On Confusing Propositional Attitudes
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Abstract

The purpose of this article is to answer the question, whether there is the possibility of self-delusion in mental content, which is understood as a set of conscious content constituting self-knowledge—if such illusions are possible, this knowledge could be challenged. More precisely, could a subject be wrong about his own propositional attitudes? Assuming a positive answer to this question, first, proper examples of such confusion should be found and, second, the Cartesian paradigm of self-knowledge should be revisited.

Introduction

The problem of explaining the possibility of an empirically and objectively proven confusion between propositional attitudes has various sources. These include bodily disorders of the first-person-perspective, which refer to errors in ownership, consisting in misidentification of the whole body or limbs [Blanke et al., 2008; Petkova et al., 2008; Ionta et al., 2011]. This self-identification problem can be illustrated with the Rubber Hand Illusion (RHI), Full Body Illusion (FBI), and Body Swap Illusion (BSI), thus showing that the integrity involved in being a persistent subject can be destroyed. These experiments are induced in healthy persons and belong to a group of illusions misleading the sense of proprioception. In RHI, a subject experiences a false hand, in BSI a subject takes the first-person perspective from the position of another person, while in FBI a subject feels as if he were embodied in other object (mannequin, robot, or avatar). In short these experiments force the conclusion that a person localizes herself where she sees her body [Petkova et al., 2008]. Or, in the stronger account, a person localizes herself where she feels her body [Ionta et al., 2011].

This kind of self-delusion has its source in the informational conflict between different contents, which leads to the mingling of the experiences reported in first-person clauses. The source of the information is, however, the body, and what appears in the mind is an effect of processed bodily sensations. It means that any description of mind-body states of this kind refers to bodily self-awareness. On these grounds it can be argued that if we assume that the mind has a physical
basis then we should also suppose that the subject is already constituted on the subpersonal level, as a synthesis of sensory information represented as an embodied self, or present in form of bodily self-awareness. The path leading from sensory information to self-awareness has been already explored. For example, we know the role of proprioception and phantom limbs in bodily illusions, and on these grounds, i.e. in reference to phenomenal content, we can explain these kinds of errors.

From cases of BSI, FBI, and RHI, called here ‘bodily self-illusions’, a question arises, namely whether there is the possibility of self-delusion in mental content, which is understood as a set of conscious content constituting self-knowledge—if such illusions are possible, this knowledge could be challenged. More precisely, could a subject be wrong about his own propositional attitudes? Assuming a positive answer to this question, first, proper examples of such confusion should be found and, second, the Cartesian paradigm of self-knowledge should be revisited.

Bodily illusions

Methodologically speaking, the issue of subjective experience is deeply rooted in the tradition of phenomenology and introspection. The former gives us direct access to our own experienced states, thanks to the function of bodily self-awareness, which emerge in form of ‘What is it like...’, ‘How does it feel...’-type questions, but not necessary in propositional form. Bodily self-awareness can therefore be a nonconceptual form of knowing about what happens to ourselves. Taking this further, and combining two similar standpoints—that of Bermudez [Bermudez 2001] and Zahavi [Zahavi 2002]—self-consciousness could be divided into two forms: the nonconceptual, which is phenomenal and constituted by content coming from bodily sensations; and conceptual, which is characterized by its propositional or propositional-like form and whose evidence is given by propositional attitudes.

Introspection serves as a tool for extracting these phenomenal contents. It is, however, a methodologically defective tool because it does not guarantee objective verifiability of reported states. Metaphorically speaking, this is a tool that everybody can use on a personal level. On the other hand, contemporary neuroscience gives us possibilities for checking whether first-person reports about phenomenal experiences are correct. This, however, presupposes a coherence in mind-body states.
Here begins the broad and deep debate on the mind-body problem. It is very hard to avoid going into the connection between brain and thought without looking to previously statements on whether mind-body states are identical, or whether perhaps mental states supervene on the physical, or emerge from them, etc. These are very important ontological problems, but are not always necessary to solve. Considering the coherence of internal and external observation (introspection and neuroimaging for instance), it is enough to assume that the correlation between neurological and mental levels simply exists.

