Desire for God and Pure Nature: A Debate Renewed," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 86 (2012), 705-730; Jean-Baptiste Lecuit, *Le désir de Dieu pour l'homme: Une réponse au problème de l'indifférence* (Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 2017).

[66] Cf. Lawrence Feingold, *The Natural Desire to See God According to St. Thomas Aquinas and His Interpreters*, 2nd ed. (Ave Maria, FL: Sapientia Press, 2010).

If natural lawyers neglect natural theology's prime place within the natural law, then natural law *doctrine* can be reduced to service as a mere *apologetical tool*. The apologetic priorities of some natural lawyers do not adequately account for the natural law's theological orientation. If one undervalues the natural law's positive orientation to God, then one will supply a replacement value to the natural law, proportionate to its utility in disputes about the meaning of human life, marriage, sexuality, et al.[67] Certain dangers emerge when reference is made to the natural law only and always for apologetic ends. First, natural law doctrine — deprived of its full theonomic nature — can begin to suffer intrinsic atrophy. When the natural lawyer neglects what the natural law is at its highest level — an inclination to the truth of God — then natural law doctrine can fail to realize its full potentiality. Second, as an instrument suffering intrinsic atrophy, the enfeebled natural law doctrine risks undergoing fundamental reconfiguration at the service of troubling ends. If the natural lawyer forgets or denies that God is the final end of the natural law, his natural law doctrine may unfold with reference to whatever purposes the natural lawyer chooses. In this situation, natural law doctrine can be subjected to peculiar construction and experience recruitment in the service of ethical projects that may not, in reality, draw the human creature closer to the truth of God.[68]

In light of the preceding analysis, it is interesting to note that Aquinas does not assume an apologetic posture in his commentary on Romans. No one familiar with his thought would conclude that apologetic projects lie outside of Aquinas's abilities or his interests. However, such apologetical endeavors do not direct his consideration of the natural law in his exegesis of Romans 1 and 2 — or his treatment of the natural law in the *Summa theologiae* for that matter. Aquinas simply maintains that people can (and do) know of the truth about God. Moreover, Aquinas (with Saint Paul) elucidates the results of vainly denying such truth. Not only do such denials compromise one's natural theology, they also compromise the actualization of life's happy fulfillment. Here is where Aquinas's biblical commentary presents something valuable: nothing by way of new doctrines absent from the *Summa theologiae*, but

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[67] Cf. John Haldane, "Thomistic Ethics in America," *Logos* 3 (2000), 150-168; Lawrence S. Cunningham, ed., *Intractable Disputes about the Natural Law: Alasdair MacIntyre and Critics* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2009).

[68] Of course, one does not deny that the natural law (and subsequent natural law doctrine) retains significance and relevance vis-à-vis many ethical questions. The point is, precisely, that it possesses a theological formality that exceeds the proximate and discrete boundaries of many ethical disputes which frequently invoke the natural law. The natural law is about more than questions concerning human life, natural death, marital union, and sexual activity. Moreover, when a natural lawyer adequately appreciates the theological nature of the natural law, he is able to apply natural law doctrine to these types of disputes in a way that illuminates moral truth.

rather something by way of a concise exposition of the *per se* theological nature of the natural law.[69] His commentary on Romans illuminates the integration (and disintegration) of the three levels of inclination outlined in *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 94, a. 2. The significance natural theology holds within Aquinas's natural law doctrine reminds theologians that the natural law comprises a theonomic entelechy that also shapes authentic moral science. Natural law doctrine, at its highest and most properly rational actualization, is about God and the human creature's relation to God. The natural law is not, essentially, an instrument that identifies an ethical lowest common denominator. At its most sublime level, the natural law is about the final common end: God.[70] God is the ultimate, extrinsic, common good (another element of Aquinas's Romans exegesis).[71] To love God above self is a part of natural law doctrine.[72] To reject the truth about God for illusions about human autonomy always

[69] For a compelling analysis of the "dynamic complementarity" between the *Summa theologiae* and Aquinas's commentary on Romans as a whole see: John F. Boyle, "On the Relationship of St. Thomas's Commentary on Romans to the *Summa theologiae*," in *Reading Romans with St. Thomas Aquinas*, ed. Matthew Levering and Michael Dauphinais (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2012), 75-82.

[70] "Man is obliged by natural law to this that he first be solicitous about his salvation, according to [the] passage of Matthew (6, 23), 'Seek first the kingdom of God'; for the ultimate end naturally falls under the appetite first, just as first principles naturally fall under the apprehension first; for in like manner all desires presuppose desire of the ultimate end just as all theoretically knowledge presupposes knowledge of the first theoretical principles" ("Ad hoc est homo naturali lege obligatus, ut primo sit sollicitus de sua salute, secundum illud Matth. VI, v. 33: *primum quaerite regnum Dei*. Ultimus enim finis naturaliter cadit in appetitu, sicut prima principia naturaliter primo cadunt in apprehensione; sic enim omnia desideria praesupponunt desiderium ultimi finis, sicut omnes speculationes praesupponunt speculationem primorum principiorum") (*De Malo*, q. 7, a. 10, ad 9).

[71] "For the divine good is called the common good in which all things participate" ("Divinum enim bonum dicitur bonum commune quod ab omnibus participatur; propter hoc potius dixit *divinitatem*, quae participationem significat, quam deitatem, quae significat essentiam Dei") (no. 117). See also: "Further, a particular good is ordered to the common good as to an end; indeed, the being of a part depends on the being of the whole. So, also, the good of a nation is more godlike than the good of one man. Now the supreme good, namely God, is the common good, since the good of all things depends on him: and the good whereby each thing is good, is the particular good of that thing, and of those that depend thereon. Therefore all things are directed to one good, namely, to God, as their end" ("Praeterea. Bonum particulare ordinatur in bonum commune sicut in finem: esse enim partis est propter esse totius; unde et bonum gentis est divinius quam bonum unius hominis. Bonum autem summum, quod est Deus, est bonum commune, cum ex eo universorum bonum dependeat: bonum autem quo quaelibet res bona est, est bonum particulare ipsius et aliorum quae ab ipso dependent. Omnes igitur res ordinantur sicut in finem in unum bonum, quod est Deus") (*ScG* III, c. 17).

[72] "All the moral precepts of the law come from the law of nature. But the precept of loving God more than self is a moral precept of the law. Therefore, it is of the law of nature. Consequently

effects deleterious consequences for the individual and for society. This is why Saint Paul and Saint Thomas spend so much time considering how knowledge of the truth about God correlates with matters of human sexuality. When the natural inclination to know the truth about God experiences neglect, the proper relational order of human sexuality also suffers frustration.[73] Aquinas maintains that the converse is also true: bad sex leads to false knowledge about God.[74]

In sum, the object of the natural law, at its highest level of inclination, is God.[75] To ignore this theonomic orientation deprives natural law doctrine of its proper ob-

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from natural love the angel loves God more than himself" ("Omnia moralia legis praecepta sunt de lege naturae. Sed praeceptum de diligendo Deum supra seipsum, est praeceptum morale legis. Ergo est de lege naturae. Ergo dilectione naturali Angelus diligit Deum supra seipsum") (*ST* I, q. 60, a. 5, sed contra). Aquinas also clarifies that this type of natural love is not exclusive to angelic beings. "Since God is the universal good, and under this good man and angel and all creatures are comprised, because every creature in regard to its entire being naturally belongs to God, it follows that from natural love angel and man alike love God before themselves and with a greater love. Otherwise, if either of them loved self more than God, it would follow that natural love would be perverse, and that it would not be perfected but destroyed by charity" ("Quia igitur bonum universale est ipse Deus, et sub hoc bono continetur etiam Angelus et homo et omnis creatura, quia omnis creatura naturaliter, secundum id quod est, Dei est; sequitur quod naturali dilectione etiam Angelus et homo plus et principalius diligat Deum quam seipsum. Alioquin, si naturaliter plus seipsum diligeret quam Deum, sequeretur quod naturalis dilectio esset perversa; et quod non perficeretur per caritatem, sed destrueretur") (*ST* I, q. 60, a. 5). We note how the focal point in this analysis is the natural love of God—naturally good in itself, and open to supernatural super-ordination through charity. "By free-will man can avoid evil to a certain degree, but not in any sufficient degree; forasmuch as he is weak in affection towards good on account of the manifold passions of the soul. Likewise universal natural knowledge of the law, which by nature belongs to man, to a certain degree directs man to good, but not in a sufficient degree; because in the application of the universal principles of law to particular actions man happens to be deficient in many ways. Hence it is written (Wis. 9:14): 'The thoughts of mortal men are fearful, and our counsels uncertain.' Thus man needs to be guarded by the angels" ("Per liberum arbitrium potest homo aliqualiter malum vitare, sed non sufficienter, quia infirmatur circa affectum boni, propter multiplices animae passiones. Similiter etiam universalis cognitio naturalis legis, quae homini naturaliter adest, aliqualiter dirigit hominem ad bonum, sed non sufficienter, quia in applicando universalia principia iuris ad particularia opera, contingit hominem multipliciter deficere. Unde dicitur Sap. IX, cogitationes mortalium timidae, et incertae providentiae nostrae. Et ideo necessaria fuit homini custodia Angelorum") (*ST* I, q. 113, a. 1, ad 1).

[73] Cf. *ST* II-II, q. 153, a. 5.

[74] Cf. Levering, "Knowing What is 'Natural,'" 131-134. For a clear summary of related themes see: Thomas M. MacLellan, "The Moral Virtues and the Speculative Life," *Laval théologique et philosophique* 12 (1956), 175-232. For a consideration of the specific relationship between the natural law and the life of virtue see: Kevin E. O'Reilly, "The Vision of Virtue and Knowledge of the Natural Law in Thomas Aquinas," *Nova et Vetera* 5 (2007), 41-66.

[75] Cf. Fulvio di Blasi, "Natural Law as Inclination to God," *Nova et Vetera* 7 (2009), 327-360.

jectivity as well as leaves the doctrine vulnerable to unpredictable use.[76] If human persons obstinately deny or deliberately frustrate this innate, natural, theonomic ordering then society, sex, family, and even self-existence begin to suffer frustration as well. The frustration of theonomic order in the speculative order eventually frustrates the human reception of the theological end in the existential order.[77] Natural theology always plays a critical role in the preservation of authentic natural law doctrine.[78]

3. The Bible, Morality, and the Hermeneutic of Continuity

In conclusion, we return to Joseph Ratzinger's account of "The Renewal of Moral Theology." What is Ratzinger's proposed solution to the unfortunate and unexpected results of the renewal? *God*. "No ethics can be constructed without God." The ethicist and the moral theologian "cannot prescind from the first tablet [of the Decalogue]."

> In the Sacred Scriptures, in fact, the entire Decalogue is considered to be the self-revelation of God…. such that without this fundamental reference to God, the second tablet, too, would not work. *I believe, then, that for moral theology, the aspect of reason is of the greatest importance…. The existence of God, too, belongs precisely to this rational dimension.* We cannot yield on this point: without God, all the rest would no longer have logical coherence.[79]

One could read Ratzinger's "The Renewal of Moral Theology" as an invitation for post-renewal moral theologians to benefit from one of his favorite themes: *the hermeneutic of continuity*. Much of his work after the Second Vatican Council as theologian, as Prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, and then as Roman Pontiff, was devoted to championing the "hermeneutic of continuity" as the

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[76] Cf. Steven A. Long, "Fundamental Errors of the New Natural Law Theory," *The National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly* 13 (2013), 105-131.

[77] For a penetrating explanation of the primacy of the speculative in natural law questions, see: Steven A. Long, "Speculative Foundations of Moral Theology and the Causality of Grace," *Studies in Christian Ethics* 23 (2010), 397-414.

[78] For recent considerations of and in Thomistic natural theology, see: Ralph McInerny, *Characters in Search of Their Author: The Gifford Lectures Glasgow 1999–2000* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2001); Thomas Joseph White, *Wisdom in the Face of Modernity: A Study in Thomistic Natural Theology*, 2nd ed. (Ave Maria, FL: Sapientia Press, 2016); Serge-Thomas Bonino, *Dieu, «Celui qui est» (De Deo ut uno)* (Paris: Parole et Silence, 2016).

[79] Ratzinger, "Renewal of Moral Theology," 368. Emphases added.

interpretive key for Vatican II.[80] To anyone familiar with the Church's magisterial texts, these statements from Ratzinger about God and reason echo those of Vatican I's *Dei Filius* which defended the light of human reason in opposition to both rationalistic and fideistic extremes.[81] The First Vatican Council even cites Romans 1:20 in reference to God who is "the source and end of all things," and who "can be known with certainty from the consideration of created things, by the natural power of human reason."[82] Thus, "there is a twofold order of knowledge, distinct not only as regards its source, but also as regards its object…. [and] we know at the one level by natural reason, at the other level by divine faith."[83] Finally, the council grieves over those "children of the Catholic Church" who are "led away by diverse and strange teachings and confusing nature and grace, human knowledge and divine faith," such that "they are found to distort the genuine sense of the dogmas which Holy mother Church holds and teaches, and to endanger the integrity and genuineness of the faith."[84] Although promulgated in 1870, these statements from *Dei Filius* bear a striking relevance to the issues Ratzinger adumbrates in his 2005 essay on the renewal

[80] Cf. Ratzinger's very first statement as Pope 20 April 2005 (http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/messages/pont-messages/2005/documents/hf_ben-xvi_mes_20050420_missa-pro-ecclesia_en.html [accessed 20 April 2017]); Matthew L. Lamb and Matthew Levering, eds., *Vatican II: Renewal within Tradition* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); Thomas Joseph White, "The Tridentine Genius of Vatican II," *Nova et Vetera* 11 (2013), 9-18; Christopher Ruddy, "'Smaller But Purer'?: Joseph Ratzinger on the 'Little Flock' and Vicarious Representation," *Nova et Vetera* 13 (2015), 713-741.

[81] "Thereupon there came into being and spread far and wide throughout the world that doctrine of rationalism or naturalism, utterly opposed to the Christian religion, since this is of supernatural origin, which spares no effort to bring it about that Christ, who alone is our lord and savior, is shut out from the minds of people and the moral life of nations. Thus they would establish what they call the rule of simple reason or nature. The abandonment and rejection of the Christian religion, and the denial of God and his Christ, has plunged the minds of many into the abyss of pantheism, materialism and atheism, and the consequence is that they strive to destroy rational nature itself, to deny any criterion of what is right and just [*omneque justi rectique normam negantes*], and to overthrow the very foundations of human society" (Vatican I, Dogmatic Constitution *Dei Filius*, in *Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils*, vol. 2, *Trent: Vatican II*, ed. Norman P. Tanner [London: Sheed and Ward; Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1990], c. 1). For a history of Vatican I, see: Dom. Cuthbert Butler, *The Vatican Council, 1869–1870: Based on Bishop Ullathorne's Letters*, ed. Christopher Butler (Westminster, MD: Newman Press, 1962) John W. O'Malley, *Vatican I: The Council and the Making of the Ultramontane Church* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2018)..

[82] *Dei Filius*, c. 2. For a recent brief study of *Dei Filius* see: Jeffrey A. Allen, "A Commentary on the First Vatican Council's *Dei Filius*," *Irish Theological Quarterly* 81 (2016), 138-151.

[83] *Dei Filius*, c. 2. Cf. Romanus Cessario, "*Duplex Ordo Cognitionis*," in *Reason and the Reasons of Faith*, ed. Paul J. Griffiths and Reinhard Hütter (New York: T&T Clark, 2005), 327-338.

[84] *Dei Filius*, c. 2.

of moral theology. Perhaps Vatican II's call for renewal within moral theology can only be fully realized if moral theologians stand in deliberate continuity with the teaching of Vatican I. Perhaps *Optatam Totius* no. 16 presupposes and requires *Dei Filius* chapters 1–2.[85]

Scholasticism received heavy criticism before, during, and after the theological renewal. Some of the critiques, no doubt, were warranted. The scholastics (neo or otherwise) were not all created equal; nor did they exercise an equal influence on Catholic theology. Durandus of Saint-Pourçain was not Henry of Ghent who was not Bonaventure who was not Thomas Aquinas. And as one can identify great diversity among the scholastics, so one can also find great diversity among the neo-scholastic manuals.[86] However, at least one characteristic of Aquinas's natural law doctrine appears to warrant both admiration and appreciation: a sapiential emphasis upon God. This emphasis was not an afterthought for Aquinas nor for the Thomists.[87] The truth about God remains an unavoidable object of human — not just Christian — inclination. And this inclination to theological truth bears significant ethical and moral implications for all human persons: "for true knowledge of God, by its very nature, leads men to good."[88]

4. Conclusion

Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger proposed a difficult topic to the Pontifical Biblical Commission: *The Bible and Morality*. This PBC document inspires moral theologians to read Aquinas's commentary on Saint Paul's letter to the Romans. Aquinas's Biblical commentary invites us to re-read his summary of natural law inclinations in the *Summa theologiae*. Taken together, these three sources compel us to reconsider the first principle and ultimate end of all authentic moral renewal: God. A natural law doctrine without God results in the absence of philosophical precision and theological finality. The temptation towards (and tensions between) rationalism and

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[85] For a recent consideration of *Optatam Totius* see: Robert Barron, "*Optatam Totius*," in Matthew L. Lamb and Matthew Levering, eds., *The Reception of Vatican II* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 191-207.

[86] For a recent and more positive consideration of the manualists, see: Brian Besong, "Reappraising the Manual Tradition," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 89, no. 4 (2015), 557-584.

[87] For a concise study of Aquinas's legacy and the perpetuation of his thought in the Thomist tradition see: Romanus Cessario, and Cajetan Cuddy, *Thomas and the Thomists: The Achievement of Thomas Aquinas and his Interpreters* (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2017).

[88] Aquinas, *Ad Rom.,* ch. 1, lectio 6, no. 112.

fideism always find ethical expression within the context of natural law doctrine. Herein lies the intrinsic value, the perennial significance, and the contemporary relevance of Aquinas's natural law doctrine as summarized in his commentary on Romans. The natural law leads the human person to God, and errors about God in natural law doctrine carry deleterious effects for human lives. Ratzinger and Aquinas both issue a stern warning to moral theologians past and present: without the God of both the natural law and the Bible a "post-metaphysical reason" will inevitably dominate ethical discourse to consequentialist consequences. Such consequences contradict the moral teaching of the Catholic Church. "Like the old Stoics, the Magisterium argues from 'nature.'"[89] However, unlike the Stoics, the Magisterium also defends human reason's ability to arrive at the existence of the one God who is truth and goodness itself.[90] One might even suggest that a rediscovery of Thomistic natural law doctrine may occasion the recovery of the Bible in moral theology. Both suffered eclipse together. Perhaps the restoration of the one requires the simultaneous rediscovery of the other.[91]

The God of the Bible is, after all, the same God of the natural law. And "true knowledge of God, by its very nature, leads men to good."

[89] Ratzinger, "Bishops, Theologians, and Morality," 64-65.

[90] "Whereas for the Stoics nature pointed to a divine reality of a pantheistic stripe, so that nature, full of gods and divinities, was saturated with signs of the divine will and of the path to divinization, in Christianity, through the concept of creation, nature became transparent to the intentions of the Creator: it expresses the language of the Creator, who lets himself be perceived through creation" (Ratzinger, "Renewal of Moral Theology," 363). Cf. Steven A. Long, "On Natural Knowledge of God: Aquinas's Debt to Aristotle," in *Theology Needs Philosophy: Acting Against Reason is Contrary to the Nature of God*, ed. Matthew L. Lamb (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2016), 74-87.

[91] Russell Hittinger has observed: "According to the encyclical [*Veritatis Splendor*], the moral theologian cannot leave behind the natural law component for the purpose of a morality of 'salvation' without subverting Scripture and the 'living tradition'" ("The Situation of Natural Law in Catholic Theology," *Nova et Vetera* 9 [2011], 660).

Towards A Biblical Thomism
Thomas Aquinas and the Renewal of Biblical Theology
Edited by Piotr Roszak and Jörgen Vijgen

Paul M. Rogers

Prophecy and the Moral Life in Thomas Aquinas's *Commentary on 1 Corinthians*

> "Theology, as theological science in the strict sense, is not prophetic but may only truly become living theology under the thrust and illumination of a prophetic impulse."
> Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger[1]

Commenting on chapters 12 and 14 of St. Paul's First Letter to the Corinthians, Thomas Aquinas expounds the apostle's teaching on the charismatic gift of prophecy in the broader context of the Church's sacraments, which he identifies in the commentary's prologue to be the epistle's main subject.[2] Thomas's handling of prophecy in these chapters sheds a unique light on how he sees the social function of prophecy in the Church (and, by extension, the Church's function in the world) to testify to the truths of the Christian faith and, especially, to moral truth. Thomas's treatment of St. Paul's teaching about the superiority of prophecy over the gift of tongues revives an important theme for moral theology today: namely, how the members of the Church are called to live as effective witnesses to the truths of faith and, particularly, to mor-

[1] "The Problem of Christian Prophecy: Interview with Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger by Niels Christian Hvidt," *30 Days* (Jan. 1999), 72-83, at 78; cited by Niels C. Hvidt, *Christian Prophecy: The Post-Biblical Tradition* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 243.

[2] *Super I Epistolam B. Pauli ad Corinthios lectura* (= *In 1 Cor*), prol. no. 2; unless noted otherwise, the English translation is by Fabian Larcher and Daniel Keating from Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on the Letters of Saint Paul to the Corinthians*, ed. John Mortensen and Enrique Alarcón, vol. 38, Latin/English Edition of the Works of St. Thomas Aquinas (Lander, WY: Aquinas Institute, 2012). Latin text and paragraph numbering (no.) follow the edition prepared by Raffaele Cai, *Super Epistolas S. Pauli Lectura*, 2 vols, eighth revised edition (Rome: Marietti, 1953).

al truths as taught within and by the ecclesial community and shaped especially by prayer — both public and private.

While many aspects of Thomas's commentary on 1 Corinthians merit their own treatment in relation to morality in the Bible — not least of all his rich treatment of St. Paul's hymn to charity at chapter 13 — I have limited my analysis to two features that come across strikingly in his commentary on chapters 12 and 14 (and uniquely with respect to Thomas's writings elsewhere) about the gift of prophecy. The first is how Thomas extends the ecclesial function of the prophet to embrace inspired acts of preaching and the interpretation of Scripture. The second feature is his treatment of prayer as the locus *par excellence* for ecclesial life and its role in moral formation. Following St. Paul, Thomas takes prayer initially to relate to the Church's public liturgy, but there are times where Thomas gestures towards an explicit affirmation of the need for prayer (whether public or private) in all Christian moral formation. Unsurprisingly, Thomas — a seasoned teacher by the time of his Corinthians commentary — shows concern in these chapters to trace the paths of St. Paul's own solicitude for the moral formation of the church at Corinth. He learns from the apostle, while at the same time making manifest to his friar listeners, how moral formation occur preeminently *in actu* without necessarily prejudicing the helpfulness of moral formation *in abstracto*. A striking case of Thomas enacting this Pauline principle of formation *in actu* comes during his discussion of praying in tongues, where he stretches the notion of prophecy towards the believer's encounter with the challenges of interpreting the words of Scripture. Here, it becomes clear that for Thomas Christian moral formation is rooted principally in living biblical teaching, which is distinct from, but not necessarily in opposition to, more philosophically-oriented formation in morals as modeled in expositions of the seven virtues and vices or of the precepts of the natural law. Reading or listening to Scripture with the help of one interpreting (who may or may not have the gift of prophecy) presents for Thomas's readers in the twenty-first century a dynamic view of Christian moral formation that calls for lived engagement with the truths of faith, given that one's life is always open to and hopeful for the possibility of cooperating with the Holy Spirit in the conversion of one's neighbor.

Initial Background

Some historical background to Thomas's 1 Corinthians commentary may be helpful at this stage. His comments on chapters 12 and 14 come at the point in the epistle where St. Paul expresses his concern to the church at Corinth about an apparent controversy over how charismatic gifts like tongues and prophecy are being

used especially during communal worship. Such gifts are, the apostle says, "manifestations of the Spirit" meant to build-up the Church, not cause division or scandal.

