“Lying, poets tell the truth …”. “The logical status of fictional discourse” by John Searle – a still possible solution to an old problem?
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Abstract
The purpose of this article is to consider an answer to the question whether Searle’s idea of sentence in a literary text is still relevant. Understanding literary utterances as specific speech acts, pretended illocutions, is inherent in the process of considering the sentence in a literary text in broader terms. Accordingly, it appears necessary to outline it. Reference to other ideas formulated both in the theory of literature as a speech act [R. Ohmann, S. Levin] as well as in logic, ontology and the theory of literature [J. Pelc, H. Markiewicz, R. Ingarden] will render it possible to adequately place and assess Searle’s theory. Confronting Searle’s theory with the order in a literary work (the relation between the text and the literary work, the status of the presented world, the issue of reference and fiction) will in turn render it possible to determine how empirically adequate Searle’s theory is.
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fictional discourse, ontology, reference, objects created in a work of fiction, pretended illocution, cognitive function, act of speech, fictional assertion
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Logic and Logical Philosophy, No. 4, Vol. 20, 2011, pp. 317-326
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