However, there is an important consequence of this assumption: If we assume that the mind has a physical basis then we should also suppose that the subject is already constituted at the subpersonal level as a synthesis of sensory information represented as an embodied self, or present in form of bodily self-consciousness. The body will be, hence, the locus of the self, which is perhaps unsurprising given the previously-mentioned experiments [Petkova et al. 2008, Aspell et al. 2010, Lenggenhager et al. 2011]. If everything works properly, the body is a physical source of the experience of being an integrated individual, and even an autonomous subject. But if something goes wrong, for example if a sensory information-conflict arises, then the integration is disturbed and the first-person-perspective fails. That is why a subject can, for example, feel embodied in his video avatar and not in his own physical body.

Petkova claims that a subject localizes himself where he sees his body: “I am there, where I see myself” [Petkova 2008]. Lenggenhager develops this statement, claiming that a subject localizes himself where he feels his body: “I am there, where I feel myself” [Lenggenhager et al. 2007, 2011]. The second point of view builds on the previous one, although the above-mentioned experiments have the same central focus: The subject still has to observe himself from the third-person-perspective during direct transmission from a camera to a 3D video head-mounted display; but in the experiments made by the group led by Lenggenhager, the subject is stimulated in multiple forms: not only visual but also tactile. Lenggenhager concludes that feeling touch enhances the connection of a subject to himself, which means that the combined information of feeling touch and seeing it at the same time is stronger than isolated visual information.

Bodily illusions and pathological disorders in self-experience and self-perception have the same source in phenomenal content. These are five senses plus proprioception, which is probably the most important since it is responsible for the synchronization of neuronal information about the position of the body and limbs. If an informational conflict arises then there is a strong possibility that the system will choose the wrong information or a new hybrid piece
of information will be combined. It can be explained through a conception about the *Hypothesis Testing Brain*. This rests on the assumption that in order to represent the world in the most probable way the brain analyses information to predict events, thereby minimalizing the risk of error [Hohwy, 2012].

As long as the information concerns the self-experience the informational conflict has no propositional form. In the moment of the formulation of first-person-reports, that is, after a conscious act of introspection, the bodily sensations are reported in form of propositions and then self-experience turns into self-perception. In other words, the difference between self-experience and self-perception lies in their form: the former is non-propositional i.e. phenomenal, the latter is propositional [Searle, 1983]. However, regardless of the form of first-person information, gained either from self-experience or self-perception, a subject will identify himself as the subject of that state. The main reason why self-experience and self-perception should be distinguished is the verifiability of the content of self-perception, which should be considered like other propositional attitudes. The propositions made in self-perception are valuable. Therefore the subject cannot be wrong that he is the person who experiences $x$, but he can be wrong about $x$ itself.

### Bodily illusion vs. mental illusion

If bodily illusions are content dependent, then mental illusions, which also require subject’s being in a certain mental state, i.e. having certain propositional attitudes, are of course content-dependent too. In the case of mental illusion we are facing following problems:

1. Problem of mental ownership: Is it me, who experiences $x$?
2. Problem of first-person-authority: Do I really best know, what I do (what I think)?
3. Problem of misidentification of the modality of mental states: Is it my belief or my desire?