Chapters 12 through 14 of Thomas's commentary come from what most scholars[3] agree is a *reportatio* of a course on 1 Corinthians given by Thomas early in his career.[4] The dating for this early course varies somewhat: sometime during 1259-65 or 1265-68 is the commonly hypothesized range. Towards the end of his life, Thomas revisited the Pauline epistles for a second course starting either in his second Paris regency (1271-72) or during his time in Naples (1272-73). The first seven chapters of the 1 Corinthians commentary show evidence that they were likely revised by Thomas during this second course, resulting in a more elaborated *expositio*. The commentary from Chapter 7:15 to 10:33 transmitted in some of the manuscript tradition is not Thomas's work, but that of Peter of Tarentaise. Daniel Keating following both Dahan and Torrell has hypothesized that the original *reportatio* for these chapters was lost, most likely during Thomas's second course while under revision, and Peter of Tarentaise's commentary was inserted into the manuscript tradition to provide a full commentary.[5] Thus, the remainder of the commentary from 10:34 onwards probably comes from Thomas's first Pauline course. Most of these details do not factor greatly into the discussion here, but they are useful, if only to keep in mind that these reflections on prophecy come at a time before Thomas wrote his four questions on prophecy in the *Summa Theologiae* (II-II qq. 171-174).

Indeed, when compared to his *Summa* treatment of prophecy, the Corinthians commentary presents a rare glimpse into how Thomas saw prophecy possibly functioning in his time. While in the *Summa* Thomas does admit that post-apostolic prophecy exists,[6] associating prophets especially with the task of guiding human morals, he expands little on this observation. Most of the examples of prophets given in the *Summa* are from the Old Testament, and this does not help us much to see how Thomas might have envisioned post-apostolic prophecy functioning in the new Christian dispensation.

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[3] See Gilbert Dahan, "Introduction," in Thomas Aquinas, *Commentaire de la première épitre aux Corinthiens* (Paris: Cerf, 2002), iii-xxx; Jean-Pierre Torrell, *Initiation à saint Thomas d'Aquin* (Paris: Cerf, 2015), chapter XIV, "Le cours sur les épîtres pauliniennes."

[4] See the overview by Daniel F. Keating, "Aquinas on 1 and 2 Corinthians: The Sacraments and their Ministers," in *Aquinas on Scripture: An Introduction to his Biblical Commentaries*, ed. Thomas G. Weinandy, Daniel F. Keating, and John P. Yocum (London: T & T Clark, 2005), 127-148, esp. 127-129.

[5] Keating, "Aquinas on 1 and 2 Cor," 127-128.

[6] *Summa Theologiae* (=*ST*) II-II q. 174 a. 6. English translations of the *Summa Theologiae* unless noted otherwise are from the Fathers of the English Dominican Province (London: Benzinger Bros., 1947).

Given the prominence of the gift of prophecy in the early Church (as attested to by St. Paul) and its continued importance in theological speculation in the Middle Ages up to the thirteenth century, Thomas's commentary on 1 Corinthians provides evidence for a view that post-apostolic prophecy still holds weight for Thomas, especially regarding Christians' moral lives. However, the weight given to post-apostolic prophecy for guiding morals — even in the commentary — quickly gets displaced by concerns about how prophets experience prophetic revelations — what one might today call a *phenomenological* account of prophecy. Thomas's analysis of prophecy in the *Summa Theologiae* and in the *Disputed Question De Veritate* q. 12 (on prophecy) often gets channeled away from charismatic individuals and towards how prophets come to know what they claim to know. The cognitive aspect of his analysis predominates. Thomas's cognitive approach to prophecy can likely be traced to the influence of St. Augustine, who analyzed prophecy into three categories of vision. For Augustine, vision offers an analogy that relates directly to knowledge; "seeing" is almost equated with "knowing" at times. For example, in the *Summa* (II-II qq. 171-174), Thomas only infrequently addresses how what prophets know — that is, their message from God — affects and builds up the Church, such as through moral teaching. In this respect, an encounter with Thomas's commentary on 1 Corinthians provides a welcome occasion to extend some of Thomas's germinal insights by expanding his view that post-apostolic prophecy exists in the Church and that it relates especially to moral formation.

Within the commentary itself, it is St. Paul's specific attention to prophecy as it relates to the gift of tongues that moves Thomas away from a predominantly cognitive analysis. Since the epistle's text forces him to bring the gift of prophecy directly into relation with the gift of tongues, what Thomas says about prophecy here is rather unique compared to his other writings where he can address prophecy discretely. The built-in need to address tongues draws Thomas's attention especially to how prophets interpret words. This interpreting of words extends not just to spoken words that come from the gift of tongues, but in a special way to the words of Scripture. This raises interesting questions about prophecy's potential relationship even to the very commentary activity that Thomas is engaged in. Can a biblical commentary itself be an act of prophecy? Does Thomas truly think God grants a special gift to certain individuals that enables them to explain to others the more obscure parts of the Bible — a type of hermeneutical gift? The analysis presented here will give a preliminary, yet equally cautious and qualified, answer to this question in the affirmative.

Prologue to the Commentary on 1 Cor

In the prologue to his commentary, Thomas explains that the main subject matter of the epistle is really "the sacraments of the Church."[7] It is probably helpful to think of Thomas's identification of the subject matter more as a framework for his continued commenting than as him identifying the subject of a treatise. Even the term "sacrament" lends itself to a type of intellectual scaffolding that interlinks different ideas, since one of the senses of the term is simply a sign that refers to something sacred, as being a thing's image or laying bare its cause.[8] It is in this sense that the word is most appropriately applied to the seven sacraments of the Church. In a slightly different sense, "sacrament" can mean something "secret" especially regarding sacred things; Thomas says that this sense of sacrament as something secret or hidden is also contained in the other sense, because in the Church's sacraments God's power is "secretly" at work for salvation.

Because these secrets need revealing, Thomas says that it falls to prelates and teachers of the Church "to manifest" these secrets "to Christ's faithful." They do this for three reasons: to honor God, to assist the salvation of others, and to fulfill their duty as laid out by St. Paul (Eph 3:8).[9] When the epistle turns to prophecy at chapters 12 and 14, Thomas focuses on the prophet's words as a divine sign or manifestation of God's Spirit. Adopting some terminological flexibility, one might call this prophecy's *sacramentality* to avoid confusion with the more technical application of the term to the seven sacraments. Prophecy's sacramentality is seen especially in the way it recalls the need for one to witness authentically and personally to Christian faith and moral truth.[10] Critically, *sacramentality* does not mean that prophecy confers

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[7] *In 1 Cor*, prol. no. 2. When Thomas identifies the subject matter of 1 Cor as being "about the sacraments of the Church," he also presents us with a glimpse of a larger program, where he links 1 Cor to the Letter to the Romans which discusses "the grace of God, which works in the Church's sacraments."

[8] *In 1 Cor*, prol. no. 1: "quandoque sacramentum dicitur sacrae rei signum, ita quod et eius imaginem gerat, et causa existat."

[9] *In 1 Cor*, prol. no. 2.

[10] A helpful image here is Jesus's exhortation not to hide a light under a bushel, but to put it on a stand to shine for all to see *that they may see your good works and give glory to your Father who is in heaven* (Mt 5:14-16). The light symbolizes the sacramentality of the Christian life as pointing to the Father's glory; this also relates to the sacramentality of the Church, whom the Christian is a member of. Interestingly, Jesus indicates this corporate or social sacramentality initially in the same passage by the image of a city atop a hill that cannot be hidden. The sacramentality of the individual believer and the Church are closely interconnected. First, Jesus says that a city on a hill cannot be hidden (communal witness). Then, he gives the example of a light on a stand as

sanctifying grace, but rather that it functions as a sign of God's work for salvation which ideally is accomplished through charity.

Breakdown of 1 Cor 12-14: An Eschatological Perspective of Spiritual Gifts and Moral Action

In the first 11 chapters of the commentary, Thomas explores the three sacraments of baptism, matrimony, and the Eucharist as they come up in the letter. At chapter 12, he observes that St. Paul begins to talk about "the reality of the sacraments."[11] He identifies two realities: one signified and contained in the sacraments, namely grace. The other is signified but not contained fully in the sacraments, namely, the glory of the resurrection. This division of grace and glory creates another framework for Thomas to proceed through chapters 12 to 16. The grace and glory framework suggests that any discussion of the sacraments or the charismatic gifts must also be seen in the light of the final end brought about in glory. This eschatological perspective is applied by Thomas in the first instance to the Church, which corporately is ordered to glory. The charismatic gifts, insofar as members of the Church exercise them, are also inherently ordered to the eschaton through their manifestation during the Church's pilgrimage. Concretely, this is seen in Thomas's comments on chapter 13: prophecy — like many of the other spiritual gifts except charity — will pass away in glory.[12] Such gifts are no longer necessary in the beatific vision. This framework of grace and glory also serves as an implicit reminder to the audience not to focus too enthusiastically on the charismatic gifts, but rather to see gifts like prophecy within the total course of God's providential and saving economy.

According to Thomas's outline at the start of chapter 12, chapters 12-14 deal principally with "the gifts of graces." By this expression, Thomas does not mean the seven *gifts of the Holy Spirit*; while he does mention the gifts of the Holy Spirit at some point, he does this chiefly to exclude them from any direct consideration of Paul's terminology of spiritual *gifts*.[13] The graces Thomas is thinking of are *sanctifying grace* and the *gratuitous graces* — the latter I have already been calling "charismatic gifts." Chapter 12, he says, treats the distinction of the gratuitous graces. Chap-

opposed to being under a bushel (individual witness). The two types (communal and individual) are intertwined.

[11] *In 1 Cor 12* no. 709: "ad rem sacramentorum."

[12] *In 1 Cor 13* no. 788, 795.

[13] See *In 1 Cor 12* no. 727.

ter 13 with St. Paul's great hymn to charity pertains to sanctifying grace.[14] Chapter 14 compares the gratuitous graces of tongues and prophecy with each other.

The Principle of all Gifts of Grace: the Holy Spirit

At 1 Cor 12: 3-4, *I give you to understand that no man, speaking by the Spirit of God, says anathema to Jesus. And no man can say the Lord Jesus, but by the Holy Spirit. Now there are diversities of graces, but the same Spirit*, Thomas draws attention to the principle and source of all spiritual gifts and graces: the Holy Spirit. He speaks of the "indwelling" of the Holy Spirit in a person through sanctifying grace. He notes, however, that this indwelling does not prevent a person from sinning in the future. A person can still sin "through a defect of the human will which resists the Holy Spirit. […] For by the indwelling of the Holy Spirit the ability to sin is not taken away totally from those freed [by sanctifying grace] in this life."[15] This point is important for highlighting the moral condition of human beings; even with sanctifying grace and the Spirit's indwelling, personal sin is still a very real presence and possibility in people's lives and in the Church. While Thomas's analysis here does not dwell much on the human capacity to sin (most likely because it is so obvious), it does draw attention to the fact that the overall concern of Thomas's exposition of St. Paul's division of the graces is moral. This moral concern is inherited by Thomas from St. Paul's own pastoral solicitude for the Corinthian church.

Thomas also clarifies what St. Paul means when he says someone "speaks something in the Holy Spirit."[16] To say something "in the Holy Spirit" can be taken two ways, he says. In the first way, someone speaks as if moved by the Spirit, but without possessing the Holy Spirit as a permanent quality or *habitus*. Thomas gives the example of someone like Caiaphas who prophesies thanks to holding the office of high priest that it was expedient for one man to die for the nation. He also cites Balaam's prophecies from Genesis. In both examples, the persons who prophesy are moved to speak, but the Holy Spirit does not dwell in them through charity. Nevertheless, both Caiaphas and Balaam speak "from a spirit of prophecy," even though they are not "prophets" in the most proper sense of the term, given that neither is aware he is prophesying.[17]

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[14] *In 1 Cor 12* no. 709.
[15] *In 1 Cor 12* no. 717 (trans. adapted).
[16] *In 1 Cor 12* no. 718.
[17] Compare *ST* II-II q. 171 a. 2; 173 a. 4.

In a second way, Thomas says some people can speak as if moved by the Spirit while the Spirit does dwell in them. This would be the case were someone to prophesy while possessing sanctifying grace. For such a person, "to speak" in the Holy Spirit can mean not only to speak words, but also it extends "to the heart and deeds."[18] This is to say, a person with sanctifying grace can "speak" in the Holy Spirit in what they say, will, and how they act. This extension of "speech" to actions reveals a subtle flexibility in Thomas's terminology that quickly adapts and extends St. Paul's own words to the full range of moral acts. Thomas writes:

> something is said by a deed, inasmuch as someone by an external work manifests his thought. *No man*, therefore, except having the Holy Spirit *can say the Lord Jesus*, is such a way that he confesses this not only by the mouth but also with the heart revering him as Lord and in work obeying him as Lord.[19]

Here we catch a glimpse of how prophecy for Thomas could extend to the affective side of human action. Obedience to a word received from God itself signifies the message the prophet has received from God, which he also wants to communicate. This consideration of obedience and action motivated by charity also allows Thomas to return to sanctifying grace; he clarifies that without grace one cannot do good.[20]

Christ as the Head and Source of all Graces: Sound Doctrine to Sound Morals

By considering the need for sanctifying grace for good action and ultimately for salvation, Thomas can reflect also on the source of all graces, which is in Christ. The difference between sanctifying and gratuitous grace, however, presents a difficulty to identifying Christ as the unique source of both. Thomas considers the objection: if every grace has only one source, why does not Christ bestow all the gifts to everyone who possesses sanctifying grace? Thomas answers this difficulty by appealing to Christ's own reception of the fullness of grace from the Holy Spirit (Jn 3:34). While Christ possesses grace fully, those united to Christ do not received it "in its entirety."[21] Thomas suggests that there would be something inappropriate if a creature were to receive the fullness of grace "in its entirety" in the same way Christ

[18] *In 1 Cor 12* no. 718.
[19] *In 1 Cor 12* no. 718.
[20] *In 1 Cor 12* no. 719.
[21] *In 1 Cor 12* no. 721.

has, who is creator. This serves to emphasize Christ's unique role as the cause and head of all graces. Commenting on Paul's analogy between the natural body and its head, Thomas illustrates this further: "For as in a natural body the head has all the senses, while the other members do not; so in the Church Christ alone has all graces, which are divided in the other members."[22]

Identifying Christ as grace's ultimate source also enables Thomas to highlight the relationship believers have with the head and how their individual gifts stem from him. Christ's headship rules out any claim that the different gifts proceed from different "authors." In relation to this point, Thomas mentions the fact that pagans attributed different preternatural gifts to different pagan gods. Preternatural wisdom was attributed to Minerva; preternaturally eloquent speech to Mercury. Here, Thomas builds on the apologetic tone of St. Paul's own letter and fills in some of its subtext. St. Paul had to address the conflicting views about these gifts and where they came from. The explanations from pagans in Corinth about where preternatural gifts came from were liable to cause confusion among Corinthian Christians; this could potentially bring occasion for them to fall back into their earlier pagan beliefs. Thomas shows how by reminding the Corinthians that Christ is the source of every grace, St. Paul is trying to prevent them from mistaking the diversity of gifts for polytheism. Instead of there being many gods, Thomas identifies the Holy Spirit exclusively as "the author of all graces."[23]

The unity of grace in Christ stressed here by Thomas introduces an important principle that applies not only to the different gratuitous graces, but also to the religious and moral life of Thomas's audience — Dominican student friars. By reminding his own audience how the diversity of gifts does not justify false pagan religion, Thomas shows how correct belief leads to the correct interpretation of where these gifts come from; this, in turn, leads to the good usage of these gifts and avoidance of them becoming occasions of sin and discord in the community.[24]

The Gratuitous Graces and the Manifestations of the Spirit: 1 Corinthians 12

We are now in a position to ask what Thomas sees the gratuitous graces bringing to morals. A gratuitous grace is, as St. Paul writes, *the manifestation of the Spirit*

[22] *In 1 Cor 12* no. 721.

[23] *In 1 Cor 12* no. 721.

[24] By reminding his audience that without Christ's grace one cannot avoid falling into sin and can do no good, Thomas also uses the diversity of the gratuitous graces as an occasion to highlight the superiority of the charity-filled life of sanctifying grace made available by Christ.

which *is given to every man unto profit* (12:7). The profit that comes from these manifestations is the good of the Church. Commenting on this verse, Thomas sets out an orderly exposition to explain what these different manifestations entail and why each of them are useful for the Church.

Identifying that the key purpose or "office" (*officium*) of the gratuitous graces lies in the Spirit's "manifestation,"[25] Thomas links these gifts right away with the epistle's central theme of sacramentality. They manifest the Spirit in two chief ways. First, through the graces the Spirit is manifested "as inhabiting the Church as both teaching and sanctifying it." Thomas gives as an example the case of someone separated from the Church by mortal sin still performing a miracle to show the truth of the faith. (Somewhat counterintuitively to how we might think today, rather than focusing on the miracle-working sinner as a cause of scandal or embarrassment for the Church, Thomas sees the sinner's miracle as pointing more clearly to the divine power at work in the Church.)

In a second way, the Spirit is manifested "as inhabiting one to whom such graces are granted."[26] Thomas gives the example of St. Stephen, who is said to have been filled with grace working many signs. "Moreover, such graces," he writes, "are not given except to the saints."[27] In this second category, Thomas sees a special role played by the saints in manifesting the Spirit through their unique gratuitous graces. This lends some support to an argument made recently by Niels C. Hvidt, who contends that while calling individuals "prophets" decreased dramatically in the Church after the Montanist controversy, most patristic and medieval authors still held the view that God bestowed on individuals certain prophetic gifts and revealed messages as part of his providential plan.[28] Since what the early Church called the "office" of prophets had diminished, patristic and medieval authors called these individuals "saints" rather than "prophets." At the same time, their relationship to an institutional office remained somewhat undefined; similarly, the expression "saint" for Thomas is relatively neutral with respect to whether the person in question holds an "office" or not.

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[25] *In 1 Cor 12* no. 725.

[26] *In 1 Cor 12* no. 725.

[27] *In 1 Cor 12* no. 725. Misleading here is the English translation of Larcher and Keating (2012), 271-72.

[28] Hvidt, *Christian Prophecy*, 88-96.

The Purpose of Manifestations of the Spirit: The Common Good

Any manifestation of the Spirit of either of these two types is meant for the common good. Thomas explains that the common good is fostered specifically "when either the true doctrine of the Church is proved (*probatur*) or when someone's holiness is proposed as an example."[29] By "proving" the truth of the Church's doctrine, Thomas does not mean here a logical proof; instead, he means that these manifestations help to confirm the faithful and convert unbelievers through a kind of "divine sign."[30] Thomas understands that the assistance of these manifestations is only a type of external "persuasion" that helps move a person to faith. Such persuasions can never replace the more essential work of God moving a person internally to believe through sanctifying grace. Still, Thomas does allow that other people can be instrumental in bringing others to salvation. He explains "[…] that by one the salvation of others can be procured. Man, indeed, cannot do this by working within, for this belongs to God alone, but only to persuading outwardly."[31]

Prophecy falls within this category of external persuasion. It is a "divine sign" that helps to confirm words of persuasion that have already been proposed regarding the truths of Christian faith. In this respect, prophecy does not replace apostolic preaching, but rather is integrally linked to it as an auxiliary. Commenting on the Pauline analogy between the Church as Body of Christ and the natural body, Thomas claims that St. Paul sees the lower ministry of prophecy being ordered to the good of the ministry of apostles; this is one way prophecy contributes concretely to the common good.

At one point, Thomas almost seems to suggest that prophets only derive their power hierarchically from the apostles.[32] It is difficult to determine what Thomas exactly means by this, since he elaborates so little on it. A possible interpretation may be that he is saying that prophets can only function profitably in the Church, because the Church has already been constituted by the apostles and their preaching. This deeply ecclesial and interrelational al understanding of prophecy is typical of Thomas's approach in this commentary, and it already rules out any simplistic view of prophecy as being inherently opposed to or pitted against hierarchical authority in the Church.[33]

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[29] *In 1 Cor 12* no. 726.

[30] *In 1 Cor 12* no. 728.

[31] *In 1 Cor 12* no. 727 (trans. adapted).

[32] *In 1 Cor 12* no. 755.

[33] In the questions on prophecy in the *Summa Theologiae*, this ecclesial dimension of prophecy is less prominent. Only on a structural reading of those questions that takes into account their

As a preliminary definition, Thomas says that prophecy relates to things that "only God can know."[34] Under this description, he observes that the traditional association of prophecy with the knowledge of future contingents remains apt, because future contingents are known exclusively by God. This definition, while traditional among other scholastic treatments of prophecy, is somewhat misleading, even when ascribed to Thomas's own account.[35] We have already seen that prophecy extends beyond future contingents and can touch on human morals, or analogously to the actions of saints. More interestingly, Thomas lists other divine signs that are associated with prophecy, namely, the gift of reading hearts and the discernment of spirits.

Prophecy and Charity in 1 Cor 13: Prophecy occurs where the Church Requires it

A brief comment on 1Cor. 13. At verse 2 St. Paul writes that *if I should have prophecy and should know all mysteries and all knowledge, and if I should have all faith, so that I could remove mountains, and have not charity, I am nothing*. Thomas relates this passage with his earlier discussion of the manifestations of the Spirit for the good of the Church. Manifestations like prophecy and miracle working occur "where the Church requires."[36] It is the needs of the Church that are front and center for understanding these gifts; hence the need for charity for them to be profitable for a person. If charity is lacking, then the person who possesses prophecy is "nothing." Thomas uses this passage also to highlight that the gratuitous graces can all be had without charity. Thus, they are not directly a sign of charity working in a person; they are rather signs of God's power and this divine power working in and through the Church and its members.[37]

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locale in the *Secunda Secundae* is light shed on Thomas's view that prophecy chiefly functions for the benefit of the Church. For one of the strongest advocates of this structural reading especially with regard to Thomas's *Summa* questions on prophecy, see Marie-Michel Labourdette, "Théologie morale," *Revue thomiste* 50 (1950), 408-421.

[34] *In 1 Cor 12* no. 728.

[35] See Jean-Pierre Torrell, "Le traite de la prophétie de S. Thomas d'Aquin et la théologie de la revelation," in *La doctrine de révélation de saint Thomas d'Aquin*, ed. Leo Elders, (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1990), 171-195, at 174; Torrell argues that Thomas was the first scholastic thinker to resolve satisfactorily the problem of limiting prophecy's specification to knowledge of future contingents.

[36] *In 1 Cor 13* no. 765.

[37] Two other noteworthy points about prophecy come out in Thomas's comments on 1 Cor 13. First, prophecy will cease in glory; there will no longer be need for it. Prophecy in this life gives

Prophecy and Tongues in 1 Cor 14

St. Paul's teaching on prophecy's superiority to the gift of tongues gives us the most material to consider how Thomas applies prophecy to the moral life. Even though in chapter 13 St. Paul establishes that charity is the greatest of all gifts, the other lesser spiritual gifts are still not to be despised. As spiritual goods, they are all orderable by charity, and uniquely — in contrast to spatio-temporal goods — many people can partake of these spiritual goods simultaneously without diminishing them, says Thomas. Even the fact that only certain individuals possess spiritual gifts like prophecy or miracle working is not a barrier to them being shared by everyone.[38]

In addition to the gratuitons graces being universally shareable, Thomas insists that there is also a hierarchy and ordering among the gratuitous graces. Prophecy stands as the highest gratuitous grace because of the good it provides the Church, and especially the good (in chapter 14) for "unbelievers." Thomas gives here his most in-depth analysis of prophecy in part to explain its superiority. He frames his analysis using two questions: (1) what prophecy is and (2) how many ways the term "prophecy" is deployed in Scripture. His analysis of prophecy's essence (*quid est*) does not differ radically from the treatments found in the *Summa Theologiae* or the *Disputed Question De Veritate* q.12, but Thomas does emphasize in the commentary prophecy's link to the interpretation of Scripture and to prayer — two aspects that barely feature in his more systematic treatments.

As far as the use of the term goes, Thomas identifies four senses of "prophecy" and then identifies a focal sense. He uses this sematic analysis to help answer the first question about what prophecy is. In its most basic sense prophecy requires (1) the imagination to be preternaturally formed, since humans come to know reality through phantasms formed in the imagination. This formation of the imagination, however, is not prophecy in the fullest sense, because someone can have a dream (like Pharaoh in the Joseph story) and still not understand what God is trying to reveal to them. Besides the imagination being preternaturally disposed, Thomas thinks prophecy's most essential aspect lies in (2) an intellectual light that is above the natural light of reason. This is the focal senses of what "prophecy" is for Thomas. The term can also extend (3) to "the courage to announce" what was revealed, and (4) to the working of miracles that ensure "prophecy's certitude."[39] In particular, the third element — "the courage to announce" what has been revealed — is something

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us "figurative and enigmatic knowledge," but in glory things will be seen clearly (no. 788). Second, all prophecy in this life is imperfect and only partial (no. 793).

[38] *In 1 Cor 14* no. 810.

