Parts of Falling Objects: Galileo’s Thought Experiment in Mereological Setting
Loading...
Date
Authors
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Springer
Abstract
This paper aims to formalize Galileo’s argument (and its variations) against the Aristotelian
view that the weight of free-falling bodies influences their speed. I obtain this
via the application of concepts of parthood and of mereological sum, and via recognition
of a principle which is not explicitly formulated by the Italian thinker but seems
to be natural and helpful in understanding the logical mechanism behind Galileo’s
train of thought. I also compare my reconstruction to one of those put forward by
Atkinson and Peijnenburg (Stud Hist Philos Sci 35(1):115–136, 2004), and propose
a formalization which is based on a principle introduced by them, which I shall call
the speed is mediative principle.
Description
Keywords
mereology, Galileo, thought experiments, logic, philosophy of science
Citation
Erkenntnis (2022) 87, pp. 1583–1604
Collections
Endorsement
Review
Supplemented By
Referenced By
Creative Commons license
Except where otherwised noted, this item's license is described as Attribution 3.0 Poland