Ad.1. According to Rosenthal, mental ownership is necessarily connected to a conscious experience of a state [Rosenthal, 2010]. If a subject experiences a state, then he knows that he is the person who experiences it. He knows that he is a subject of the experienced state. This is in fact a version of the Cartesian approach. Descartes’s paradigm for self-knowledge was a form of methodological
scepticism that led to the *Cogito* argument. In his reasoning Descartes points out the transparency of the mind, which means that all thoughts are evident to the thinker (a subject is aware of all of his thoughts), and that his thoughts are incorrigible (he cannot be mistaken about whether he has a particular thought). Descartes also emphasized the reflective character of thoughts (any thought necessarily involves knowledge of the thinkers’ Self) and finally intentionality manifested by the fact that thoughts come to the thinker *as if* they were representing something. In the sixth meditation we find the foundation of what we call today ‘first-person-authority’, characterized as infallibility of our judgements about our own mental states, and incorrigibility—our judgements about our own mental states cannot be corrected by others or self-intimation—where our mental states are transparently available to us [Guttenplan, 1994, p. 91]. In the Cartesian paradigm the statement: “I believe” is self-verifying, because a subject (thinker) cannot be wrong about it. If he has a belief, than he knows that he has it. This therefore leaves no place for scepticism about me, as a subject, who makes statements about his propositional attitudes. The power of justification for these sorts of judgements comes from the fact that they have already been made and have the content that they do.¹

Rosenthal’s account is similar to the Cartesian view. He claims that the consciousness of a current state presupposes the subject of the state—the bearer—, which has been criticized by T. Lane and C. Liang [Lane, Liang, 2010]. On the basis of pathological cases like somatoparaphrenia they claim that ‘the conscious awareness of a mental state does not guarantee first-person ownership’ [Lane, Liang, 2010, p. 1]. They try to demonstrate that we see a case of mingled representations in higher-qlevel thoughts constituting self-knowledge, although the phenomenal experiences ascribed by the patient to himself preserve the presence of subject even if the source of the content was false.

If the first problematic case (1) concerns the problem of the subject-identification, then the second (2), mentioned above, involves the problem of content-identification. Mental states like beliefs, desires, and wishes have a propositional content that is expressed in the form of “that-clauses”. Such “that-clauses”, expressing the content of a belief, are epistemically different from the first-person clause (i.e. “I believe…”), because of the privileged access to the first-person-state (attitude). Here is necessary to quote one of essential examples:

Split-brain patients can always report objects presented in the right half field of vision. But when objects are presented to the left, the patients say not to see them, simply because these are processed by the isolated right hemisphere, which has no capacity for language and speech. However, many patients can draw these unseen objects, select them from a row of other objects, match them to words, or perform other (simple) cognitive operations, as long as the behaviour is executed by the left hand, which is connected to the right hemisphere […] Are these patients seeing the objects in the left half field? They say not, and they know best, don’t they? [Lamme, 2006, p.494]

The last question is crucial because it undermines first-person-authority. Do subjects really best know which attitude they are in? In cases related to phantom limbs, like somatoparaphrenia, concerning the misidentification of body as not belonging to the owner, the source of the problem is a misidentification of the content of an attitude despite its phenomenal or propositional character. The mode of the attitude seems, however, unquestionable. A subject knows the state he is in. Even experiencing the phantom pain, although the source of pain is false because a subject identifies it as a limb, which in fact was amputated, the mode of state— i.e. pain—is real, and a subject is right about it. In the case of split-brain patients the mode of the state “Am I seeing or not seeing” is doubtful. There are many explanations of this phenomenon, like, for example: The patient in fact sees the object but because there is no communication between the both hemispheres the patient has no conscious access to the content of the perception. Another explanation says that the pictures occurring on the left side of visual field are not reported, because they are perceived by the right hemisphere, which is ‘speechless’. Despite these explanations the problem remains the same. There are cases challenging the first-person-authority, which should be guaranteed by direct access to own mental states, but which isn’t, always.

In the two first cases bodily illusion (i.e. misinterpreted phenomenal content) is transformed into a propositional form if reported from introspection. Hence mental illusions depend on content, which means that they are reported in the form of a that-clause, if access to the content and identification of the bearer of the state are possible. In other words, ‘that-clauses’ express a content of the state, and I-clauses express an attitude towards the content, i.e. the relation between the subject of the state and the content of that state. But what if the subject can identify himself and the content of the state, but cannot properly identify his relation to the content? This is the main problem in the third case of mental illusion.