[39] *In 1 Cor 14* no. 812.

that Thomas barely even mentions in his other writings on prophecy, while the other three elements are familiar loci. This sematic analysis shows that Thomas employs the term "prophecy" somewhat analogously depending on the circumstances. In the commentary, he identifies explicitly St. Paul's focal sense of prophecy as being the reception of a supernatural intellectual light.

Having given a working definition of prophecy, Thomas next turns to the expression "speaking in tongues." To speak in tongues, he says, is "properly" to say something that is neither understood nor explained.[40] The speaker does not understand what he is saying and can give no explanation or interpretation; likewise, most people that hear cannot understand what is said. By comparing prophecy and tongues, Thomas can explore two things: first, the relationship of the people to the Church; second, the role played by the two gifts in forming Christian prayer. It is in this later discussion of prayer that Thomas appeals to the primacy of the final end in moral acts, which allows him to explain why St. Paul values prophecy over tongues. This excursus on moral acts and the final end — which may seem somewhat surprising given the context — signals an important connection that Thomas makes between these lesser gifts and his fundamental moral theology. Seeing tongues and prophecy as part of the Church's public prayer life, Thomas signals to us in the twenty-first century that a gift like prophecy might be more suitably treated in moral theology than exclusively in mystical or spiritual theology — the place where one is most likely to encounter a treatment of prophecy in theological textbooks since roughly the sixteenth century.[41]

As a preface to comparing tongues and prophecy, Thomas gives the basic outline of St. Paul's argument for prophecy's superiority. Praying in tongues, he says, honors God; prophecy, however, honors God and is also useful for one's neighbor because it brings spiritual consolations.[42] Now, it is better to honor God and serve one's neighbor than to honor God alone. Therefore, prophecy is better than tongues.

At the outset, one notices a structural similarity between this argument and the argument Thomas makes elsewhere about the superiority of the mixed life of action and contemplation over the purely contemplative life.[43] There is a way in which Thomas's own embrace of the Dominican charism — which embodied a mixed form

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[40] *In 1 Cor 14* no. 813.

[41] See Hvidt, *Christian Prophecy*, 24-25, 134-135, 152-153.

[42] *In 1 Cor 14* no. 816.

[43] *ST* III q. 40 a. 1 ad 2: "the contemplative life is, absolutely speaking, more perfect than the active life, because the latter is taken up with bodily actions: yet that form of active life in which a man, by preaching and teaching, delivers to others the fruits of his contemplation, is more perfect than the life that stops at contemplation, because such a life is built on an abundance of contemplation, and such was the life chosen by Christ."

of religious life that balanced public preaching and contemplative prayer and study — highlights and accentuates the Pauline principle at work here.

As Thomas presents it, St. Paul's argument seems simple enough, but questions quickly surface. Exactly what type of help does prophecy give? Here Thomas is more expansive, identifying four types of spiritual edification that prophecy brings. First, a prophet can explain visions or the Scriptures to others; it is the act of interpreting Scripture that Thomas explicitly calls "an act of prophecy."[44] Second, prophets can edify beginners, give encouragement to the more advanced faithful, and bring consolation to those undergoing suffering. The traditional category of *bringing consolation to the afflicted* is often associated with the works of mercy, but it is interesting to note how here Thomas relates bringing consolation as specifically something done by prophets through words and deeds. Third, they can evoke spiritual affections in others by encouraging them to do good acts or by consoling them to tolerate evils suffered. Finally, prophets can instruct others about matters of the faith.[45] It is in this last category — prophets as teacher of the faith — that Thomas explicitly says prophecy can be directly about morals. The other three types of edification, however, certainly do relate to Christian morality, but it is in giving doctrine and teaching that Thomas sees prophecy as relating most directly to human morals. Unfortunately, Thomas gives few concrete examples; and this leaves his readers today the task of trying to piece together what this might look like. But as seen earlier, the figure of the saint looms large as a prominent example for being a Christian witness to the truth of faith and morals.

The weight and importance Thomas gives to witnessing to moral truth and teaching emerge more clearly in the subsequent discussion where he turns to praying in tongues. Here is a type of human action (itself a charismatic gift) that comes face to face with the gift of prophecy. The setting of the Pauline discussion is critical to note: it is about public prayer. Thomas indicates that prayer is essential for moral living.

The connection between prayer and the moral life is made explicit when Thomas begins to consider the fruits of prayer. One of prayer's fruits is the merit that is obtained from God by the one who prays. This merit is obtained even when people do not know the meaning of their prayer, as happens when praying in tongues; this is why, Thomas says, St. Paul still praises praying in tongues, because it is still meritorious for the person praying.

A further fruit of prayer is found in its spiritual *consolation* and *devotion*. To enjoy this consolation and devotion, however, requires that someone understand what

[44] *In 1 Cor 14* no. 835: "interpretari est actus prophetiae."

[45] *In 1 Cor 14* nos. 818-819.

his prayer means. When people do not understand the words they pray, consolation and devotion are impossible. Even without understanding, prayer is always meritorious so long as it unites us to God, our final end. Here Thomas draws a comparison to other types of actions to get behind meritorious action. In other kinds of action, say almsgiving out of charity, for an act to be meritorious, the actor need not have in mind at every single moment the final intention of his action: to honor God. He can consider other things such as the individuals or groups the alms are going to; or he can make provisions for effective use of the alms, which might prevent him from considering at every moment his love of God. Similarly, the gift of tongues can be meritorious even without understanding the meaning of the prayer so long as the one praying intends to honor God.

At the same time, Thomas stresses that in moral action understanding what you are saying or doing and why is a preferable state of affairs; St. Paul makes this explicit in the case of praying in tongues, and Thomas makes an implicit connection to other moral acts, thus revealing how an understanding of the merit of prayer can shed light on meritorious action in general. As the gift that makes praying in tongues intelligible, prophecy is preferable to praying in tongues alone.

Thomas provides us with just enough material to make a further argument that runs parallel to his and serves to justify the study of human morals in sacred doctrine. While not strictly necessary for the merit of faith, the study of human morals itself — when undertaken out of charity — can increase one's devotion and serve as a consolation perhaps in morally desolate or confusing times. Study also enables one to serve others. And this is a better state of affairs than if one were simply to act morally in all cases.[46]

Thomas's discussion about prayer's merit does not remain an abstract analysis because he soon highlights how St. Paul presents himself as a living model for the Corinthians when he says: *I thank my God I speak with all your tongues. But in the Church I had rather speak five words with my understanding, that I may instruct others also: than ten thousand words in a tongue* (14:18-19). Thomas notes how the apostle refers especially to his own actions "in the Church." This is pivotal; St. Paul is not introducing principles for Christians to follow or apply; but rather he is calling to mind his own life as a teaching example. Along these lines, Thomas presents a short allegorical reading of St. Paul's five words of understanding; he says that they stand for the five things a teacher should teach. These are: (1) what to believe, (2) how to act, (3) what to avoid (namely, sin), (4) what to hope for (namely, one's eternal reward), and (5) what to fear (eternal punishment). This association with the five

[46] See *In 1 Cor 14* no. 839.

goals of a teacher reveals just how strong a link Thomas makes between the prophet and the teacher. But what the prophet uniquely does is call to mind the essentials of Christian faith and morals in people's lives. Prophets do not take the place of teachers (the *doctores*), whom both St. Paul and Thomas think hold a distinct office and function in the Church. Still, Thomas suggests there is a degree of overlap between prophets and teachers insofar as both are meant to instruct and serve others.

The service that prophecy offers to others also extends in a unique way to those outside the Church. This may initially seem to go against what St. Paul says about tongues being a sign chiefly for unbelievers, and prophecy being for believers (14:22). However, St. Paul also testifies to the fact that a prophet through knowing the secrets of a person's heart can convince an unbeliever who comes into the Church assembly (14:24-25). This sets up an interesting dynamic where the comparison of gifts within the ecclesial community are meant to show forth to the world as "signs."[47]

Thomas comments that St. Paul thinks that unbelievers are usually unconvinced by tongues; they normally require the understanding manifested by a prophet to help stir their conversion. Being able to read others' hearts is a special type of prophecy that has a strong moral dimension and effect when exercised within the Church assembly. Heart reading enables the prophet to make judgments about another person's bad moral state or vices, so as to provoke moral awareness.[48] This moral awareness is meant to lead to a conversion to God in the first instance, but also, says Thomas, to the Church, because it is through prophets exercising the gift of reading hearts in the Church that this moral awareness comes about. Thomas writes that the person whose heart is read, as a result, "will show reverence not only to God but also to the Church, because he will declare that *God is among you indeed* who prophesy in the church […]. It appears, therefore, that the gift of prophecy is more useful in regard to unbelievers."[49]

Thomas's adaptation of the Pauline teaching on tongues also presents an example of how he tries to rethink this gift with respect to later liturgical developments in the Church and the new needs of Christian moral formation. While it is no longer customary to have two or three people pray in tongues in the assembly, Thomas notes that at the Mass there are still two readings — the epistle and gospel — which he links directly with praying in tongues. In place of the prophet who is present to interpret tongues, there is the preacher who gives instruction about the readings. Linking prophecy with the explanation of Scripture in a liturgical context, Thomas

[47] *In 1 Cor 14* nos. 857-858.
[48] *In 1 Cor 14* nos. 863-864.
[49] *In 1 Cor 14* no. 865.

says that for St. Paul the literal sense of *prophet* is someone who proposes words of instruction to the people assembled by expounding Scripture. [50]

It is somewhat tempting to think here that Thomas may have looked up from the epistolary at this moment while commenting and smiled at the group of student friars assembled. Is not Thomas performing what he is saying to some extent? While lecturing on Scripture is by no means preaching at Mass, Thomas is offering a word of instruction by expounding Scripture to those present. Does this mean that Thomas had a claim to be a prophet? It is difficult to say; but perhaps the question is not essential.

Would Thomas say that anyone who preaches "prophesies"? On this question, there is more material to go on. Thomas addresses this question indirectly when discussing St. Paul's directions that men ought to pray and prophesy with heads uncovered, while women should keep their heads covered.[51] Citing a passage from the Gloss that says prophesying is "unlocking the Scriptures," Thomas puts forward a hypothetical argument that says that anyone who preaches, since they are interpreting Scriptures, must be said to be "prophesying." Thomas's reply to this hypothetical argument is a much more sober treatment. He writes:

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[50] *In 1 Cor 14* no. 873. It seems unlikely that when St. Paul spoke about the interpreting of tongues he meant first and foremost the interpreting of Scripture. He seems to be talking about individuals who when they prayed spoke in a language that they themselves did not understand. While acknowledging that the term "tongues" refers to speech that neither the speaker nor most listeners understand (*In 1 Cor 14* no. 814), Thomas says something that would puzzle a modern day biblicist. When St. Paul spoke about the Corinthians interpreting tongues via prophecy, Thomas says what Paul meant by interpreting tongues was principally providing words of instruction to people by expounding Scripture (*In 1 Cor 14* no. 873). Does this mean that Thomas had no room for the gift of tongues as understood as speaking or praying in unintelligible speech? (See John L. McKenzie, "Tongue," *Dictionary of the Bible* [London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1966], 896). Thomas avoids directly addressing where St. Paul says he prays in tongues, even when this seems to be very much implicated by the epistle's plain sense (14:18); see *In 1 Cor 14* no. 848. There may not be a straightforward reason for this. One may need to recall that the medieval Church of Thomas's day lived downstream from the Montanist controversy of the second century and its claim of New Prophecy. The contemporary Danish theologian Niels Hvidt, who has argued comprehensively and positively about the possibility of enrichening contemporary theological discussions about post-apostolic prophecy in the Church, points to a permanent scar left by Montanism in the early Church which has led (understandably) to suspicion and unease in later periods about the claims of post-apostolic prophecy and charismatic gifts, including speaking tongues (*Christian Prophecy*, 88-91). Given that prophecy and tongues are so intertwined, Thomas in asserting the continuation of prophecy in the Church seems content to say very little about tongues as unintelligible speech or prayer. (This may be Thomas's own way of interpreting and affirming St. Paul's teaching about the superiority of prophecy over tongues.)

[51] *In 1 Cor 11* nos. 593-594.

> The one who preaches and teaches in schools speaks from his own person. Hence even the Apostle (Rom 2:16) calls the gospels his own, namely, on account of the energy he used in preaching it. But one who recites sacred Scripture in the Church, for example, by reading a lesson or an epistle or a Gospel, speaks from the person of the whole Church. This is the kind of prophesying that the Apostle understands here.[52]

It has been noted by Denys Turner that a striking characteristic of Thomas's writing comes across in his self-effacement, as if Thomas almost "disappears" in his texts.[53] Instead, what is left is what he is pointing to, and this is what Thomas the teacher would most press his students on. The teacher points back to the truth he is trying to teach; the prophet points back to the work of the Spirit. By being attentive to Scripture, Thomas is being attentive to its author: the Holy Spirit; he is training his student likewise to be attentive to the Spirit, since this will bring them closer to God and enable them to serve others more faithfully and devotedly.

This aspect of prophecy adds prominence to the presence of Scripture in Thomas's own moral theology. This claim should not be taken to denigrate or downplay the importance of rational reflection or argumentation when Thomas reflects on morals. Nevertheless, his commentary on 1 Corinthians does point to how the Bible functions more as a first principle in moral reflection than do other secondary considerations. Such secondary considerations could include certain schemas of the virtues and vices, which, for instance, structure his *Summa Theologiae*, or certain presentations of the precepts of the natural law.[54] Certainly, Thomas did develop aspects of his moral theology around such schemas, and this approach has a

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[52] *In 1 Cor 11* no. 594 (trans. adapted).

[53] Denys Turner, *Thomas Aquinas: A Portrait* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2013), 2-3.

[54] Of course, this raises the complex case of moral precepts that are themselves contained in Scripture, for instance, the Decalogue. Even here, there is a more basic principle at work which is brought out in how Thomas describes the differences between the Old Law and the New Law. While the Old Law promulgated on Sinai was written on tablets of stone, the New Law is first and foremost a spiritual law given by the Holy Spirit, and only secondarily a written law (*ST* I-II, q. 106, a. 1). The spiritual priority of the New Law suggests that charismatic individuals, who themselves have been given special gifts by the Holy Spirit, might have a more direct influence on how Christians see, understand, and live the New Law in their lives. This, of course, includes and never rules out the encounter of each Christian with Scripture and the moral law, but in many ways Christians always need encouragement to seek a prayerful encounter with God in Scripture. This encouragement is itself a gift from the Holy Spirit and plays an indispensable role in the life of believers and the Church at large. It is in the encounter with Scripture that they may read how Scripture itself penetrates down to a person's inner "marrow" (Heb 4:12) and forms their moral conscience. The encouragement to read Scripture, thus, provokes one to seek out deeper formation prayerfully in the Spirit and in communion with the Church and perhaps even with the

permanent value. But what is noteworthy in this commentary is that Thomas does not always feel beholden to follow such schemas when discussing human morals. The attention he places on the prophetic gift of interpreting Scripture suggests that Thomas recognizes in prophecy a much more dynamic interaction among the living members of the Church (both prelates and laity) in how, in the words of *Lumen Gentium* (n. 12), they "share in Christ's prophetic office" by witnessing to the moral truths contained in the Bible.

Conclusion

Inasmuch as the ordering of the gifts of tongues and prophecy shapes how individual Christians come to understand their relationship to and place in the Church, these gifts are especially relevant for Thomas to the moral life of believers. In the course of chapters 12 through 14 of 1 Corinthians, Thomas considers prophecy within an ecclesial setting, even though the tendency in his other writings — say in the *Summa Theologiae* — is on the prophet's experience or the psychology of revealed knowledge. His 1 Corinthians commentary stresses uniquely that Pauline concern that prophets must be authentic witnesses to unbelievers as reflected in their moral consciousness and lives. Thomas's method of unpacking the gift of prophecy, which only particular individuals possess, by looking to the ecclesial community may also provide a model for how to approach the broader ecclesial dimensions of his moral theology.[55] The situating of the individual in the community and, thereby, finding meaning and purpose for one's gifts is a particularly useful model to have at one's disposal in moral reflection undertaken within the Church. In the first instance, it goes against the grain of moral atomism, so dominant especially in Western societies, that sees the individual and the attainment of any desired moral goal as self-justifying and an end in itself. More positively, such a model helps us to refocus on the role that communities play in allowing individuals to realize and use their gifts for the good of others and, for ecclesial communities, to witness to those who yet to believe in Christ.

During our present time (especially in Europe) where in many once predominantly Christian societies religious people find themselves in reduced numbers

guidance of certain individuals who have gifts to help people discern the will of God through a type of discernment of the Spirit (which Thomas also identifies as a kind of prophecy).

[55] For a study that takes Thomas's treatment of prophecy and applies it fruitfully to the wider context of the Church, see Marianne Schlosser, *Lucerna in caliginoso loco: Aspekte des Prophetie-Begriffes in der scholastischen Theologie*, (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2000), 10.

or even statistical minorities, sustained reflection about how a person finds a place or *home* in the Church seems especially urgent and vital, even if such a concern may be rather distant from the experience of Aquinas's own deeply Christianized society of the thirteenth century. In many cases, the experience of someone finding a *home* in the Church where their gifts can be exercised fruitfully and appreciated is often reported as being a critical factor among the newly converted. Finding a place in the Church for each person including for their God-given gifts, as St. Paul explained to the Corinthians, is a deeper sign of how Christ finds a place for each person in his body — an incorporation that transforms and saves the individual. Such a transformation, of course, is moral, since it introduces a new motive — namely, charity — into one's life that calls one to live less for oneself and more for the good of others, with a special urgency for being authentic moral witnesses to Christ's love for those who yet believe.

Towards A Biblical Thomism
Thomas Aquinas and the Renewal of Biblical Theology
Edited by Piotr Roszak and Jörgen Vijgen

Jörgen Vijgen

The Intelligibility of Aquinas' Account of Marriage as *remedium concupiscentiae* in his Commentary on 1 Corinthians 7, 1-9

Ever since the mid-20th century, numerous scholars and theologians have criticized Thomas Aquinas's account of marriage, both as a natural institution and as a sacrament. For them, Aquinas's use of legal terminology such as contract, debt, etc., does not give enough attention to marriage as a sacrament or a covenant. He is equally seen as overemphasizing the physical aspect of marriage to the detriment of the good of the spouses that is realized in marriage. He is also reproached with describing marital intercourse as being sinful unless it is done *propter solam procreationem*. And finally the idea that marriage functions as a *remedium concupiscentiae* is seen as "legimitizing disordered sexuality", as an "outlet for concupiscence", as a context "where it can be given free rein".[1]

It is especially this last objection that I want to address in this contribution. The idea of marriage as a remedy is based on 1 Corinthians 7, where St. Paul, having affirmed that "it is good for a man not to touch a woman", concedes that "each man should have his own wife and each woman her own husband" in order to ward off acts of fornication (*porneias*). As is well known, this remedial aspect of marriage became influential in the West through the writings of St. Augustine and became part of the theological and magisterial tradition[2] although it can also be found in writings

[1] Cormac Burke, *The Theology of Marriage. Personalism, Doctrine, and Canon Law* (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press 2015), 241.

[2] Some argue that the textual absence of the traditional notions of the primary and secondary end of marriage, in which *remedium concupiscentiae* is include, in the documents of the Second Vatican Council represents a rejection or abandonment of the traditional hierarchy between

of Eastern Church Fathers before the time of Augustine such as John Chrysostom (ob. 407) and Basil of Caesarea (ob. 379).[3]

I will first present the relevant ideas in Aquinas's commentary on 1 Corinthians, 1-9. Subsequently, I will then address and clarify several of Aquinas's presuppositions in order to shed light on the contemporary validity of the remedial aspect of marriage.

The commentary on 1 Corinthians, 7: 1-9

Commenting on 1 Corinthians 7, 1-2: "It is well for a man not to touch a woman. But because of fornication, each man should have his own wife and each woman her own husband", Aquinas notes that verse one deals with what is essentially good (*per se bonum*) while verse two pertains to what is necessary (*necessarium*) in these matters. His justification of verse one relies on three arguments which in turn rest upon an insight from natural philosophy. As he explains more fully in the *Summa Theologiae*, the principal difference between the nutritive and the generative power of the vegetative soul consists in the fact that the former has its effect in what already exists, whereas the latter has its effect in another "because a thing cannot generate itself".[4] It is because of this feature of the generative power to produce something extrinsic to it that it can be said that the vegetative soul "approaches the dignity of the sensitive soul"[5] because the sensitive soul equally operates on extrinsic things. Moreover, in order to generate something, the generating thing must already possess

these ends. As becomes evident, however, from the discussions in the Conciliar Aula, the absence is merely due to the pastoral aim of the Council. See *Acta Synodalia*, vol. IV, pars VI, p. 487: "Commissio ceteroquin iam antea statuit quaestiones technicas de finibus non esse tractandas". The same answer was given to 190 Fathers who asked for inserting an explanation regarding the hierarchy of these ends: "In textu pastorali qui dialogum cum mundo istituere intendit elementa illa iuridica non requiruntur (...) lnsuper in texto, qui stylo direct() et pastorali mundum alloquitur, verba nimis technica (hierarchia) vitanda apparent": see *Acta Synodalia Sacrosancti Concilii Oecumenici Vaticani II*, vol. IV, pars VI, p. 478. See Alain Mattheeuws, *Union et procréation. Développements de lu doctrine des fins du mariage* (Paris : Cerf 1989), 97-102 ; Francisco Gil Hellin, "Los 'bona matrimonii' en la Constitucion pastoral 'Gaudium et spes' del Concilio Vaticano II," *Scripta Theologica* 11 (1979), 153-161; Perry J. Cahall, *The Mystery of Marriage. A Theology of the Body and the Sacrament* (Chicago: Hillenbrand Books, 2016), 92 no. 56.

[3] John Chrystome, *Hom. In verb. Apost.* (PG 51, 210); Basil, *Epist. 160* (PG 32, 627-628). The idea of *remedium concupiscentiae* is reminiscent of Aristotle's observation in *Pol.* II, 5 (1263a9) that "it is an honorable action to abstain from another's wife for temperance sake".

[4] *ST* I, q. 78, a. 2 co.

[5] Ibid.

in some respect, that which is in regard to the species to be generated, the generated thing "for it belongs to a thing which is already perfect to 'produce another like unto itself'", as Aristotle says.[6] Insofar as this generative power enables man to endure at the level of the species, both Aristotle and Aquinas concur that such a feature of the generative power enables man to continuously participate in the imperishable and the divine. As Aquinas comments on Aristotle's text, the production by living things of their like exists in order that these living things "may become as like to the divine as possible."[7] On this basis Aquinas is able not only to distinguish between the nutritive power which serves man in preserving him as an individual and the generative power which helps to preserve the species but not the individual man, but also to order them hierarchically for the nutritive power exists to serve the generative power which alone enable a divine-like participation. All this leads Aquinas in his 1 Corinthians commentary to the conclusion that it is not in congruity with the natural telos of the generative power to seek to 'touch a woman' in order to preserve oneself as an individual.[8]

With the philosophical superiority of the generative power in place, Aquinas proceeds to give three arguments as to why marriage between an individual man and woman is not essentially good:

> first, in regard to the soul, because as Augustine says in the Soliloquies [II,x,17]: "Nothing so casts a man down from the citadel of his power as that contact of bodies without which a wife cannot be had." Consequently, in Exodus (19:5) it says to the people about to receive the Law: "Be ready by the third day; do not go near a woman"; and in 1 Samuel (21:4): "I have no common bread at hand, but there is holy bread; if only the young men have kept themselves from women." Secondly, as to the body, the fact that a man subjects himself to a woman by marriage and makes himself a slave out of a freedman. This is the most bitter of all servitudes. Hence it says in Ecclesiastes (7:26): "I found more bitter than death the woman whose heart is snares and nets." Thirdly, as to external things with which a man must occupy himself, when he has a wife and children to be fed; whereas it says in 2 Timothy (2:4): "No soldier on service gets entangled in civilian pursuits, since his aim is to satisfy the one who enlisted him.

Regarding the 'sexist' position[9] on women reflected in this passage, one should note the following. The passages from the Bible and Augustine mentioned here are

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[6] Ibid. Aquinas refers to Aristotle, *De Anima* II, 4 (415a26-b7).

[7] *In II De Anima*, l. 7, no. 314 (Leonine edition vol. 45/1, p. 97, ll. 104-107).

[8] *In I Cor.* 7, no. 314.