The third case of mental illusions concerns the problem of identifying a modality of mental state. That is, the subject can ask himself, for example,
whether the mental state he is experiencing should be identified as a belief or a desire? Thus the problem concerns the mingling of propositional attitudes. This problem has a different character from the previous two issues. The problem of mental ownership—Is it me, who experiences \( x \)?—and the problem of first-person-authority—Do I really best know, what I do (and what I think)?—are somehow still rooted in phenomenal content. Their source lies *de facto* in the processing of information coming from the senses, and thus this is a case of the transformation of phenomenal content into the propositional. In the problem of misidentification of the modality of mental states, the processing is performed only on the mental level, and therefore only on the propositional content. Which is precisely why this issue is so interesting. The question is, how does it happen that on the mental level—the level of self-knowledge, where reasoning already has an internal character and information processing is not threatened by errors occurring due to external determination—the mingling of the mode of own mental states is possible?

Explaining confusion of attitudes

The starting point of any search for this mingling could either be an everyday experience or in philosophical reasoning. For the second, one thesis comes from Peter Strawson, who claims that a condition of the ascription of states of consciousness to oneself is the ability to ascribe them to others [Strawson, 1996, p. 99.] The further obvious consequence of this assumption (which is well justified in Strawson’s theory) is the following question: If we can misidentify the mental states of others, perhaps we misidentify our own states too.

In addition, in everyday experience there is no doubt that the mingling of mental states of others happens from time to time. It occurs, for example, when we misinterprets the intention of a sender in communications act or when we takes a grimace for anger instead of astonishment, or when on the basis of an observation of the behavior of our neighbor we draw conclusions about his charity—which in fact is only a desire to be loved. These examples, described in terms of folk psychology, are from everyday life, but are, however, fuzzier than philosophical accounts of the same cases. To analyze these, it is worth mentioning some examples that have already been discussed in philosophical discourse. One of these is *akrasia*, that is, the weakness of the will.

*Akrasia* is a good example of a confusion of propositional attitudes, because it concerns the state when a subject thinks that he knows, for example, that \( x \) is
better than \( y \), but despite this knowledge he still does \( y \). In other words, the subject acts contrary to his beliefs. Here two questions need to be answered: Does the subject in fact know that \( x \) is better than \( y \)? Does the subject understand what the phrase ‘something is better than . . .’ means? (For whom it is better? In general, or in particular situation?) These questions can be combined into one general supposition: Perhaps the subject does not understand the sense of “being better” and hence misunderstands the whole attitude. There is also the possibility that the subject understands the sense of the sentence “\( x \) is better than \( y \)” but he does not understand his attitude towards the sentence.

The first approach to clarifying these situations is anchored in ancient philosophy, but is repeated in the analytical philosophy of the 20th century [see: Davidson, 1980]. This explanation was inherited from Socrates, and utilizes his belief in human reason and rational thinking. According to it, the subject does not know that \( x \) is better than \( y \), because, if he did know, he would act the right way. The knowledge about what is right would not allow him to act against true judgment. This first explanation says that in cases of misunderstanding the meaning of “knowing” is an example of misidentification of an attitude.

The second explanation (which here we prefer) seems to be cognitively finer. It rests on the meaning of attitudes, discovered in the process of an inner translation. There exist at least four meanings of the expression “I know . . .”:

1. I believe that \( x \) is better than \( y \).
2. I understand that \( x \) is better than \( y \).
3. I assert that \( x \) is better than \( y \).
4. I am convinced about the truthfulness of the sentence: “\( x \) is better than \( y \).”

Knowing, understanding, asserting, believing, and being convinced are synonymous forms of self-expression, i.e. the expression of an attitude towards the sentence containing the judgment “\( x \) is better than \( y \)”. However the above four meanings, which are apparently similar, are not translated literally in the process of inner translation. While the extension of the above expressions, relating to the recognition of the truth of a judgment, allows us to identify their synonymy, their intension makes this distinction vague and fuzzy. It should also be noted that during the translation process the content of the attitudes does not change. What changes is the attitude itself. It seems that in this case it is not the content that determines the identification of the attitude.

The related idea of inner translation being the cause of state-misidentification has been presented from a psychological point of view in the paper *Experience, Meta-
consciousness and the Paradox of Introspection [Schooler, Schreiber, 2004]. The authors consider the dissociations between self-reports and behavioral evidence, asking why sometimes the introspective self-cognition generates false judgments. They explain these cases by pointing out the dissociation between consciousness and meta-consciousness, where translation dissociations are defined as the meta-conscious misrepresentation of an underlying experience [Schooler, Schreiber, 2004, p.22]. The authors list three probable causes of such dissociation, namely detection, transformation, and substitution. The problem of detection is connected to the stimulus strength, which is available in introspection. If the stimulus is too weak to identify, then it can be misinterpreted in introspective reports. [Schooler, Schreiber, 2004, p.32]. The problem of transformation lies in the nonverbalisability of many experiences. If a holistic non-verbal experience is translated into words, the description can be imprecise because of a lack of proper correspondence to the stimulus [Schooler, Schreiber, 2004, p.32]. The problem of substitution refers to the additional content of beliefs. A memory of conscious experience may be blurred by expectations and motivations, which become a part of beliefs occurring in meta-consciousness [Schooler, Schreiber, 2004, p.33].

The explanation given by the authors corresponds with the problem of self-delusions caused by a misidentified phenomenal experience, but it does not explain confusions of propositional content. The authors assume that the gap between self-reports and objective third-person-evidence comes from the imperfect cognitive system of a subject, and, hence, the authority belongs to the measuring tools. The tools, however, give an image of phenomenal i.e. physical states, which of course can be misinterpreted or inadequate to propositional translation. The partial loss or falsification of data can be explained by the switching that occurs between ontological levels, and hence by the change in information processing and access to this information. The bigger problem arises when the translation happens on the same, mental level. Here information is processed on one ontological level and as such access is guaranteed to the whole content occurring in the field of self-knowledge.

In addition, the three explanatory causes presented by Schooler and Schreiber still don’t give any more clues about the case of akrasia, which is of course the opposite to what happens in the wrong detection of weaker stimulus. In terms of the transition from the phenomenal to the propositional level, akrasia indicates the stronger stimulus, which wins, and should be interpreted as a stronger desire to do things despite rational arguments or reasoning to the contrary. In this procedure, the attitude toward the sentence: ‘X is better than y’, does not matter. The three causes of the meta-conscious misrepresentation of an underlying experience require reconsideration in light of the confusion of mental states reported in
judgments constituting self-knowledge, or, in other words, in misrepresented in self-knowledge.

The problem of detection is connected to the direction of a subject on a content of his mental states, rather than to a stimulus. This is the characteristic feature of the mind called intentionality, and the main role in this intentional direction is played by attention. As such, one type of paying attention to one’s own mental states is introspection, whereas paying attention to a higher level mental state means putting together compositions from mental and phenomenal components to create a self-representation of the subject of these states. The question is: What forces the subject to focus on a particular mental state? We can also ask whether the subject could potentially grasp a different mental state, which belongs to him at the same time. If perceiving the world with the senses produces multiple contents, which provide attitudes of a special kind, and if we are ‘attacked’ by multiple stimuli, then we could be in a state other than that of the actual content that determines a specific propositional attitude. In other words, if the content determines an attitude and we receive more than one stimulus from the outside (because of the diverse information delivered by different senses), then we could potentially focus on another attitude. As such, the content of our knowledge about actual mental states depends on the attention paid to internal states, which is reflected in self-consciousness. It should be emphasized that in self-knowledge the subject pays attention to a mental state and not to the phenomenal state. This is important, because the motivation for attention does not depend on a stronger stimulus but on an attitude.

The difference between the explanation based on transformation, proposed in this article, and the account presented by Schooler and Schreiber consist in the fact that the solution given by Schooler and Schreiber retains the transition from the phenomenal to the propositional level. However, considered confusion of attitudes only happens on a propositional level, because the content of an attitude is no longer phenomenal. The transformation, understood as a transition from the phenomenal level to the propositional level of first-person reports has already been considered here as a problem concerning mental ownership and first-person-authority—but not as a misidentification of the modality of mental state. To explain the phenomenon of confusion of propositional attitudes it is necessary to stay within the mental processes occurring in the frame of self-knowledge and having the propositional form. This form is language-like, and can be considered as a representation, so long as it keeps the syntax and semantic, that is, the two characteristic features of language.