[9] On this topic see Francisco J. Romero Carrasquillo and Hilaire K. Troyer de Romero, "Aquinas on the Inferiority of Woman," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 87 (2013), 685-710.

very rarely used by Aquinas and often in a neutral context.[10] For instance, the other times in which he mentions the passage from Augustine clearly show that Aquinas reads it as a confirmation of the claim that "venereal pleasure" oppresses the faculty of reason and "weakens the mind" and is therefore not directed towards women as such.[11] Furthermore, Ecclesiastes 7:26 is used in his commentary on Isaiah 52:2 ("loose the bonds from your neck") to illustrate "carnal love" as one of the bonds or nods (*vincula*) which God can untie.[12] Aquinas uses the same text in his sermon *Germinet terra* in order to show that it was fitting that the medicinal grace of the Incarnation was first shown in the Virgin Mary because the corruption of the human race also first occurred in Eve.[13]

As has been said, verse two ("But because of fornication …") deals with what is not essential but nevertheless necessary in these matters. In other words, because the generative power has as its essential end not the preservation of the individual but the preservation of the species, the actualization of the generative power does not belong essentially to man. "Natural reason", however, teaches man that the actualization of the generative is indeed necessary for offspring because this power is "ordained towards" (*ordinatur ad*) the preservation of offspring.[14] It seems to me that this argument from natural reason alone is in itself sufficient to conclude as Aquinas does "the first need for touching a woman is for the procreation of children." Nevertheless he uses an implicit reference to Gen. 1:18 ("It is not good for man to be alone; let us make him a helper like to himself") as a minor premise to reach the same conclusion.[15]

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[10] The text from the *Soliloquia* occurs only in four places in his works; the others are: *ST* II-II, q. 151, a. 3, ad 2, II-II, q. 186, a. 4 co, *De perfectione*, c. 8. Exodus 19:5 occurs only one time in his works; 1 Samuel 21:4 only two times; Ecclesiastes 7:26 only three times and 2 Timothy 2:4 only four times.

[11] See for instance *ST* II-II, q. 151, a. 3, ad 2.

[12] *In Is.* c. 52 (Leonine edition vol. 28, ll. 107-114): "Item super illo verbo, solve vincula, nota quod sunt vincula a quibus solvit Deus, primo mundanae solicitudinis. Job 39: quis dimisit onagrum liberum, et vincula ejus quis solvit? Secundo carnalis amoris. Eccle. 7: inveni amariorem morte mulierem, tertio perversae actionis. Psalm. 106. Eduxit eos de tenebris et umbra mortis, et vincula eorum disrupit. »

[13] Sermon *Germinet terra* (Leonine edition vol. 40/1, pp. 284-285, ll. 134-145): "Infirmitas ista consequta est ex peccato et Deus uoluit adhibere remedium medicine. Fecit ad similitudinem boni medici. Quando boni medici uolunt ostendere medicinam suam ponunt se primo ad graues infirmitates ut sic reddantur famosi. Languebat totum genus humanum et in muliere uidebatur quasi totum corruptum, unde dixit Salomon: *Inveni mulierem amariorem morte*. Et ideo Dominus uolens ostendere suam medicinam esse bonam, ostendit eam primo in muliere ut per mulierem derivaretur ad alios..."

[14] *In I Cor.* 7, no. 317.

[15] See *In I Cor.* 7, no. 316: "Circa primum considerandum est, quod actus generativae virtutis ordinatur ad conservationem speciei per generationem filiorum, et quia mulier data est viro in

The necessity expressed in verse two comes in two ways because, while initially marriage had been instituted as a function of nature (*officium naturae*) for the generation and education of children, St. Paul now "proposed a second necessity according to which it was instituted as a remedy for sin (*remedium culpae*)."[16] This is so is because "carnal desire remains alive in believers even after baptism, although it does not rule, it impels men especially toward venereal acts on account of the vehemence of their pleasure." Following Matthew 19:11: "Not all men can receive this saying but only those to whom it is given", Aquinas observes that "it requires greater virtue to conquer this desire entirely than can belong to men" and therefore "it is necessary that this desire be in part yielded to and in part mastered. This, indeed, happens when the act of generation is ordained by reason and man is not totally mastered by the desire, but the desire is rather subjected to reason."[17]

Somewhat further he notes that because not everyone is equipped for "this good", that is, the good expressed in verse 1: "it is good not to touch a woman"; "each man on account of the temptation to fornication should have his own wife, that is, determined by himself, so as to avoid uncertain and promiscuous concubinage, which pertains to fornication."[18] Consequently, next to the first good, the good of the production and education of offspring, marriage has a second good, i.e. " a *remedium concupiscentiae*, which is restricted to a particular person; and this good is called fidelity, which a man preserves toward his wife, by not going to another woman, and similarly the wife toward the husband."[19] Somewhat further in his commentary on this passage, Aquinas explains that for those who have not received the gift of continence, that is the gift to "serve God in virginity", the Apostle permits marriage, that is "to serve God in marriage" as a concession (*indulgentia*) for it is, as St. Paul says, " better to marry than to burn" (1 Cor. 7:9), i.e. than to be overcome by the heat of concupiscence. Aquinas welcomes the comparison[20] of incontinence to the burning heat of concupiscence because it illustrates in a clear fashion that, because of the evil

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adiutorium generationis, prima necessitas tangendi mulierem est propter procreationem filiorum." See also *ST* I, q. 92, a. 1.

[16] *In I Cor.* 7, no. 316.

[17] *In I Cor.* 7, no. 316.

[18] *In I Cor*. 7, no 319.

[19] *In I Cor*. 7, no. 318.

[20] Burke, *The Theology of Marriage. Personalism, Doctrine, and Canon Law*, 206, n. 65 translates "abusiva comparatione" with "[the Apostle uses] the comparison abusively" and therefore thinks Aquinas is critical of St. Paul's phrase "it is better to marry than to burn". The French translation, however, has "l'Âpotre se sert d'une catachrèse" and notes that "abusiva comparatione" refers to the a type or figure of speech, known as catachresis, in which a word or phrase is being applied in a way that significantly departs from conventional (or traditional) usage. See Thomas d'Aquin, *Commentaire de la Première Épître aux Corinthiens*. Introduction par Gilbert Dahan,

of incontinence, marriage in order to avoid fornication, although it is a "lesser good" (*bonum est, licet minus*), remains a good worth pursuing.[21]

This concise presentation by Aquinas of the remedial aspect of marriage can only be understood fully by exploring the several presuppositions at work in the background of his commentary on 1 Corinthians 7.

The first presupposition: Medicinal or healing grace

The remedial or medicinal aspect of marriage for Aquinas is but an application of the more general idea that each sacrament, in its own way, confers medicinal grace or healing grace. In the prologue to his commentary on Book IV of Peter Lombard's *Sententiae*, Aquinas explains that, because of the gravity of the sickness instituted by original sin, a sufficient remedy (*sufficiens remedium*) can only come from the Word of God who is the source of life. Following Hebr. 2, 17: "he had to be made like his brethren in every respect, so that he might become a merciful…" and Luke 6, 19: "power came forth from him and healed them all", Aquinas views the Incarnation as the universal and first medicine (*universali medicina et prima*) from which the sacraments as particular medicines come forth and by which salvation in a hidden manner under the cover of visible things is brought about.[22] In other words, already at the level of grace understood *generically* it includes a perfection and elevation of human existence *at its core*. "This core elevation of the soul", as Roger Nutt writes, "corresponds to the inner healing that is needed as a result of sin."[23]

In treating the sacrament of marriage in particular Aquinas argues that it is precisely because this general definition of sacraments applies to marriage, that marriage is a sacrament for "… a sacrament carries a certain remedy of holiness for man against sin, shown by sensible signs, ….Wherefore, since this is found in marriage, it

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Traduction par Jean-Éric Stroobant de Saint-Éloy, Annotation par Jean Borella et Jean-Éric Stroobant de Saint-Éloy (Paris : Cerf, 2002), 217 with note 4.

[21] Cf. *In I Cor*. 7, no. 335.

[22] Cf. *In IV Sent*., pr.: "haec sunt sacramenta, in quibus sub tegumento rerum visibilium divina virtus secretius operatur salutem, ut Augustinus dicit." This definition of the sacraments from Book IV (1255-1256) is based on Augustine and Isidore of Sevilla (*Etymologiae* VI, XIX, 40) and is still present in his *De articulis fidei* (1261-1265). See Joseph de Ghellinck, "Un chapitre dans l'histoire de la définition des sacrements au XIIe siècle," *Mélanges Mandonnet: Études d'histoire littéraire et doctrinale du Moyen Age*, vol. 2 (Paris: Vrin, 1930), 79.

[23] Roger W. Nutt, *General Principles of Sacramental Theology* (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press 2017), 142.

is counted among the sacraments."[24] In other words, insofar as marriage is instituted as a sacrament after original sin, "it is of the *ratio* of a sacrament that it be a sign and a remedy".[25] More in particular, the grace conferred in a sacramental marriage includes both a "divine faculty" and a "help by which man can fittingly make use of that faculty". "Wherefore, since in marriage a man is given by divine institution the faculty of enjoying his wife for the procreation of children, grace is also given without which he could not do this fittingly."[26]

Similarly, in his *Summa Theologiae*, Aquinas confirms the special nature of sacramental grace for it confers, "over and above grace commonly so called, and in addition to the virtues and gifts, a certain divine assistance in obtaining the end of the sacrament."[27] One of the differences between grace in general and sacramental grace in particular consists in the fact that whereas virtues and gifts remove vices and sins insofar as these vices and sins regard the present and the future, sacramental grace offers "a special remedy" in regard to past sins, that is "the acts of which are transitory whereas their guilt remains".[28] In fact, one of the reasons why sacraments are necessary for salvation is due to the state of original sin by which man's affections are subjected to corporeal things. As Aquinas reasons: "the healing remedy should be given to a man so as to reach the part affected by disease. Consequently it was fitting that God should provide man with a spiritual medicine by means of certain corporeal signs; for if man were offered spiritual things without a veil, his mind being taken up with the material world would be unable to apply itself to them."[29]

With this in mind, it should not surprise us that Thomas enumerates the seven sacraments according to the purpose for which they were instituted, namely "to be a remedy against the defects caused by sin." From this perspective, therefore, he repeats the traditional doctrine that marriage was instituted "in remedium contra concupiscentiam personalem".[30]

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[24] *In IV Sent*., d. 26, q. 2, a. 1 co.

[25] *In IV Sent*., d. 26, q. 2, a. 2 co.

[26] *In IV Sent*., d. 26, q. 2, a. 3 co.

[27] *ST* III, q. 62, a. 2 co.

[28] *ST* III, q. 62, a.2, ad 2. On the basis of *De Ver*. q. 27, a. 5, ad 12, the Thomist tradition argues that "sacramental grace is a special modification and strengthening of sanctifying grace, which exerts an influence on the acts of the various virtues. … This modal reality added to habitual grace forms the basis of the moral right to the future reception of actual graces corresponding to the sacrament received." Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange, *The Priest in Union with Christ*, transl. Geogre W. Shelton (The Newman Press, Westminster Md. 1954), 20-21; Idem, *De Eucharistia : accedunt de paenitentia: quaestiones dogmaticae : commentarius in Summam theologicam S. Thomae* (Torino : Berruti 1943), 5.

[29] *ST* III, q. 61, a. 1 co.

[30] *ST* III, q. 65, a. 1 co. See footnote 27.

The second presupposition: The hierarchy among essential ends

Recall that for Aquinas sacramental grace offers divine assistance "in obtaining the end of the sacrament" (*ad consequendum sacramenti finem*).[31]

The position of Aquinas regarding the ends of marriage is fairly straightforward throughout his writings. First of all, he distinguishes between essential ends (*fines per se*) and accidental ends (*fines per accidens*).[32] The term 'finis' is used both in the *Scriptum* as well in his *ScG*[33] while in his Corinthians commentary he uses 'necessitas'[34]. While the accidental ends can be infinite[35] because they contain that which a person intends in any action (*finis operantis*) by marrying[36], i.e. why people choose to marriage which can be as varied as the couples themselves; the ends *per se* of marriage exists irrespective of subjective motivations and are threefold. The principal or primary end[37] of marriage consists in the procreation and education of children, the secondary ends: which are still essential ends (*fines per se*): consist in

[31] *ST* III, q. 62, a. 2 co.

[32] *In IV Sent*., d. 30, q. 1, a. 3 co: "Respondeo dicendum, quod causa finalis matrimonii potest accipi dupliciter; scilicet per se, et per accidens. Per se quidem causa matrimonii est ad quam matrimonium est de se ordinatum; et haec semper bona est; scilicet procreatio prolis, et fornicationis vitatio. Sed per accidens causa finalis ipsius est hoc quod contrahentes intendunt ex matrimonio." *In IV Sent*., d. 40, q. 1, a. 3 co. "Finis autem matrimonii per se et primo est bonum prolis".

[33] *ScG* III, 78.

[34] *In I Cor*. 7, no. 316. Related to this is the use both in the *Scriptum* and *ST* of 'perfectio'. See for instance *In IV Sent*., d. 26, q. 2, a. 4 co: Respondeo dicendum, quod duplex est integritas. Una quae attenditur secundum perfectionem primam, quae consistit in ipso esse rei; alia quae attenditur secundum perfectionem secundam, quae consistit in operatione. Quia ergo carnalis commixtio est quaedam operatio, sive usus matrimonii, per quod facultas ad hoc datur; ideo erit carnalis commixtio de secunda integritate matrimonii, et non de prima." And *ST* III, q. 29, a. 2.

[35] *In IV Sent*., d. 30, q. 1, a. 3, ad 1: "Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod verum est de causa per se et principali; sed quod habet unum finem per se et principalem, potest habere plures fines secundarios per se, et infinitos per accidens."

[36] *In IV Sent*., d. 30 q. 1 a. 3 co: "Respondeo dicendum, quod causa finalis matrimonii potest accipi dupliciter; scilicet per se, et per accidens. Per se quidem causa matrimonii est ad quam matrimonium est de se ordinatum; et haec semper bona est; scilicet procreatio prolis, et fornicationis vitatio. Sed per accidens causa finalis ipsius est hoc quod contrahentes intendunt ex matrimonio."

[37] In his *Scriptum* Aquinas mostly uses the term 'principalis' but there are instances where he equates principalis and primarius. *In IV Sent*., d. 33, q. 1, a. 3, qc. 3, ad 2: "Ad secundum dicendum, quod antiqui patres ea dispensatione qua plures uxores habebant, ad ancillas accedebant uxorio affectu. Erant enim uxores quantum ad principalem et primarium finem matrimonii, sed non quantum ad illam conjunctionem quae respicit secundarium finem, cui conditio servitutis opponitur, cum non possit simul esse socia et ancilla."

"that which is ordained to the good of those contracting marriage," and are twofold: "the mutual service that the spouses devote to each other in domestic matters"[38] and the *remedium concupiscentiae*.[39]

In order to understand the hierarchy between these essential ends, it is crucial to see that Thomas uses 'procreatio' or 'generatio' as a *pars pro toto*, referring to a much larger whole. The *bonum prolis* could never be simply limited to the perpetuation of the human species. Almost always Thomas emphasizes that the real heart of the good of offspring is not in the generation children, but in the education of children. This emphasis on bringing up children in virtue lies at the heart of his argument for monogamy and indissolubility on the natural level. In fact, nearly every time the *bonum prolis* is discussed, Thomas emphasizes that in considering the generation and the education of children, the former is always for the sake of the latter. He writes:

> "marriage was chiefly instituted for the good of offspring, not only their generation, since this can happen without marriage, but also their upbringing to the perfect state: since everything naturally intends its effect to arrive at its perfect state. But in children a two-fold perfection must be considered: first, the perfection of nature not only as to the body, but also the soul, through those things which are of natural law; second, the perfection of grace."[40]

For St. Thomas, marriage is not just for the sake of producing children so that the human race may continue. Rather, marriage is, and more importantly so, for the

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[38] *In IV Sent.*, d. 26, q. 1, a. 1 co: "Secundo quantum ad secundarium finem matrimonii, qui est mutuum obsequium sibi a conjugibus in rebus domesticis impensum." See also In IV Sent., d. 31 q. 1 a. 2 ad 1: "Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod in prole non solum intelligitur procreatio prolis, sed etiam educatio ipsius, ad quam sicut ad finem ordinatur tota *communicatio operum quae est inter virum et uxorem*, inquantum sunt matrimonio juncti, quia patres naturaliter thesaurizant filiis, ut patet 2 Corinth., 12, et sic in prole, quasi in principali fine, alius quasi secundarius includitur" See also *ST* II-II, q. 164, a. 2 co: "…propter quae viro coniungitur, quae sunt generatio prolis, et communicatio operum pertinentium ad domesticam conversationem."

[39] Although these ends are *per se* ends they do not belong to the essence of marriage. For Aquinas, the marital act does not belong to marriage's essence but is rather its natural consequence. See *In IV Sent.*, d. 26, q. 2, a. 4 co: "Respondeo dicendum, quod duplex est integritas. Una quae attenditur secundum perfectionem primam, quae consistit in ipso esse rei; alia quae attenditur secundum perfectionem secundam, quae consistit in operatione. Quia ergo carnalis commixtio est quaedam operatio, sive usus matrimonii, per quod facultas ad hoc datur; ideo erit carnalis commixtio de secunda integritate matrimonii, et non de prima." He cites approvingly a statement of St. John Chrysostom: "it is not sex but free will that makes a marriage" (matrimonium non facit coitus, sed voluntas): *In IV Sent.*, d. 27, q. 1, a. 2, sc 1.

[40] *In IV Sent.*, d. 39, q. 1, a. 2 co.

sake of producing virtuous adults. The centrality of the rearing of children is the reason for the secondary end of marriage. Again, he writes:

> "In the good of offspring is not only to be understood procreation of children but also their education, to which all sharing of labor between a man and a woman joined in marriage is ordered as to an end, ... And thus in the procreation of children another end is included, as a secondary end in a principal end."[41]

The secondary end of mutual service is *not* of less importance to marriage nor can it be dispensed with absolutely, for both primary and secondary ends are essential ends of marriage. *Nor* does 'secondary' mean that the good of the individual is to be sacrificed to the good of the many. *Nor* is the secondary end the incentive that is attached to the procreative end in order to induce spouses to undertake some onerous duty for mankind. Rather, a secondary end is secondary because it is included in the primary end, as a means is included in the end. In more personalistic terms one could say therefore that the love between spouses goes beyond willing the good of the other to the willing that even more others be brought into that love.

Moreover, insofar as marriage is a sacrament, it extends even beyond the education of the children in virtue. It aims to rear children for heavenly beatitude. He writes:

> "The procreation of children, as a good of the sacrament, adds something beyond procreation of children as intended by nature. For nature intends offspring according as the good of the species is preserved in them. But beyond this, in offspring as a good of the sacrament of matrimony, is understood that children received are ultimately ordained to God."[42]

If children are a common good of marriage, they must finally be ordered to the ultimate common good of the universe, which is God. St. Thomas even goes so far as to say that "offspring, as a good of matrimony, includes remaining faithful to God.

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[41] *In IV Sent*., d. 31, q. 1, a. 2, ad 1: "Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod in prole non solum intelligitur procreatio prolis, sed etiam educatio ipsius, ad quam sicut ad finem ordinatur tota communicatio operum quae est inter virum et uxorem, inquantum sunt matrimonio juncti, quia patres naturaliter thesaurizant filiis, ut patet 2 Corinth., 12, et sic in prole, quasi in principali fine, alius quasi secundarius includitur."

[42] *In IV Sent*., d. 31, q. 2, a. 2, ad 1: "Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod proles prout est bonum sacramenti, addit supra prolem prout est intentum a natura. Natura enim intendit prolem prout in ipsa salvatur bonum speciei; sed in prole secundum quod est bonum sacramenti matrimonii, ultra hoc intelligitur ut proles suscepta ulterius ordinetur in Deum."

For children are considered a good of marriage according as they are hoped for in order to be raised to the worship of God."[43]

In other words, for St. Thomas marriage is not just for the sake of producing children so that the human race could continue, nor is it just for the sake of producing virtuous adults, but it exists for the sake of producing saints. This "for the sake of" must be understood correctly. It does not mean for Aquinas that "marriage is instrumental to ends extrinsic to it."[44] Both primary and secondary ends are essential ends or intrinsic goods but this fact, however, in no way negates the long Catholic tradition that they are also instrumental goods, for even intrinsic goods can be used instrumentally for higher goods. Moreover, the primacy of procreation and education refers to the end which is distinctive of marriage as such. In other words, were the nature of man constituted so that either offspring were not necessary or no particular stable union between persons were required for their upbringing, then it would not exist. When this need ceases in the next life, there will no longer be marrying and giving in marriage among the children of men (cf. Mt. 22:29-30). Without this primary end, there would be no need for a "society of domestic fellowship" (*domesticae conversationis consortium*), an "indivisible union of souls" (*in quadam indivisibili coniunctione animorum*) or a "conjugal society" (*associatio matrimonium*)[45] in which there is a mutual inward moulding and union of the spouses for the perfection of each other specifically. In other words, without the primary end, there would only be the need for perfecting oneself in particular and other people in the generic sense showing charity toward our neighbors. In this sense, the secondary end is contingent upon the primary end.

The third presupposition: The nature of concupiscence and pleasure

Many of the objections against the idea that marriage is a *remedium concupiscentiae* derive from conflating three distinct meanings of the term 'concupiscentia'

[43] *In IV Sent*., d. 33, q. 1, a. 2, ad 5: "Ad quintum dicendum, quod proles, secundum quod est bonum matrimonii, includit fidem ad Deum servandam; quia secundum quod proles expectatur ad cultum Dei educanda, ponitur matrimonii bonum."

[44] Germain Grisez, *The Way of the Lord Jesus, vol. 2* (Quincy: Franciscan Press, 1992), 565.

[45] The form of marriage as an indivisible union of souls is in *ST* III, q. 29, a. 2, while *domesticae conversationis consortium* appears in ScG III, 123. One finds Aquinas calling marriage a "conjugal society" (*associatio matrimonium*) in *In IV Sent*., d. 26, q. 1, a. 1.

in Aquinas: concupiscence as the desire for a good, concupiscence as the desire for pleasure, and concupiscence as an inordinate desire for mutable goods.

a) The most general meaning of concupiscence is desire for a good and is exemplified in the love of concupiscence which is directed at goods which are desired for oneself or for others. Its object is a good wanted for oneself or for someone else (*vel sibi vel alii*)[46], as a means to be used well whereas the love of friendship is directed to whom I wish good.

b) A more particular meaning of concupiscence refers to a specific passion of the concupiscible faculty and is defined as "a craving for what is pleasant,"[47] or the desire for a sensible good considered as absent.[48] According to these two meanings, concupiscence can be considered a natural and good part of created nature.[49]

c) Finally there is concupiscence as an inordinate desire for mutable goods.[50] The disintegration of the natural order of things that occurred as a result of the Fall of Man means that neither the concupiscible appetite nor its desires are subject to man's reason. This overthrow of the natural order results in this third meaning of concupiscence as the material effect of original sin by which we tend to corruptible goods for their own sake.[51] In this final sense concupiscence has a broader range than sexuality but Aquinas nevertheless equates this inordinate desire for mutable goods with the immoderate desire for sexual pleasure, because, as he points out, sexual "pleasures are more impetuous, and are more oppressive on reason" than others[52]. For Thomas this is due to the nature of the sense of touch as Aristotle already

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[46] *ST* I-II, q. 26, a. 4 co.

[47] *ST* I-II, q. 30, a. 1 co: "Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit in I Rhetoric., concupiscentia est appetitus delectabilis."

[48] *ST* I-II, q. 30, a. 2, ad 1: "Ad primum ergo dicendum quod bonum delectabile non est absolute obiectum concupiscentiae, sed sub ratione absentis,…"

[49] Cf. *ST* I-II, q. 30, a.3 co.

[50] *ST* I-II, q. 82, a. 3 co: "Inordinatio autem aliarum virium animae praecipue in hoc attenditur, quod inordinate convertuntur ad bonum commutabile, quae quidem inordinatio communi nomine potest dici concupiscentia. Et ita peccatum originale materialiter quidem est concupiscentia; formaliter vero, defectus originalis iustitiae."

[51] Michel Labourdette writes that concupiscence can be taken as "l'ensemble des puissances humaines, comme privées de la grâce et déliées du lien d'intégrité ; soit, de façon plus restreinte, les puissances d'affectivité sensible ; soit enfin, parmi celles-ci, l'inclination aux désirs et plaisirs d'ordre sexuel." He adds : "Mais de toute façon, il s'agit bien de la puissance même, comme privée et déliée et donc inclinée ; il ne s'agit nullement de ses actes : ceux-ci ne sont pas forcément mauvais, mais s'ils le sont, relèvent du péché personel et n'appartiennent pas à l'état de péché originel." Michel Labourdette, *Cours de théologie morale. Tome 1. Morale Fondamentale* (Paris : Parole et Silence, 2010), 629.