As for the third cause of the wrong inner translation, namely, the problem of substitution, Schooler and Schreiber present this as a problem similar
to self-deception. They argue that a memory of conscious experience may be blurred by expectations and motivation, which become a part of beliefs occurring in meta-consciousness [Schooler, Schreiber, 2004, p.33], while first-person-reports about one’s own mental states can be influenced by other conscious or unconscious factors. However, there is a difference between confusion of propositional attitudes and self-deception. Self-deception is intentional, which means that underlying motives and expectations create self-deceptive beliefs according to the will and knowledge of their bearer, that is, the subject [see: Bok, 2005, p.861]. Hence self-deception contains to some extent a will to have the desired attitude and knowledge about the lack of it. By contrast to self-deception, the confusion we are interested in here is an unintentional replacement of one object by another believing that it is the right object: This is the problem exemplified by akrasia. The subject thinks that he knows (or understands) that $x$ is better than $y$. According to Socrates and Davidson this knowledge should motivate him to choose $x$, but it does not. This is a manifestation of trust in the human rationality. Therefore they conclude that in fact the subject does not know that $x$ is better than $y$. The attitude he ascribes to himself is different from the actual attitude he adopts. So what is the right attitude? What should replace “I know” in the case of akrasia? Perhaps a phrase word would be “I tolerate, that”, because the tolerance means assertion without acceptance. But this is weak speculation; no better name for this attitude is obvious, and in fact the problem lies not in the naming but in the belief that the subject actually has this state. This is the problem: why does the subject believe that he understands, hopes, and wants something, then suddenly it turns out that his understanding was in fact faith, hope, and desire? As if he had said: “I thought that I loved you, but I was wrong. It was only a desire”; or “I was sure that there was alien life in space, but in fact it was only a wish”; or even, “I thought that I gave him money because I pitied him, but then I realized I was only irritated”.

The examples given above—which are, of course, simplified—have their source in the problem of confusion of propositional attitudes, which can be also formulated as the problem of identification of a state of self-knowledge.

The lack of logic and the intentional gap

The problem of confusion between propositional attitudes in fact has to be considered as two kinds of error. That is, the subject can be mistaken in a second-order belief: “I believe that I know/understand/believe”, as well as doubt-
ing his first-order attitude: “I know/understand/believe”. But considering the mistake as a transition from first-order belief to second-order belief it is easy to fall into the trap of thinking this takes place in the transition from the phenomenal to the propositional level. In this transition, a part of the translated content can be lost, and this explains the misidentification of a mental state. The aim of this paper is to solve the problem by referencing processes happening on one and the same ontological level.

Another reason why we should look at the problem in this way is as follows. In the case of akrasia, as explained according to Socrates or Davidson, even if the subject misidentifies his attitude as knowledge, hence as belief and understanding, the identification has already happened and the misidentified state should motivate him to the right action. An attitude, misidentified or not, should consequently lead to other attitudes that follow from the previous one. Assuming that an attitude determines other possible attitudes, the monadic attitude is similar to an $A$-theory: If the subject knows that $x$ is better than $y$, then the subjects understands that it is better to do $x$ than $y$. The consequence of the “$A$-theory” will be a set of propositions that follow from the theory: $\text{cl}(A)$, for example: “I will do $x$”, “I want to do $x$”, “I prefer to do $x$”. This is a simple abstract model of logical deduction. The problem is that the logic does not work in the case of psychological states. It seems as if the information processing on the mental level—where this processing could be already called “reasoning”—lacks the consequence operator $\Phi_2$. So on the level of self-knowledge the transition from one identified state to the assertion of another attitude as a consequence of the previous state is not guaranteed. In other words, self-knowledge (a subject’s knowledge about his own mental state) does not determine the occurrence of another expected attitude. Again, the transition between attitudes in self-knowledge, hence between second-order beliefs, is not analogous to the transition between sentences presented in the process of reasoning. There is no automatic inference between attitudes. But why does the subject misidentifies his attitude?