[52] *ST* II-II, q. 151, a. 3 co: "delectationes venereae sunt vehementiores et magis opprimentes rationem quam delectationes ciborum."

observed. The basis of all sensory operation is found in the sense of touch. For example, when this sense is unmoved, as occurs during sleep, all the other external senses are unmoved as well.[53] Moreover, the sense of touch is the most basic because it is the most extensive sense insofar as it extends throughout the whole body. It pervades all the organs of the body so that all organs, in addition to their own operation, are also an organ of touch.[54] Reinhard Hütter rightly notes, therefore, that "one can surmise that this effect [the oppression of reason] of sexual pleasures is due to their surpassing intensity and … [that] the desire for inordinate sexual pleasure, when heeded and habituated as the vice of lust, can — due to the vehemence of the passions to which the vice of lust gives rise — frequently acquire a powerful and even absorbing reality."[55]

For Thomas, therefore, the love of concupiscence is a good and necessary part of human nature. At its best it can be the altruistic desiring of noble goods for another or a virtuous desiring of honorable things for oneself. Similarly, the concupiscence that is a desire for pleasure is an integral part of nature: every creature naturally tends toward the end for which it was created, and pleasure is the enjoyment of the attainment of the end.

Consequently, and contrary to a widespread opinion, he thinks it entirely reasonable and even part of divine providence to be interested in and motivated by the prospect of enjoying the pleasures of marital sexual intercourse.[56] This stems from his more universal claim, -rejecting the Stoic position-, that "it belongs to the perfection of moral good, that man should be moved unto good, not only in respect of his will, but also in respect of his sensitive appetite"[57] or that "it is natural [for men] that their concupiscible powers are borne to what is sensibly pleasurable according

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[53] See *ST* I, q. 76, a. 5 co; *Q. D. De Anima*, a. 8 co (Leonine edition 23/1, 67, ll. 208-228).

[54] See *In II De Anima*, l. 19, no. 484 (Leonine edition 45/1, 149, ll. 85-114) and *In III De Anima*, l. 3, no. 602 (Leonine edition 45/1, 183, ll. 52-65). For an intelligent argument to recover the sense of touch as the sense of a tangible and experiential certitude see Charles De Koninck, "*Sedeo, ergo sum*: Considerations on the Touchstone of Certitude", *Laval théologique et philosophique* 6 (1950), 343-348.

[55] Reinhard Hütter, "The Virtue of Chastity and the Scourge of Pornography: A Two-Fold Crisis in Light of Aquinas's Moral Theology," *The Thomist* 77 (2013), 1-39, here 15.

[56] *In IV Sent*., d. 31, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1: "…ad excitandum ad actum quo defectui speciei subvenitur, divina providentia delectationem apposuit in actu illo…"; See also *De Ver*. q. 25, a. 5, ad 7 (Leonine edition 22/3, 739-740, ll. 154-162): "Ad septimum dicendum, quod cum aliquis accedit ad uxorem suam ex concupiscentia dummodo non excedat limites matrimonii, est peccatum veniale; unde patet quod ipse motus concupiscentiae in coniugato iudicium rationis praeveniens, peccatum veniale est. *Sed quando per rationem determinatur quod est licitum concupisci, tametsi sensualitas in id feratur, nullum erit peccatum*."

[57] *ST* I-II, q. 24, a. 3 co.

to the ordination of reason".[58] From this perspective one should not be surprised to find that Thomas rejects the contempt for marriage and sexuality, expressed in the following objection: "to seek pleasure in this act would be mortal sin, to accept the pleasure offered would be venial sin, but to hate it would be a thing of perfection" with the following unambiguous words: "Sed hoc non potest esse."[59] The philosophical basis of this rejection lies in Aristotle's insight that pleasure perfects action as a supervening end, that is "over and above the good that an action itself is, there supervenes another good, pleasure, which implies repose of appetite in the presupposed good of action"[60]. Thomas' answer to the Stoic objection is therefore absolutely unambiguous: "the pleasure of a good operation is good, and a bad operation carries bad pleasure." For him the Stoic objection is ultimately founded in what he calls "the insanity of some people" who think corporeal things were caused by an evil god and this, he says, is "the worst heresy".[61]

It is entirely natural to desire the pleasure that accompanies any faculty's accomplishment of what it was made to do. It is when the pleasure of that fulfillment is sought to the exclusion of the fulfillment itself that the order of nature is inverted. This happens for instance when the spouse is viewed as an object for of the other spouse, treating him or her, as Aquinas says, as a gigolo or prostitute.[62] In such a case the marital act would be reduced to a mere sexual act because the sex act is being pursued solely for the sake of pleasure. Aquinas' rejection therefore of such a reduction is entirely compatible with his constant claim that pleasure is a proper, supervening end of the marital act.

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[58] *De Malo*, q. 4, a. 2, ad 1 (Leonine edition 23, 111, ll. 318-320): "naturale est ei quod concupiscibilis feratur in delectabile sensus secundum ordinem rationis."

[59] *In IV Sent*., d. 31, q. 2, a. 3 co.

[60] Kevin White, "Pleasure, a Supervenient End," in *Aquinas and the Nicomachean Ethics*, ed. Tobias Hoffmann, Jörn Müller and Matthias Perkams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 220-238, here 237. He compares the supervenience of pleasure with "the finish that a cabinet-maker puts on a piece of work [which] is neither the cabinet's essence-constituting formal cause nor that for the of which the cabinet exists, yet is the cabinet's formal perfection and final completion" (Ibid.)

[61] *In IV Sent*., d. 26 q. 1 a. 3 co: "Respondeo dicendum, quod supposito quod natura corporalis sit a Deo bono instituta; impossibile est dicere, quod ea quae pertinent ad conservationem naturae corporalis, et ad quae natura inclinat, sint universaliter mala; et ideo, cum inclinatio sit naturae ad prolis procreationem, per quam natura speciei conservatur, impossibile est dicere, quod actus quo procreatur proles, sit universaliter illicitus, ut in eo medium virtutis inveniri non possit; nisi ponatur secundum quorumdam insaniam, quod res corporales causatae sunt a Deo malo; ex quo forte ista opinio derivatur quae in littera tangitur; et ideo est pessima haeresis."

[62] *In IV Sent*., d. 31, q. 2, a. 3, ad 1: "Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod tunc voluptates meretricias vir in uxore quaerit quando nihil aliud in ea attendit quam quod in meretrice attenderet."

Equally contrary to a widespread opinion is Thomas' rejection of the claim that the marital act can only be performed *propter procreationem*. He claims precisely the opposite when he writes: "when spouses come together in the hope of procreating *or* (*vel*) so that they may give each other what each is entitled to, which is a matter of *fides*, they are completely free from wrongdoing"[63] Thomas even adds that if spouses have intercourse simply out of the natural impulse (*motus naturae*) to have children, their act is "imperfect unless it is further directed towards some marital good".[64]

Fides, commonly translated as 'fidelity' means for Aquinas much more than not being unfaithful. More primarily it includes the positive commitment to be maritally and therefore bodily united with the other.[65] The marriage promise includes as "more basic" (*principalius*) that spouses "will give each other due bodily cooperation in marital intercourse".[66] Such a commitment to belong to and be united with, in mind and body, one's spouse is the particular form of friendship Aquinas calls marriage.[67] The marital act can therefore be entered into with joy,[68] and the fact that it can give the greatest of all bodily pleasures[69] is not unreasonable because, as he

[63] *In IV Sent*., d. 31, q. 2, a. 2 co: "quando conjuges conveniunt causa prolis procreandae, vel ut sibi invicem debitum reddant, quae ad fidem pertinent; totaliter excusantur a peccato"

[64] *In IV Sent*., d. 31, q. 2, a. 2, ad 1: "…quando natura tantum movet ad actum matrimonii, non excusatur a peccato omnino, nisi inquantum motus naturae ordinatur actu vel habitu ulterius ad prolem secundum quod est bonum sacramenti. Nec tamen sequitur quod motus naturae sit malus; sed quod sit imperfectus, nisi ad aliquod bonum matrimonii ulterius ordinetur."

[65] *In IV Sent*., d. 31, q. 1, a. 2 co: "sic est fides, per quam homo ad suam accedit, et non ad aliam."

[66] *In IV Sent*., d. 31, q. 1, a. 2, ad 3: "Ad tertium dicendum, quod sicut in promissione matrimonii continetur ut neuter ad alterum torum accedat; ita etiam quod sibi invicem debitum reddant: et hoc etiam est principalius, cum consequatur ex ipsa mutua potestate invicem data; et ideo utrumque ad fidem pertinent."

[67] See especially *ScG* III, c. 123.

[68] *In 1 Cor.* 5, no. 325: "Secundo agit de reiteratione coniugalis actus; et primo ponit documentum, dicens iterum revertimini in idipsum, ut scilicet vobis invicem debitum reddatis, finito tempore orationis. Unde et III Reg. VIII, 66 dicitur, quod celebratis dedicationis solemniis, profecti sunt in tabernacula sua laetantes." Regarding Dt. 24:5 ("When a man hath lately taken a wife, he shall not go out to war, neither shall any public business be enjoined him, but he shall be free at home without fault, that for one year he may rejoice with his wife.), Aquinas writes: "Et ut etiam maior dilectio inter coniuges a principio contrahatur, praecipitur quod, cum aliquis nuper uxorem acceperit, nihil ei publicae necessitatis iniungatur, ut libere possit laetari cum uxore sua." (*ST* I-II, q. 105, a. 4 co).

[69] *In IV Sent*., d. 31, q. 2, a. 1, ad 3: "Ad tertium dicendum, quod superabundantia passionis quae vitium facit, non attenditur secundum intensionem quantitativam ipsius, sed secundum proportionem ad rationem; unde tunc solum passio reputatur immoderata, quando limites rationis excedit. Delectatio autem quae fit in actu matrimoniali, quamvis sit intensissima secundum

writes, "the mean of virtue depends not on quantity but on conformity with right reason: and consequently the exceeding pleasure attaching to a venereal act directed according to reason, is not opposed to the mean of virtue"[70] nor is there anything wrong in giving assent to such pleasures in the marital act.[71]

In short, for Thomas, insofar as the marital act is an expression and actualization of the spouses' mutual commitment in marriage, it is natural and reasonable that the marital act is stimulated and accompanied by and perfected in pleasurable fulfillment.

Nevertheless, Aquinas points out that the marital act has been providing a remedy for the disordering that is concupiscence ever since the time of original sin, that is at the time of the law of nature. Insofar as marriage was instituted under the law of Moses,[72] it equally was ordered towards the "repression of concupiscence" in order to prevent marriages among close relatives[73] or to impede the baseness (*turpitudo*) attached to the satisfaction of concupiscence in the marital act.[74]

These and other texts might give the impression that the marital act needs to be excused because of its intrinsic sinfulness. Several qualifications are in order here.

1/First, Thomas observes that "something is properly said to be excused which has a resemblance to evil, and yet is not evil".[75] The marital act therefore has a likeness to an inordinate act and it is this likeness which needs to be excused.

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quantitatem, tamen non excedit limites sibi a ratione praefixos ante principium suum, quamvis in ipsa delectatione ratio eos ordinare non possit."

[70] *ST* II-II, q. 153, a. 2, ad 2; see also *In IV Sent*., d. 26, q. 1, a. 3, ad 6: "Ad sextum dicendum, quod superfluum passionis quod virtutem corrumpit, non solum impedit rationis actum, sed tollit rationis ordinem; quod non facit delectationis intensio in actu matrimoniali, quia etiam si tunc non ordinetur homo, tamen est a ratione praeordinatus."

[71] *De Malo*, q. 15, a. 2, ad 17 (Leonine edition 23, 276, ll. 370-380): "Ad septimum decimum dicendum, quod sicut Philosophus dicit in X Ethicorum, delectationes in bonitate et malitia consequuntur operationes delectabiles; et ideo sicut carnalis commixtio non est peccatum mortale coniugato, est autem peccatum mortale non coniugato, similis etiam differentia est de delectatione, et de consensu in delectationem: non enim potest esse grauius peccatum consensus in delectationem quam consensus in actum, ut patet per Augustinum XII de Trinitate."

[72] *In IV Sent*., d. 26, q. 2, a. 2 co: "secundum autem quod remedium praebet contra vulnus peccati, institutum fuit post peccatum tempore legis naturae; secundum autem determinationem personarum, institutionem habuit in lege Moysi."

[73] *In IV Sent*., d. 40, a. 3 co.

[74] See *In IV Sent*., d. 26, q. 2, a. 3 co and ad 4.

[75] *In IV Sent*., d. 26, q. 1, a. 3, ad 4: "Ad quartum dicendum, quod illud proprie dicitur excusari quod aliquam similitudinem mali habet, et tamen non est malum, vel non tantum quantum apparet: quorum quaedam excusantur a toto, quaedam a tanto; et quia actus matrimonialis propter corruptionem concupiscentiae habet similitudinem actus inordinati, ideo pro bono matrimonii excusatur a toto, ut non sit peccatum."

2/Secondly, the resemblance to an inordinate act "is not the baseness of fault, but of punishment, coming from our first sin so that namely the lower powers and members of the body do not obey reason"[76]

3/Thirdly, and despite this baseness as a result of concupiscence, reason can still find a mean of virtue which makes the marital act good and reasonable, and this is precisely what *fides* and *proles* in the marital act accomplish. As a result, "through the goods of marriage, which dignify carnal concupiscence, the act to which concupiscence inclines loses its external baseness."[77]

4/Fourthly, even if in the marital act reason is unable to operate, such a quantitative excess is not contrary to the mean of virtue, as we have seen. As a result, Aquinas can claim that the marital act, by intending the good of *proles* and *fides*, can even contribute to the formation of virtue.[78]

5/A final and important qualification is in order. Even on the natural level the remedy provided by the marital act cannot be a matter of simply providing sexual release. On the contrary, throughout his writings, Aquinas confirms Aristotle's claim in book III, chapter 12 (1119b8-11) of the *Nicomachean Ethics* that desires which are simply "given an outlet" only grow in strength, and hence there is the need for moderation through discipline.[79] Such a moderation is a matter of an integration of desire with reason or, in the case of marriage, of integrating sexual desire with the marital goods of *proles* and *fides*. In doing so, the sexual desire becomes 'honorable' by being given a meaning in conformity with the dignity of the marital goods.

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[76] *In IV Sent*., d. 26, q. 1, a. 3, ad 3: "Ad tertium dicendum, quod turpitudo illa concupiscentiae quae actum matrimonii semper concomitatur, non est turpitudo culpae, sed poenae, ex peccato primo proveniens; ut scilicet inferiores vires et membra corporis rationi non obediant; et propter hoc ratio non sequitur."

[77] *In IV Sent*., d. 26, q. 2, a. 3, ad 4: Uno modo ut actus ad quem inclinat concupiscentia, exterius turpitudine careat; et hoc fit per bona matrimonii, quae honestant carnalem concupiscentiam.

[78] Ibid.: "Quamvis enim opera concupiscentiae congrua secundum se nata sint concupiscentiam augere; tamen secundum quod ratione ordinantur, ipsam reprimunt: quia ex similibus actibus similes relinquuntur dispositiones et habitus."

[79] See *SLE III*., l. 22, nos. 444-446 (Leonine edition 47/1, 193, ll. 164-184); see *In IV Sent*., d. 2, q. 1, a. 1, qc. 2 co: "concupiscentia non reprimitur per hoc quod ei satisfit, sed magis augetur, ut philosophus dicit in 3 Ethicor."; *In IV Sent*., d. 26, q. 2, a. 3, arg. 4; *ST* II-II, q. 151, a. 2, ad 2.

The fourth presupposition: Marriage and the need for sacramental grace because of original sin

Nevertheless, even virtue at the natural level is insufficient for St. Thomas to consider the marital act as a true remedy for concupiscence. Ultimately, in his characterization of marriage as a remedy for concupiscence, Aquinas never loses sight of the fact that the only true remedy for concupiscence is supernatural grace. While in regard to its act, concupiscence can be mitigated and even redirected to something good through the goods of marriage, "on the part of concupiscence itself, as it is repressed in its root…marriage offers a remedy by the grace which is given in it."[80]

Unlike many of his predecessors, Thomas did not adhere to the preventive model of marriage as espoused by Peter Lombard. In this model marriage, unlike the other sacraments, was only a remedy and not a source of grace. Its adherents "assumed that marriage prevented sin by obviating the occasions for sinning and by excusing the marital act, but not by reforming the soul as the other sacraments did."[81] The foundation of Aquinas's theory about marital grace lies in his claim that in removing something negative, this negative aspect must be replaced by something positive. Just as the heat that takes away cold is the same as the heat that makes things warm, he argues, any grace that impedes something negative must foster something positive. Hence, a marriage contracted in faith in Christ confers a grace that helps the recipients both to avoid evil as well as to fulfill whatever work is incumbent on them as spouses. This theory is, for Thomas, the most probable because whenever God gives human beings the power to do something, he also enables them to actualize it fittingly. Since God, through the divine institution of marriage, gave man the right to marry and to use the powers that belong to that right, so God will also provide the grace without which they could not do so fittingly.[82] In his view, grace

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[80] *In IV Sent*., d. 26, q. 2, a. 3, ad 4: "Ad quartum dicendum, quod contra concupiscentiam potest praestari remedium dupliciter. Uno modo ex parte ipsius concupiscentiae, ut reprimatur in sua radice; et sic remedium praestat matrimonium per gratiam quae in eo datur."

[81] Philipp L. Reynolds, *How Marriage became One of the Sacraments. The Sacramental Theology of Marriage from its Medieval Origins to the Council of Trent* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2016), 623.

[82] *In IV Sent*., d. 26, q. 2, a. 3 co: "Unde alii dicunt quod matrimonium, inquantum in fide Christi contrahitur, habet ut conferat gratiam adjuvantem ad illa operanda quae in matrimonio requiruntur; et hoc probabilius est: quia ubicumque datur divinitus aliqua facultas, dantur etiam auxilia quibus homo convenienter uti possit facultate illa; sicut patet quod omnibus potentiis animae respondent aliqua membra corporis, quibus in actum exire possint. Unde, cum in matrimonio detur homini ex divina institutione facultas utendi sua uxore ad procreationem prolis, datur etiam gratia sine qua id convenienter facere non posset."

does not add something entirely new to marriage but elevates a power that belongs to it by nature. Even without grace, marriage can be made honorable by way of the marital goods. Even in the realm of concupiscence, a good acquired habit by way of moderation and discipline is possible. However, that remedy is effective against concupiscent acts. It is only grace that can heal the habitual "root" of concupiscence.

Thomas notes an important objection to this theory, an objection which is of direct importance for our topic. If the sacraments extend the efficacy of Christ's Passion, then there must be some resemblance between marriage and the Passion. Marriage, however, is an occasion for rejoicing and has carnal pleasure adjoined (*delectationem adjunctam*) to it, whereas the Passion was above all painful. He responds by saying that the required resemblance in marriage lies in the charity that the Passion presupposed. Christ suffered not for the sake of pain but through love, in order to unite the Church with himself as his bride.[83] "Just as the water of baptism is able to touch the body and cleanse the heart by its contact with the flesh of Christ, so marriage has this from the fact that Christ represented it in his Passion." [84]

It is because marriage is from the moment of consent onwards a source of grace, representing the love of Christ and his Church, that marital intimacy can not only be virtuous but even holy. He writes:

> "Any human act is called good in two ways. In one way, by the goodness of virtue…In another way, by the goodness of sacrament, according to which an act is not only called good but also holy; and the marital act has this goodness from the indissolubility of the union, according to which it represents the union of Christ and his Church."[85]

Concretely this means for Thomas that "the marital act is always either a sin or it is meritorious in someone who has grace".[86] The root of such a meritorious act is charity itself.[87]

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[83] *In IV Sent*., d. 26, q. 2, a. 1, ad 3: "Ad tertium dicendum, quod quamvis matrimonium non conformet passioni Christi quantum ad poenam, conformat tamen ei quantum ad caritatem per quam pro Ecclesia sibi in sponsam conjungenda passus est."

[84] *In IV Sent*., d. 26, q. 2, a. 3, ad 1: "… sicut aqua Baptismi habet quod corpus tangat et cor abluat ex tactu carnis Christi; ita matrimonium hoc habet ex hoc quod Christus sua passione illud repraesentavit; et non principaliter ex aliqua sanctificatione sacerdotis." For more on this see Reynolds, *How Marriage became One of the Sacraments*, 657-660.

[85] *In IV Sent*., d. 31, q. 2, a. 1, co.

[86] *In IV Sent*., d. 26, q. 1, a. 4, co

[87] *In IV Sent*., d. 26, q. 1, a. 4, ad 1: "radix merendi quantum ad praemium substantiale est ipsa caritas."

In light of the meritorious nature of the marital act, stemming from charity itself, it becomes intelligible that for Thomas the good of the sacrament of matrimony "adds" (*addit*) something beyond mere procreation, namely the education of children toward holiness.[88]

The meaning of the remedial end of marriage comes to light in his distinction between the avoidance of fornication in the spouse, which he considers not to be a sin, and the avoidance of fornication in him or herself, which he views as a venial sin because of the existence of an excess in sexual desire.[89] Thomas does not understand *remedium concupiscentiae* as an outlet for what Bernhard Häring, a theologian who recently was brought back into prominence, called "unbridled urges" nor "a lesser evil than fornication"[90], but as an integral part of the mutual aid and service that the spouses owe each other in charity. In other words, to engage in the marital act out of concern for the highest good of one's spouse — his or her union with God which is threatened by temptation — is truly a work of charity.

The fifth presupposition: Marriage and the inextricable link with original sin

For Thomas the marital act is inextricably linked with original sin. This becomes clear, for instance, in his response to the objection that, since lust (*luxuria*) is no worse than other sins, it has no need of a sacrament of his own, i.e. marriage. He responds by saying that "there was need for a special sacrament to be applied as a remedy against venereal concupiscence: first because by this concupiscence, not only the person but also the nature is defiled: secondly, by reason of its vehemence whereby it clouds the reason."[91]

The latter reason refers to, as I take it, to concupiscence as an inordinate desire for mutable goods with the qualification that *venereal* concupiscence is more oppressive on reason than other desires because, as Aristotle observed, venereal or sexual desires involve the most basic of the senses, namely the sense of touch, which ex-

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[88] *In IV Sent*., d. 31, q. 2, a. 2, ad 1.

[89] *In IV Sent*., d. 31, q. 2, a. 2, ad 2: "Ad secundum dicendum, quod si aliquis per actum matrimonii intendat vitare fornicationem in conjuge, non est aliquod peccatum; quia hoc est quaedam redditio debiti, quod ad bonum fidei pertinet. Sed si intendat vitare fornicationem in se, sic est ibi aliqua superfluitas; et secundum hoc est peccatum veniale: nec ad hoc est matrimonium institutum, nisi secundum indulgentiam, quae est de peccatis venialibus."

[90] Bernhard Häring, *Zusage an die Welt* (Bergen-Enkheim: Kaffke, 1968), 8.

[91] *ST* III, q. 65, a. 1, ad 5.

tends throughout the whole body. The former reason refers to the fact that through venereal concupiscence not only the person is affected by the personal sin of lust but also to the fact that venereal concupiscence is a condition that resulted from original sin, understood as a sin of nature.[92] Concretely this means that, as a result of this sin of nature, no longer are "the lower powers of the soul held together under the control of reason" nor is "the whole body held together in subjection to the soul".[93] The fact that venereal concupiscence and its consequent sin of lust damages both the nature as well as the person gives concupiscence a particular character: it functions namely as a constant reminder of the wounded state of human nature.

The lack of order and harmony between concupiscence and reason within the human being as a result of original sin affects the marital act. As I have argued elsewhere, Thomas is clearly aware of the fact that the moral life, which for many includes marriage, will never be served by denying the reality of original sin.[94]

The moral optimism of Thomas does not consist in denying this reality but in viewing the marital act as a remedy for original sin and its effects at both the natural and sacramental levels. Recall, however, that Thomas distinguishes between concupiscent acts which can be redirected to something good through the goods of marriage on the one hand, and concupiscence itself which through the grace of the sacrament of marriage can be properly ordered from its root (*radix*).[95]

Although Aquinas remains somewhat silent on the exact meaning of this proper ordering of concupiscence itself from its root through the grace of the sacrament of marriage[96], we can, on the basis of what we have said before, formulate some thoughts.

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[92] Cf. *ST* I-II, q. 81, a. 1 co.

[93] *ST* I-II, q. 85, a. 5 co.

[94] Cf. Jörgen Vijgen, "The Corruption of the Good of Nature and Moral Action: The Realism of St. Thomas Aquinas," forthcoming in *Espiritu* 67 (2018)

[95] Cf. *In IV Sent*., d. 26, q. 2 ,a. 3, ad 4.

[96] See Peter Kwasniewski, "St. Thomas on the Grandeur and Limitations of Marriage," *Nova et Vetera, English Edition*, 10 (2012), 415-436, here 423-424: "The uppermost reality at work in and displayed by the passion and death of Jesus Christ is, for St. Thomas, the burning charity of His Heart. This being so, the statement that "the conjoining of Christ to the conjoining of Christ to the Church, that marriage signifies, is perfected by charity," [In IV Sent., d. 26, q. 2, a. 3] amounts to saying, that this state of life . . . both objectively assimilates the spouses to that supreme mystery of redemptive love and subjectively fills them with it. This, it would seem is implied in the statement that grace is the reality contained by the sacrament (its res contenta). Unfortunately for us, he did not explicate this truth as much as he might have done; still greater mysteries commanded his attention, the sovereign mystery of the Eucharist most of all. And with good reason: the Eucharist, says Thomas again and again, really contains the very One who suffered for us, and thus brings to the communicant the very source and goal of charity. What Christian marriage symbolizes is truly

In bringing children into the world and rearing them towards virtue and holiness within a permanent relationship, the marital act is being dignified to the utmost degree because it becomes a channel of virtue, producing virtuous citizens which in turn increase the justice and charity of the polity, as well as a channel of grace which enables the child to enjoy the reward of eternal life. Christian spouses are moreover offered the additional grace of being able to engage in these acts out of charity or justice, thereby meriting eternal life for themselves and assisting the spouse in avoiding sin and remaining in grace. In doing so, marital relations can constitute a gift of self that truly benefits the receiver because it counters the disorder which resulted from the Fall. Marital intimacy becomes an act of mutual help by reversing the disordering that resulted from the Fall. Engaging in marital intimacy out of the intention of fidelity or submission to each other is an act of justice, which directly counters the privation of justice that original sin caused in human relations, as well as an act of charity because by building up the Body of Christ the spouses are ordered to God and to the community,[97] an order of which man was deprived by original sin.[98]

Conclusion

Much more could and should be said about these presuppositions of St. Paul's and of Thomas' account of marriage as a *remedium concupiscentiae*. While a clarification of the more philosophical presuppositions regarding the hierarchy between essential ends and the nature of pleasure as a supervening end are extremely helpful in dispelling the negative view of sexuality attributed to the Common Doctor, ultimately a more thorough clarification and justification of the need for medicinal grace, curing the effects of original sin, is needed to appreciate anew the longstanding tradition of viewing marriage as a *remedium concupiscentiae*. John Capreolus

present in the Eucharist; it is this sacrament that brings about, and ever deepens, the "spiritual marriage" as Thomas expressly calls it) in which eternal life consists: the indissoluble unity of the Bride and the Bridegroom, of the members with their Head. While the sacrament of marriage signifies the highest mystery, it does not, unlike the other sacraments, effect precisely what it signifies. That is, it does not actually bring about the union of Christ and the Church; rather, it is derived from that preexistent union and points to it as the reality signified but not contained (the res significata non contenta)."

[97] See *ST* III, q. 65, a. 1 co and ad 3; *In IV Sent*., d. 39, q. 1, a. 1 co: "…quod principalius bonum matrimonii est proles ad cultum Dei educanda."

[98] See *ST* I-II, q. 82, a. 2 co: "Causa autem huius corruptae dispositionis quae dicitur originale peccatum, est una tantum, scilicet privatio originalis iustitiae, per quam sublata est subiectio humanae mentis ad Deum."

(ob. 1444), the *Princeps Thomistarum*, already had this in mind when he wrote that "it is not by natural reason but by faith that we hold that marriage is ordered towards the repression of concupiscence".[99]

[99] Johannes Capreolus, *Defensiones theologicae*, In IV Sent. d. 26, q. 1, a. 3, § 1, ad 5, ed. Paban-Pègues, Tours, 1906, t. VI, p. 501 A: "Non enim naturali ratione sed fide tenetur quod matrimonium ordinatur ad reprimendam concupiscentiam". Cited in the short but seminal article by T. G. Belmans, "Le 'remedium concupiscentiae' comme fin du marriage," *Revue Thomiste* 101 (1993), 289-303. I have equally profited from his book: *Le sens objectif de l'agir humain: pour relire la morale conjugale de Saint Thomas*, Libr. Ed. Vaticana, Città del Vaticano, 1980. See also Jörgen Vijgen, "Belmans, Theodorus O. Praem.," *Biographisch-Bibliographische Kirchenlexikon* Band XXXI (2010), 79-81.

Towards A Biblical Thomism
Thomas Aquinas and the Renewal of Biblical Theology
Edited by Piotr Roszak and Jörgen Vijgen

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Aquinas on the Indissolubility of Marriage

I. Introduction

The evangelical scholar Gordon J. Wenham has remarked, "The issue of remarriage after divorce painfully divides evangelical Christians."[1] He notes that whether remarriage after divorce is permitted divides family members and church communities, even when all parties can agree that "the Bible advocates lifelong, monogamous heterosexual marriage as best for human welfare."[2] For Wenham, if we can agree that God has revealed himself in Christ and communicated Christ's will for us through inspired Scripture, then we can agree that we ought to listen to what divine revelation teaches about this matter, even if it proves to be painful at first for us. He mounts a number of arguments in favor of the view that the first Christians, in obedience to Jesus' commandment, "sometimes tolerated divorce for *porneia* (Matt. 5:32) or desertion (1 Cor. 7:15)," but "never tolerated, let alone approved of, marriage after divorce."[3]

Wenham's careful reading of Scripture has led him to the same basic interpretation that can be found in the Catholic Church, despite the difficulties imposed by indissoluble marriage. Wenham recognizes that contemporary evangelicals who argue in favor of remarriage after divorce often are "strongly motivated by pastoral concern for divorced persons who remarry," and far from condemning such concern, he remarks that such concern "is admirable. We are instructed to 'carry each other's burdens, and in this way… fulfill the law of Christ' (Gal 6:2)."[4] If we believe that Jesus

[1] Gordon J. Wenham, "No Remarriage after Divorce," in *Remarriage after Divorce in Today's Church: Three Views*, ed. Mark L. Strauss (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2006), 19-42, at 19.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid., 41.

[4] Wenham, "A Response to Craig S. Keener," 121-25, at 121.

prohibits remarriage after divorce (and that Paul does as well), we must not show ourselves to be uncaring with respect to the plight of many divorced Christians who have remarried. Wenham comments that "in the realm of broken relationships, immense wisdom and tact are needed," and "pastoral insensitivity" must be carefully avoided.[5] At the same time, he insists that "strong principle and compassion are not opposite poles; but just as our Lord dealt compassionately with the adulterous woman without condoning her sin (John 8:1-11), so the modern church can handle the complex issues thrown up by divorce and remarriage in a sensitive and loving way."[6]

Wenham appeals solely to the Bible and to modern historical-critical exegesis. In my view, his arguments can be strengthened by attention to Thomas Aquinas's exegetical arguments. In turn, to understand Aquinas's exegetical positions in their full context, it is necessary to appreciate Aquinas's arguments about why the indissolubility of marriage is not alien to our human nature but in fact pertains to it and, in the order of grace, perfects it. Aquinas emphasizes that marriage, as a sacrament, signifies the indissoluble union of Christ and his Church, and objectively and indissolubly unites the married couple. With regard to the grace of the sacrament of marriage, Joseph Koterski observes, "Aquinas concludes that matrimony, inasmuch as it is contracted in the faith of Christ, is able to confer the grace that enables us to do what Marriage requires, for wherever God gives us a faculty to do something, God also gives the helps by which one can do it well."[7]

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[5] Ibid.

[6] Ibid., 122.

[7] Joseph W. Koterski, S.J., "Aquinas on the Sacrament of Marriage," in *Rediscovering Aquinas and the Sacraments: Studies in Sacramental Theology*, ed. Matthew Levering and Michael Dauphinais (Chicago: Hillenbrand Books, 2009), 102-13, at 113. Along these lines, see also Nicholas J. Healy, Jr., "The Merciful Gift of Indissolubility and the Question of Pastoral Care for Civilly Divorced and Remarried Catholics," *Communio* 41 (2014): 306-30. As Healy points out, "Within the Church, the breakdown of marriage represents a crisis of faith in the sacramental economy. The sacrament of marriage is a privileged point of contact between the order of nature and the new gift of grace. Marriage is a real symbol of the fidelity and mercy of God in his covenant love for creation. In the life, death, and Resurrection of the Incarnate Son, this faithfulness reaches down to the deepest roots of nature and—through the Church and her sacraments—heals and elevates nature to the extent of allowing nature to share in God's own life and love" (ibid., 307). For further discussion of Aquinas's theology of marriage, see Peter Kwasniewski, "St. Thomas on the Grandeur and Limitations of Marriage," *Nova et Vetera* 10 (2012): 415-36; Guy de Broglie, S.J., "La conception thomiste des deux finalités du marriage," *Doctor Communis* 30 (1974): 3-41. For a negative appraisal, see Colleen McCluskey, "An Unequal Relationship of Equals: Thomas Aquinas on Marriage," *History of Philosophy Quarterly* 24 (2007): 1-18. For important historical background and analysis, see Philip L. Reynolds, *How Marringe Became One of the Sacraments* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016). I address Reynold's insights and proposals in a monograph I am currently researching.

In what follows, I first explore Aquinas's arguments for the natural indissolubility of marriage, as these arguments are found in his systematic works. Second, I investigate his view on supernatural or sacramental indissolubility, especially in light of his *Commentary on Ephesians* (specifically Ephesians 5). Third, I examine Aquinas's discussion of two seeming exceptions to the indissolubility of marriage: the so-called "Pauline privilege," which allows the marriage of unbaptized persons to be dissolved, and Jesus' allowance for divorce in cases of *porneia* in Matthew 19:9. In doing so, I attend both to his *Commentary on the Sentences* as well as to his *Commentary on Matthew*.

1. Natural Indissolubility in the *Summa theologiae* and the *Summa contra Gentiles*

Natural Indissolubility in the Summa theologiae

In his account of chastity in the *Summa theologiae*, under the rubric of the virtue of temperance, Aquinas offers an argument for the indissolubility of marriage.[8] Asking whether fornication is a sin, he argues that it is a sin, because even when it does not result in a pregnancy, fornication tends to lessen the chances that the man and the woman will conceive a child within marital wedlock, and in turn this lessens the chances that the child will be raised by his or her mother and father. In Aquinas's view, which has since been borne out by statistics,[9] the flourishing of a child generally is enhanced by being raised by his or her mother and father. Aquinas puts this point in terms of the care given by the mother and the protection and guidance given by the father. The father's presence seems much more replaceable or dispensable, since it would seem that the mother could either raise the child by herself or, if needed, a friend or neighbor could stand in for the father's role. For Aquinas, the father functions as "guide and guardian" assuring the child's progress "in goods

[8] For further discussion, see chapter 4 (on the virtue of chastity) of my forthcoming *Aquinas's Eschatological Ethics: Retrieving the Christian Virtue of Temperance* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press).

[9] See David Popenoe, *Life without Father: Compelling New Evidence that Fatherhood and Marriage Are Indispensable for the Good of Children and Society* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996); Popenoe, *Families without Fathers: Fatherhood, Marriage and Children in American Society* (New York: Routledge, 2009). See also Mark Regnerus, "Parental Same-Sex Relationships, Family Instability, and Subsequent Life Outcomes for Adult Children: Answering Critics of the New Family Structures Study with Additional Analyses," *Social Science Research* 41 (2012): 1367-77.

both internal and external," but Aquinas does not here specify further why someone else (for instance, the mother) could not easily take the father's place as "guide and guardian."[10] Yet, there is no question that fathers are important for the flourishing of their children, as Aquinas indicates.[11]

With this point as a given, Aquinas moves toward the indissolubility of marriage. But before showing how Aquinas does this, let me note that he is well aware that among other animals, monogamy — let alone lifetime monogamy — is hardly the norm. He supposes that this relates to the lengthy duration and high degree of difficulty involved in raising a human child well. Because of the duration and difficulty, the father is especially needed. Therefore, Aquinas argues that "human nature" — not a mere animal inclination, but our rational inclination rooted in the kind of creaturely flourishing that befits us — "rebels against an indeterminate union of the sexes."[12] Aquinas is not saying here that we do not wish, in our fallen experience of lust or even in our openness to potential different partners when (prior to marriage) we come of age, to mate with more than one person. Obviously, fornication and adultery are problems because people willingly and relatively commonly choose to commit such acts. What Aquinas means by saying that "human nature rebels against an indeterminate union of the sexes," then, is that we naturally, rationally tend to want to form families. Men naturally want to take care of their children; women naturally want the father of the child around and supportive during the raising of the child. Given our fallen nature, we can easily turn away from this, as Aquinas is well aware; and yet it is quite clear that our species — as distinct from dogs or from birds — tends naturally and rationally toward lengthy and public union between one male and one female. Aquinas comments, "Hence it is that in the human race the male has a natural solicitude for the certainty of offspring, because on him devolves the upbringing of the child."[13] Generally speaking, it matters to men to be confidently able to raise their own children, rather than to have their female partner impregnated by various other men and then to be charged with raising those children. For this reason, Aquinas observes, human nature tends to try to ensure that "a man should be united to a determinate woman and should abide with her a long time or even a whole lifetime."[14]

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[10] II-II, q. 154, a. 3. All translations of the *Summa theologiae* are taken from Aquinas's *Summa theologica*, 5 vols., trans. the Fathers of the English Dominican Province (Westminster, MD: Christian Classics, 1981).

[11] See for example Kyle D. Pruett, *Fatherneed: Why Father Care Is as Essential as Mother Care for Your Child* (New York: The Free Press, 2000).

[12] II-II, q. 154, a. 3.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Ibid.

This directedness of human nature explains why marriage is naturally part of human experience, and explains why the indissolubility of marriage makes sense even at a "natural" level. Since both partners are needed for the raising of children, the bond between the man and the woman, in which they undertake to raise children (a process of caregiving that, in humans, continues even when the children have reached adult age, although it continues in a lesser way), is a bond that cannot simply be annulled by the man or by the woman. It is the kind of bond that the man or woman cannot walk away from when it becomes inconvenient or the grass seems greener elsewhere. In the raising of children, there will be difficult times, and if the man (or the woman) could simply walk away from the bond, then human flourishing across the generations would be seriously imperiled. Thus, it is not up to the man or the woman to dissolve the bond. The bond has a status that does not end when choice dictates or when the children grow old. The needs of the family continue, and the bond continues. Although Aquinas does not here state that marriage is indissoluble, one can see the roots of indissolubility in the needs and rational inclination of flourishing human nature.

Natural Indissolubility in the Summa contra gentiles

In his discussion of marriage in the *Summa contra gentiles*, we find a more extensive version of the above argument.[15] Aquinas remarks that according to "certain people" it remains an open question whether fornication is a sin; indeed, since it does not violate a marriage bond, why cannot an unmarried couple have sex with each other without sinning?[16] This was a real issue in the late thirteenth century, as in fact it always has been. Aquinas sums up the view that he opposes: "For they say: Suppose there is a woman who is not married, or under the control of any man, either her father or another man. Now, if a man performs the sexual act with her, and she is willing, he does not injure her, because she favors the action and she has control over her own body. Nor does he injure any other person."[17] One can see why this argument has seemed airtight to many people over the course of history. Prior to marriage, at least when we are of age, we have not bound ourselves to any particular

[15] Note that Aquinas died before he could specifically treat the sacrament of marriage in his *Summa theologiae*.

[16] *Summa contra gentiles* III, ch. 122 (p. 142). All translations of Book III of the *Summa contra gentiles* are taken from Aquinas, *Summa contra gentiles*, Book III: Providence, Part II, trans. Vernon J. Bourke (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975).

[17] Ibid.

person, and so why can we not have sex with another free and willing person, just as we are free to enjoy other pleasures with any free and willing person? This argument becomes even stronger in a society, unlike Aquinas's, in which contraception is cheap and generally effective. The notable point, then, is that the argument in favor of fornication had serious adherents even in Aquinas's broadly Christian culture in which such generally effective contraception was lacking.

Aquinas knows that a possible answer would be to suppose that although the man and woman do not injure each other, they inflict some kind of injury on God or on their neighbor. After all, the neighbor may be scandalized by the fact that an unmarried man and woman are having sexual intercourse. The act might seem to undermine the stability of the neighbor's marital bond. For God's part, the act of fornicating might seem to be an offense against God's laws regarding marriage. Rather than specifying what the offense against God might be, Aquinas states simply that "we do not offend God except by doing something contrary to our own good."[18] It is necessary, therefore, to show that the fornicating man and woman are actually doing something against their own true good; otherwise their action certainly does not offend God. Likewise, the scandalized neighbor can be safely ignored unless the act is essentially sinful, that is to say, unless the act is truly against the human flourishing of the man and woman. People take scandal from all sorts of things, including things that are not sins, and so the mere fact of a scandalized person does not make an action wrong.

Aquinas considers it necessary, therefore, to be able to offer an argument for why fornication draws humans away from our true good, our true end. In the *Summa contra gentiles*, he considers marriage under the rubric of God's providence, the way in which "God exercises care over every person on the basis of what is good for him."[19] In this light, he argues that human actions, and even human bodiliness, are teleologically ordered to human goods. Getting into the nitty-gritty of male bodiliness, he notes that unlike the emission of urine, excrement, and sweat, the emission of semen does not aim at ridding the body of waste or regulating the body's equilibrium. Rather, the emission of semen belongs to a process that is teleologically a procreative or generative process, and this is so even when various factors ensure that the semen does not result in a conception. The point is that the bodily process within which the semen make sense is a bodily process that, as such, is shaped by the need to sustain the human race by conceiving a child. Biologically speaking, the act has a describable teleology, whether or not the person intends that teleological outcome. The question then becomes whether it is good — rational — for a person

[18] Ibid. (p. 143).
[19] Ibid. (p. 143).

to act in ways that freely harm or undermine the bodily teleology of the human act. Can we rationally use our sexual organs, so as to emit semen, without worrying about the fact that we are harming or undermining the bodily teleology of the act in its ordering to procreation?[20]

It seems as though the answer would have to be yes, since we are free and rational and our bodily needs or dynamisms do not limit us; we can override our bodily needs and dynamisms, as for example when we go hungry in order to grow spiritually. But there is a difference between not satisfying a bodily need, on the one hand, and deliberately acting against our bodily teleology, on the other. Since we are body-soul unities, our bodily teleology has to be fully accounted for in our rational actions; our bodies are not mere mechanisms that the soul sits upon and directs arbitrarily. We can deprive our bodies of things that they need (as in fasting). But to act against the purposes inscribed in our bodily processes is to introduce a contradiction within an actual bodily act: in performing the bodily act that has its own teleology, we deem that our rationality can set aside, within the bodily act itself, the bodily act's own teleology.

When we rationally respect the bodily teleology of the sexual act of intercourse, we see that its deepest bodily purpose — even if it is often not accomplished, and even when we can thwart the emitted semen from being able to impregnate the woman — is procreation. Procreation, however, is not the unthinking act that it is in mere animals. On the contrary, humans who engage in rational procreative acts are committing themselves to the possibility of caring for and raising children, a possibility that involves a number of rational commitments, since it involves many years of work and much mutual labor between the man and woman. Aquinas contrasts the human being once again with dogs and birds, and he reiterates his point that under normal circumstances "the female in the human species is not at all able to take care of the upbringing of offspring by herself, since the needs of human life demand many things which cannot be provided by one person alone."[21] Note that the "needs of human life" are both spiritual and bodily; even if one parent can provide all that is needed for the child's body, there are spiritual needs that can be met for the child only by the other parent (whether the father or mother). Aquinas concludes that "it is appropriate to human nature that a man remain together with a woman after the generative act, and not leave her immediately to have such relations with another woman, as is the practice with fornicators."[22]

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[20] For further discussion of this controversial point, see chapter 4 of my *Aquinas's Eschatological Ethics*.

[21] Ibid. (pp. 144-45).

[22] Ibid. (p. 145).

Aquinas recognizes that some women may be wealthy and may not want or need a man around to provide for bodily needs. But he points out that not only is the morality of an action determined by exceptional individual circumstances, but also human children require "education for the soul."[23] He considers that the education that parents must offer children is first and foremost an education in moral action, and thus an education in prudence. He explains that "a man lives by reason, which he must develop by lengthy, temporal experience so that he may achieve prudence. Hence, children must be instructed by parents who are already experienced people."[24] Ultimately, the education that parents owe their children is an education in living according to reason rather than simply giving in to the impulses of passions. In the instructing of children, due to "the impulsion of the passions, through which prudent judgment is vitiated," there will be a need for "correction."[25] Aquinas argues that this, too, requires two parents, rather than solely the woman. He argues that the father will be particularly able, due to his extra strength, to deliver the needed correction and punishment to unruly adolescents.[26]

It follows, as Aquinas says, that "it is natural" — natural to the human being as a rational animal whose offspring need much time and care to reach maturity — "for the man to establish a lasting association with a designated woman, over no short period of time."[27] Among other benefits, this ensures that the man can be confident that the children he raises are his, which gives him added motivation to care for them. The woman, in turn, gains by being confident that the man will help to care for and educate the children whom she bears. Aquinas adds the point that fornication is not merely like a person choosing "to walk on his hands, or to use his feet for something usually done with the hands."[28] Such activities obviously have no moral bearing, or at least little bearing upon the human good. By contrast, how we use our sexual organs has a large bearing upon the human good.

Aquinas appreciates that such arguments may not sway persons who, in the midst of erotic attraction, would simply like to have sex with each other without worrying about what might happen in terms of future children and without worrying about whether such children will have the benefits of a stable family with both parents. Therefore, he also advances some arguments based upon the authority of God's

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[23] Ibid.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Ibid.

[26] Along erroneous lines, but in accord with the educational practices of his day, he also argues that the father will be more able to deliver the instruction that flows from a fully developed reason.

[27] Ibid. (p. 146).

[28] Ibid.

teaching. God teaches us not only through the natural order for human flourishing, which we perceive through rational reflection, but also through inspired Scripture. Against those who hold that deliberately emitting semen in a manner that is opposed to the procreative ordering of our sexual organs — namely through masturbation or homosexual activity, or even through bestiality — is not a sin (just as it is not a sin to emit other bodily fluids when we feel the need to do so), Aquinas argues that the fact that such actions are opposed to true human flourishing in families and communities is indicated scripturally. He cites Leviticus 18:22-23, "You shall not lie with a male as with a woman; it is an abomination. And you shall not lie with any beast and defile yourself with it, neither shall any woman give herself to a beast to lie with it: it is a perversion."[29] Well aware that not all the Levitical laws have literal application in the fulfillment brought by Christ, he adds confirmation from the New Testament, in the light of the Spirit's outpouring and Christ's coming: "Do you not know that the unrighteous will not inherit the kingdom of God? Do not be deceived; neither the immoral, nor idolaters, nor adulterers, nor homosexuals… will inherit the kingdom of God" (1 Cor 6:9-10).

Thus, both in the *Summa theologiae*'s discussion of chastity and in the *Summa contra gentiles*'s discussions of marriage, Aquinas argues that it is natural, reasonable, and good for human flourishing that there be an exclusive union between a man and a woman that endures for a long time, long enough to raise the children.

Reasons for the Natural Indissolubility of Marriage

After the children are raised, does the marital bond become dissoluble? Aquinas gives various reasons for why human flourishing requires that the marriage be strictly indissoluble until the death of one of the spouses.[30] First, he argues that the marital bond should endure until the father and mother's care of the child ceases. As already indicated above, for humans this means that "the father's solicitude for his son should endure until the end of the father's life," and so the marriage should be strictly indissoluble.[31] Second, he argues that unlike in many other animals, where the female needs the male only for reproduction and for nothing else, in the case of humans a woman can benefit from the presence of a man for other reasons than re-

[29] Ibid.

[30] Some of these reasons rest upon his view of the rational superiority of the male (not due to a greater soul, but due to bodily factors through which rationality is mediated). We can discard these reasons, while appropriating the others.