The unintentional confusion of propositional attitudes could be explicated in the perceptual model of self-knowledge by means of the analogy of inner perception to outer perception, namely by an intentional gap between subject and the intended object. In this model the subject perceives his mental states in the same way that he perceives objects from the outer world. Of course we can say (following, for example, R.G. Millikan [Millikan, 1991]) that the relation is not the same because there are intermediaries (sensibilia, representa-

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2 I thank Daniel Żuromski for pointing out the analogy.
tions) between the subject and observed outer object, whereas introspection is direct. However, while this difference is important for epistemology, it is less so for psychology. On the level of reflexive consciousness, the subject perceives equally the content of perception as well as perceiving that he perceives. The perceptual model of self-knowledge also offers an alternative explanation of self-delusion and cases when the first-person-authority is impaired, like bodily-illusions. The collapse of first-person-authority in these cases is determined by an error in inner perception. Inner perception is self-reflected, hence it has a relational form. A relational approach to intentionality has the consequence of forming an approach to mental functions and products such as propositional attitudes (judging, believing, doubting), which themselves are relational.

Characterizing the approach to perception of inner states causes the belief that the observer is a subject of these states; it also explains the mistakes in object identification. If the inner eye perceives the inner object in the same way as the outer eye does, then the perceived object could be misrepresented. However we have already said that inner perception is direct, so what is the cause of its disturbance? The cause is the content of the attitude. A particular proposition derived from an attitude can be a referent of many different attitudes. It is like a variable that gains individual character and becomes constant only in a particular relation. Hence there can exist one proposition and many alternative attitudes toward that proposition. The subject can recognize his attitude as one of these, but not necessarily correctly. The set of the alternative attitudes is sometimes too fuzzy to identify all the features describing correct attitudes, and the relevant characteristic may fit other attitudes. Identification depends on how strongly the content determines the attitude. Hence the subject can identify himself as the subject of the state and can also identify the content of the state, but cannot properly identify his relation to this content. But this might be even worse. This causation depends partially on external factors, unknown to the subject. In other words, the subject sometimes has limited access to justification of the judged content. This could explain the problem of the confusion of propositional attitudes at the level of first-order beliefs.

Summary

The considerations above are an attempt to answer the question concerning the confusion of propositional attitudes: What is this confusion, and how can we explain it? Although the mingling happens at the mental level, the related
phenomena—such as bodily illusions—have to be taken into account in order to describe the relation between the phenomenal and propositional (personal) spheres, and problems arising from it. For this purpose, subjectively-experienced phenomena have been divided into phenomenal and mental illusions. An explanation has been offered in terms of mistakes in the translation of the phenomenal into mental states from some psychological studies, especially that of Schooler and Schreiber. Clearly distinguished from bodily illusions, mental illusions have been formulated as three questions:

1. The problem of mental ownership: Is it me who experiences x?
2. The problem of first-person-authority: Do I really best know, what I do (or what I think)?
3. The problem of misidentification of the modality of mental state: Is it my belief or my desire?

The third issue concerns the confusion of propositional attitudes. The problem of akasria—weakness of the will—has been reviewed and considered as an example of such confusion. We said that on the one hand, the knowledge of having an attitude of certain kind does not determine the occurrence of another attitude, which can follow from the previous one. On the other hand, the attitudes are determined by their content, which is at least partially dependent on unknown factors, which in turn can modify and blur inner perception. The roots of confusion in propositional attitudes were found in the very nature of mind as a psychological entity. The reason for the mingling of mental states was visible in the lack of inference in the frame of second-order beliefs. An explanation for the misidentification in first-order attitudes has been given in reference to the perceptual model of self-knowledge.

References


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