[31] ScG III, ch. 123 (p. 147).

production. Since men are often attracted to women by beauty (among other attributes), it would be unjust for a man to bond with a woman only while she is young, and then cast her aside after the children are grown or after her youthful childbearing years are over. Aquinas holds that "if any man took a woman in the time of her youth, when beauty and fecundity were hers, and then sent her away after she had reached an advanced age, he would damage that woman contrary to natural equity."[32] Clearly the same point would apply to a woman who used a man's help during the years of his strength, and then cast him aside when he was older. The point is that if human flourishing is the standard, then the end of the child-raising years should not open the door to dissolving marriages.

The third reason that Aquinas gives is based upon his view that "the society of husband and wife" is "an association of equals" rather than "a sort of slavery on the part of the wife."[33] In Aquinas's time, men generally had more power, more control over finances and over decision-making (though obviously this point does not fully apply to the many men who lived as penniless peasants or as miserable soldiers). Given this unequal power, the man should not have power to divorce while the woman has no such power. In contemporary society, of course, most divorces are initiated by women. For today, the take-away from this argument of Aquinas's is simply that it is better for both the man and the woman that neither spouse possesses the power to toss aside the other spouse.

Aquinas's fourth reason has as its main concern ensuring that the father continues to care about his children, which in general happens only when they are his and when he is present. Aquinas states that "if a husband could put away his wife, or a wife her husband, and have sexual relations with another person, certitude as to offspring would be precluded, for the wife would be united first with one man and later with another."[34] Generally speaking, Aquinas is no doubt right that when a woman divorces a man and partners with another, the new man is less interested in the wellbeing of the existing children, and the father himself often grows more distant.[35] The wellbeing of the children, then, calls for an indissoluble marital bond.

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[32] Ibid. (pp. 147-48).

[33] Ibid. (p. 148).

[34] Ibid. (p. 148).

[35] See for example E. Flouri, M. K. Narayanan, and E. Midouhas, "The Cross-Lagged Relationship between Father Absence and Child Problem Behaviour in the Early Years," *Child Care Health Development* 41 (2015): 1090-97; Sara McLanahan, Laura Tach, and Daniel Schneider, "The Causal Effects of Father Absence," *Annual Review of Sociology* 39 (2013): 399-427. These studies would, of course, need to be complemented by further studies in order to demonstrate the common-sense point I am making here.

Fifth, Aquinas proposes that the greater a friendship is, the longer-lasting the bond should be. He then remarks that marriage is "the greatest friendship," because husband and wife "are united not only in the act of fleshly union, which produces a certain gentle association even among beasts, but also in the partnership of the whole range of domestic activity."[36] In defense of the claim that marriage is the greatest friendship, he observes that Genesis 2:24 teaches that a man and woman choose each other over what otherwise would be their most important relationship, namely, their relationship to their parents who raised them. His conclusion is that as the greatest friendship, marriage should be an indissoluble bond. Note that this reason is rooted in the personal love shared by the couple, rather than being rooted in the good of the family or in the need to avoid the injustice of one spouse being discarded in old age.

Sixth, Aquinas argues that the indissolubility of the marriage union pertains to the good of both the man and the woman because it encourages both to behave in moral ways that conduce to true individual and societal flourishing. He considers that whereas a more casual bond would encourage both the man and the woman to keep an eye out for a better partner, an indissoluble bond makes it more likely that "the love of one spouse for the other will be more faithful."[37] Their indissoluble bond also makes it more likely that their domestic economy will be more prudent and frugal, since the man and the woman know that they will share possessions until they die. Furthermore, it avoids the almost inevitable animosity between the spouse who initiates the divorce and the relatives and friends of the spouse who endures the divorce, which is a serious matter especially in small localities where people all know each other. Arguably, it also decreases the adulterous impulses that would be inflamed if the man or the woman knew that he or she could trade up for a better spouse.

In sum, Aquinas sets forth six arguments that build upon the grounds of human procreative teleology — and that add to this the element of friendship — in order to show that for the good of the children, of the couple, and of the family, marriage should be indissoluble. He caps these arguments, which stem from reasoning about the purposes and goods of marriage, with an argument that comes from divine revelation. Well aware that fallen humans often do not want to commit permanently to each other or to their children — well aware of the family dysfunction that continues to mar human existence — the New Testament teaches that marriage is a sign (in Aquinas's words) "of the inseparable union between Christ and the Church, which is a union of one spouse with another (Eph. 5:24-32)."[38] In teaching that Christian

[36] ScG III, ch. 123 (p. 148).
[37] Ibid. (p. 149).
[38] Ibid. (p. 149).

marriage is a sign of the utterly indissoluble bond between Christ and the Church, the New Testament makes clear that marriage must be indissoluble. As confirmation of the teaching of Ephesians, Aquinas cites Jesus' words in Matthew 5:32, "I say to you that every one who divorces his wife, except on the ground of unchastity, makes her an adulteress; and whoever marries a divorced woman commits adultery."[39] He also cites Paul's words in 1 Corinthians 7:10-11, "To the married I give charge, not I but the Lord, that the wife should not separate from her husband (but if she does, let her remain single or else be reconciled to her husband) — and that the husband should not divorce his wife."[40]

Aquinas concludes that it is clear both that natural marriage should be indissoluble and that Christian marriage is indissoluble, according to the will of Jesus (as interpreted by Paul, speaking in Jesus' name). At the same time, Aquinas recognizes that although natural marriage *should* be indissoluble, this is a very high bar for fallen people, who are not strengthened by the explicit revelation of Christ and the outpouring of his Holy Spirit. Recall that Jesus' teaching prohibits divorce so firmly that his own disciples cry out against it. In response to Matthew 19:9, where Jesus teaches that "whoever divorces his wife, except for unchastity, and marries another, commits adultery; and he who marries a divorced woman, commits adultery," Jesus' disciples rebuke him. They tell him, "If such is the case of a man with his wife, it is not expedient to marry" (Mt 19:10). Jesus replies to them by stating that "[n]ot all men can receive this precept, but only those to whom it is given" (Mt 19:11).

Aquinas does not here address this exchange between Jesus and his disciples. He focuses instead on the fact that God did not give the precept about marriage's indissolubility to the Jewish people in the Torah. Aquinas suggests that without grace, a man and a woman can be at each other's throats, ready to kill each other.[41] Therefore, because of the people's "hardness of heart" (Mt 19:8) God gave a precept in the Torah that explained the conditions for acceptable divorce. Christ's followers, by contrast, will be empowered by grace to obey his precept about the indissolubility of marriage, a precept that accords with the natural indissolubility of marriage and that enables marriage to be a supernatural sign of the indissoluble union of Christ and his Church. Although Aquinas does not mention it here, recall Jesus' appeal in Matthew 19:4-6 to the indissolubility of natural marriage as instituted by God: "Have you not read that he who made them from the beginning

[39] Ibid. (p. 150). Note that in the Vulgate and RSV, Jesus' words in Matthew 5:32 and 19:9 are identical, although some ancient manuscripts of 19:9 lack the final clause "and he who marries a divorced woman, commits adultery."

[40] Ibid. (p. 150).

[41] See ibid. (p. 150).

made them male and female, and said, 'For this reason a man shall leave his father and mother and be joined to his wife, and the two shall become one' [Gen 2:24]? So they are no longer two but one. What therefore God has joined together, let no man put asunder."

2. Supernatural or Sacramental Indissolubility

Whereas in Book III of the *Summa contra gentiles* Aquinas seeks generally to deal "with divine things according as the natural reason can arrive at the knowledge of divine things through creature" — although he often caps his arguments in Book III with scriptural citations — in Book IV he proposes to take "[w]hat has been passed on to us in the words of sacred Scripture" as "principles."[42] In his question on the sacrament of marriage as instituted by Christ, he is exploring one of "the things which surpass reason that have been done by God, such as the work of the Incarnation and what follows thereon."[43]

Why does there need to be a supernatural "sacrament" of marriage, if natural marriage — marriage as part of the created human ordering to individual, familial, and communal flourishing — is already indissoluble in itself (despite the dispensation that God allowed to the Israelites and presumably to others as well)? In chapter 78 of Book IV, Aquinas answers that "[w]hen something is ordered to different ends there must be differing principles directing it to the end."[44] Marriage is ordered naturally to the flourishing of political communities (the family and the society) and to the good of the preservation of the species through the begetting and raising of children. Supernaturally, however, marriage is ultimately ordered to the good of Christ's Church, the supernatural society of the baptized across the generations. In begetting and raising children, Christian married couples do so not only in light of the flourishing of merely human communities, but specifically "for the worship of God."[45] The child is baptized and educated as part of Christ's Body, called to eternal union with the holy Trinity.

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[42] *Summa contra gentiles* IV, ch. 1 (p. 39). All translations from Book IV of the *Summa contra gentiles* are taken from Aquinas, *Summa contra gentiles*, Book Four: Salvation, trans. Charles J. O'Neil (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975). See also Thomas S. Hibbs, *Dialectic and Narrative in Aquinas: An Interpretation of the Summa Contra Gentiles* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995).

[43] Ibid. (p. 39).

[44] ScG IV, ch. 78 (p. 295).

[45] Ibid. (p. 295).

Furthermore, not only the procreative ordering of marriage is supernaturalized, but also the marital union itself stands as a sign of Christ's union with the Church. Aquinas here cites Ephesians 5:32, "This is a great mystery [or sacrament], and I mean in reference to Christ and the church"; and he also cites further biblical passages confirming the unbreakable unity of Christ and the Church — among them Song of Songs 6:9, "My dove, my perfect one, is only one," as well as Christ's promise never to depart from his Church, "I am with you always, to the close of the age" (Mt 28:20), a promise echoed by 1 Thessalonians 4:16, "we shall always be with the Lord."[46] All this is crucial because marriage, as a sacramental sign of Christ's unity with his Church, causes in the man and the woman a real interior correspondence to what marriage signifies in the supernatural order. Aquinas explains that "because the sacraments effect that of which they are made signs, one must believe that in this sacrament a grace is conferred on those marrying, and that by this grace they are included in the union of Christ and the Church."[47]

In Christian marriage, the man and woman are incorporated into the unity of Christ and the Church in such a profound way as truly to be a living sign of this unbreakable unity precisely in the "fleshly and earthly things" that they undertake in family life.[48] The conclusion is evident: Christian marriage, with its proper goods of offspring, fidelity, and the sacrament, must above all be indissoluble. Aquinas concludes, "Necessarily, then, matrimony as a sacrament of the Church is a union of one man to one woman to be held indivisibly."[49]

When in his *Commentary on Ephesians* Aquinas comments on Ephesians 5, therefore, he devotes a good bit of attention to the way in which Paul's exhortation to men to love their wives deploys the two examples of the love of Christ for the Church and the love of a man for himself. When he reaches the crucial passage about the sacrament or mystery that is marriage, he focuses first on Paul's appeal to "the authority of Scripture" — namely, Paul's quotation of Genesis 2:24, "'For this reason a man shall leave his father and mother and be joined to his wife, and the two shall become one'" (Eph 5:31). Recall that Jesus, too, appeals to Genesis 2:24 in insisting upon the indissolubility of marriage against the Mosaic Law's permission of divorce (Mt 19:4-5). Why is it, Aquinas asks, that in marriage the two become *one*? It may seem an exaggeration to claim that husband and wife become one in their lives together.

Aquinas argues that it is not an exaggeration, for three reasons. The first is that the man and woman's love is strong enough to impel them to leave father and

[46] Ibid. (p. 296).
[47] Ibid. (p. 296).
[48] Ibid. (p. 296).
[49] Ibid. (p. 296).

mother. In men, Aquinas thinks that there is a natural instinct to unite with and care for a woman; and vice versa. The intimate love of the man and the woman, then, goes beyond even the love of children for parents or friend for friend. The second reason that Aquinas gives for the unique unity of husband and wife is the fact that they live together so intimately, and therefore have the opportunity for the deepest human friendship. The third reason given by Aquinas is sexual intercourse. Bodily speaking, sexual intercourse forms as it were one body, through the carnal joining of two bodies in one bodily act.[50]

After defending Genesis 2:24 on this basis, Aquinas observes that Paul applies Genesis 2:24 to the relationship of husband and wife by interpreting the "one flesh" unity in a mystical way. Specifically, Paul argues that mystically, Genesis 2:24's reference to the natural "one flesh" union of husband and wife should be read as pointing to the supernatural unity of Christ and his Church. For Paul, therefore, the "one flesh" union of husband and wife — their love, their living together, and their sexual union — is, in Aquinas's words, "the symbol of a sacred reality, namely, the union of Christ and the Church."[51]

Asking why Paul terms marriage a "great mystery" (or, in Latin, a "great *sacramentum*"), Aquinas observes that four sacraments are rightly called "great": baptism insofar as its effect of washing away sin and opening the gates of heaven; confirmation insofar as its minister is a bishop; the Eucharist insofar as it contains "the whole Christ"; and lastly marriage insofar as it signifies the union of Christ and his Church.[52] The *greatness* of marriage among the other sacraments consists in the fact that it symbolizes the telos or goal for which the whole cosmos was created. Marriage symbolizes the very thing for which the whole Old Testament, and all God's work, prepared. Marriage symbolizes the perfect consummation toward which the Church strives and in which the Church already participates by grace. This greatness of symbolization requires marriage to be indissoluble.

Aquinas proceeds to ask what Genesis 2:24 might look like if interpreted along Paul's mystical lines. He proposes that the "man" who "leaves his father" could be Christ, who as the divine Son comes into the world. This same Christ also leaves his "mother" in the sense that Christ, raised in the synagogue, fulfills the covenants with Israel and establishes the Messianic community united around himself. Christ

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[50] For the material in this paragraph, see Aquinas, *Commentary on the Letter of Saint Paul to the Ephesians*, trans. Matthew L. Lamb, in Aquinas, *Commentary on the Letters of Saint Paul to the Galatians and Ephesians*, ed. J. Mortensen and E. Alarcón (Lander, WY: The Aquinas Institute for the Study of Sacred Doctrine, 2012), §333, pp. 325-26.

[51] Ibid., §334, p. 326.

[52] Ibid.

"cleaves to his wife" in the sense that he clings permanently to the Church, from which he promises never to separate himself (see Matthew 28:20).[53]

Aquinas also argues that some passages in the Old Testament are references to Christ alone, while other passages in the Old Testament can rightly be interpreted as referring to Christ *and* to others. Genesis 2:24 belongs to the latter group, since it can rightly be interpreted both as being about Christ and as being about others (who are thereby "types" of Christ). Here Aquinas reads Genesis 2:24 in light of Ephesians 5:33, "let each one of you love his wife as himself." Christ cleaves to his wife the Church, and men must cleave to their wives in the same way, thereby showing themselves to be "types of Christ."[54] Indissoluble marriage marks the Church's members as true "types" of Christ, configured to their Lord. Genesis 2:24 is about Christ, and it is about us — so long as we rightly perceive marriage's indissolubility.

3. 'Exceptions' to Indissolubility

However, what about the seeming exception to indissolubility that Jesus makes in Matthew 5:32//19:9, and the exception that Paul apparently makes to indissolubility in 1 Corinthians 7:15? Given Aquinas's strong commitment to the natural and supernatural indissolubility of marriage, how does Aquinas interpret these biblical passages? And do his arguments still hold in light of contemporary biblical scholarship?

The "Pauline Privilege" in the Commentary on the Sentences

Let me begin with Aquinas's treatment of 1 Corinthians 7:15, the so-called "Pauline privilege," in his *Commentary on the Sentences* (as made easily available in the *Supplement* that his students added to his unfinished *Summa theologiae*).[55]

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[53] Ibid.

[54] Ibid., §335, p. 327.

[55] On the "Supplement," see the brief note in Jean-Pierre Torrell, O.P., *Saint Thomas Aquinas*, vol. 1: *The Person and His Work*, trans. Robert Royal (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1996), 333. For a more thorough treatment that I can offer here of Aquinas's theology of marriage in his *Commentary on the Sentences*, see B. M. Perrin, "L'institution du mariage dans le *Commentaire des Sentences* de saint Thomas (I)," *Revue Thomiste* 108 (2008): 423-466; Perrin, "L'institution du mariage dans le *Commentaire des Sentences* de saint Thomas (II)," *Revue Thomiste* 108 (2008): 599-646; Reynolds, *How Marriage Became One of the Sacraments*. See also Donald J. Gregory, *The Pauline Privilege: An Historical Synopsis and Commentary* (Washington,

The text of 1 Corinthians 7:15 reads, "But if the unbelieving partner desires to separate, let it be so; in such a case the [Christian] brother or sister is not bound." In interpreting this verse, Aquinas's position is that the Christian spouse can certainly divorce the non-Christian (unbaptized) spouse; the only real question is whether the Christian spouse, having undertaken the divorce, is free to marry again. In answer to this question, Aquinas states that if the Christian spouse divorced a non-Christian spouse who was *not* trying to draw him or her back into unbelief, then the Christian spouse *cannot* marry again until the death of the non-Christian spouse. By contrast, if the non-Christian spouse *was* indeed trying to draw the Christian spouse back into unbelief, then the Christian spouse *can* marry again. When Aquinas describes a spouse as "unbelieving," he does not have in view a person who has lost his or her faith; rather, he has in view an unbaptized person. As he comments, "if a believer marry a baptized heretic, the marriage is valid, although he sins by marrying her if he knows her to be a heretic."[56] Aquinas considers it illicit for a Christian to marry a non-Christian — in his view the "disparity of worship" serves as an impediment to a valid marriage[57] — and so he has in view solely a case in which the couple both begin as non-Christians, but then one of them converts to Christianity.[58]

Aquinas affirms that there can be valid marriages between non-Christians (or "unbelievers"). He observes that "there is marriage between unbelievers, in so far as marriage fulfills an office of nature."[59] But if this is so, then how could a person's becoming a Christian free them from their marital bond, which — even as a natural marriage — Aquinas consistently deems to be indissoluble? After all, Aquinas

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D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1931). Since Aquinas's commentary on 1 Corinthians 7:10-10 has been lost, editions of Aquinas's Commentary on 1 Corinthians instead contain an excerpt from Peter of Tarentaise's commentary. I therefore limit myself to the authentic *Commentary on the Sentences*.

[56] Suppl., q. 59, a. 1, ad 5. For the material in q. 59, a. 1, see Aquinas's *In IV Sent.*, dist. 39, a. 1.

[57] Suppl., q. 59, a. 1, ad 1. I should also that in the case of a marriage contracted between a baptized Christian and an unbaptized person (as distinct from a marriage contracted between two unbaptized persons, one of whom later receives baptism), the Church allows, in certain circumstances, for a dissolution of the marriage, but this determination requires in each case the decision of the pope (and therefore this is sometimes termed the "Petrine Privilege"). For discussion, see Wojciech Kowal, O.M.I., "The Power of the Church to Dissolve the Matrimonial Bond in Favour of the Faith," *Studia canonica* 38 (2004): 411-38; Kowal, "Quelques remarques sur la discipline de la dissolution de marriages en faveur de la foi," *Studia canonica* 43 (2009): 161-81. See also the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith's Normae de conficiendo processu pro soutione vinculi matrimonialis in favorem fidei *Potestas Ecclesiae* (2001), at www.vatican.va.

[58] For Aquinas all of this is a particularly serious matter because he holds that "[t]he chief good of marriage is the offspring to be brought up to the worship of God" (Suppl., q. 59, a. 1).

[59] Suppl., q. 59, a. 2, ad 3. For the material in q. 59, a. 2, see Aquinas's *In IV Sent.*, dist. 39, a. 2.

states in this very context that "no impediment that supervenes upon a true marriage dissolves it."[60] If two unbelievers can have a true marriage, and Aquinas states that they certainly can, then even if a Christian cannot rightly marry a non-Christian, this point cannot override the fact that prior to one of them becoming a Christian, they were truly married to each other. Aquinas affirms that "the marriage tie is not broken by the fact that one of them is converted to the faith."[61] How, then, could Paul be correct that the Christian "brother or sister is not bound" by the marital bond?

On the one hand, Aquinas answers by suggesting that although the "marriage tie is not broken" when a spouse becomes Christian, nonetheless the fact that one spouse is still an unbeliever may mean that "cohabitation and marital intercourse" is no longer appropriate, since the resulting children would not be properly educated in faith.[62] In such a case, it is licit for the Christian spouse to ask for and obtain a divorce, even if the marital bond remains in force. Such a divorce amounts to what we would today term a "legal separation": the marriage continues, but the ecclesiastically granted divorce means that the one spouse no longer owes the marriage debt (sexual intercourse) to the other spouse, and also that cohabitation is no longer requisite.

On the other hand, however, Aquinas adds that even though on its own natural marriage is indissoluble, natural marriage is not "altogether firm and ratified."[63] Why not? He observes that baptism is a form of death — as taught by Romans 6:3-4, where Paul exhorts, "Do you not know that all of us who have been baptized into Christ Jesus were baptized into his death? We were buried therefore with him by baptism into death, so that as Christ was raised from the dead by the glory of the Father, we too might walk in newness of life."[64] Aquinas argues that like bodily dying, the death that we undergo in baptism releases us from the marital bond: "he who dies to his former life is not bound to those things to which he was bound in his former life."[65] Does this mean that a father who receives baptism is now freed from his duties to his children? On the contrary, says Aquinas, the children ought now to go with the Christian father, if the Christian father deems it necessary to divorce the unbelieving wife.[66]

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[60] Suppl., q. 59, a. 3, *sed contra*. For the material in q. 59, a. 3, see Aquinas's *In IV Sent.*, dist. 39, a. 3.

[61] Suppl., q. 59, a. 3.

[62] Ibid.

[63] Suppl., q. 59, a. 5, ad 1. For the material in q. 59, a. 5, see Aquinas's *In IV Sent.*, dist. 39, a. 5.

[64] For discussion of Aquinas's use of Romans 6:3-4 in the *Summa theologiae*'s treatise on baptism, see my *Paul in the* Summa Theologiae (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2014), chapter 3.

[65] Suppl., q. 59, a. 4; see in particular ad 2. For the material in q. 59, a. 4, see Aquinas's *In IV Sent.*, dist. 39, a. 4.

[66] See Suppl., q. 59, a. 4, ad 4.

However, the newly Christian spouse is not required to take advantage of Pauline privilege. Paul states that "if any brother has a wife who is an unbeliever, and she consents to live with him, he should not divorce her" (1 Cor 7:12). As Aquinas puts it, "the believer after his conversion may remain with the unbeliever in the hope of her conversion… and he does well in remaining with her, though not bound to do so."[67] Nonetheless, prior to baptism, a marriage cannot be considered definitively "ratified," because baptism is a real dying, with the result that in this specific case "marriage contracted in unbelief can be annulled."[68] He adds that the marriage is certainly not automatically annulled. It is not annulled even by an ecclesiastical divorce, which means a legal separation. Rather, it is annulled by entering into a Christian marriage. Aquinas comments that "the firmer tie always looses the weaker if it is contrary to it, and therefore the subsequent marriage contracted in the faith of Christ dissolves the marriage previously contracted in unbelief."[69] A natural marriage, which is indissoluble in most instances, becomes dissoluble once a person has died in Christ through baptism, and this dissolution happens when the perfect bond of (Christian) marriage comes to take the place of the imperfect bond of natural marriage.

Is this logic still plausible? It may seem insulting to have one standard for Christian marriages and one standard for non-Christian ones, especially if at the same time the Church holds that even natural marriage is indissoluble. It seems to me, however, that the Pauline privilege is defensible on the grounds that baptism is a real (sacramental) dying with Christ. It is this death that opens the way for a Christian marriage to supersede the marriage contracted prior to becoming a Christian. But it remains the case that, as Paul says, "if any brother has a wife who is an unbeliever, and she consents to live with him, he should not divorce her" (1 Cor 7:12).

Indissolubility and Porneia (Mt 5:32; 19:9) in the Commentary on the Sentences and the Commentary on Matthew

The other biblical texts that are frequently quoted against the indissolubility of marriage are Matthew 5:32 and 19:9 (which say the same thing in the Vulgate and the RSV). Matthew 19:9 reads: "I say to you: whoever divorces his wife, except for unchastity, and marries another, commits adultery; and he who marries a divorced woman, commits adultery." The Greek word translated "unchastity" — or in the Vulgate "fornication" — is *porneia*, and its meaning is difficult to determine with

[67] Suppl., q. 59, a. 3.
[68] Suppl., q. 59, a. 5, *sed contra*.
[69] Suppl., q. 59, a. 5, ad 1.

exactitude. The Gospel of Matthew is the only Gospel to include the exception due to *porneia*. In the Gospel of Luke, we find "Every one who divorces his wife and marries another commits adultery, and he who marries a woman divorced from her husband commits adultery" (Lk 16:18); and the same is the case in Mark 10:11-12, which reads, "Whoever divorces his wife and marries another, commits adultery against her; and if she divorces her husband and marries another, she commits adultery." In the Gospel of Matthew, as I have noted above, it is important to appreciate that the disciples are shocked by Jesus' words. The exception does not seem to impress them at all; they conclude, as though Jesus' words were extraordinarily radical, that it follows that "it is not expedient to marry" (Mt 19:10).

Obviously, however, a marriage that can be dissolved because one spouse sins after the marriage has been validly contracted, cannot ever have been an "indissoluble" marriage of the kind that can signify the utterly indissoluble unity of Christ and the Church. If a valid Christian marriage can be dissolved due to something that takes place after the marriage bond is sealed, then whatever else the Christian marriage may be, it is certainly not indissoluble. On the contrary, it has always been contingently dissoluble, and can be dissolved as soon as a particular sin takes place. Jesus' exception clause in Matthew 19:9 (and 5:32) may therefore seem to remove the ground for considering marriage to be indissoluble. If so, then Paul's statement that "a married woman is bound by law to her husband as long as he lives" (Rom 7:1) would need to be revised to say clearly that not only death, but also sexual sin (*porneia*), can dissolve an otherwise binding, valid marriage.

How does Aquinas interpret this text? As we have already seen, he has no problem holding that in certain circumstances Christians can get divorced. He affirms that "one is not bound to keep faith with one who breaks his faith. But a spouse by fornication breaks the faith due to the other spouse. Therefore one can put the other away on account of fornication."[70] A man can divorce his wife on account of fornication, and, logically, a woman can divorce her husband on the same grounds. Divorce is permitted in the case of proven fornication. But a legitimately divorced person cannot re-marry, because Jesus goes on to say that "whoever marries a divorced woman commits adultery." Arguably, this is because the divorce does not dissolve the marriage, but instead is a legal separation. A man who has divorced his wife on the just grounds of her proven fornication is still a divorced man. When Jesus says that "whoever marries a divorced woman commits adultery," Aquinas assumes that this applies to the divorced man as well, since the marriage itself is not dissolved by divorce.

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[70] Suppl., q. 62, a. 1, *sed contra*. For the material in q. 62, a. 1, see Aquinas's *In IV Sent.*, dist. 35, a. 1.

In an objection, Aquinas notes that common sense and mercy might seem to dictate otherwise: "It would seem that a husband can marry again after having a divorce. For no one is bound to perpetual continence. Now in some cases the husband is bound to put away his wife forever on account of fornication."[71] Put simply, it seems as though the Church is asking too much, beyond what is humanly possible.

Aquinas is well aware that some people will not listen to Christ or follow his way of holiness, and he is aware that we will all fall short. Yet, the fact remains that Christian marriage is indissoluble. Destroying its indissolubility would go against the commandment of Christ and render it inefficacious as a sign of the unbreakable unity of Christ and the Church. Moreover, destroying its indissolubility would not benefit the flourishing of the individuals and families that comprise Christ's Church, even if it would address certain hard cases such as the divorced husband who has to endure the suffering of lifetime continence. The Church cannot fix all human tragedies on earth. Aquinas gives the example of the man condemned to lifetime continence when his wife "contract[s] an incurable disease that is incompatible with carnal intercourse."[72] The Church can accompany such persons, but it cannot take away the cross-shaped suffering of having (in this case due to illness) to endure a lifetime of abstinence from sexual intercourse. Nor can the Church approve of the suffering spouse's recourse to illicit modes of satisfying his or her desire for sexual intercourse. Here the Church must point to the deeds and sayings of Jesus and offer a Christ-centered spirituality of self-sacrifice, in which one unites oneself with the will of the Father and asks for the Spirit's assistance, with recourse to the sacrament of penance as medicine.

When Aquinas takes up Matthew 5:32 in his *Commentary on the Gospel of St. Matthew*, he divides Matthew 5:32 into two parts: "every one who divorces his wife, except on the ground of unchastity [Vulgate: fornication], makes her an adulteress"; and "whoever marries a divorced woman commits adultery." With respect to the first part, he asks whether divorce can in fact ever be acceptable, even on the grounds of "fornication" (i.e. adultery). After all, Paul teaches, "Repay no one evil for evil" (Rom 12:17); and Jesus commands, "Love your enemies and pray for those who persecute you" (Mt 5:44). But divorcing one's wife after she has committed adultery seems to be a clear case of repaying evil with evil. Aquinas replies that Jesus allowed divorce in such cases, not as an act of evil retaliation, but as an act of just punishment for infidelity.

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[71] Suppl., q. 62, a. 5, obj. 1. For the material in q. 62, a. 5, see Aquinas's *In IV Sent.*, dist. 35, a. 5.

[72] Suppl., q. 62, a. 5, ad 1.

With respect to the second part, "whoever marries a divorced woman commits adultery," Aquinas explains that this is because she already has a marriage. The legitimate divorce accomplishes a legal separation, but it does not dissolve the marriage. Therefore, since she is still married, if she were to be re-married this would in fact be a case of adultery, a further sin against her existing marriage.

When commenting upon the parallel text of Matthew 19:9, Aquinas says a bit more, because Matthew 19:9 belongs to the context of Jesus' broader remarks about marriage and divorce. When in Matthew 19 the Pharisees ask Jesus whether divorce is lawful, Jesus points them to Genesis 1:27 and 2:24. Jesus asks rhetorically, "Have you not read that he who made them from the beginning made them male and female, and said, 'For this reason a man shall leave his father and mother and be joined to his wife, and the two shall become one?'" (Mt 19:4-5). On this basis, Jesus forbids divorce: "So they are no longer two but one. What therefore God has joined together, let no man put asunder" (Mt 19:6). Recall that in response, the Pharisees challenge Jesus to explain why the Mosaic Law permits divorce. Jesus answers that this was permitted by Moses because of the people's "hardness of heart" (Mt 19:8). The key point is that God's plan for creation did not include divorce: "from the beginning it was not so" (Mt 19:8). In sum, Jesus has come to restore creation to its intended order.

In the course of commenting on these verses, Aquinas remarks that although God could have founded the human race simply with one person, God chose to found the human race with two persons, a man and a woman. God did so, according to Aquinas, "in order that it might be indicated that the form of matrimony was from God."[73] This ensured that marriage could not be despised by Christians (as it was by Gnostics and other radical dualists), and it also grounded in creation the nuptial pattern of new creation, that is, the marriage of Christ and his Church or the marriage of God and humankind. Aquinas recognizes that some have falsely taught that God does not condone marriage and that the distinction between man and woman is a postlapsarian distinction. Genesis 1-2 overcomes such false teaching and ensures that marriage is recognized as being between one man and one woman. Aquinas also comments on what it means for the two to be one flesh; he notes that they are one flesh in their offspring and one flesh in sexual intercourse.

Granted that "man" cannot dissolve a true marriage joined by God (see Mt 19:6; Gen 2:24), does God ever will to dissolve a true marriage? Aquinas replies that the only possible reason for God doing so is when a couple wishes to enter into consecrated religious life. By contrast, when humans want to dissolve a marriage, the rea-

[73] Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on the Gospel of St. Matthew*, trans. Paul M. Kimball (Dolorosa Press, 2012), 631.

son is usually that one or both members of the couple want to contract a relationship with someone else. But "if God has joined something together, only He can separate it."[74] Aquinas argues that Jesus' way of phrasing the Mosaic permission ("For your hardness of heart Moses allowed you to divorce your wives") shows that the permission was from Moses, not from God. God inspired Moses to grant this permission, but God carefully did not confirm it "by divine authority," because God's plan was to pour out his Spirit so that the order God intended in creation could be restored in Christ.[75] Furthermore, Aquinas finds it notable that Jesus says that Moses "allowed" or permitted it, rather than commanded it. In Aquinas's view, Jesus thereby makes the point that "the permission did not derive from a precept, but rather it was permitted to avoid a greater evil."[76] The permission was not a positive command to do a good (let alone to do an evil), but rather the permission simply sought to ensure that the people would not commit a greater evil.

Turning to the verse that stands at the center of post-Reformation controversy, Aquinas observes that Jesus rules out divorce, "[b]ut fornication is excepted."[77] He notes that "fornication" can be both carnal and spiritual. In 1 Corinthians 7:15, we find an exception regarding divorce made with respect to *spiritual* "fornication"; in Matthew 19:9 we find an exception regarding divorce made with respect to *carnal* "fornication." But in the latter case, Aquinas emphasizes, the marriage cannot be dissolved, though a divorce (or legal separation) may legitimately take place. Aquinas underscores that "by no subsequent impediment [i.e. subsequent to the enactment of the marriage] can the bond of marriage be dissolved, because it signifies the union of Christ and the Church: hence, since the union of Christ and the Church cannot be dissolved, neither may the union of marriage."[78] Paul's remark in Ephesians 5:32 could make sense in no other way; if a valid Christian marriage could in fact be dissolved, then this would mean that a Christian marriage cannot really signify (let alone signify efficaciously) the unbreakable unity between Christ and his Church. A dissoluble bond cannot signify an indissoluble bond.

Aquinas asks why Jesus only grants an exception for fornication, given that there are many other serious sins one might commit. In reply, he reasons that fornication is opposed to the sexual fidelity that one owes to one's spouse, and therefore this particular action can be justly punished by the harmed spouse refusing any longer to have sexual intercourse (the marriage debt) with the "one who is not faith-

[74] Ibid., 632.
[75] Ibid., 633.
[76] Ibid., 634.
[77] Ibid.
[78] Ibid.

ful."[79] He also suggests that since a man is loath to say that his wife has been sexually unfaithful, the exception made for carnal fornication will not tempt men to abuse it.

In his commentary on Matthew 19:9, Aquinas does not even consider the notion that Jesus, in making the exception, is making an exception for divorce *and remarriage*. After all, in Matthew 19:9, Jesus says that someone who has been the subject of the exception and is now legitimately divorced cannot re-marry. It is precisely the legitimately "divorced woman" who, if re-married, causes the one who marries her to commit adultery. If the one who marries her commits adultery, it can only be because she is already married: she is divorced and legally separated, but her marriage has not been dissolved.

The key point is that Jesus does not intend to permit divorce in the sense of a dissolution of a Christian marriage. The New Testament as a whole, as well as Matthew 5:32//19:9, shows the dissolution of a Christian marriage to be impossible, since as Jesus and Paul confirm, Christian marriage cannot be dissolved by anyone but God, and God wills for Christian marriage to be an efficacious sign not only of marriage as intended in the natural order of creation, but also the utterly indissoluble marriage of Christ and the Church in the supernatural order of redemption and deification.

Recall that the disciples complain that if one can only divorce due to adultery, then "it is not expedient to marry" (Mt 19:9). For his part, Aquinas well recognizes that marriage can be burdensome and people will want to dissolve their marriages. In his commentary on Matthew 19, he notes that "leprosy and the like" — serious diseases — make marriage a tedious chore when one spouse is afflicted.[80] Similarly, a couple can be afflicted by financial anxieties or other problems that make one spouse desire divorce. Aquinas argues that the real answer, according to Jesus (in Jesus' response to his disciples), is not divorce but rather is the virtue of chastity. Voluntary virgins, committed to the vowed religious life, help us to see that this is possible.

Does Contemporary Historical-Critical Scholarship Correct Aquinas?

In their consummate historical-critical work on the Gospel of Matthew, W. D. Davies and Dale Allison provide a detailed analysis of Matthew 5:32//19:9. Let me summarize here what they say about Matthew 5:32, "I say to you that every one who divorces his wife, except on the ground of unchastity, makes her an adulteress; and whoever marries a divorced woman commits adultery." First, they note one of the

[79] Ibid.

[80] Ibid., 635.

differences between Mark 10:11-12 and Matthew 5:32, and they tentatively attribute this difference to the hypothetical "Q" source. They state, "We thus appear to have two slightly different traditions. In Mark the husband commits adultery (because he remarries) while in Q (= Matthew) the husband cause the woman to commit adultery (because she, it is assumed, will remarry)."[81] Then they turn to the "except on the ground of unchastity" clause, which, as we noted above, is unique to the Gospel of Matthew.

Their first remark in this regard is that — in light of "the similar qualifying phrase in 19.9… which is certainly redactional" — "we have here in all probability an editorial addition."[82] They then state that in their view, even if Matthew did not add the qualifying phrase, we can be sure that it did not come from Jesus. If Jesus' own position had originally included such a qualifier, then earlier texts would have been sure to report the qualifier, given the unusual stringency of what the earlier texts did in fact report. They affirm, "Certainly παρεκτὸς λόγου πορνείας cannot be dominical: it has no parallel in Mk 10.11-12; Lk 16.18; or 1 Cor 7.10."[83] They argue further that the qualifying phrase is likely "based on the '*erwat dābār* of Deut 24.1," which reads "because he has found some indecency in her."[84] They then go on to describe the traditional interpretations of the meaning of the exception clause. As they point out, "According to Erasmus and most Protestant scholars since his time, Matthew allows the innocent party to divorce and remarry in the event of adultery. According to the almost universal patristic as well as Roman Catholic opinion, Matthew permits only separation for adultery, not remarriage (cf. 1 Cor 7)."[85]

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[81] W. D. Davies and Dale C. Allison, Jr., *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Gospel according to Saint Matthew*, vol. 1: *Introduction and Commentary on Matthew I-VII* (London: T. & T. Clark, 1988), 528.

[82] Ibid.

[83] Ibid.

[84] Ibid.

[85] Ibid., 529. They cite Henri Crouzel, *L'Église primitive face au divorce. Du premier au cinquième siècle* (Paris: Beauchesne, 1971). For the patristic viewpoint, which Aquinas follows, see for example Aquinas's *Catena Aurea*, vol. I (Parts 1 and 2): St. Matthew, trans. Mark Pattison (Albany, NY: Preserving Christian Publications, 1995). See also *Matthew 1-13*, ed. Manlio Simonetti, vol. 1a of the Ancient Christian Commentary on Scripture Series, ed. Thomas C. Oden (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2001); *Matthew 14-28*, ed. Manlio Simonetti, vol. 1b of the Ancient Christian Commentary on Scripture Series, ed. Thomas C. Oden (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2002); *1-2 Corinthians*, ed. Gerald Bray, vol. 7 of the Ancient Christian Commentary on Scripture Series, ed. Thomas C. Oden (Downers Grove, IL: 1999). See also the extensive studies by Crouzel, written in preparation for his book and after his book: Crouzel, "Séparation et remariage selon les Pères anciens," *Gregorianum* 47 (1966): 472-94; Crouzel, "Les Pères de l'Église ont-ils permis le remariage après separation?," *Bulletin de Littérature ecclésiastique* 70 (1969): 3-43; Crouzel, "Remarriage after Divorce in the Primitive Church? A Propos of a Re-

Against the hope that they can settle this controversy on the basis of historical-critical evidence, they argue that it cannot be settled on such grounds. Thus they comment, "In our judgment, the issue cannot, unfortunately, be resolved on exegetical grounds: Matthew's words are simply too cryptic to admit of a definitive interpretation."[86] Other biblical texts, therefore, would have to be appealed to in solving this problem, such as the relevant texts in Mark, Luke, and 1 Corinthians (as well as Ephesians 5:32).

Davies and Allison are almost equally reticent in determining what the intended meaning of πορνεία is. The RSV uses the term "unchastity," and Aquinas uses the term "fornication" (by which he means adultery). In the view of Davies and Allison, the word πορνεία could mean either "fornication," "incest," or "adultery." They think that "fornication" is unlikely because not strong enough. In advancing their own preferred translation, they remark, "Choosing between the two remaining alternatives — 'incest' or 'adultery' — is nearly impossible, and if we favour the translation, 'adultery', it is only with great hesitation."[87] They give four grounds for favoring the translation "incest." The first is that this is the meaning of πορνεία in 1 Corinthians 5:1 (which the RSV translates as "immorality"). The second is that the evangelist Matthew already has a word that he uses consistently for "adultery" — μοιχεύω — and he does not use that word here. The third is that in Acts 15 and 21, we find the Council of Jerusalem ruling that Gentiles must abstain from πορνεία, and it is likely that the Council's list of four proscribed things (including πορνεία) comes from Leviticus 17-18's holiness code, which proscribes sexual intercourse with near relatives (see Leviticus 18:6-18). Fourth and most significantly, "If Matthew's Christian community was, as seems most likely, a mixed body of Jews and Gentiles, the evangelist

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cent Book," *Irish Theological Quarterly* 28 (1971): 21-41; Crouzel, "Le canon 10 (ou 11) du Concile d'Arles de 314 sur le divorce," *Bulletin de Littérature ecclésiastique* 72 (1971): 128-31; Crouzel, "Le texte patristique de Matthieu V, 32 et XIX, 9," *New Testament Studies* 19 (1972-1973): 98-119; Crouzel, "Le marriage des chrétiens aux premiers siècles de l'Église," *Esprit et Vie* 83, no. 6 (1973): 3-13; Crouzel, "Deux texts de Tertullian concernant la procedure et les rites du mariage Chrétien," *Bulletin de Littérature ecclésiastique* 74 (1973): 3-13; Crouzel, "A propos du Concile d'Arles: Faut-il mettre *non* devant *prohibentur nubere* dans le canon 10 (ou 11) du Concile d'Arles de 314 sur le remariage après divorce?," *Bulletin de Littérature ecclésiastique* 75 (1974): 25-40; Crouzel, "Le remariage après separation pour adultère selon les Pères latins," *Bulletin de Littérature ecclésiastique* 75 (1974): 189-204; Crouzel, "'Selon les lois établies pour nous': Athénagore, *Supplique*, ch. 33," *Bulletin de Littérature ecclésiastique* 76 (1975): 213-17. Crouzel sums up his research, and devastatingly critiques spurious attempts to make the Fathers favor remarriage after divorce, in his "Divorce et remariage dans l'Église primitive," *Nouvelle revue théologique* 98 (1976): 891-917.

[86] Davies and Allison, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Gospel according to Saint Matthew*, vol. 1, 529.

[87] Ibid.

could easily have faced a situation in which Gentiles entering the community were found to be, because of marriages made before their conversions, in violation of the Levitical incest laws (cf. 1 Cor 5). (Incest was much more common among Gentiles than among Jews.)"[88] If the fourth reason were the real issue, then from the Christian perspective, the marriages would be invalid from the outset, and would simply be annulled.

Davies and Allison end up favoring "adultery," which is the meaning understood by Aquinas as well (since fornication within marriage is adultery). Interestingly, they report that the Shammaites (as opposed to the dominant Hillelites) interpreted the "'*erwat dābār*" of Deuteronomy 24:1 "as *dĕbar ʿerwâ*, that is, as unchastity on the part of the woman within marriage," which might make Matthew 5:32//19:9 as essentially "a Christian statement of the Shammaite position" (a position that was greatly declining in influence by Matthew's time).[89] Since unlike Aquinas they think that Matthew 5:32 does not state clearly whether re-marriage is permitted after a legitimate divorce, they hold that a simple "reassertion of Shammai's position on divorce would perhaps have been sufficiently isolated as to be considered much more strict than general Jewish opinion (cf. Mt 19.11)," which would have had to be the case to provoke the disciples' stunned reaction.[90] I think this is implausible. In my view, the disciples' stunned reaction could only make sense if remarriage was ruled out.

One further instance of the vast historical-critical literature on this topic may be cited. Markus Bockmuehl turns to the Dead Sea Scrolls and other late Second Temple texts for evidence, and he finds that "1QapGen 20.15, seconded by references like Philo, *Abr.* 98; Matt 1.19; etc., clearly establishes a pre-rabbinic exegetical tradition (based on Deut 24.4 and Lev 18.20; Num 5.13-14, 20) to the effect that adultery (and rape) requires divorce."[91] Bockmuehl argues that Matthew 5:32//19:9 fits within this tradition, and he suggests that the exception clause of Matthew 5:32//19:9 therefore may be in support of divorce but without allowing re-marriage in any instance.[92] Thus Bockmuehl, himself an eminent historical-critical exegete, tends to favor the position defended by Aquinas.

More examples could be given. But I hope that this suffices to indicate that contemporary historical-critical exegesis does not rule out Aquinas's position. If

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[88] Ibid., 530.

[89] Ibid.

[90] Ibid.

[91] Markus Bockmuehl, *Jewish Law in Gentile Churches: Halakhah and the Beginning of Christian Public Ethics* (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2000), 21.

[92] In this regard he also cites Gordon J. Wenham, "Matthew and Divorce: An Old Crux Revisited," *Journal for the Study of the New Testament* 22 (1984): 95-107, at 98-105.

anything, historical-critical scholarship on Matthew 5:32//19:9 supposes that Jesus himself was even stricter than Aquinas supposes.

Conclusion

Aquinas's biblical exegesis has made clear the significance of Ephesians 5:32 for Christian reflection on marriage. Christian marriage can only be such a sign — what Perry Cahall calls a sign of "the union of Christ with the Church through the Incarnation" — if Christian marriage, when validly covenanted and consummated, is in fact indissoluble.[93] Were Christian marriage dissoluble on the basis of something that occurs after the marriage has been validly covenanted and consummated, then Christian marriage would not be "a great mystery… in reference to Christ and the Church" but would signify a contingently dissoluble reality, quite the opposite of the utterly indissoluble bond of Christ and the Church. This efficacious signification of each Christian marriage is a reality intrinsic to each Christian marriage, whether or not the particular marriage is in all ways ideal. As Aquinas puts it in a passage I noted above: "by no subsequent impediment can the bond of marriage be dissolved, because it signifies the union of Christ and the Church: hence, since the union of Christ and the Church cannot be dissolved, neither may the union of marriage."[94]

Aquinas's biblical exegesis also gives us a deeper insight into Jesus' teachings about marriage and divorce. On the basis of the exception clause in Matthew 5:32 — an exception clause that modern historical-critical scholars tend to think was not part of Jesus' historical teaching (but that the risen Jesus, through his Spirit inspiring the formation of the New Testament, certainly willed to include) — Aquinas holds that Jesus affirmed the validity of divorce in cases of adultery. But since it is precisely a validly "divorced woman" who, according to Jesus' teaching in Matthew 5:32, may not marry again — on pain of committing adultery — Aquinas affirms that Jesus teaches that the valid divorce does not dissolve the valid marriage, but instead only produces a legal separation. In every Christian marriage, according to Jesus in Matthew 19:6, "they are no longer two but one. What therefore God has joined together, let no man put asunder." Aquinas's exegesis upholds Jesus' affirmation, while fully acknowledging the burdens placed on some couples, including potentially the burden of perpetual continence.

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[93] Perry J. Cahall, *The Mystery of Marriage: A Theology of the Body and the Sacrament* (Chicago: Hillenbrand Books, 2016), 305.

[94] Aquinas, *Commentary on the Gospel of St. Matthew*, 634.

As Aquinas says in his commentary on Ephesians 5:32, Christian marriage is "great." By this he means that it is awe-inspiring, and that it involves a tremendously life-giving — even if also cross-carrying — participation in the meaning of the entire cosmos, namely the marriage of God and humanity in Christ. In his *Summa contra gentiles*, Aquinas reminds us that Christian marital indissolubility is not something alien to us; rather, it is something for which we were naturally created. In his providential care for human flourishing, God ordained marriage as an indissoluble state for the flourishing of human individuals, families, and communities. Marriage, as a natural reality, can only be dissolved by death or, in certain circumstances, by the real sharing in Christ's death effected by baptism. Aquinas goes to great lengths to show the reasonableness of indissoluble marriage, given the need of human children for lengthy care, and given the fact that one spouse should not abandon the other after the strength of their childbearing years is gone.

The point here is that Jesus' insistence upon indissoluble marriage, although it was shocking to his disciples and is difficult for fallen humans, is in fact something that pertains to the flourishing of our nature as created, which we can now recover in Christ. As Aquinas frequently reminds us, especially in his biblical exegesis, his defense of the natural reasonableness of the truth of marriage's indissolubility has biblical justification in Jesus' words to the Pharisees, "Have you not read that he who made them from the beginning made them male and female, and said, 'For this reason a man shall leave his wife, and the two shall become one' [Gen 2:24]?" (Mt 19:4-5). Paul, of course, quotes Genesis 2:24 to the same effect in Ephesians 5:31.

In sum, Aquinas's biblical exegesis and theology about Christian marriage offer reasoning that helps us to perceive what Christ Jesus truly means when he teaches the Pharisees, much to the shock of his disciples, "What therefore God has joined together, let no man put asunder" (Mt 19:6).

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